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Preface 
Each semester in my course on community in American culture, I sud-
denly pose this question to the students: "Imagine an American commu-
nity of twenty thousand people; then imagine that ten years later its popu-
lation is still twenty thousand, but virtually none of the residents are the 
same; how do you account for that?" After looks of initial puzzlement, 
hands shoot up: "A flood or other natural disaster?"; "A nuclear acci-
dent?"; "Economic dislocation-they all worked for the same employer, 
and the plant moved?" The hypotheses go on, but each eventually is dis-
missed by the group as relatively implausible. To be sure, some of these 
ecological or economic crises might produce massive dislocation, but how 
to account for an equal amount of resettlement? Then someone eventually 
asks: "Racial change?" And, invariably, throughout the room there is a 
collective "oh-yes, sure!"; then class members settle back as if nothing 
more need be said, because we all, presumably, "understand." Each time 
this happens I find myself reflecting again on what this exercise says 
about American culture and ourselves as participants in it: that collective 
behavior based upon dynamics so powerful that they could hardly be ac-
counted for even by catastrophic degrees of environmental or economic 
impact can be triggered by race, and that such social dynamite is nev-
ertheless so much a part of our cultural surround that we simply accept it 
as a given, as something that we presume we understand-whether con-
sciously or at some other level of our psyche,and whether we really do or 
not. 
The hypothetical, of course, is not hypothetical at all. It corresponds 
to the real case of the west Baltimore area called Edmondson Village, 
where roughly forty thousand people did indeed change places--some 
twenty thousand leaving, twenty thousand arriving--over a period of ap-
proximately ten years, between 1955 and 1965, in an especially acute 
instance of blockbusting that triggered white flight and racial change on a 
dramatic scale. As a teacher of American Studies at the University of 
Maryland Baltimore County, a campus located on the west side of the 
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Baltimore metropolitan region, I continued to encounter references to this 
particular episode in student family history assignments. Typically they 
cropped up in interviews with parents or grandparents-whether whites 
whose families had fled the neighborhood or African Americans whose 
families had moved in behind them. The range of feelings was wide: 
among whites they ranged from anger and bitterness to bewilderment and 
a sense of loss; among African Americans there often were measures of 
satisfaction with new opportunities but also feelings of disappointment 
and frustration. The interpretations differed, particularly for those on the 
two sides of the racially dividing experience, as did assignments ofrespon-
sibility and blame. But common to all was a sense of social dynamics that 
seemed beyond individual control and a sense of disjunction, as if their 
lives had been marked at this one key point by a dramatic experience that 
still seemed unresolved and a legacy that was uncertain. I came to inter-
pret these references as expressions of, and testimony to, the trauma of 
rapid racial change, and I set out to try to trace its dimensions. 
If the legacy of that trauma is still somewhat unresolved for Ed-
mondson Village residents, past and present, the fact of the matter is that 
it still is unresolved in many ways for American culture as a whole, be-
cause the phenomenon was by no means unique to Edmondson Village. 
It happened in other Baltimore neighborhoods, in sections of numerous 
cities, large and small,and in many regions of the United States. In some 
places they called it "panic peddling"-but, by whatever name, it was a 
process that dramatically changed the shape of America's urban areas in 
the postwar decades and laid the groundwork for persistent patterns of 
race and residency. Despite what we like to feel have been significant 
changes since that era in legislation, in institutional procedures, and in 
public attitudes, mechanisms that sometimes may have been more subtle 
and processes that may have been more gradual nevertheless have contin-
ued to produce similar results, if on a less dramatic scale. Therefore, I 
found it compelling to try to understand the Edmondson Village case for 
what light it might shed on these larger patterns of race in our national 
culture, past and present. 
Blockbusting, of course, was a logical extension of the pervasive sys-
tem of residential segregation that American society had crafted-by law 
and by custom-to create and preserve a dual housing market in Ameri-
can cities, severely circumscribing housing opportunities for African 
Americans. In the changing social climate of post-World War II urban 
America a silent conspiracy that had seemed so unshakable suddenly 
proved exceedingly vulnerable, even fragile. Ironically, it was not amelio-
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rating racial attitudes or institutional reform that produced the transfor-
mation as much as it was entrepreneurs out to exploit the crevices in the 
system for financial gain, profiting at the expense of both populations. 
One result of such cataclysmic change was rapidly resegregated commu-
nities. Whites paid dearly for their decisions to flee; African Americans 
gained sorely needed residential options, but the toll for them was high as 
well. 
This is the story I set out to explore, but it soon became apparent to 
me that the focus needed to be broader than the episode of blockbusting. 
In order to try to understand the character of a white community that 
panicked in this way, it was necessary to look back to the circumstances of 
community formation and to examine the social and cultural patterns 
that gave Edmondson Village its particular identity. But it also was essen-
tial to look at the African American community that replaced the white 
one in similar terms, examining the character of those who were pioneer 
settlers in the period of racial change and tracing their experience over 
time to the recent past. I realized that I needed to provide these twin 
perspectives in order to feel that I could adequately interpret this moment 
of social trauma. This book is primarily a history of racial change trig-
gered by blockbusting, but it also is an exploration of the kind of commu-
nity that developed in this rowhouse suburb of Baltimore, an attempt to 
answer how and why that community responded to the challenge of racial 
change in the way it did, and a study of the experience of the succession 
African American community in the aftermath of such traumatic dynam-
ics. Its chronological parameters are 1910, the eve of row house develop-
ment on this predominantly rural western edge of the city, and 1980, 
twenty-five years after the first African Americans took up residence in 
what had been an all-white residential environment. 
My early encounters with the Edmondson Village story came through 
family history interviews, and oral history seemed like a fruitful avenue to 
explore it further. The moment of racial change is still recent enough to 
be vivid in the memories of those who observed it firsthand, and the 
constructions that individuals place upon their own experience can be 
immensely helpful in trying to understand the complex dynamics under-
lying an episode where attitudes and feelings represent such relevant 
data. This study is based in part upon some thirty in-depth oral history 
interviews conducted over a period of ten years with individuals posi-
tioned to offer a variety of perspectives on the community's past, includ-
ing whites who lived in Edmondson Village prior to the period of racial 
change and African Americans who came after them. I asked inter-
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viewees to share their views on the entire community experience, not just 
on the episode of racial change. While traditional historians often have 
been reluctant to depend very heavily on oral history sources, I found it 
essential to do so in order to gain insight into how community residents 
interpreted their own experience. 
At the same time, however, it became clear to me that other evidence 
was necessary to place their views in perspective, especially when they 
varied in their interpretations of the racial change process. Therefore, I 
turned to sources of quantitative data, including the tract records af-
forded by the U.S. Census, which provide aggregate figures on the com-
munity as a baseline for comparison, and my own survey of ten sample 
blocks, which traces individual households over time. The result, I hope, 
is a community history that combines both qualitative and quantitative 
sources to develop a comprehensive portrait of continuity and change. 
My special thanks begin with those connected with the community's 
experience who agreed to participate in the interview process. They shared 
their stories with openness, patiently reflected on my questions-whether 
about everyday patterns oflife or about social attitudes and behavior-and 
thoughtfully sought to place the dynamics of racial change in perspective. 
Since certain aspects of these interviews might prove too personal or contro-
versial, I decided to employ the convention of assigning pseudonyms in 
most instances. I did so with some regret, because the story of Edmondson 
Village is the story not only of asocial process but of individuals-little 
different from any of us-wrestling with the complexities of trying to build 
a satisfying and meaningful life and coming to terms-for better or worse-
with social and cultural patterns that have been pervasive in American life. 
My second debt is to my students in American Studies classes at 
UMBC, who have shared their own family experiences and wrestled with 
their own attitudes and perspectives as we have tried together to puzzle out 
the meaning of the Edmondson Village experience. As a teacher, I find it 
particularly satisfying that the research involved in the enterprise from its 
inception has contributed to classroom learning and, in turn, has been 
enriched by that process. Several students conducted related research pro-
jects, which they have permitted me to draw upon, and their contributions 
deserve thanks by name: April Lunn, Monica Murray, Kelly O'Shea, Doug 
Stanton, and Nancy Swartz. 
My colleagues in American Studies at UMBC share the kinds of con-
cerns about social and cultural process that I bring to this project and 
provide the supportive atmosphere for teaching and research that makes 
such endeavors rewarding. For their contributions, both direct and indi-
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rect, let me express my appreciation to Warren Belasco, Carole McCann, 
Patrice McDermott, and Leslie Prosterman. At various points Kathy 
Peiss, Linda Shopes, and Joseph Arnold read portions ofthe manuscript, 
extended encouragement, and offered constructive suggestions, for which 
I am also grateful. Throughout the many drafts of the project Carolyn 
Ferrigno has provided vital technical assistance, and she has prepared the 
manuscript in its final version; there must be a special category of thanks 
for the exceptional combination of skill and care she has exhibited in the 
process. 
Nearby history has the benefit of convenient access, but it still de-
pends heavily upon the quality oflocal resources for research. I benefited 
greatly from the collection in the Maryland Department of Baltimore's 
Enoch Pratt Free Library, especially the clipping files where articles have 
been painstakingly culled from local newspapers over the years. I found 
the staff members always efficient, helpful, and courteous, even in an era 
of woeful civic underfunding for such vital services as public libraries. 
A project like this makes extraordinary demands upon one's family. 
For me this book would have been inconceivable without the patience, 
understanding, and support Jo, Stephen, and Sharon have extended 
through the many stages of research. In an era of debate about family 
values, I must also acknowledge my debt to my parents, George and 
Eloise Orser, who shaped my sensitivity to social issues, exhibited a genu-
ine concern for people, and always emphasized the importance of human 
values. To my father, now deceased, and my mother, I dedicate this book. 
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The Trauma of 
Racial Change 
The recent reflections of two women illustrate the poignancy and com-
plexity of their experience in the west Baltimore neighborhood of Ed-
mondson Village when racial change began to occur on a massive scale in 
the late 1950s, early 1960s. In an interview I conducted with a white 
former resident, Marilyn Simkins sought an explanation for the response 
of whites who panicked and fled the neighborhood: "They saw a very 
secure world changing very drastically," she said, "and they couldn't ac-
cept it. This was distasteful, and in some respects it was forced down 
their throats, and they felt they had no other choice, I guess." 1 In a sepa-
rate interview session, Margaret Johnson, a pioneer from the era of initial 
African American settlement in the same neighborhood, described her 
own feeling about the flight of her white neighbors: "They were friendly, 
but they were prejudiced. They didn't want to live where colored people 
did .... They don't have to say it .... They didn't tell you [why they 
moved]; they just moved!" 2 Embedded in both statements-though not 
necessarily voiced in the careful choice of words and in the sense of digni-
ty that each displayed-are shadings that range from anger and pain to 
wistfulness and bewilderment. Both testify eloquently to the trauma of 
rapid racial change on two different sides of the neighborhood succession 
experience, a trauma whose legacy continues to be felt in their lives and in 
the lives of countless other former and present residents of outer urban 
neighborhoods such as Edmondson Village. In fact, it is a collective trau-
ma whose significance for recent American social and cultural history is 
still insufficiently appreciated and understood. 3 
The Role of Blockbusting 
Edmondson Village, an extensive rowhouse neighborhood on Baltimore's 
west side, had been developed from the 1920s onward as. a suburban en-
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clave for Baltimore's burgeoning white middle class. During the single de-
cade from approximately 1955 to 1965, however, virtually its entire popula-
tion of twenty thousand was replaced in rapid fashion by a new population 
of equal size. Few explanations-whether natural, social, or economic-
would be adequate to account for such massive displacement and resettle-
ment. Yet, in the urban equation of mid-twentieth-century America a sin-
gle factor represented sufficient causation: race. (See maps 1 and 2.) 
That the experience of racial change is common enough in recent 
history for this statement to seem unremarkable is telling in itself. But in 
the Edmondson Village case, rapid racial change was triggered by a par-
ticularly intensive and systematic application of blockbusting. As contem-
poraries came to define it, blockbusting was the intentional action of a 
real estate operative to settle an African American household in an all-
white neighborhood for the purpose of provoking white flight in order to 
make excessive profits by buying low from those who fled and selling high 
to those who sought access to new housing opportunities. 
Blockbusters lit the match, but, as the definition implies, they were 
only one ingredient in a complex set of circumstances. Indeed, blockbust-
ing exploited the crevices of an otherwise pervasive and systematic system 
that governed race and residence. In mid-twentieth-century urban Amer-
ica, a silent conspiracy sought to assure and preserve the segregated dual 
housing market. At the institutional level, the refusal of the real estate, 
financial, and governmental establishment to underwrite housing choices 
that challenged dominant patterns of residential segregation represented 
one pillar of a remarkably durable conspiracy. However, the dual housing 
market constituted an unwritten agreement in the restraint of trade, as 
legal historian Garrett Power has argued in his work on Baltimore, and 
the problem of enforcement was the temptation to "cheat," especially if 
there was an advantage to be gained by doing so. In these terms, block-
busters functioned as cheaters, operating outside the pale of mainstream 
institutions. While these operatives risked censure in withdrawing from 
the general conspiracy, their activities also permitted establishment insti-
tutions to maintain the illusion of upholding the racial status quo. In the 
early stages of post-World War II blockbusting, such agents were active 
on the margins of ghetto areas, engaging in transactions shunned by con-
ventional real estate and lending institutions; in the later stages, they 
sometimes took advantage of more open mortgage policies that channeled 
funds into particular sections of cities deemed to be "changing." The 
financial pay-off for such activities often was immense.4 
At the individual level, the refusal of white residents to consider the 
possibility of residential integration made their own racism the second 
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pillar upholding the edifice of the dual housing market. Social and racial 
homogeneity frequently were the unwritten promises of residential com-
munity, especially in suburbanizing outer city neighborhoods, whether the 
provinces of the white elite or of whites with more modest income levels. It 
often was assumed that economic constraints made racial integration un-
likely, though the assumption was much more credible for exclusive en-
claves than for ordinary neighborhoods. But such reasoning betokened an 
unquestioned faith in the mechanisms ofresidental segregation, which led 
most white residents to take for granted the preservation of the racial status 
quo in housing. Ironically, this absolute position-which categorically 
ruled out heterogeneity and made their social world seem so secure-also 
heightened their vulnerability to the tactics of blockbusters, who could play 
on their presumptions of racial exclusivity to trigger their fears. Therefore, 
in particular historic moments when circumstances converged to threaten 
the conspiracy controlling the dual housing market, as in the instances of 
blockbusting in the post-World War II period, resistance or flight were the 
characteristic responses. When whites cried foul, blockbusters and their 
defenders could point out that they had only themselves to blame if they 
lost out in the process. 
Finally, of course, the set of requisite circumstances depended upon 
pent··up demand for housing opportunity by African Americans, long re-
stricted in terms of residential options but eager, even desperate, for im-
proved housing and neighborhood amenities. Since they were denied entry 
to the real estate market beyond the perimeters of residential segregation, 
finding mainstream real estate and financing doors closed to them, their 
only access to home purchases came through the offices of blockbusters or 
speculators. Given these constraints, many African Americans neverthe-
less were ready to seize the opportunity for new housing on such terms, 
even if the costs were exploitative and the financial arrangements shaky. 
][ndeed, when blockbusters were challenged on the ethics of their opera-
tions, they defended their practices as providing a necessary service others 
refused and therefore requiring greater risks, which justified higher profits. 
The tactics used by blockbusters to manipulate the system to their 
advantage were not entirely new in the 1950s and 1960s. Gilbert Osofsky 
found that similar practices were employed at the turn of the century in 
Harlem, when New York's African American population swelled as a result 
of migration from the South, and speculators, dubbed "white black-
mailers," channeled African American tenants into the temporarily de-
pressed tenement market uptown.5 From time to time in twentieth-century 
American cities, areas of African American concentration expanded in 
similar fashion in response to population pressures and changes in housing 
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stock at the neighborhood and metropolitan level, especially as inner city 
housing aged and new housing became available on the suburban periph-
ery. Typically, this kind of enlargement was incremental, occurring on the 
margins of the African American ghetto, and often it represented acquisi-
tion of residence in neighborhoods where physical deterioration or de-
pressed housing prices had begun to occur. Sherry Olson has noted that 
some expansion of this type occurred in Baltimore immediately following 
World War I, when African American population increases combined with 
a suburban boom in whites-only housing to produce an episode where 
some of the tactics that came to be associated with blockbusting were em-
ployed.6 
What made the episodes of blockbusting and the resultant racial 
change in American cities during the 1950s and 1960s so significant, how-
ever, was their extent and scale. Rather than marginal ghetto expansion, 
entire neighborhoods and broad sections of cities were transformed from 
predominantly all-white to predominantly all-African American in a rela-
tively short period of time. In Baltimore, charges of blockbusting were 
voiced in the midst of massive episodes of white flight and rapid racial 
succession, primarily in the northwestern and western sections of the city 
(the Reisterstown Road, Liberty Heights Avenue, and Edmondson Ave-
nue corridors) and to a lesser extent on the near northeast (along lower 
Harford Road and The Alameda, and in sections around Lake Mon-
tebello). In Chicago, a comparable process occurred with particular in-
tensity on the south and west sides, where inhabitants referred to the 
work of "panic peddlers" in triggering white flight and producing large-
scale racial change in such neighborhoods as Lawndale and Austin. The 
same term was applied to operatives in Washington, D.C., in the midst of 
racial change which occurred there in dramatic proportions. And the pro-
cess apparently was much the same in the New York borough of Brooklyn, 
where the pre-World War II concentration of African Americans and Puer-
to Ricans in a section of Bedford-Stuyvesant expanded substantially during 
the postwar decades. 7 
In a number of cities-Boston, New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, 
Baltimore, and others-blockbusting sometimes targeted Jewish neigh-
borhoods, prompting extensive Jewish to African American succession. 
Jews and African Americans, both excluded from equal access to the 
housing market, whether by such legal mechanisms as restrictive cove-
nants or by discrimination entrenched in custom, often lived in close 
proximity yet with clear lines of social separation. While Jewish commu-
nities often exhibited rare degrees of tolerance, they also were dispropor-
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tionately singled out by speculators and frequently proved vulnerable to 
such manipulation. Hillel Levine and Lawrence Harmon have made a 
convincing case that older Jewish neighborhoods in Boston were vic-
timized through the collusion of the city's financial, real estate, and politi-
cal leadership, for example.8 However acute such episodes, the phenome-
non of blockbusting as a trigger for white flight transcended religious and 
ethnic identification. Baltimore's Edmondson Village area, for instance, 
consisted of a rather even mix of Protestants and Roman Catholics, and 
numerous other cases similarly illustrate the broad susceptibility of com-
munities to blockbusting tactics. 
Sometimes the residential turnover accompanying blockbusting oc-
curred in older, inner city neighborhoods, when speculators carved up 
large housing units into multifamily tenements and profited from charg-
ing excessive rents to new African American tenants. This process charac-
terized the experience in Cleveland's Hough section during the 1950s, for 
example.9 But in other instances, blockbusting and rapid racial change 
extended into areas that in the process became the "secondhand sub-
urbs," where the housing stock was only several decades old, single-
family dwellings predominated, and resident home ownership was the 
prevailing pattern, as was the case in Edmondson Village. In these cir-
cumstances, speculative profits resulted when housing, typically bought 
low from fleeing whites, was sold to African Americans at higher than 
market value and on terms arranged to benefit the speculator, not the 
buyer. 
In retrospect, the 1950s and 1960s represented the zenith of block-
busting and the kind of rapid racial change it generated. During these 
decades the cracks in the edifice of the segregated housing market became 
more visible. The World War II period produced unprecedented popula-
tion growth in urban centers, but little expansion in the available housing 
stock. At war's end, suburban development opened up a new housing 
frontier for white Americans, but the walls of de facto segregation contin-
ued to hem in an African American population feeling severely cramped 
by inadequate and rigidly limited housing. Pressure upon housing alone 
might have forced change. But expectations were rising as well. In part 
these resulted from improved economic opportunities available to some 
African Americans in the wartime and postwar economy. In part they 
were spurred by the formative stages of the civil rights movement, which 
gained ideological steam from a war fought against racism to produce a 
more vocal challenge to the racial status quo. One prop of the dual hous-
ing market was struck down in 1948 when the Supreme Court ruled that 
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states could not enforce residential restrictive covenants. Rising expecta-
tions and a sense of changing times led some African Americans to con-
sider active choices to improve their housing opportunities and neighbor-
hood amenities. 
In spite of these mounting pressures-perhaps because of them-
mainstream private and governmental institutions sought to hold a firm 
line, resisting the voices of change and making very few concessions to 
accommodate the new circumstances. Much the same must be said for 
white public opinion. Nowhere was reluctance to confront change more 
evident than on the domestic front, the province of home. In older inner 
city neighborhoods white residents frequently had to accept degrees of 
social diversity regarding class and ethnicity, but race was another mat-
ter. Faced with the prospect of African American settlement, residents of 
such neighborhoods sometimes resisted racial change forcefully, even vio-
lently, especially in instances where ethnic ties and social class combined 
to reinforce internal cohesion and to repel outsiders. In other cases, they 
viewed African American entry as another sign of neighborhood pow-
erlessness, and flight ensued. 
Outer city neighborhoods had been developed on the implicit prom-
ise of social homogeneity inherent in the suburban ideal in its various late 
nineteenth- and twentieth-century versions. In these suburban havens, 
whether older or newer, whites constructed what they considered to be a 
safe and secure social world, depending upon covert mechanisms to as-
sure racial restriction rather than upon traditions of overt resistance. 
Therefore, white residents of most outer city neighborhoods typically re-
fused to consider the possibility of racial integration. During the decades 
in question many communities remained immune to change, whether due 
to geographical or social, political, and economic factors. Overt resistance 
occurred occasionally, as was the case in the Brooklyn section ofCanarsie, 
where Italians and Jews, once displaced from older sections of the city, 
dug in their heels to defend their neighborhood's identity, attempting to 
maintain the community as a "fortress, a fenced land." 10 In some in-
stances, residents tried valiantly to make integration work. Chicago'S 
Oak Park community, for example, developed a national reputation for 
its systematic efforts to stem the tide of white flight and to promote 
racial balance. II But in many communities, when residents were con-
fronted directly by the challenge of African American settlement, they 
succumbed to racial fears and moved on. When the process was abetted 
by blockbusting, as in Edmondson Village, flight often assumed dramat-
ic proportions. 
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Flight on such a scale traumatized whole communities, leaving its 
mark on those who left as well as upon those who took their place. While 
fleeing whites may have contributed to their own victimization through 
their collective behavior, they nevertheless faced the many difficulties as-
sociated with hasty relocation: the loss of community ties, the uncertain 
prospects of new settings, and-for many-the substantial financial pen-
alty that blockbusting extorted. The social and economic toll for African 
American newcomers was often even greater. They gained housing op-
tions they had been illegitimately denied but at exploitative prices that 
strained their economic resources-necessitating new and sometimes 
onerous family strategies to meet the financial demands·-and on terms 
that left them extremely vulnerable and insecure. Sometimes the insta-
billity of rapid racial change continued unabated in unstable patterns of 
residential turnover. Incoming residents often complained that commer-
cial and governmental services declined in the wake of white flight and 
racial change. Given the exploitative mechanisms involved in blockbust-
ing and the instability that episodes of white flight engendered, it is no 
wonder that many whites and, indeed, many African Americans feared 
that the result would be slum creation. All too often, the prophecy proved 
accurate. That some succession communities such as Edmondson Village 
could weather such circumstances with measures of stability and viability 
is a tribute to the perseverance and resiliency of African American pi-
oneers, not in any way a refutation of the social trauma involved. 
Since the late 1960s, egregious forms of blockbusting have been less 
common, partly as a result of changes in attitudes and institutional struc-
tures. The 1968 Fair Housing Act, for instance, explicitly forbade block-
busting, discrimination in multiple listings, and steering, though enforce-
ment has proved problematic, and some forms of these abuses continue to 
exist, usually in much more subtle fashion than before the act was passed. 
The rate of racial change also has cooled substantially. Yet, recent scholar-
ship on racial residential segregation has found it to be persistent both in 
central cities and in suburbs, with the strong likelihood of resegregation in 
racially mixed areas and with very little change in that pattern over time. 12 
Nationally, the percentage of African Americans living in suburbs actually 
declined during the decade of the 1960s, and the much-heralded increase in 
African American percentages during the 1970s and 1980s often has repre-
sented "ghetto spillover" racial resegregation patterns. 13 
The scholarly literature on race and residency in twentieth-century 
America harks back to the pioneering work of the Chicago School of Soci-
ology, whose ecological analysis of metropolitan change posited a model 
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of "natural succession" to account for socioeconomic evolution in urban 
neighborhoods. Perhaps adequate as a description of the changing com-
position of Chicago communities in the early decades of the century, this 
model failed to pay sufficient heed to the role played by institutional 
forces in maintaining the status quo or in manipulating the change pro-
cess. In the post-World War II period, accelerating racial change led soci-
ologists to focus debate on the concept of a "tipping point" for racial 
change, giving rise to a flurry of studies seeking to determine the particu-
lar circumstances that might account for and predict white flight. How-
ever, a universally applicable social scientific model proved elusive. Over 
the past several decades, some studies of the large-scale white movement 
from central cities to suburban areas since World War II have down-
played the causal role of white flight. One argument suggests that nonra-
cial factors were largely responsible for the racial changeover of neighbor-
hoods; a second contends that white avoidance, not white flight per se, 
has been the chief explanation for neighborhood change. 14 Both lines of 
argument have contributed to a broader understanding of the complexity 
of the dynamics involved. The former quite rightly called attention to 
factors other than race that attracted whites to new suburban settlement; 
the latter demonstrated that the interruption of normal patterns of in-
migration can profoundly affect neighborhood balance by accelerating 
the racial change process. However helpful these considerations, they all 
too often have been presented as either/or explanations. While white out-
migration certainly resulted in large measure from the pull of the sub-
urbs, there is no denying that racial fears interpreted as the push of a 
changing city also served as a powerful force. Moreover, the mathematics 
of white avoidance still cannot discount the salience of white flight as the 
primary contributor to rapid racial change and resegregation. Further-
more, neither explanation has paid particular heed to the special dynam-
ics of blockbuster-induced residential turnover during this traumatic his-
torical moment. 
What occurred in Edmondson Village was a particularly acute form 
of white flight fueled by blockbusters who preyed upon white fears to 
induce panic selling. Two broad questions are central to this investigation 
of the Edmondson Village case: First, why did whites there so readily 
succumb to blockbusting? And, second, what was the legacy of block bust-
ing and white flight for the succession African American community? 
To try to answer the first question one must seek to understand who 
Edmondson Village's white residents were, what kind of community they 
had created for themselves in social character and cultural style, and why 
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the entrance of African American settlers was perceived as so threatening 
to their conception of community. Moreover, since communities do not 
exist in isolation, the story necessarily involves an exploration of the larg-
er forces of the nation and the metropolitan area that undergirded their 
social world, as well as consideration of the changing dynamics that chal-
llenged it so profoundly at mid-century. These broader perspectives pro-
vide the necessary context to address the primary issues about the nature 
of white response to racial change in Edmondson Village: What were the 
specific mechanisms of blockbusting that were applied in this case? Why 
was this particular community susceptible to such manipulation? How 
did these circumstances produce the panicked, massive white flight that 
ensued? 
The second focus of this study is the experience of African American 
pioneers. Since white response was shaped by assumptions about race 
and by perceptions that African American settlers deviated in substantial 
ways from previous residents, it is important to examine the sociall char-
acter and expectations of the new group to determine whether in terms of 
socioeconomic status and aspirations they resembled or differed from 
their rowhouse neighbors who so rapidly abandoned the area. Of course, 
the circumstances under which African American pioneers acquired their 
housing did contrast vastly with those of their white predecessors; there-
fore, the impact of blockbusting and associated speculative activity upon 
the new residents deserves special examination. Finally, what kind of 
community emerged for African Americans in the wake of blockbusting 
and white flight? Such conditions seemed unpropitious for community 
well-being-to contemporaries on both sides of the racial divide, as well 
as in retrospect-but the social record of Edmondson Village needs to be 
investigated systematically to examine this assumption and to make some 
determination about the African American experience of "secondhand 
suburbanization." This study will consider the first quarter century of 
these pioneers' tenure in a neighborhood characterized by such dramatic 
upheaval. 
The Edmondson Village story affords a case history of the process of 
massive residential racial change that contributed in such profound ways 
to the radical reconfiguration of urban space and experience in twentieth-
century America. Though the special circumstances involved in this row-
house community in west Baltimore deserve exploration and delineation, 
the attitudes and social mechanisms at work there were not unique. Since 
prevailing assumptions about the likely consequences of racial change 
often have become self-fulfilling prophecies, and the unresolved legacy of 
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these dramatic episodes continues to shape behavior and policy, it is es-
sential that we come to terms with this traumatic chapter in our recent 
past. 
Studying Community 
A key concept in this study is community, a somewhat elusive quality in 
modern American urban culture. Kai Erikson, in Everything in Its Path, 
provides a useful model for conceptualizing community in his effort to 
interpret the individual and collective dimensions of trauma that a cata-
clysmic flood produced in the settlements along Buffalo Creek, West Vir-
ginia, in 1972. Analyzing a situation in which the sense of community had 
been particularly intense, Erikson noted that the people of Buffalo Creek 
had been "held together by a common occupation, a common sense of the 
past, a common community, and a common feeling of belonging to, being 
a part of, a defined place." 15 While the circumstances of urban living 
differed for the people of Edmondson Village from those in Erikson's Ap-
palachian communities, the effort to understand the trauma of racial 
change requires a similarly broad, profound, and sensitive conception of 
the complex dimensions of community. 
Taking cues from Erikson's example and from a rich tradition of 
scholarly literature, my study defines community as a relatively small 
area with defined boundaries shared by a population whose sense of com-
mon space, form of social interaction, and broad consensus regarding mo-
rality and values provide the basis for a common identity. Therefore, the 
dimensions of shared physical setting (place, including both the natural 
and the built environment), social structure (the nature of social status 
and social interaction) and symbol (the realm of shared identity, beliefs, 
and values) establish the analytical framework for considering commu-
nity in Edmondson Village and for gauging its social and cultural charac-
ter over time. 16 
There is always the possibility that the concept of community may be 
posited to assert a nostalgic distortion of an urban past or present. While 
locally based identifications are important in the twentieth-century me-
tropolis, recognition always must be given to the patterns of physical mo-
bility and social identification that transcend the local context and to the 
pervasive influence of national culture as mediated through forms of mass 
communication and commercialism. The suburbanization process also 
has contributed to the erosion of traditional forms of community. By es-
tablishing socially homogeneous residential areas, suburbanization has 
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served to heighten social distinctions, such as class and race, thereby de-
fining community in quite narrow terms. The depth and durability ofthis 
form of suburban-style community is one of the underlying questions of 
this study. 
Socioeconomic status represents a second important concept in the 
evaluation of the process of racial change in Edmondson Village. Social 
class always has been real but relative in the American experience, de-
fying most attempts at precise categorization yet unmistakably a factor in 
perceptions and in social behavior. The Edmondson area's initial row-
house residents typically fell somewhere at the social mid-point; in popu-
lar parlance this was a broadly middle-class community. By many socio-
logical definitions, especially those focusing upon occupation, the white-
collar Iblue-collar mix of the labor force might have been viewed as a 
combination of lower middle class and upper working class. However, 
rather than attempt to assign what inevitably would be an arbitrary-
and perhaps stereotypical-classification, I have chosen to cast the pre-
sent analysis in terms of des trip tors of socioeconomic status, such as occu-
pation, income, and education, and to look closely at such other demo-
graphic factors as conditions of residency, age, and family type. By 
describing socioeconomic status rather than categorizing it too glibly, this 
study seeks to provide a social profile of the community as a basis for 
comparison over time. 17 
The special relevance of socioeconomic status centers upon two consid-
erations. First is the assertion that American sub urbanization has been 
inextricably linked with social class and race, typically resulting in socially 
homogeneous communities. Secondly, a critical factor of interpretation re-
gards the socioeconomic status of the neighborhood's whites and of the 
African Americans who sought to settle there-critical both in perceptions 
at the time and for analysis of racial change in retrospect. In instances of 
racial change whites often take race as a marker of class and make the 
assumption that incoming African Americans represent decline in socio-
economic terms; this contention needs to be examined carefully against the 
possibility that African American pioneers may resemble prior white resi-
dents more than they differ from them. A careful analysis of perceptions 
and attitudes, on the one hand, and of objective evidence regarding socio-
economic status, on the other, is necessary to try to unravel the social 
realities beneath this particular instance of rapid racial change. 
This study is based upon both qualitative and quantitative data. The 
former consists primarily of oral history interviews conducted with approx-
imately thirty respondents, including whites who resided in the neighbor-
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hood for various periods from its initial development in the late 1910s to the 
point of racial change in the 1950s and 1960s, and African Americans, both 
those who were pioneers in the process of racial change and more recent 
settlers. An effort was made to include a diverse sample of both popula-
tions, taking into consideration such factors as age, gender, location within 
the neighborhood, and period of residence. To protect the privacy of inter-
viewees who have offered their views on an episode so recent and with 
aspects potentially controversial, pseudonyms have been used in all cases 
except where the public role of individuals (as elected or appointed offi-
cials, developers, or entrepreneurs, for instance) makes their identification 
a necessary and appropriate part of the historical record. 18 
Oral history interviews are not necessarily objective. Rather, they 
constitute thoughtful reflection by participants in the evolution of the 
community experience, filtered through the perspective of the present and 
their own constructions of the past. They do, however, offer extremely 
valuable perceptions of social reality. Though subjective by nature, such 
perceptions shape human behavior and therefore take on a social signifi-
cance of their own. People act upon what they believe to be true, whether 
objective or not. As Italian social historian Alesandro Portelli has ob-
served: "The first thing that makes oral history different ... is that it tells 
us less about events as such than about their meaning." 19 This perspec-
tive was extremely helpful for a study of the complex and controversial 
dynamics involved in racial change, since it provided a way of helping to 
interpret apparent contradictions between the qualitative evidence of the 
interviews and the quantitative evidence derived from other data. As I 
have noted in an earlier reflection on the significance of this disparity 
regarding white perceptions of the racial change process, "oral history 
testimony points most clearly to the central social reality at the heart of 
the neighborhood experience, and it is that reality which the data on 
social characteristics must help us to understand, not the other way 
around." 20 
Quantitative data provides the second baseline for analysis, always in 
dynamic tension with the qualitative oral history sources. Federal census 
tract reports, which included limited details in 1930 and more extensive 
tables from 1940 forward (through the 1990 census), supply considerable 
information regarding social characteristics at the neighborhood leve1. 21 
They provide the basis for compiling a rather thorough profile of the 
social character of the community at each decade point. However, the 
tract data reports afford little information for the period before 1940. 
Moreover, they do not permit the tracing of particular individuals or 
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households over time. These shortcomings necessitated the development 
of a block reconstruction method for this study. My sample block survey 
provides a profile of households on ten sample blocks at ten year inter-
vals, beginning in 1920. It draws upon city directories, tax records, and 
(for the later period) telephone directories to determine such information 
as place of prior and subsequent residence, tenure of residence, home 
ownership, and occupation. 22 While the aggregate figures from the census 
tract data afford a systematic social portrait of the community at fixed 
points, the residential case histories of the sample block survey help to 
trace patterns of stability and change over time. 
Rowhouse Suburbia 
In the late nineteenth century and through the first half of the twentieth, 
rowhouse suburbanization made relatively new housing on the urban pe-
riphery available to a broad segment of America's middle class in cities 
like Baltimore. In doing so, its developers sought to capitalize upon an 
ideal of suburban living that evolved in tandem with the transportation 
innovations of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to promise a combi-
nation of the convenience of the city with a more natural setting associ-
ated with the countryside.23 Exclusive and costly detached housing devel-
opments set the initial tone for the suburban ideal. In the Baltimore area, 
for example, Roland Park (begun in the 1890s) and Guilford (begun in the 
19IOs), laid claims as upper income preserves on the basis of the size and 
architectural distinctiveness of their dwellings, their extravagant use of 
space, and their attention to landscape design. Both projects of the Ro-
land Park Company and based upon plans drawn up by the prestigious 
firm founded by Frederick Law Olmsted, they were designed, in the un-
abashed words of promoter Edward Bouton, to "catch the whole of the 
better class suburban development of the city." 24 Clearly suburbs of this 
ilk promised a social elite not only elegance but privacy and exclusivity as 
well. 
Rowhouse suburbia made more modest claims than these upper in-
come versions, offering an affordable suburban ideal for the mainstream.25 
Builders like James Keelty, who began large-scale development in the Ed-
mondson Avenue area of west Baltimore in the 1920s, recognized the attrac-
tion of a housing alternative that appealed to the suburban ideal by com-
bining the benefits of the city-transportation and opportunities for jobs, 
education, shopping, and recreation-and evocations of the country-
fresh air, light, trees, and green grass. Beginning in the late 191Os, the in-
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Figure l.The Edmondson area: rowhouse suburbs, 1938. Rowhouses line 
the streets on the Edmondson Avenue hillside, as construction of Hilton 
Parkway, a boulevard transversing Gwynns Falls Park, dominates the fore-
ground. The James Keelty Company began building rowhouses, many of 
them the newer daylight type, on this lower portion of the hill in the 1920s. 
By the 1950s the hillside had been filled with Keelty-built houses. (The 
Peale Museum, Baltimore City Life Museums) 
creasingly popular row house version they proffered was the "daylight 
style," an adaptation of the traditional urban rowhouse, redesigned with 
more spacious proportions to provide an outside window for each room. 
While the Tudor-style adornments of Keelty's finest Edmondson Avenue 
rowhouses in the Wildwood section could only faintly echo a Roland Park or 
Guilford, nevertheless the housing package afforded by the daylight row-
house was spacious, solidly constructed, and reasonable in cost. And, while 
the density of population in rowhouse suburbia more resembled the tradi-
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Figure 2. The view up the Edmondson Avenue hill looking west from the 
vicinity of Hilton Street, 1954, shows the central role played in the early 
years by streetcar accessibility, as well as the increasing importance of auto 
and truck transportation by the 1 950s. Keelty-built daylight rowhouses in 
1920s styles are evident on the right side, as are important community in-
stitutions: the Edgewood Theater, Christ Edmondson Methodist Church, 
and St. Bernardine's Roman Catholic Church (with its golden dome). (Col-
lection of the Maryland Historical Society, Baltimore) 
tional city than the elite suburbs, it appeared to afford a version of the latter 
in its implicit promise of a family-oriented, socially homogeneous residen-
tial preserve, relatively free from the commercial and industrial functions of 
urban life and differentiated along lines of class and race from the diverse 
population groups of the evolving metropolis.26 
While the suburban ideal offered an attractive package for house-
builders and their clients, the predilection for more homogeneous commu-
nities drew support from other quarters, including the ranks of housing 
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reformers and planners interested in expanding the suburban option be-
yond its more upscale versions. The historian Robert Fairbanks has argued 
persuasively that in the first decades of the century the views of these two 
groups converged in a common diagnosis of urban ills that suggested that 
the congestion, disorder, and heterogeneity of the city could be cured by the 
creation of improved housing in community settings. He notes that these 
views received codification in 1931 when the President's Conference on 
Home Building and Home Ownership, convened by Herbert Hoover, con-
cluded that federal housing policy should be guided by the goal of estab-
lishing "homogeneous communities," a conviction that subsequently un-
dergirded New Deal housing programs.27 Indeed, it was not the 
homogeneity of the suburbs-elite or more modest-to which reformers 
objected but the tendency for suburban residents to live what Harlan Dou-
glass, in his 1925 volume, The Suburban Trend, called "bi-focal" or "lop-
sided" lives. Douglass, who felt that suburbs represented "the hope of the 
future city" because of the prospect for decentralization, was troubled that 
suburban residency tended to separate the personal domain of home from 
the public realm of the larger metropolitan area. Acknowledging the social 
and economic selectivity characteristic of such communities, Douglass be-
lieved that there was nothing wrong with homogeneity if a more "all-sided" 
notion of civic responsibility could be cultivated and if more diverse housing 
options for suburban living could be made available to larger numbers of 
people. Indeed, his enthusiasm for decentralized suburbs led him to exude: 
"Even the relatively slight acceleration of the suburban trend by such 
means of social control as are in sight, may set up changes in the structure 
and relationships of modern society which, when sufficiently reinforced, 
may save the day for the human race." 28 
The new suburbs were not only homogeneous in terms of class but in 
terms of race as well. A pervasive system of Jim Crow extended the invisible 
color line of discrimination to all aspects of social life-schooling, employ-
ment, public accommodations, and housing. Like many other border and 
northern cities, Baltimore had developed a rather clearly defined, racially 
segregated ghetto by the opening years of the twentieth century.29 As the 
African American population began to increase substantially, white re-
sponse typically took two forms: racial restriction in the housing market 
and white flight. The former found its most vivid illustration in the attempt 
during the 19lOs to enact residential segregation ordinances (what Garrett 
Power has called "apartheid Baltimore style"). In 1917 such legal restric-
tions were ruled unconstitutional because of the limitation they placed 
upon property rights (not because they were discriminatory). They were, 
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however, replaced by a pervasive and systematic set of mechanisms for ac-
complishing de facto what could not be done de jure, ranging from informal 
private pressure to institutional discrimination involving the real estate in-
dustry, state law, and lending agencies-both private and governmental.3o 
The second mode of avoiding residential mixing was white flight. A 
1911 British report on "The Cost of Living in American Towns" observed 
regarding race and housing patterns in Baltimore: "In those areas of the 
city which are inhabited by the wage-earning classes a general segregation 
by race or by colour is discernible .... It often happens, especially in the 
better parts of the city, that when a coloured family is able to secure a house 
in the center of a row hitherto exclusively occupied by whites, the latter will 
remove at the earliest moment, even at a pecuniary loss." 31 Flight, of 
, course, was an admission that the mechanisms limiting African American 
residency had failed. However, through the interwar decades they generally 
tended to hold, despite some modest change in the post-World War I years. 
By 1940, when African Americans constituted nearly one-fourth of the 
city's total population, the line of de facto racial segregation was firmly 
drawn around a spatially limited ghetto area more than 75 percent Mrican 
American. (See map 1.) Even during World War II, under conditions of 
unprecedented population growth, as both Mrican Americans and whites 
flocked to cities to take advantage of war-fueled employment opportunities, 
the artificial restrictions on living space persisted-though they were com-
ing under intensive pressure. 
Through the first several decades of the twentieth century the silent 
conspiracy on race and residency proved remarkably durable. However, 
Baltimore's African American community played an important role in the 
evolving assault upon segregation and discrimination, which eventually 
would take the form of a powerful national movement. In the 1930s the 
dormant Baltimore branch of the NAACP had been revived, and by the end 
of World War II it was one of the largest and most active in the country, 
spearheading efforts to secure gains for African Americans in schooling, 
voting, employment, and public accommodations.32 Housing opportunity 
remained a difficult challenge, but the surge in African American popula-
tion during the 1940s made it one of the greatest pressure points as the 
decade progressed. In the late 1940s and early 1950s the old neighborhood 
racial division lines began to be breached, gradually at first, then with 
greater speed and volume, as what one local African American interviewee 
called "the evacuation" by whites began to occur on the city's near west 
side. Suddenly, the undercurrents of change threatened to become a tide. 
African American housing pressure, white racism: the tinder only re-
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quired the match of the blockbuster. When it was applied in the Ed-
mondson Village area between 1955 and 1965, it touched off an intensive 
wave of white flight, rapidly and systematically creating near total popu-
lation changeover in an entire section of the city. Repeated in varying 
forms in urban areas across the nation, the era's dramatic episodes of 
racial succession rewrote the demographic maps of American cities. So 
much part of the social landscape, yet so little understood, this story rep-
resents one of those critical points at which our collective past bears so 
importantly upon our collective present. 
2 
The Making of a 
Rowhouse Neighborhood 
Because of the electric railway, the very modest wage earner, no less 
than the prosperous business man, might leave his wife to breathe fresh 
country air and his children to romp over green fields, and yet not be 
further removed from them in point of time than if they 
were crowded into some sunless, damp court. 
-William A. House, president of Baltimore's United Railways (1912) 
In his now classic study of Boston's late nineteenth-century streetcar sub-
urbs, Sam Bass Warner, Jr., observed that developers had not built com-
munities; they had built streets of houses. Yet, as Warner made clear, the 
results were neighborhoods whose social and economic structures dis-
tinctly differentiated them from older sections of the previous walking 
city. The new suburban metropolis of Boston by 1900 functioned as a 
"selective melting pot" in which "people were separated by income and 
mixed together with little regard to na.tional origin." 1 The heyday of the 
streetcar era in the first decades of the twentieth century and the advent 
of the auto in the following two, urban housing pressures related to race 
and immigration, and larger-scale development strategies by countless 
builders combined to hasten the process in city after city, from Boston to 
Baltimore. Yet we have few case studies that examine the social and cul-
tural character of these newly established communities, which rapidly 
encircled the older urban core during the first half of the century, pro-
foundly transforming the American metropolis, eventually to be eclipsed 
by new, even larger waves of suburbanization and engulfed by massive 
social or racial change in the post-World War II period. 
This chapter· traces the history of the late streetcar/early auto row-
house suburb that took root in the Edmondson Avenue corridor of west 
Baltimore in the early decades of the twentieth century, experienced the 
housing boom of the 1920s and continued growth thereafter, and created a 
new community with its defined turf, distinctive social character, and pat-
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terned culture only to succumb totally and rapidly to white flight in the 
late 1950s and early 1960s. In numerous communities in urban centers 
like Baltimore and elsewhere, such a scenario was not untypical for the 
era, yet its very "typicality" deserves investigation. It poses a two-fold 
question: I) what was the social and cultural character of these new, high-
ly differentiated middle-income urban neighborhoods, and 2) why did 
they respond as they did to the prospect of racial change? This chapter 
focuses on the first question, hoping to find some clues from the commu-
nity's early evolution for later consideration of the second. 
Two factors stand out in the formative stage of the Edmondson com-
munity's growth from 1915 to 1945: first, the process of development and 
settlement interacted to produce a social definition that remained re-
markably consistent over the decades, functioning as a cushion for consid-
erable degrees of social change; second, the differentiated conception of 
community provided the appearance of stability and security but in real-
ity was quite fragile, proving to be an inadequate basis for adaptation to 
change, which it could not contain. Even if developers built houses rather 
than communities, the social and cultural structure of the communities 
that emerged was not simply a matter of happenstance but rather a com-
plex interplay of individual aspirations and collective forces we must con-
sider if we are to understand the complexity of the twentieth-century 
American city at the neighborhood level. 
A word about the Edmondson area's earlier history and character: 
with its western boundary near the crest of the uplands that ring Bal-
timore on the north and west (along a line that had become the city's new 
border in 1888), the Edmondson area sloped downward to its eastern 
terminus, the Gwynns Falls, site of earlier mill enterprises. The ravine 
formed by this small river cut a deep natural border separating the dis-
trict distinctly from the developing urban areas to its east and from the 
city center a full three and a half miles away. Prior to 1910 the only imme-
diate access for vehicular traffic between countryside and city lay along 
Edmondson Avenue, which bisected the tract and crossed the Gwynns 
Falls on a narrow trestle bridge constructed by Baltimore County in 
1879-80, just ahead of the city's annexation in 1888. As late as 1910 the 
Edmondson area still consisted primarily of farmland and woods, the pre-
serve of farm estates, a character reflected both in contemporary maps 
and in the federal manuscript census of that year. While some of the 
landowning gentry class were year-round residents like Hugh Gelston of 
Gelston Heights, others maintained country residences primarily for sum-
mer habitation, as was the case with Mary Frick Garrett Jacobs of Up-
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lands and E. Austin Jenkins of Hunting Ridge, who owned the two large 
estates that bounded the area just west of the city line.2 Smaller landhold-
ings were in the hands of a somewhat lesser status gentry group, working 
farmers, or those engaged in entrepreneurial occupations. 
The gentry clearly continued to set the social and economic tone of 
the area in 1910 as it had in the past, but two other broad social groups 
were clearly identifiable in the social equation. First, there were those 
whose livelihood was primarily related to the area's rural environment, 
whether farm workers on. the larger estates, performers of rural-related 
crafts and services, or operatives and laborers in such enterprises as quar-
rying. The second and newer group, who settled in two brick duplexes 
and a short line of rowhouses along Edmondson Avenue at the bottom of 
the hill, differed substantially from the others and represented a har-
binger of imminent change. For them the Edmondson area provided a 
country suburban residence for households whose employment was pri-
marily urban. A milk route dairyman, a slaughterhouse butcher, an en-
graver, a superintendent in a furniture factory, they-and those who 
would join them shortly-were commuters to the offices, business estab-
lishments, and factories east ofthe Gwynns Falls in the settled portions of 
the city. Altogether the three groups numbered only ninety-seven,3 yet 
their presence could be linked with other signs of impending change: the 
Ellicott City streetcar line, which had begun electric service along Ed-
mondson Avenue in 1899; the new bridge in 1910; the new shingle subur-
ban mttages built along Walnut Avenue in Rognel Heights just west of the 
city limits, beginning in 1909; and the additional construction along Ed-
mondson Avenue of several sets of brick duplexes and rows between 1910 
and 1914, expanding the tiny nucleus at the bottom ofthe hill and initiat-
ing a new one near the top.4 By 1914 the rowhouse builders were offering a 
housing package for a new middle-class urban commuter that promised 
"all the conveniences of the city with all the advantages of the country." 5 
The suburban ideal had arrived on the Edmondson hillside. 
The Keelty Rowhouse and the Suburban Ideal 
Between 1910 and 1930, the Edmondson Avenue area west of the Gwynns 
Falls experienced a population surge from 97 to 8,991, much of it coming 
in the single decade of the 1920s. In retrospect, it appears clear that the 
market existed for new housing for particular types of people and that 
developers emerged who were ready to meet that need with housing that 
suited the clientele. Though there was little that seemed to dictate how 
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the developer, housing type, and new residents would interact, by 1930-
and certainly by 1940-the social character of the community was firmly 
set. Much of the responsibility was due to James Keelty and his 
"daylight-style" rowhouses. 
Beginning in 1916, Keelty made a series of purchases that outflanked 
the existing developments at the top and bottom of the hill. By 1922 he 
had gained control of most of the undeveloped land along Edmondson 
Avenue, in 1926 he acquired the entire Gelston estate on the north, and in 
1928 he purchased the old Lyndhurst estate on the northwest.6 With these 
acquisitions, Keelty accumulated two-thirds of the land for the future 
rowhouse community. 
In advertisements for his houses, he proudly referred to himself as 
"James Keelty, The Builder." Born in Ireland in 1869, brought to Bal-
timore by his parents as a child of age ten or eleven, and educated in the 
Hibernian Free School, Keelty started off as a stonemason but soon be-
gan to build two-story rowhouses on his own. After completing his first 
projects along Calvert Street and Greenmount Avenue in the central por-
tions of the city, in 1908 he turned to the western side, constructing two-
story, buff-brick swell fronts in the 2300 blocks of West Fayette and West 
Baltimore streets before moving farther out to the growing Poplar Grove 
area (along Mosher and Dukeland Streets and Riggs Avenue) in the 
191Os, where many of his houses had stone porch fronts and upper bays. 
Having purchased the land along Edmondson Avenue on the next hill to 
the west, Keelty began to develop it in the early 1920s. By 1930 Keelty 
houses occupied approximately fifty square blocks of the Edmondson 
area; ten years later most of the section's 1,584 housing units had been 
constructed by his companyJ (See map 3.) 
While Keelty's developments were substantial, there was nothing 
particularly unique about either his enterprise or his product. Rather, 
Keelty houses of the 1920s and ·1930s represented the apex of Baltimore 
rowhouse design, the "daylight" or "sunlight" house. Soon daylight 
houses were all the rage, with one builder trying to capitalize on the fad in 
an advertisement by having a wife coo, "Oh, Dickie, dear, let's buy one of 
these 'bright in every corner' houses." 8 The distinctive feature of the day-
light house style was that each room indeed did have at least one outside 
window. Conventional, earlier two-story rows had one or two "blind" 
rooms in the center, though sometimes a skylight was added to give light 
to a central room upstairs. Houses of the older type built on the west side 
just prior to the new innovation typically had fourteen-foot widths and 
depths of forty-five to fifty feet.9 In contrast, a typical Keelty daylight of 
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the early 1920s had a front twenty to twenty-two feet wide and a depth of 
approximately thirty-five feet. Upstairs, each of the three or four bed-
rooms had at least one window, while downstairs an entry hall with stairs 
and a spacious living room occupied the front, and the dining room and 
kitchen both had windows to the rear. (See figure 3) 
For the consumer, the daylight modification of the rowhouse meant a 
spacious, pleasant housing interior at a modest cost that made home own-
ership possible for middle-income people. For the developer, the slight 
decrease in density (in the Edmondson area, for example, two daylights 
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occupied approximately the same amount of frontage [forty to forty-four 
feet] as three of the conventional rows [forty-two feet]) still allowed many 
of the economies of row house construction-shared walls, common utility 
lines, and simultaneous erection. Sherry Olson has pointed out that 
progressive-era concern about older, narrower urban housing designs 
with their lack of light and air had created a climate of opinion receptive 
to the wider, daylight styles as a housing reform, a trend underwritten by 
a series of progressive municipal building codes. 10 When demand for new 
housing became intense in the post-World War I period-the building of 
new housing having been virtually halted during the war-·-it was the new 
daylight form that consumers demanded. 11 Just beginning his Edmondson 
area development at precisely the moment these several trends converged, 
Keelty switched to the new style, daylight rows marching up the Ed-
mondson hill, block by block. (See figures 4 through 8.) 
Though Keelty's Edmondson rowhouses of the early to mid-1920s 
were solid and spacious, if modest, adaptations of the daylight type, his 
crowning version came in the late 1920s and the 1930s in Wildwood, the 
name he gave developments on the extensive land tracts that had been the 
Gelston and Lyndhurst estates. Designed as an upgraded form of the basic 
daylight box, these dwellings were billed as English type, distinguished 
from the earlier homes primarily by slightly more spacious dimensions 
(some were twenty-two by thirty-seven feet, with an additional half-story in 
a gabled attic), quality features (such as slate roofs, copper spouting, tile 
porches, and fireplaces), and architectural variation (gabled roofs, red 
Tudor-type brickwork, and architectural variety within the row). (See fig-
ures 9 and 10.) John Carpenter, whose family moved into a Keelty-built 
house on Norman (later Normandy) Avenue in 1921, recalls his reaction 
as a boy to the new Wildwood homes across Edmondson Avenue: "The 
houses in Wildwood, we heard at the time, were supposed to be Keelty's 
best. I guess he started and made money, and then when he got to Wild-
wood, he upgraded the houses. I had a couple of boy friends who were in 
the Scout troop [and lived] there, and I can remember going in their 
houses, and they had a third-story attic that was finished off, and I 
thought this would be great, to have a play room or study up there, which 
our houses didn't have." 12 
Keelty ads for Wildwood, "Baltimore's newest suburban develop-
ment," once more evoked the suburban ideal: Wildwood, they boasted, 
. was "splendidly convenient to the cars [streetcars], churches of various 
denominations, schools, stores and banks, and but a quarter hour's drive 
to the city," yet enjoyed the benefits of nearby parkland and a ridge-top 
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Figure 4. '~reaway" houses, among the first rowhouses on Edmondson 
Avenue, built in the period 1911-1914. These houses were 14 feet wide by 
45 feet deep, with a narrow space ("areaway") in the rear between every 
two pairs to allow light to inner rooms. (See the layout of the "areaway" 
style rowhouse in Figure 3.) 
location-"standing on the front porch of these homes you can see all over 
the city" -a combination representing a "truly suburban atmosphere." 13 
IfKeelty's housing type was right, his timing may have been unfortunate; 
begun in 1928, development of Wildwood was slowed by the onset of the 
Depression. 14 By the mid-1930s it had accelerated again, only to experience 
the abrupt halt that World War II caused here, as elsewhere. 
The rapid pace of Keelty's development from the early 1920s onward 
hinged not only upon his land acquisition and construction methods, but 
also upon the provision of essential urban services. Rognel Heights, just 
west of the city line prior to the 1918 annexation, had been developed in 
1909 with the provision of a private water supply system. By the early 
teens, however, expansion of the city water supply and sewage systems 
permitted extension of both services into the Edmondson section on Bal-
timore's far western side. 15 In contrast to these new municipal facilities, 
privately financed tr;:msportation in the form of the United Railways and 
Electric Company's Ellicott City streetcar line had been in place since 
1899, when electric service was initiated on the tracks along Edmondson 
Avenue. Keelty ads, like those of the earlier developers, stressed the con-
venience of streetcar transportation, assuming right up to World War II 
that prospective buyers would be coming by trolley out from the city 
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Figure 5. James Keelty Company daylight-type rowhouses, built in the ear-
ly I 920s. With front widths of 20 feet and depths of 35 feet, these houses 
could offer a window in every room. 
(though one further quality feature of the Wildwood houses; recognizing 
changing times, was the provision for a garage}.16 In 1932 Baltimore City 
officials opened an additional span over the Gwynns Falls, the new West 
Baltimore Street concrete bridge, Mayor Howard W. Jackson noting the 
connection between public works and private investment: "The opening 
of this bridge marks an important step in the further development of this 
section of the city. The Gwynns Falls Valley for many years has been a 
natural barrier to quick communication between the older section of the 
city to the east of the valley and that evergrowing section to the west." 17 
Keelty not only built rapidly and extensively, he also apparently built 
well. "Keelty-built" homes became a hallmark of quality construction on 
the west side, a trademark "The Builder" prided himselffor. No absentee 
landlord, he continued to maintain his office within the community 
throughout the period. Demonstrating a paternalistic interest in the new 
neighborhood he had built, he contributed the cost of the sanctuary for 
the new St. Bernardine's Roman Catholic Church as a memorial to his 
recently deceased young daughter. (See figure ll.) One striking feature of 
Keelty's developments was the high rate of home ownership, a point to be 
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developed later. And it is generally conceded that he offered a quality 
product at a relatively low cost. Creation of ground rent aided greatly in 
the process, a mechanism in Maryland state law that benefitted both the 
consumer, by reducing the amount of the mortgage, and the developer, for 
whom it often represented the margin of profit. 18 (See figure 12.) But 
rowhouse developers like Keelty were not simply selling houses; they were 
selling a "housing package." Location, cost, house type, and size-all 
were determinants of the market whose housing needs would be met and, 
therefore, also determined the social character of the community that 
would form.19 In many ways the most telling promise of Edmondson's 
"suburban atmosphere" was more apparent in result than in billing: a 
remarkable degree of social homogeneity. Keelty had built a community 
whose social character was as regular as the brick fronts of his two-story 
houses. 
The Social Character of the New Rowhouse Community 
If the Keelty daylights represented the apex of urban rowhouse living for 
middle-income residents, their appearance on the market right after World 
War I could not have been more opportune in terms of population growth 
and housing needs. During the decade from 1910 to 1920 the city's popula-
tion had increased precipitously at a rate of 31 percent, producing conse-
quent pressure upon housing. Janet Kemp's 1907 study of Housing Condi-
tions in Baltimore chronicled a growing urban housing crisis, documenting in 
particular the degree of overcrowding and unhealthy conditions in districts 
where African Americans and new foreign-born immigrants were concen-
trated. 20 In the early 191Os, concern for such conditions led to passage of a 
series of racial residential segregation ordinances by Baltimore's city coun-
cil and its politically "progressive" mayor, though the legislation subse-
quently failed constitutional tests. These circumstances presaged a sizable 
white exodus to the periphery, including the large portion ofland added to 
the city after the annexation ofl918.21 Housing developments such as those 
along Edmondson Avenue would function to siphon offfrom older, densely 
settled areas that segment of the urban populace able and willing to make 
the move. In this late period of streetcar suburbanization, physical space 
increasingly corresponded with social class. 
For the Edmondson area, change was the order of the day as the 
community absorbed high rates of population growth. During the 1920s 
the total population there quadrupled, and even during the economic 
hard times of the 1930s it experienced a 31 percent increase. As John 
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Figure 6. Daylight houses in the 500 block of Normandy Avenue built by 
the James Keelty Company in 1921. These were 21 feet by 35 feet. (See the 
Sanborn fire insurance map in figure 8 for the configuration of comparable 
housing on nearby N. Loudon Avenue.) 
Carpenter put it, "there were people moving in all the time; ... they 
were always building houses." Not only was in-migration strong and 
steady, but a substantial number of settlers were in the young family-
forming stages, so that new births added to the total. Population gains 
from these two sources more than offset the losses due to death and the 
steady, normal out-migration rate (29 percent per decade) during the 
same period.22 
Just as remarkable as the degree of change was the degree ofresiden-
tial longevity. In 1930, for example, 68 percent of those on the sample 
blocks had lived there for five years or more, and 82 percent were first 
residents in their dwellings; by 1940 a strikingly high 92 percent had lived 
in their present homes for five years or more, 62 percent were first resi-
dents, 38 percent second, and no housing had yet turned over to a third 
resident.23 While this degree of residential permanence suggests an appar-
ent high level of satisfaction, it also contributed subtly to change in the 
long run, since the eventual result would be a maturing population, a 
factor still masked in this period by the continuing in-migration of young 
adults and expansion of the housing stock. 
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Figure 7. One of the Normandy 
Avenue houses, which were dis-
tinctive for the dormer window on 
the small front mansard, behind 
which was a main roof sloping 
slightly to the rear. Marble lintels 
and stone porch fronts were 
among the "quality" features of. 
these 1920s-era daylights. 
Blockbusting in Baltimore 
In a setting of considerable movement and flux, however, the social 
homogeneity of the new settlers provided a clear definition of the commu-
nity and acted in a powerful way to provide a sense of stability, the over-
whelming retrospective perception of those interviewed for this study. If 
new settlers lacked prior contact, they nevertheless shared remarkable 
similarities when it came to such matters as age and family status; home 
ownership; place of origin and prior urban experience; racial, ethnic, and 
religious identification; and occupational level. These were the ingre-
dients that seemed to provide a basis for community in the new context. 
By population count young adults (aged twenty-five through forty-
four) predominated in the new community, setting the norm as one of 
modest-sized nuclear families. Though their children represented a siz-
able contingent in the neighborhood and gave it a youthful cast, those 
from birth to age twenty actually numbered fewer than their parents' 
generation, both in 1930 and in 1940. In that latter year census data 
showed that 58 percent of all households consisted of three to five mem-
bers, while only 3 percent were composed of one person and only 10 per-
cent of more than five. 24 Relatively youthful with small families, many of 
the Edmondson settlers shared a common stage in the life cycle and a 
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similar family type as an adaptation to their social and economic circum-
stances. 
Keelty and the lesser developers in the Edmondson area produced 
housing for a community of single-family resident homeowners. In 1920 
all of the houses on the sample blocks developed to that point were owner-
occupied. Ten years later, after the rapid housing and population expan-
sion of the 1920s, home ownership in the sample blocks stood at 86 per-
cent, and even after the worst of the Depression in 1940 it was a high 80 
percent. Census data for 1940 showed a somewhat lower 63 percent, but 
by 1950 the census figure had climbed to 73 percent (while in the sample 
it was a striking 96 percent). By comparison, citywide figures for an ur-
ban area usually considered distinguished for its high rate of home owner-
ship showed 39 percent of the dwelling units to be owner-occupied in 
1940, while in 1950 the figure had increased to 50 percent.25 Of course, 
many of the Edmondson residents listed as homeowners were, in fact, 
only in the process of buying their homes, a financial burden they shared 
in common and one that sometimes led them to refer to the area as 
"Mortgage Hill." 26 
The Depression challenged the American dream of home ownership 
and employment for many Americans. In Baltimore, unemployment 
reached twenty percent in 1933, and home ownership fell by one-fifth 
dming the decade, even as the city administration resisted New Deal pro-
grams intended to help victims of the Depression. But Edmondson area 
residents were cushioned from the direct impact of hard times, as employ-
ment and home ownership levels remained relatively steady throughout 
the period.27 
Residents also shared somewhat similar places of origin and urban 
experiences. Not newcomers to the city, most were moving from prior resi-
dence in older Baltimore neighborhoods. In a sizable number of cases, 
residents in the early period migrated from older neighborhoods nearer the 
center city that had been impacted by considerable population growth 
during the 1920s (and subsequently), sometimes by the numbers of African 
Americans or European immigrants. The sample block data for 1920, 1930, 
and 1940 shows relatively even streams of migrants from I) areas of West 
Baltimore immediately east of the Edmondson district, 2) Old West Bal-
timore (from the city's center to Fulton Street), 3) South Baltimore, and 4) 
East Baltimore.28 With population density producing pressures upon the 
aging housing stock in those areas as well as creating new strains ofhetero-
geneity, movement was one solution-but one available only to those able 
to afford to purchase a single family dwelling, even at a modest cost. 
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Figure 8. The Edmondson Avenue area, depicted on this 1928 fire insur-
ance map, exhibits the mixture of rowhouse sizes in one of the sections of 
early development at the corner of Edmondson Avenue and N. Loudon Ave-
nue, the latter a typical side street. Houses in the 4000 block of Edmond-
son Avenue and numbers 520-530 along the west (left) side of N. Loudon 
are of the "areaway" type, with the passage separating the rear of the 
houses between every pair. 4017 and 4019 Edmondson Avenue are du-
plexes, separated from adjoining houses by a narrow passage extending the 
length of the entire house. Both types share the narrow fronts and long 
depths of the earlier rowhouse styles. In contrast, the houses on the odd 
side (to the east, or right) and in the 3900 block of Edmondson Avenue are 
daylights, wider and less deep. Comparison of the' two indicates that the ra-
tio of frontage required for the daylights as opposed to the older types was 
approximately 2 to 3. Note the garages (marked 'W') on the lower left; lo-
cated in the middle of some of the blocks in this section, these could be 
purchased or rented by the minority of residents who had automobiles. 
(Insurance Maps of Baltimore, Maryland, Sanborn Map Company, 1928; used 
with permission) 
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Regarding race, the social definition of the new neighborhood was 
near absolute: new residents were white. In 1930 only u)rty-four of the 
total population in the two census tracts were African American, and in 
1940 that small number had shrunk even farther to thirty-four (while 
white population grew from 8,947 in 1930 to 11,745 in 1940). Moreover, 
census block data for the latter year shows that the handful of African 
American households were located on the margins of the two tracts, with 
none occupying the new brick rowhouses.29 As Madge Cooper recalls: 
"The only blacks lived on Hilton Street-almost to Frederick Road. 
There were two-or maybe three-homes; then on the other side of the 
railroad ... there were a few; but those people had lived there for many, 
many years-probably before we came; and they never bothered us, and 
we never bothered them. But there was no real socializing-and the chil-
dren, of course, didn't go to our school; I have no idea where they went to 
school."30 Or, in Marilyn Simkins's recollection: "You just didn't see 
black people in the neighborhood, except women who came in to do day 
work or delivery men, or something like that. They just didn't live in the 
area then." 31 
Indeed, the racial exclusivity of white neighborhoods like the new 
Edmondson area was undergirded by a web of mechanisms that served to 
assure residential segregation. In additio~ to long-standing patterns of 
individual prejudice and custom were the controls exerted by powerful 
institutions: the real estate industry (the statement by the National Asso-
ciation of Real Estate Brokers deemed it improper to introduce members 
of another race into a neighborhood), state law (restrictive covenants, 
though not necessarily used in this section of the city, were upheld by the 
Maryland Court of Appeals in 1938 and not ruled unconstitutional by the 
U.S. Supreme Court until 1948), and the financial establishment (where 
private lending institutions and the government mortgage agencies estab-
lished by the New Deal federal administration typically discriminated 
against African Americans).32 These mechanisms worked with such ap-
parent effectiveness that racial diversity simply was not an overt issue 
within the confines of the community. 
If race was an absolute definer, religion was less so, and ethnicity 
only a trace. The emerging community was overwhelmingly Roman 
Catholic and Protestant, congregations of the latter established within the 
boundaries being from such main line denominations as Lutheran, Meth-
odist, and Reformed Episcopal. Conspicuous was the absence of Jewish 
residents, whether because of choice or exclusion. Among the early set-
tlers German names stand out slightly more prominently numerically, 
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Figure 9. Early Keelty "English-type" daylight rowhouses in the Wildwood 
development, advertised in 1928. These are in the 600 block of Wildwood 
Parkway. 
with Irish perhaps second, but in most cases ethnic ties appeared not to 
be strong. Very few settlers were first generation immigrants; while some 
were second generation, most would have been third and beyond. Where 
ethnic ties once had been important, they had been left behind in the old 
neighborhood.33 
A high level of home ownership; similarities in place of origin and prior 
urban experience; racial, ethnic, and religious homogeneity-all contrib-
uted in important ways to the social definition of the emerging rowhouse 
community. Yet, no factor was more important in that definition than occu-
pationallevel. Social historians in recent years rightly have been cautious 
about hierarchical rankings of occupation as well as about judgments re-
garding upward and downward mobility based upon those rankings. 34 Oc-
cupationallevel however, clearly has a variety of consequences, not least of 
which is income. And income and occupation, taken together, may have 
far-reaching influences upon such other dimensions of social life as social 
status, lifestyle, aspiration, and opportunity.35 At the very least, the occu-
pational profile of a neighborhood provides some indication of its socio-
economic diversity or homogeneity. Moreover, comparison of occupational 
level and of changes in a given community with trends in the national and 
metropolitan workforce may provide some indication of how residents of 
that neighborhood fit in the larger social and economic context. 
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Figure 10. Architectural variations such as dormers, gabled porches, and 
sloping slate roofs characterized the "English-type" daylight rowhouses. 
With dimensions of 22 by 37 feet, these included a half-story attic and a 
garage in the rear. 
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What is most striking about the new Edmondson rowhouse commu-
nity was the concentration of occupational types in several middle-level 
categories and the way in which that configuration persisted over time 
with little change, even as older families matured or moved away and new 
families moved in. Perhaps no other social factor contributed so greatly to 
the perceived stability of the neighborhood: individuals might come and 
go, but occupational types remained the same. The occupational profile 
that emerged with the first household heads in 1920 (in the sample block 
survey) was one strongly concentrated in four areas: sales, clerical, crafts 
(skilled trades), and manufacturing. On the one hand, there were few in 
credentialed professional or upper managerial capacities, though there 
were some in middle management; on the other, Edmondson was not a 
community oflaborers, service workers, or domestics.36 With only slight 
variation, this was the occupational pattern that persisted for the rest of 
the community's history-even into the later period of racial change. 
According to the sample block survey, during the 1920s the percent-
age of residents in managerial positions increased somewhat and those in 
positions as craftsmen to a greater extent, but after the Depression de-
cade of the 1930s the balance evened out once more. While the block 
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study is only a sample limited to household heads, census tract data for 
1940 on all persons in the neighborhood confirms the pattern, though it 
shows even more level distribution among sales-clerical (grouped together 
in that report), craftsmen, and operative categories (the latter being 
somewhat underrepresented in the sample block data).37 Perhaps more 
clearly than the sample, the census emphasized the middle-level occupa-
tional profile in the neighborhood. 
Most women did not participate in the community's paid workforce. 
For the early period the sample block survey (limited to household heads 
and based primarily upon city directories) suggests only a few instances 
where widows or adult daughters living at home were employed, though 
city directories do not provide an adequate picture of women's employ-
ment.38 The 1940 census tract data paints a more complete portrait of 
women's role in Edmondson's paid workforce, one that apparently had 
begun to increase. In that year women constituted 28 percent of those 
employed, a figure not differing substantially from the citywide average 
for white women. While the percentage of women working outside the 
home represented a distinct minority, their involvement indicated that 
Depression economics, changing norms regarding women's work, and a 
gap between middle-class aspirations and rowhouse realities may have 
made an impact on the hillside community. Two-thirds of women's jobs 
were concentrated in the sales-clerical category, and women were very 
thinly represented in other types of jobs: women constituted only 2 per-
cent of professionals, 2.5 percent of managers, and 4.2 percent of opera-
tives, while women working as domestics were only .5 percent of the total 
paid workforce. 39 As a general norm, the pattern for women was work 
within the home, not paid labor outside, and this was especially true for 
married women and mothers. 
The 1940 census also provides an opportunity to compare the Ed-
mondson area workforce with that of the city as a whole. At first glance, 
the very middle-level profile of the neighborhood is reflected in the way 
that it closely mirrors the citywide averages. In this sense Edmondson 
might be considered a typical Baltimore neighborhood. Yet, in a city 
where place of residence was becoming highly differentiated along lines of 
race, class, and religious or ethnic identification, neighborhood occupa-
tional profiles were likely to be much more skewed toward certain catego-
ries than others. Therefore, the concentration of Edmondson's jobs in the 
center illustrated its own peculiar identity rather than its typicality. To-
gether with other developing rowhouse and detached house communities, 
it played a middle-level role increasingly set off from older, more hetero-
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Figure II. St. Bernardine's Roman Catholic Church, c. 1929, Edmondson 
Avenue and Mt. Holly St. Begun in 1928 and completed the next year, the 
sanctuary of the new church was contributed by James Keelty and his wife 
as a memorial to their deceased daughter. (The Peale Museum, Baltimore 
City Life Museums) 
geneous neighborhoods by a social definition in which occupation and 
social class were closely linked.4O 
Two related phenomena were operating upon the workforce in cities 
like Baltimore, both with consequences for neighborhood structure. First, 
rapid growth across the spectrum of occupational possibilities had ex-
panded the total number of urban jobs considerably, particularly on the 
eve of Edmondson's initial development.41 Had no other changes occurred 
at all, this expansion would have provided a pool of residents who might 
have spilled over from older, existing neighborhoods into the newly devel-
oping rowhouse suburbs. Insofar as occupation and income were corre-
lated, the cost of new housing would have acted as an economic filter chan-
neling the expanded workforce into particular new residential choices. But, 
accompanying workforce expansion was a major shift in the character of 
the workforce. The transition to mass, machine production not only re-
quired large numbers of semiskilled operatives; it also fed a new consumer 
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Figure 12. Handwritten re-
ceipt for the $100 down-
payment on a James 
Keelty rowhouse costing 
$3650 in 1922. The house 
had been purchased by 
Robert Lansinger at 4008 
W Franklin Street. (The 
family of Robert 
Lansinger) 
economy that necessitated dramatic growth of the bureaucratic, market-
ing, and consumer-service sectors. Most of Edmondson's workers filled 
these latter ranks. Sellers of goods, middle-level managers, clerks in large 
establishments (both business and government), repairers and installers 
of consumer goods, or foremen and managers who facilitated the produc-
tion process-by and large, these were neither the skilled artisan pro-
ducers of the past nor the semiskilled mass production operatives needed 
in such large numbers at that time. In this sense Edmondson's residents 
were indeed a new middle class, a mix of those engaged in the sales, 
clerical, crafts, and manufacturing positions of an increasingly consumer-
oriented economy.42 
If they constituted a new, expanding occupational profile, were they 
themselves newcomers to those job categories? The sample block survey 
indicates that throughout the period under consideration those moving 
into the Edmondson area had not made a recent change in occupational 
category. The majority of new residents simply were settling in a neigh-
borhood where occupational level was remarkably similar to their own. 
For the minority who had made a recent change in work, it usually was a 
modest one, in almost all cases along a continuum from unskilled to 
skilled, from manual to nonmanual, or from employee to supervisor or 
manager-all in a direction that a middle-class culture would have inter-
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preted as "upward" mobility.43 Once settled, the same pattern held dur-
ing the period of tenure for Edmondson residents: 1) a predominance of 
occupational stability, and 2) a tendency for change, when it occurred, to 
proceed along the same continuum, almost never the reverse. 
Opportunity for occupational upward mobility tended not to increase 
over time, however; if anything, it may have declined slightly during the 
period, not surprising during the Depression decade but somewhat more 
significant in the postwar boom era.44 Even though actual rates of oppor-
tunity for change may have been leveling or lessening over time, the percep-
tion of occupational stability and upward mobility no doubt contributed to 
the image of a stable, prosperous neighborhood.45 Both were consistent with 
the national faith, and both were more likely to be privileges of the middle 
class than of those whose occupational experience was more marginal. 
Amidst the considerable change attributable to rapid and substantial 
development, it was the social homogeneity of the new neighborhood that 
gave it definition and that contributed in a significant way to the sense of 
stability. Young family heads, homeowners, first-generation suburbanites, 
sharing similar social identifications, Edmondson residents were represen-
tatives of a new and growing class in cities such as Baltimore. While the 
particular occupational mix gave some definition that may have distin-
guished the housing on the hill from other developing sections of the city, in 
general the middle-level occupations prevalent in the Edmondson area 
were those of a new consumer-oriented economy, and Edmondson's work-
ers were its functionaries. Even as older residents moved away or died and 
newer residents took their places, the social character of the settlers in the 
Keelty-built neighborhood remained remarkably the same. 
Community and Culture in the New Rowhouse Neighborhood 
In many ways the streetcar epito"mized the character of the new rowhouse 
community's culture. Every morning most men took it out of the neighbor-
hood to their places of work; once a week or so women rode it downtown to 
do their major shopping; and when children reached their early teens, they 
traveled on it to high schools elsewhere in the city. Work, shopping, school, 
home-to a great extent these functioned as separate spheres, segregated 
along lines of gender and age and operating in distinctly defined physical 
spaces. Just as surely, the physical isolation of the new neighborhood and its 
social homogeneity walled it off from the diversity as wen as the historic 
roots of the larger metropolitan area, only a short streetcar ride away.#) If 
the Edmondson area was a version of the emerging middle-class equation, 
then differentiation seemed to be one important corollary. 
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As a brand new residential area, the streetcar suburb lacked many of 
the historic bases associated with community cohesion. Indeed, as might 
commonly be expected with any new development, one is struck by the 
general absence of community organizations and institutions (other than 
the churches), even commercial activities, a lack paralleled by the corre-
sponding absence of collective rituals and traditions. Nevertheless, social 
homogeneity mirrored an apparent sense of cultural homogeneity. The new 
Edmondson residents appeared to share levels of collective identity, com-
mon understandings, and shared values, which, taken together, functioned 
to provide some of the structures for coping with the segmentation and 
novelty of the communityY They felt the community to be stable and 
themselves to be secure because in many ways they were like one another. 
An exchange with a former resident illustrates this perception: "We moved 
there in the spring, and in the fall I started to school, and I only went to 
school three days, [before] they were building the houses on Edgewood 
Street. [Did that change the neighborhood much?] No, because you knew 
those people, too." 48 Yet, as a basis for community, social homogeneity-
and its reflection in cultural homogeneity-was extremely one-dimension-
al. And in an urban area where an increasing number of people were socially 
and culturally "not like us," its premises would be profoundly challenged. 
Names and boundaries both are significant for the way in which they 
reveal levels of collective identity and identification.49 Interviews with for-
mer residents from the period under consideration produce no single, 
commonly agreed upon name prior to the erection after World War II of 
the Edmondson Village Shopping Center, which eventually provided a 
widely accepted appellation. Portions of the development were given 
names by the developers-Lyndhurst and Wildwood by Keelty, and Al-
lendale by another builder-but for some reason none of these seemed to 
stick, nor were the boundaries between them all that distinct. The follow-
ing interchange with two early residents was. characteristic: 
Orser: The area where you lived, did it ever have a name? 
Wallace: No, it never had a name of a development, you mean. 
Morgan: But the improvement association we came under, was that the Lynd-
hurst Improvement Association? 
Wallace: The only thing my mother ever joined was the women's civic league, 
because she was still trying to get that alley. 
Orser: But if you told people where you lived, what did you say? 
Morgan: I always just said Edmondson Avenue-I always would say just above 
Hilton Street, because most people know where that is. 
Wallace: On the other side of the bridge. 
Morgan: Yes, that's it ... 50 
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But if the community's name was vague, its outer boundaries were quite 
clear in people's perceptions. Natural barriers to the east and north (the 
wooded ravine cut by the Gwynns Falls valley, which had been designated 
parkland) and a cemetery on the southwest distinctly limited areas where 
rowhouse settlement touched adjoining inhabited areas. Due south, where 
such barriers were absent, social distinctions differentiated the area from 
the older streetcar suburb of Irvington; similarly, to the immediate west, 
Rognel Heights, with its frame detached houses, was considered somewhat 
distinct, but more so were the spacious lots and larger houses of Hunting 
Ridge and Ten Hills beyond. For an area so clearly demarcated in people's 
perceptions, its lack of a clear name is surprising. Did it suggest that the 
new community lacked historical connection with its past (as indeed it 
did); a natural, physical meeting point or focus, such as a major crossroads 
or village center (as indeed it did); any strong political or social organiza-
tions (as indeed it did); or a degree of self-sufficiency socially and economi-
cally (as indeed it did)? 
While in many ways Edmondson community culture mirrored the larg-
er national culture, mediated through such increasingly important chan-
nels as popular mass media, and perhaps did not differ substantially from 
other urban variations, it nevertheless is instructive to consider the particu-
lar shape cultural beliefs took in a newly formed community with such 
clearly delineated social characteristics. To a great extent, this was a culture 
in which gender and age groups each had their defined roles, spheres, and 
institutions-distinctions undergirded apparently by widely shared norms. 
Men's role was employment, and employment universally took them 
out of the neighborhood. There they encountered the diversity of urban 
types not present in the residential community, but they did so from a van-
tage point marked by relative occupational stability, even security. If few 
would make dramatic occupational changes that might be interpreted as 
advancement, fewer would view their career as downward occupational 
mobility. Most worked in relatively large corporate settings, as part of the 
bureaucratic or the industrial process. Typical employers included Mc-
Cormick's Spices, the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, the Baltimore Gas 
and Electric Company, Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone, Baltimore 
Transit, Hutzler's Department Store, Sun Life Insurance, and the U.S. 
Post Office. A minority of residents worked in small shops or businesses 
or, in the case of craftsmen, in the construction and repair trades, though 
usually not in a business of their own. Almost none were independent 
artisans, proprietors, or professionals. 
An interview from the latter years of this period suggests that men's 
work was something not widely shared with other family members, and 
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that, indeed, considerable deference might be paid to the father upon his 
return home from the career world. As Alice Hughes recalled: 
In the summer when everybody would be outside playing, about 4 o'clock in the 
afternoon, not only my mother but most of the mothers would round up the 
children and bring us in and make us take baths, wash hair, and put on clean 
clothes, so that when our father came home we looked presentable-because they 
very much believed that if the father had to go out all day and put up with what-
ever he had to put up with, which was never mentioned, by the way-you as-
sumed that your father was somehow really suffering at his office, whatever he 
was doing, you knew that he worked all the time, every minute, he was really in 
there slugging away-and when he came home at the end of the day, the least you 
could do was look presentable for him. 51 
Apparently, men's roles in the community were defined by a rather clear 
cultural ideal.52 
For women, the cultural norm was equally explicit, especially pro-
nounced in the pre~cribed role for .married women with children. The 
following interchange with two interviewees who grew up in the 1920s and 
1930s is a typical illustration: 
Orser: Now, what about both of your mothers; did they work at home, or-? 
Morgan and Wallace: Home! 
Wallace: Home, my gracious! 
Morgan: Mothers didn't work back then. My mother didn't work-ever. 
The vigor of the response evokes a traditional middle-class ideology that 
large numbers of households were able to maintain. In many cases Ed-
mondson residents had come from neighborhoods where some women 
worked outside the home or from family backgrounds in which female 
members may have had to do so. Clearly, the housewife role was a privi-
lege not available to all socioeconomic classes, and it appears to have been 
interpreted as a badge of middle-class status by Edmondson's populace.53 
Ifwidely held as an ideal, especially in the instance of mothers of young 
children, the limitation nevertheless was far from absolute in practice, and 
the exceptions were noteworthy. For example, daughters typically contin-
ued to live at home for a relatively short period of time after completing 
school, usually until marriage, and it was generally acceptable-even 
expected-for them to work outside the home. It also was not uncom-
mon-though apparently less desirable-for women to continue to work 
after marriage until childbirth. These variations also pointed toward some 
generational change. While the two women cited above could not have 
imagined their mothers working outside the home as they grew up, both of 
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them took secretarial courses in high school and found employment in 
clerical jobs until they were married (and afterwards, in one of the cases). 
The fact that a substantial minority of Edmondson women did work out-
side the home suggested economic exigencies, alternative choices, or de-
grees of latitude that broadened the avowed ideal. 
If father's province was the workplace, mother's was the home.54 
Supposedly freed from any prospect of outside employment, she was to 
devote full time to housekeeping, childcare, shopping, and volunteer ac-
tivities such as church and school. The same two interviewees reflected on 
how totally their mothers regarded the kitchen as their preserve: 
Wallace: My mother never allowed me in the kitchen. When I got married, I didn't 
even know how to make a cup of coffee. She never allowed me in the kitchen. 
Morgan: Mother ... used to say, it's too much trouble, let me do it, and when I'd 
measure anything, she would say, you don't have to have a [measuring] cup; 
just take any cup. And I'd say, but it's not the same. Oh, my heavens, she just 
laughed at me, and she'd say, oh, I'll never learn. And even when I got 
married, she would let me cook, but she'd say, now when you're ready to 
make the gravy, you don't know how to make it, so I'll make it. She always 
said that. 
Living within a somewhat isolated residential area with few facilities or 
activities available within its boundaries, women had very limited oppor-
tunities for contact that transcended those of block and community. 
The Edmondson community had a predominantly young family pro-
file, and children were a substantial ingredient in community life as well as 
a correspondingly important element in the cultural definition of roles. Ele-
mentary andjunior high schools were neighborhood-based, but public and 
parochial institutions reinforced divided religious affiliations, to some de-
gree channeling friendship patterns. It was not until high school that Ed-
mondson area young people left the local environs for an educational set-
ting that brought them into contact with those from other neighborhoods, 
usually on a basis segregated by gender, race, and, to some degree, class. 
Though leisure activities were an increasingly important phenomenon of a 
developing teenage culture, there was "nothing to do" in the neighborhood, 
a void only partially filled by sports activities and the opening of a local 
movie theater. It was primarily the churches that stepped into the breach, 
maintaining recreation or teen centers.55 In this period the teenage role 
ended abruptly at the conclusion of high school education, with employ-
ment, marriage, and an independent household as expected norms.56 
If roles were highly differentiated across lines of gender and age with 
significant portions of individual experience relegated to separate institu-
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tions, physical spaces, and sets of social contacts, it was the family unit 
and the community that somehow had to draw these together. It is diffi-
cult to evaluate how well either performed this task, but several observa-
tions are in order. First, families, by and large, were somewhat isolated 
from nearby kinship networks. Second, except for the fledgling churches, 
there were few established institutional supports for the family unit and 
few social outlets for men, women, or youth within the community. Final-
ly, in a brand new residential neighborhood, there were few precedents, 
traditions, or guideposts to set the tone of community life. It might be 
assumed that these factors, taken together, would place considerable re-
sponsibility, even pressure, upon the nuclear family. 
Yet, it is the uniformity rather than diversity of cultural norms and 
values that stands out in the examination of this formative period in the 
rowhouse community's history. Since these norms and values did not de-
rive from the particular place, we must assume that they were the distilla-
tion of common experience, influenced by such factors as mass culture, 
family background and experience, and prior cultural experience, applied 
in a particular setting in a similar way by people sharing a common social 
definition that found expression in a set of shared values. 
To a great extent, the community the new families brought into being 
and whose shared culture gave them sustenance and support was a mirror 
of themselves and their collective experience. Seeking new residence in a 
new suburban locale, physically set apart from other sections of the city, 
they found it in the clearly defined physical and social boundaries of the 
Edmondson area. First generation suburbanites with prior urban experi-
ence in older neighborhoods, they discovered others with similar back-
grounds. Middle level on the occupational continuum in a Baltimore 
economy where their ranks were swelling, they settled into houses next to 
neighbors who were more likely than not to share very similar job types 
and economic status. Predominantly young and family-forming, they 
could expect others on the street to share the same stages of the family 
cycle. The consequence of so much shared experience and situation was a 
community whose culture represented a strong strain toward consistency 
and uniformity-even conformity. That tendency was particularly evi-
dent in the steadfastness with which gender and age roles were defined in 
this formative period. It was as if an unwritten cultural code provided 
stability and security in a situation that, in fact, was novel and ever-
changing. In this community culture, similarity bred familiarity: 
Morgan: Oh yes, we knew everybody. I knew people in her block, the 3300 block, 
and all the people across from us, and on our side, I knew those people. We 
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knew everybody's name .... We even knew people that lived way down on 
that other side. 
Wallace: Everybody was so helpful. If anybody would get sick, you'd always go 
and help them out. And I know at our house at Christmas we always had 
open house, and my mother on her dining room table would have this big 
punchbowl of eggnog, and everybody would go to Elsie's for eggnog for 
Christmas. And you always visited your neighbors for Christmas. Every 
neighbor would give a party. But my mother always had hers on Christmas 
day, because she had to be home; all the family would be coming. But we 
were very close, all the neighbors. 
Simkins: They would get together, for example, on the fourth of July in the back-
yard .... She was friendly with her neighbors, and on Christmas day it was 
the tradition, on my block at least, that you went to visit your neighbors-you 
went to church, and when you came home you went to visit your neighbors, 
and had a toddy, or something; and then you went home and had your after-
noon and evening with your family. 
It is always difficult to measure such qualities as closeness, particularly 
when viewed in considerable retrospect. Yet, streetcar rowhouse living in 
the new Edmondson area appears to have engendered a degree of neigh-
borly relations and a common culture that was an important and satisfy-
ing context for area residents. 
The high degree of social homogeneity and the strain toward unifor-
mity that had characterized the neighborhood from its inception reached 
its zenith during the decade following World War II, when the demand 
for housing and commercial services spurred the culminating physical de-
velopment of the area and ushered in an era of apparent suburban satis-
faction, the subject of the next chapter. Ironically, these same persistent 
qualities contributed in significant ways to the rapidity with which the 
community crumbled in the face of the challenge of racial change at the 
end of this postwar interlude. In retrospect, the process of urban differen-
tiation that gave birth to the Edmondson area as a white rowhouse en-
clave provided a social definition that residents took to be the basis for a 
shared sense of stability and security. In many respects, the Keelty-built 
mwhouse neighborhood offered a satisfying and rewarding lifestyle, the 
basis for the strong note of nostalgia that infuses many interviewees' 
memories. At the same time, however, this definition proved to be not 
only narrow but-ultimately-fragile and illusory, because it allowed lit-
tle room for inclusion of others or adaptation to change. Perhaps this one-
dimensional concept of community was the greatest cost of the outer-city 
residential sections Keelty and numerous other developers erected to meet 
the needs of an expanding metropolis in the first half of the century. 
3 
Continuity and 
Undercurrents of Change 
Those were the gold old days. 
-David Graff 
Without a doubt Edmondson Village was the most 
beautiful shopping center around. 
-Edgar Raines 
When the Edmondson Village Shopping Center opened its doors in 1947 on 
the site of the former Hunting Ridge estate at the top of the Edmondson 
Avenue hill, it seemed to represent the culmination of the suburban ideal to 
which residents of the area had aspired. Almost overnight, "the Village" 
gained acceptance as the community's focal point, providing both a com-
mercial center and a point of reference-not just for shopping, but for meet-
ing, for "hanging out," for identifiability. Significantly, the name gained 
rapid acceptance as a designation for the community as a whole. Ed-
mondson Village was now complete, as if the addition of the commercial 
cluster to the residential section fulfilled the image of suburban community 
life. For white residents of the area during this period before the moment of 
racial change, these were Edmondson Village's "golden" years. 
But they were golden in other senses as well. It was during this period 
that the postwar construction boom surged to fill up the remaining open 
spaces within the community, completing the area's physical growth. As if 
to symbolize this completion, the Keelty Company expanded its rowhouse 
fiefdom then quietly sold off undeveloped sections and exited the community 
it had built. By the mid-1950s, the Edmondson Village area was fully devel-
oped, with little vacant space remaining for housing or for anything else. 
As the postwar housing boom surged beyond outer city neighbor-
hoods like the Edmondson section into new areas outside the city's 
boundaries, the suburban ideal took on new forms-not rowhouse, but 
ranch-style. The circumferential beltway provided a new main street for 
these suburbs, opening prime locations for housing and commercial de-
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velopment and setting the pace for white middle-class tastes. The Ed-
mondson Avenue area no longer stood as the epitome of the suburban 
ideal; it was becoming distinctly urban, settled, obsolete-old. 
For those coming of age in Edmondson Village in the 1950s these 
were the golden days of adolescence, and hanging out at the shopping 
center became a way of teenage life. But if teens set the era's tone, they 
were by no means preponderant in the population. Indeed, the satisfac-
tion with the area's rowhouse style of living produced a very stable, set-
tled population. After the war, new housing contributed to a degree of 
rejuvenation and a parallel population surge, but it also masked the fact 
that this was a distinctly maturing populace. Moreover, the stability of 
residents' economic status not only was an indication of relative security; 
it also suggested a possible leveling off of prospects for upward social 
mobility. Often, when socioeconomic advancement did occur, it produced 
a decision to move to the newer outer suburbs. 
Golden, too, was the community's social character, increasingly pre-
cious in the midst ofmajor social changes in urban areas during the postwar 
period. During the 1940s Baltimore City's African American population 
grew by more than 25 percent, while the boundaries of segregation ex-
panded hardly at all, placing extreme stresses upon a limited, aging hous-
ing market. Not only did Baltimore still hew to a dual housing market; its 
school system remained segregated, Southern-style. An emerging civil 
rights coalition was beginning to challenge the foundations of the tradition-
al racial status quo, but its efforts were rumblings seemingly beneath the 
surface. White suburban rowhouse communities like Edmondson contin-
ued to serve as social enclaves, defined by race and class, and there were 
few signs from within these perimeters that anything would ever be differ-
ent. Therefore, the entry of the first African American students into the 
neighborhood's junior high school in 1954 as the result of the city's new 
desegregation plan, followed the next year by the settlement of the first 
African American residents in the southeastern corner of the community, 
produced shock, consternation, and resistance. Change was afoot, yet the 
narrow social definition of the Edmondson Village community-so con-
sistent and stable over the years-allowed no room for it. As powerful out-
side forces impinged on the neighborhood's suburban ideal while residents 
resisted change, their gold appeared to be the work of an alchemist. 
The Edmondson Village Shopping Center and the Suburban Ideal 
On May 7, 1947, large crowds attended the opening of the Edmondson 
Village Shopping Center, "a suburban shopping center of harmonious 
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Figure 13. The Edmondson Village Shopping Center in its early years. The 
photo was taken by Jerome Adams in 1952. Note the brick wall screening 
the parking lot from Edmondson Avenue. (The Peale Museum, Baltimore 
City Life Museums) 
design, said to be unique in American city planning," in the words of the 
Baltimore Evening Sun} Advanced billing by the developers, Jacob and 
Joseph Myerhoff, proclaimed that Edmondson Village would be "the 
only planned, integrated shopping center in Baltimore, under one owner-
ship and management" with control over the design and construction of 
the entire project. The announcement boasted of the architectural consid-
eration that had gone into the undertaking: "The Village is in one of the 
finest residential districts in Baltimore, and with this fact ever in mind, it 
is being created in a mode of architecture reminiscent of the charming 
atmosphere of colonial Williamsburg." Recognizing that the postwar peri-
od would be the era of the automobile, the developers took pains to point 
out the care that had been taken to assure adequate parking in a manner 
harmonious with site and community. The center would consist of a ma-
jor area department store branch (the second branch of the downtown 
Hochschild, Kohn firm) as the anchor for as many as forty smaller 
shops.2 (See figures 13 through 16.) 
The new shopping center occupied approximately ten acres on the 
site of the former Edward Austin Jenkins estate, Hunting Ridge. The 
sale of the estate and the intended razing of the house represented the 
belated end of the earlier gentry era, as the Baltimore Sun noted in Sep-
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Figure 14. The Hochschild, Kohn Department Store rises above the roof-
line of other shops in the Edmondson Village Shopping Center, shortly 
after it opened in 1947. Architectural variation was employed to alleviate 
the straight line of the strip layout. In 1949 an additional section was 
completed to the east (far right), containing a movie theater and a bowling 
alley. (Baltimore Sun) 
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tember, 1945: '~nother landmark of old Baltimore is about to make way 
for the modern city. The last bit of Hunting Ridge, pre-Revolutionary 
estate, has been sold .... And so Hunting Ridge bows to modern prog-
ress and a new community will come to life." 3 
Edmondson Village Shopping Center partners Jacob and Joseph 
Myerhoffwere major players in post-World War II residential and com-
mercial development in the Baltimore region. Joseph, who was brought to 
the United States in 1906 by his Russian Jewish parents, got his start as a 
housing developer in the 1920s and 1930s with projects in northeastern 
and northwestern Baltimore (Govans, Loch Raven, Northwood, and Fal-
staff). In 1936 brother Jack Oacob) joined the business. During World 
War II the team built an apartment house in the southern section of the 
city (Brooklyn) with FHA backing, and at war's end they turned to large-
scale housing development in the Essex-Dundalk area of southeastern 
Baltimore County. Edmondson Village was their first shopping center, 
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though later under a separate company Joseph was to build the Westview 
and Eastpoint centers as well.4 
The most striking aspect of the center-and the one that won it im-
mediate accolades-was its handsome Williamsburg-style architecture. 
Essentially a strip in concept, its facade nevertheless provided sufficient 
variety-with irregular roof lines, bays, dormers, and gables-to evoke 
its village claim. (See figures 13 and 14.) These architectural features, the 
creation of architects Kenneth Miller and James Edmunds, masked the 
actual regularity of the layout. Large chimneys also were borrowed from 
the colonial Williamsburg prototype, adding charm and variety but serv-
ing primarily an ornamental function. Restrictions on the size and place-
ment of signs, requiring them to be flush with the building line and to 
employ lettering consistent with the architecture, enhanced the tradition-
al appearance. 
Though the use of colonial architecture in a suburban shopping cen-
ter appeared to be novel, the style had been popular throughout the 1930s 
nationally, in part as a response to the restoration of Colonial Williams-
burg with Rockefeller largesse.5 Builders responded to this trend. For ex-
ample, in the Wildwood and Lyndhurst residential sections adjacent to 
the future center, James Keelty introduced local rowhouse colonial adap-
tations in the 1930s, a style the company continued in its postwar develop-
ment in the Wildwood section (along Kevin Road and elsewhere). The 
colonial motif took other west Baltimore manifestations in duplex and 
detached house form, such as in Hunting Ridge, to the immediate west. 
The shopping center's colonial Williamsburg-style design received 
wide praise from professional critics and the public alike. The Urban 
Land Institute, for instance, concluded its review with the judgment that 
the architectural plan gave the effect of "a series of individual build-
ings, ... adding considerable charm and distinctive character to the 
project." 6 Architectural character not only had aesthetic benefits;. it 
served to draw the public as well. This point was not lost on the center's 
management, which in 1950 noted with pleasure: "Small wonder that so 
many thousands of Baltimoreans have made Edmondson Village a regu-
lar shopping habit ... [and] that Baltimoreans make it a point of pride 
to bring out-of-town visitors to Edmondson Village, a landmark of Bal-
timore progress." 7 With its Williamsburg tone, Edmondson Village had 
become more than a retail center; it was a west Baltimore attraction. 
The second most notable design element was provision for the auto-
mobile. Trolley tracks along Edmondson Avenue featured prominently in 
the foreground of news pictures of the opening in 1947, but the parking 
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Figure IS. Crowd gathered for the dedication of the Hecht Company De-
partment Store on the south side of Edmondson Avenue across from the 
Edmondson Village Shopping Center, October IS, 1956. The new building 
did not conform to the colonial architecture of the center, its Williamsburg-
style lines visible in the distance. The photographer was John Stadler of the 
Baltimore News-American. Uacques Kelly) 
lots-visible just beyond-were a major consideration in the plan. To 
accommodate parking for some 550 cars in front, the center was set back 
on a secondary access road paralleling Edmondson Avenue at a distance 
of two hundred feet. Considerable care was taken to minimize the visual 
impact of the parking lot, depressing it below street level (which the Ur-
ban Land Institute said "lessens the apparent distance of the buildings 
from the main highway"); dividing it into three sections, each enclosed 
with decorative brick walls; and bordering it with shrubbery and trees-
all steps intended to be "in keeping with the district in which the Village 
is located." While usually mentioning convenient trolley access, advertis-
ing emphasized the automobile: ''All Roads Lead to Edmondson Village" 
trumpeted a 1951 ad.8 One-stop shopping was essentially a car-oriented 
concept. 
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When Edmondson Village opened in 1947 it boasted the Hochschild, 
Kohn department store (with two stories; a third was added in 1951) and 
twenty-nine shops and stores ranging from auto supplies to hardware to 
shoes to gifts to ice cream to drugs to food-"the most complete shopping 
selection in Baltimore," in the words of a 1951 flyer. 9 But the developers 
clearly wanted Edmondson Village to be a center serving multiple func-
tions. The original set of buildings included a clubhouse for community 
organizations and activities, complete with a seating capacity of 250, a 
stage, and a kitchen. In 1949, recreational facilities were enhanced by the 
opening of a movie theater seating 1,250 and a twenty-three-lane bowling 
alley below. These additions insured that Edmondson Village would be-
come a multipurpose center for the area. 
From its inception the center clearly aimed at serving a large region 
not simply the nearby Edmondson Avenue community. A 1950 flyer pro-
claimed, "In terms of time, Edmondson Village is really a shopping cen-
ter for all Baltimore," and a 1951 ad, claiming that "parking is a dream," 
traced automobile routes from all points of the western side of the city 
and county. to 
In 1956 the addition across the street of a Hecht Company branch 
department store, not bearing the Village's colonial architectural style, 
further enhanced the regional appeal of Edmondson Village, which to 
that point had no real competition on Baltimore's west side. (See figure 
15.) However, the center's pre-eminence was short-lived: in 1958 Joseph 
Myerhoff's firm built the Westview Shopping Center some two miles west 
at the intersection with the new beltway, the first in a series of develop-
ments in adjacent suburban Baltimore County that signaled the end of 
the Village's distinctive but brief period of commercial hegemony. 
People who patronized the Edmondson Village Sho'pping Center dur-
ing those early years inevitably cite its uniqueness, sometimes insisting 
that they were told it was the first shopping center in the country, or in 
the East, or, closer to the actual truth, "the first suburban shopping cen-
ter on the East Coast." II Even the latter claim requires qualification, 
though the perception of the Village's special status said much about 
people's feelings toward it. While the suburban shopping center was espe-
cially a creation of the postwar era, and Edmondson Village was one of 
the first of the new breed, it actually was an idea that had been some time 
in coming. Baltimore had its own early version in the small English Tudor 
group of stores erected in Roland Park in 1896.12 On a scale more compa-
rable had been the Shaker Heights Center near Cleveland (early 1920s); 
Country Club Plaza in Kansas City (begun in 1923); and the Highland 
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Park Shopping Village in Dallas (1931). The latter most nearly appears as 
the prototype for centers like Edmondson Village (and several developed 
in the Los Angeles area just prior to it), with stores grouped away from 
the street, provision for parking courts to permit maximum access by 
auto, a scale of forty stores for "one-stop shopping," and a distinctive, 
harmonious architectural style (in that case Spanish), which lent itself to 
the village designation. In the Washington, D.C., area and elsewhere the 
immediate postwar period gave birth to a number of small suburban strip 
groups of stores with small amounts of parking in front, but Edmondson 
Village might make fair claim to being the first regional, suburban shop-
ping center of harmonious design on the East Coast-a string of quali-
fications that area residents found unnecessary.13 
The Village quickly changed both shopping habits and lifestyles. In an 
area of such dense residential development, yet with no retail outlets other 
than the small corner stores-most of them groceries, with a scattering of 
drugstores, cleaners, and bakeries-the Village offered a range of shop-
ping opportunities that began to wean shoppers-women in particular-
from the weekly trolley trip downtown. Moreover, its Food Fair super-
market produced the first competition with the downtown food markets 
(principally Lexington) and the corner groceries. Marilyn Simkins's moth-
er's shopping habits had been typical for Edmondson area women prior to 
the Village: 
Wednesday was shopping day for downtown-usually every week or every other 
week. She went by the #14 streetcar to Howard and Lexington. VVe had accounts 
at all the big department stores-Hochschild's, Hutzler's, Hecht's, Stewart's; you 
could get anything you wanted downtown. She would get clothing or things for 
the house; or maybe it was just an afternoon for herself. She would wear a 
dress .... You were used to having personal service in your local [grocery] store. 
You had your weekly order-and you didn't always pay for it either; you had your 
bill, and you paid it by the week or by the month. I very rarely carried money; if 
we needed bread, I would trot on down and get the bread, and it was just put 
right on the ticket; and then my father would pay the bill. 
But the opening of the Village changed all that: 
After my father died-he died when I was eleven-when I was thirteen she got 
her driving license, and that made her more mobile. And the shopping center was 
open at the Village, and she started to go out to Food Fair to shop and out to 
Hochschild's, and it. widened her scope--having her own car .... Hochschild's 
looked like a wonderland .... You could go into Hochschild's and get just about 
anything you wanted; it was very well stocked, very well maintained. And Hess 
Shoes was there; and the hardware store; Clayton's Women's Shop; Reamer's 
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Figure 16. Christmas lights outlining the trees and store fronts at the Ed-
mondson Village Shopping Center, 1958. The photographer was Fred G. 
Kraft of the Baltimore News-American. Uacques Kelly) 
Men's Store. You could go to Edmondson Village and get just about anything you 
needed, if you preferred not to go downtown. And then Hecht's opened up, and 
that gave you two choices .... I didn't know what a supermarket was until Ed-
mondson Village opened up with Food Fair for the first time. 
Not only did shopping habits change, however. The Village provided 
a much needed community center for a large residential area lacking any 
natural gathering point. It became a place for meeting people and social-
izing, whether in the adult mode where such needs could be ascribed to 
"shopping," or in the teenage and childhood style of "hanging out," as-
pects to be discussed more fully later. In an area lacking other entertain-
ment facilities, it served that function too. The Edmondson Village Thea-
ter soon became the regional cinema, while the older Edgewood Theater 
was now perceived as a neighborhood movie house. As Joe Slovensky, a 
teenager in the 1950s, recalls: "The Edmondson Village movies-I never 
saw a theater that beautiful inside. I mean when we walked in there-
where we got the tickets-that was all marble .... You walked in the 
lobby-I mean, that was a lobby, man! And they had big curtains that 
closed until the next show was ready. And they had the big bay windows 
that looked out on the parking lot, and that would be open, except at 
show time, and they would close them. That was a beautiful place!" 14 
In addition to commercial entertainment-the theater and the bowl-
ing alley-the Village provided a site for public entertainment functions. 
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Particularly popular attractions were record hops in the parking area. 
The center included other drawing cards, two of which elicited frequent 
mention in interviews: the monkeys in the shoe store window and the 
lights at Christmas. Bertha Roberts was one of many who recalled the 
former: "Hess's Shoe Store was on the corner, at the far end. They had a 
cage with monkeys in it-they were darling. The mamas would take their 
children to get their shoes, and the children wouldn't misbehave, because 
they could watch the monkeys." 15 Since Hess also had a barbershop, the 
monkeys served the same diversionary function for itchy youngsters in the 
barber's chair. At Christmas the roof lines of the shopping center's build-
ings were lined with lights, and lights were hung in the trees planted 
around the parking lot. (See figure 16.) Eunice Clemens echoed the mem-
ories expressed by many interviewees: "I remember at Christmas they 
used to put little Christmas lights on those trees around Edmondson Vil-
lage. And one time my nephew took us out, and it was so crowded you 
couldn't even park, so many people came just to see those trees." 16 
The Edmondson Village Shopping Center filled a vacuum, both in 
the physical development of the Edmondson Avenue rowhouse area and 
in the lifestyle of its residents. Seeking a village-like atmosphere in their 
suburban quest, they found it in this cluster of colonial-style shops and 
stores that gave a sense of completion to their residential environment, 
not only filling their shopping needs but serving as meeting places and 
entertainment as well. That there may have been a vacuum is suggested 
by the rapidity with which Edmondson Village became the focal point for 
the area, providing it a point of reference, an identity, and a name. Tech-
nically Edmondson Village was the shopping center itsel~ but increas-
ingly the term was used to refer to the community as well. Soon real estate 
listings pointed out that their properties were "near Edmondson Village 
Shopping Center," and as early as 1949 they began to label the location 
simply as Edmondson Village. Early references bearing this appellation 
were primarily to the immediately adjacent streets; soon real estate listings 
used the name for the entire hillside rowhouse area. If Keelty provided 
much of the housing for the developing neighborhood, the M yerhoffs gave it 
a commercial center: the suburban village seemed complete. 
Baltimore's Second Housing Boom 
At the end of World War II, the Edmondson area began to experience its 
second housing boom. Census figures show that from 1940 to 1960 the 
housing stock of the two census tracts nearly doubled, with the primary 
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Map 4. Post-World War II Develo 
ment of the Edmondson Avenue 
Area, listed by developer or build 
1. D.]. Pistorio (late 1940s); 
2. Keelty Company (1940s); 
3. Edmondale Building Company 
(late 1940s); 
4. Edmondale Apartments (c. 195( 
5. Wildwood Section 10, Keelty 
Company (early 1950s); 
6. Wildwood Section 10, portion 
developed by the Kevin Company 
(1954-1955); 
7. Uplands Apartments, Ralph Ch 
(c. 1950); 
8. Edmonson Village Shopping 
Center, Joseph and Jacob Myerhoj 
(1947/1949) . 
(Compiled by the author; map by 
UMBC Cartographic Services) 
growth occurring in the late 1940s following the end of the wartime build-
ing moratorium, and in the early 1950s. During the 1940s the portion 
north of Edmondson Avenue (tract 1608) increased its housing units by 43 
percent, and during the 1950s by another 19 percent. South of Edmondson 
Avenue (tract 2007) expansion was on a slightly smaller, but still impres-
sive, scale: a growth rate of 25 percent during the 1940s, and 16 per cent 
during the 1950s.1 7 Moreover, development of the extensive triangle in the 
neighborhood's northwest (census tract 2804, just beyond tract 1608) 
added to the very substantial spurt of new housing. Virtually all of the new 
housing was rowhouse in type, with the exception of apartments on the 
community's margins in Edmondale and Uplands. The net effect of this 
postwar boom was that by 1955 the entire area had been filled in, as 
densely developed as rowhouse layout would permit. (See map 4.) 
The James Keelty Company continued to be the prime mover, 
though now without its founder, who died in 1944. 18 Continuing as a fami-
ly firm (under James, Jr., who was joined after the war by younger broth-
er Joseph), the company completed the development the elder Keelty had 
begun. Few periods in Keelty's earlier operations exhibited the speed and 
scale of the company's postwar development. The standard Edmondson 
area rowhouse of this era was colonial in its architectural style, essentially 
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a simple adaptation of the six-room daylight version that Keelty had built 
in the Edmondson area beginning in the 1920s. 
Keelty's colonial daylights from the late 1930s and the postwar period 
represented a distinct retrenchment from the commodious two and a half-
story English-style Wildwood daylights that had run afoul of Depression 
economics. 19 The slightly smaller and more modest design signaled a 
market decision to downscale Edmondson area housing, an eventuality 
with significant consequences for the community's postwar growth and 
social character. 
Many colonial-style features were structurally superficial-old brick, 
tall windows, white fascia boards. The early colonials (those built until ap-
proximately 1950) were characterized by full gabled slate roofs, porches 
with matching slate, lower front bays at intervals, and varied front door 
lintels.2o Many of the colonial rows continued to enjoy the greater distance 
from the street and the resulting larger yards that had characterized the 
Wildwood section, but the newer developments omitted garages. An impor-
tant construction innovation was the use of concrete block as a backing for 
the brick fa~ades, which Joseph Keelty maintains "was a labor-saving and 
cost-saving device, without any sacrifice in quality." 
However, by 1950 the colonial adaptations were downscaled further. 
Keelty Company colonial daylights built in the final stages of develop-
ment represented a simpler version, with a low slate mansard front roof 
(which masked a nearly flat roof) and a concrete front entry slab (instead 
of a full covered porch). Moreover, these colonials had smaller overall 
dimensions.21 The gradual alteration of the postwar colonials suggest 
cost-cutting measures and a reversal of the company's earlier pattern of 
continuing to upscale its housing product in the area, not simply adapta-
tions to changing architectural tastes and building methods. 
Edmondson's postwar house-building boom benefited from new mort-
gage opportunities, just as did new housing elsewhere. Long term FHA-
guaranteed mortgages, a product of New Deal Depression-era innovations, 
provided more protection for consumers while permitting builders to secure 
construction loans that would roll over into permanent savings and loan 
financing, thereby freeing up capital for additional new development. After 
the war, VA financing provided further federal assistance for new housing. 
Joseph Keelty observed: "There hadn't been any [new housing] built in 
four years, and people had money-G.!. Bill financing enabled a lot of 
people to buy houses." As in the prewar period, a high level of home owner-
ship continued to characterize the Edmondson area; 73 percent of the Ed-
mondson housing stock was owner-occupied in 1950.22 
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In the late 1940s the Keelty Company sold off a portion of its unde-
veloped land. The section north of Wildwood was purchased by developer 
Leonard Stallman, whose Edmondale Building Company proceeded rap-
idly to erect its own version of colonial-style rowhouses and the area's first 
large apartment complex, the Edmondale Apartments. While some Ed-
mondale houses featured the gabled slate roofs of the earlier colonial style, 
most represented a considerably more spartan version that exhibited few of 
the architectural embellishments that had made the Keelty colonials dis-
tinctive.23 In 1949 Edmondale houses were advertised as selling for $8,590 
[plus a ground rent 0[$90], "only $890 down for vets." These less expensive 
colonials were presented with the familiar lure of the suburban ideal: "Ev-
erything about Edmondale is aimed at making the family's health, well-
being, and happiness go up, up, up! They'll be near schools, churches, play-
grounds, the Edmondson Village Shopping Center. They'll be in a modern, 
sunshiny neighborhood away from the roar of mid-town ... but only 20 
minutes from downtown by streetcar." 24 The Edmondale Apartments, a 
significant deviation from the otherwise uniform rowhouse character of the 
area, consisted of two- and three-story buildings, the taller exhibiting front 
columns as a bow to the neighborhood's colonial theme. By 1950 much of 
the Edmondale development had been completed, a sizable component of 
Edmondson's postwar building boom. 
In 1950 the Keelty Company began construction in its remaining un-
developed portion of the Wildwood tract-the northwestern triangle 
along Kevin and Wicklow and their cross streets. (See map 4.) The 1950 
master plan for the section (Section 10, Wildwood) indicated dense row-
house development, providing for 366 new dwellings. (See figure 17.) In 
1952 the Keelty Company advertised some of these (Kevin Road) houses 
in the following manner: 
Check the location, the features, the value of the beautiful Keelty-built homes, 
Edmondson Avenue section, on Kevin Road ... facing beautiful Gwynns Falls 
Park .... One of the highest elevations in Baltimore-with all suburban advan-
tages and all city conveniences. Near St. Bernardine's Catholic Church and 
School, a fine elementary school, shopping centers, and transportation .... 
Three large bedrooms-gas-fired automatic hot-water heater-modern kitchen 
units-tiled bathroom-good sized closets-all modern conveniences and finest 
trimwork .... These homes are selling fast because the price can't be beat for 
homes of this quality. Only $9800-ground rent $96-on terms as low as $950 
down, $72.70 a month to qualified veterans. 25 
Abruptly, however, the Kevin Road development changed hands; in 1954 
Kevin Road rowhouses were being advertised by the Kevin Company for 
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Figure 17. Group Homes Development Plan, Wildwood Section 10, James 
Keelty Company, November 27, 1950. Lots and house layouts have been 
planned to accommodate the bends of Flowerton Road and Rokeby Road at 
the top of the map; note the small tracts, otherwise unusable, designated as 
"play area." In the lower section the streets are Kevin Road (above) and 
Wicklow Road (below); adjacent portions of Kevin and Wicklow (to the left 
[NW] of the section shown here) were sold to the Kevin Company for de-
velopment in 1954. Goseph Keelty) 
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$9500. 26 The Keelty Company had sold its last project in the Edmondson 
area, where operations had been underway since the early 1920s. The 
area's prime developer had built a community and moved on before com-
pleting the final phase of its plans. 
From the early 1930s onward the Keelty Company increasingly had 
become involved in development beyond the confines of the Edmondson 
section. During the 1930s and 1940s Rodgers Forge, just north of the city 
limits in Baltimore County, emerged as its showpiece for rowhouse devel-
opment, a northern suburban counterpoint to its finest Wildwood row-
houses. In the early 1950s, on the eve of the company's exit from the Ed-
mondson area, development in Rodgers Forge continued strong. In 1955 
the Keelty Company announced a new rowhouse development on the west 
side, beyond the city limits (Frederick Heights). But the firm was about to 
make a dramatic shift from rowhouse to ranch-style detached house, a 
move initiated with Colonial Gardens, farther to the west in the Catonsville 
area of suburban Baltimore County. Split-levels, ranchers, and two-story 
cottages-these house styles represented considerable upgrading in terms 
of type and cost, and they appealed to a more affiuent clientele.27 The 
Keelty Company had adopted a new version of the suburban ideal. Joseph 
Keelty reflected on the company's change of direction and its eventual 
abandonment of westside development altogether: "Yes, we finished up 
Wildwood-sold the last lots there and didn't build it-I would say in the 
middle fifties. Then we moved up into the Catonsville area; we did several 
on Frederick Road-Medford, Frederick Heights. Then we did a couple of 
individual house [developments ]-we got away from the rowhouse-one 
was Keeper Hill [off of Rolling Road]; some in Colonial Gardens. It was 
probably in the latter fifties that we didn't have any more land out in that 
area and mainly concentrated in the north end, from Rodgers Forge north." 
By the mid-1950s, the Edmondson Avenue area's available parcels of 
land had been filled in, almost entirely with dwellings of the rowhouse 
type, and the neighborhood now bordered its own new regional shopping 
center. The final phases of the postwar housing boom brought some 
downscaling of the new housing stock and the exodus of the major devel-
oper. In retrospect, both eventualities signaled a new era for the commu-
nity; for the moment, they simply pointed to completion of three and a 
half decades of development. 
The postwar housing boom was not unique to the Edmondson area, 
of course, but part of a major phenomenon in metropolitan areas nation-
wide. Fueled by the opportunity for wartime work, large-scale migration 
to the country's industrial and commercial urban centers induced severe 
housing shortages. This hiatus, exacerbated by the virtual moratorium on 
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new house construction during the national emergency, produced enor-
mous pressure on the existing housing stock and created an insatiable 
demand for new housing at war's end. When the postwar period turned 
out to be an era of prosperity rather than the predicted economic depres-
sion, the demand for housing reached unprecedented proportions. The 
policies of federal lending agencies, which gave preference to new rather 
than existing housing, helped underwrite the shift to the suburbs. 
An important dimension of postwar suburbanization, though one sel-
dom acknowledged explicitly, was the factor of race. In Baltimore and 
many other cities where African American population had increased sig-
nificantly during the war but where housing space had remained vir-
tually the same as the result of traditional walls of segregation, African 
American housing needs intensified. In response to the twin forces of 
postwar residential expansion and the challenge to traditional racial pat-
terns, the white middle and working classes experienced the proverbial 
pull and push of suburbanization: the attraction of new housing in a sub-
urban setting, the push of groups from whom they sought social distance. 
These social forces combined to produce a wave of sub urbanization to 
edipse all previous versions. That surge not only fed Edmondson Vil-
lage's housing boom and accounted for the completion of its development; 
it also passed it by with a new form of tract home and ranch-style subur-
banization that left the city limits behind. The streetcar had been the 
vehicle of the Edmondson area's early development; the auto ferried the 
new outer suburbanites. 
The halt in new housing during the war made a bad situation even 
more desperate. Reporter Louis Azrael noted in a 1946 Baltimore News-
Post column that Baltimore ranked first among the seven largest cities in 
the dilapidation of its housing stock: "Our housing situation, even if it 
should return to peace-time levels, would still be worse than in any other 
of the nation's biggest cities." 28 
At war's end the problem of dilapidated housing remained unad-
dressed, but the boom in new suburban housing took little time getting 
underway. Two factors stand out in the postwar figures: 1) the enormous 
magnitude of new housing activity, and 2) the shift from city to suburban 
county development. Between 1940 and 1950 the housing stock of the met-
ropolitan area as a whole (SMSA) expanded by 31 percent-much of it 
occurring in the latter 1940s-and between 1950 and 1960 by an addition-
al 39 percent. Figures for Baltimore City alone, though showing growth 
rates of 17 and 18 percent for the two decades, respectively, were less 
dramatic.29 Increasingly, Baltimore City's development was leveling off or 
declining as available areas filled up, and nearby county suburban areas 
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were the hot spots for residential development. As Frank Henry observed 
in a 1950 Sun article on the role of developers in the creation of new neigh-
borhoods: "For the house builders it has been a long, gigantic game of 
leapfrog, going forward by fits and starts. They build one neighborhood 
on the city's perimeter and leap over that to build another beyond. And 
now that little land is left within the city for mass housing developments, 
the contractors have gone into Baltimore and Anne Arundel counties." 30 
Relentlessly, the developing edge of the urban area was moving beyond 
the city's political boundaries. 
By 1949 the postwar building boom was in full swing. "New Homes 
for 72,000" blared a headline in the Sun, which estimated that twenty 
thousand new living units in the metropolitan area in 1948-49 would be 
enough to house the entire population of Silver Spring, then considered 
Maryland's second largest city. A water bureau official expressed the be-
lief that the number of dwelling units being erected "must equal or exceed 
the number undertaken in the boom years of the twenties." 31 In 1950 the 
Sun noted "Heavy Moving Underway," citing estimates by overworked 
moving companies that the current volume of housing relocations repre-
sented "the biggest mass movement of tenants since World War II broke 
out." 32 An interviewee involved in the real estate industry during this 
period observed that the combination of pent-up demand, reasonable 
prices, available financing (including FHA and VA loans), and new hous-
ing opportunities created an unprecedented housing market; as he put it, 
"The 'Open House' replaced sex and baseball as the national pastime." 33 
Though the rowhouse continued to be a popular housing choice, it 
was being challenged by apartments and by newer detached housing 
styles. Carroll Williams, Sun real estate reporter, estimated that one-
quarter of the new units were apartments, mostly of the garden type, 
meaning that they were two or three story structures, accessible by stairs 
rather than elevators.34 In 1950 he reported that some thirteen thousand 
apartment units were recently completed or underway, enough to house 
fifty thousand people. The largest such project, Westland Gardens, lay 
just beyond the city limits on the southwest side in Baltimore County. The 
second largest, Uplands (built by Ralph Chiaro), adjoined the Edmondson 
Village Shopping Center, occupying a portion ofland formerly part of the 
Uplands Estate from which it took its name. The, smaller Edmondale 
Apartments project on the other edge of the Edmondson Village section 
contributed to the great increase in apartment availability on the west 
side, though Williams commented that a great deal of the apartment de-
velopment activity was on the city's northern fringe. 35 
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Demand for the ever-popular Baltimore rowhouse continued to be 
strong, primarily the daylight "group home" version, which departed 
from the earlier uninterrupted row by clustering groups of row houses and 
provided for front yard set-back. As the Sun noted: "Well-lighted, well-
ventilated and with trees on their lawns, they were a far cry from the 
blind-roomed dwellings of the turn of the century." 36 
But most popular in the rapidly developing suburban areas at the 
city's edge and beyond were detached houses. Tract frame bungalows of-
fered the most economical version. More desirable, if they could be af-
forded, were what Carroll Williams referred to in 1949 as "ramblers": 
"the West's sprawling, squat, ranch-type houses." 37 By the late 1950s 
Williams was claiming in Sun articles that new house construction was 
almost evenly divided between the rowhouse (or group house) and de-
tached houses (bungalows, ranchers, or ramblers). The trend, he said, 
was toward larger versions, with design reflecting the interest in "outdoor 
living with inclosed gardens, covered patios, ornamental fences, ponds 
and pools, barbecue pits and outdoor fireplaces"-and carportsP8 Clear-
ly 1950s-style suburbanization was leaving Edmondson's rowhouses be-
hind in style, space, and cost. 
Highway expansion struggled to keep pace with the new wave of sub-
urbanization and provided it with fresh impetus. When Baltimore County 
community associations resisted plans for a metropolitan beltway in 
1953-54, highway officials countered that the proposed road was not in-
tended primarily as a bypass but that· instead it was needed to reduce 
congestion in the rapidly growing suburban sector, contending that 85 
percent of the traffic would be intracounty, not interstate.39 The highway, 
begun in 1954 and finally completed in 1962, indeed contributed to a 
"boom around the beltway"; as one regional publication put it: "The new 
beltways for motor vehicles around Baltimore and Washington were con-
ceived mainly as by-passes but have in fact fundamentally altered the real 
estate and business structures of the two metropolitan areas."40 A 1965 
study by the James Rouse Company concluded that the Baltimore Belt-
way, the first circumferential highway completed under the federal inter-
state program, had generated "fully two-thirds of all major retail develop-
ment in the Baltimore area in the past five years."41 
The Racial Geography of Housing in Postwar Baltimore 
While suburban development was streaming beyond the Edmondson Vil-
lage section on the western side, equally significant social and economic 
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pressure was building up to its east. Between 1930 and 1950 Baltimore 
City's African American population increased by nearly 60 percent (from 
142,106 in 1930 to 165,843 in 1940 to 225,099 in 1950). Yet, during the 
Depression decade and the World War II years the racial boundary of 
Baltimore's African American district remained virtually unchanged. On 
the west side in both 1930 and 1940 it ran along Fulton Avenue south of 
Edmondson Avenue and along Pulaski Street north of Edmondson; by 
1950 there had only been modest movement, shifting the four additional 
blocks west to Pulaski below Edmondson Avenue. 42 (See map 1.) Al-
though Pulaski Street was only a mile from the Edmondson area's eastern 
edge, this relatively small degree of change may not have appeared to 
represent a fundamental alteration in the racial geography of housing. 
Even as the ghetto boundary began to ease westward, residential segrega-
tion continued to prevail. In 1950 seventeen census tracts in the westside 
ghetto had African American percentages over 75 percent (5 more than in 
1940), while three had more than 50 percent. North or west of the new 
line no census tract had as much as a 25 percent African American pres-
ence. 
Residential segregation not only limited the geographical options 
available for African American residency in Baltimore but restricted Afri-
can Americans to some of the oldest, poorest sections of the city as well. 
In the early 1940s plans for an expressway to run west from the city's 
center along the Franklin-Mulberry streets corridor, right through the 
heart of the west Baltimore ghetto, were justified both because the high-
way would provide relief from automobile congestion and because it 
would aid in "the rehabilitation of blighted areas." Writing on behalf of 
the Commission on the City Plan, J.D. Steele argued: "This highway will 
cut through the heart of the worst slum area, demolishing in the west half 
of the freeway approximately 2500 dwelling units, and a trip afoot, mak-
ing detours into the alleys, will be sufficient to convince most people of 
the need for cleaning out these slum areas." 43 In a series of articles on the 
proposed expressway and its impact in the Sun in 1944, Frederick Kreller 
noted that along the route one found some white residents whose "homes 
are well tended despite their age." He observed however,: ''As the [pro-
posed] freeway passes beyond Fulton Avenue, and into the section occu-
pied by Negroes deterioration becomes more evident. Homes are very 
badly in need of repair and paint; dead rats lie in the street where they 
were crushed by automobiles; alleys are littered with debris and foul-
smelling garbage; lots where homes formerly stood are covered with a 
thick layer of ashes .... Many of the houses in this section are unfit for 
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humans." 44 That same year the Citizens Planning and Housing Associa-
tion released a report estimating that between 1940 and 1944 there had been 
"a continuous in-migration at an average rate of 300 to 400 Negroes a 
month," yet during the same period "only one additional dwelling unit for 
each fifteen additional Negroes" had been added to the housing stock.45 
One postwar response to the acute conditions portrayed by such as-
sessments was the erection of public housing projects, a solution that 
eliminated slum housing through urban renewal while it perpetuated the 
segregation of the ghetto. By 1955 the Housing Authority of Baltimore 
announced plans for three major public housing complexes designed to 
accommodate 1,668 families. In 1957 work began on one of these projects 
on the city's west side, Lexington Terrace, with one fourteen-story and 
four eleven-story apartment buildings.% In the early 1960s another major 
complex, the George P. Murphy Homes, was erected nearby. These high-
rise dream projects of the 1950s and 1960s all too soon would become the 
new slums of later decades. 
The war years and their aftermath produced ambivalent economic 
prospects for African Americans. While many suffered from dislocation 
and traditional limitations onjob opportunity, a sizable number benefited 
from employment expansion in such formerly restricted areas as industry 
and governmentY Moreover, the antitotalitarian and antiracist ideology 
of the war effort helped to foster a climate for a formative civil rights 
challenge to segregation and discrimination. These changes heightened 
expectations for Mrican Americans, yet hopes remained unfulfilled in the 
area of housing, even for those whose improved economic status provided 
them the financial means to seek new opportunities. Carroll Williams, 
writing in the Sun in 1955, called attention to the continued neglect of 
African American housing needs: "The Negro population of Baltimore 
has always lived in hand-me-downs." Since the dramatic postwar boom in 
new house construction was for whites only, he argued, African Ameri-
cans with improved economic status had no alternative except to try to 
push into secondhand housing in surrounding white areas. Williams felt 
that the relationship between African American housing needs and a 
whites-only building boom was direct: "When the history of home build-
ing in this decade is written, it will be seen that the improved status of the 
Negro is one of the chief factors behind our huge home-building boom. 
For though practically all of the home building has been undertaken with 
white occupancy in mind, it has been the pressure of the Negro popula-
tion on the older houses of white occupancy, that has made such a ready 
market for the new." 48 
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As racial change began to occur on the west side, it conformed to 
familiar patterns of residential race relations in the dual housing market. 
When African Americans settled on formerly all-white blocks, whites fol-
lowed long-time Baltimore patterns through either resistance or flight. 
The former was evident, for example, when in 1948 the Sun reported on a 
home on the west side (in the 1400 block of West Fayette Street, near 
Franklin Square) that had been vandalized when an African American 
family moved in, its windows broken and the letters "KKK" smeared on 
the outside.49 Flight appeared to be more common than overt resistance. 
For instance, in that same year the congregation of Christ Methodist 
Church, located at North Avenue and Retreat Street since 1895, sold its 
building to an African American Baptist church and merged with the 
Edmondson Avenue Methodist Church, an action clearly signaling the 
expansion of African American residency into a section on the northern 
fringe of the prewar racial boundary and the flight of the white congrega-
tion's members westward.50 While flight may not have been on a large 
scale from a metropolitan perspective in the late 1940s and while it may 
still have seemed distant to residents of Edmondson Village, it neverthe-
less could be dramatic in those sections directly affected. One African 
American interviewee, Samuel Brown, recounted the first postwar move-
ment of African Americans westward and the panicked white response: 
Black people started moving out of the confined areas somewhere around forty-
seven or forty-eight, but what would happen was that whites would evacuate a 
block or two blocks, and black people would move in. The evacuation would take 
place first. I remember streets like Fulton Avenue, Monroe Street-they were once 
totally white, and they went through the transition and changed somewhere be-
tween forty-six and forty-nine-that was the time I was in service-when I went in, 
there were no black people and when I came out they were black streets .... But it 
wasn't integration ... in the early phases, it was an 'evacuation.51 
A survey of real estate advertisements in the Baltimore Sun reflects 
the changing residential pattern on the west side.52 The immediate post-
war years brought an increase in listings for houses for sale under the 
designation "colored," as real estate firms either reflected or created 
changing residential patterns in choosing to market houses under this 
rubric. Often ads noted that the house already was vacant, confirmation 
that evacuation indeed had taken place. The specification of vacancy im-
plied there need be no direct contact between former (white) residents 
and new buyers, whether aspirant African American homeowners or 
those wishing to invest in African American-occupied housing. 
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The year 1950 marked a watershed in the racial geography of the west 
side, if one is to use the ads as an indicator. Prior to that year few listings 
advertised any housing west of the Fulton Avenue/Pulaski Street bound-
ary as "colored." However, in 1950 the line was breached with notices for 
houses in the 2200 block of West Saratoga Street immediately to the west, 
while farther to the northwest notice was served of "Colored Homes-
Walbrook Specials." A year later housing in the 2500 blocks of westside 
streets (Edmondson Avenue, West Fayette Street, West Lanvale Street) 
was advertised as "colored," and in one more year the same was true for 
the 2700 and 2800 blocks (Edmondson Avenue, Ellicott Driveway, Har-
lem Avenue). In 1953 a house in the 3000 block of Lanvale Street was 
referred to as one of "Walbrook's Outstanding Colored Buys." Walbrook, 
the next neighborhood to the east of the Edmondson ViHage area, sud-
denly was experiencing massive racial change. Within a period of only 
two to three years the city's racial boundary had shifted nearly a mile 
westward. Significant African American settlement was now occurring on 
the adjacent hill just across the Gwynns Falls ravine from the Edmondson 
area's boundary. 
Challenges to the Racial Status Quo 
The breach in old lines of residential restriction represented a visiblle sign 
of changing times at the moment when a variety of forces were coalescing 
to challenge the racial status quo in Baltimore and elsewhere. While ini-
tially these seemed little likely to impinge on the rowhouse preserve where 
notions of social insulation prevailed, they represented a significant un-
dercurrent in the postwar social climate. 
Compared to some cities, Baltimore had a long tradition of civic ac-
tivism and political involvement among its African American popula-
tion.53 By the turn of the century the shift from earlier residential patterns 
of dispersion to increased ghettolike concentration on the near west side 
had helped to make the section called Old West Baltimore the base for a 
number of important institutions, particularly churches, which served as 
the center for community cohesion and action. The desperate conditions 
of the 1930s provided fertile ground for challenges to the social and eco-
nomic manifestations of segregation and discrimination, launching a civil 
rights movement that continued its assaults for the next several decades. 
Karen Olson and others have called attention to the important working 
coalition established in the 1930s between Lillie Carroll Jackson, who was 
elected president of the dormant Baltimore branch of the NAACP in 1935; 
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Carl Murphy, Jr., publisher of the locally produced Afro-American, which 
provided publicity for the movement; and the Interdenominational Min-
isterial Alliance, a politically powerful association of African American 
clergy. Under Jackson's leadership and with the support of the other two 
partners, the Baltimore branch became an energetic grassroots organiza-
tion, its membership by 1946 making it the largest chapter in the country. 
During the 1930s and the years of World War II this coalition, some-
times joined by white progressives, launched a series of assaults on seg-
regation and discrimination. In the early 1930s protests were mounted 
against stores in the African American community that refused to hire 
African Americans, rallying around the slogan, "Don't Buy Where You 
Can't Work." Effective voter registration campaigns dramatically in-
creased the size and influence of the African American electorate and 
helped secure the victory of Republican candidate Theodore McKeldin as 
mayor in 1943; McKeldin in turn appointed African Americans to impor-
tant positions in the city administration and opened some jobs in city 
employment. Protests against lynchings on Maryland's Eastern Shore 
galvanized the African American community in the 1930s, as did demon-
strations against brutality by the Baltimore police force during World 
War II. The Baltimore branch of the NAACP filed suit against residential 
restrictive covenants; though the case was lost in the Maryland Court of 
Appeals in 1938, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled against the constitu-
tionality of such state-sanctioned discrimination ten years later. 
Educational opportunity remained a central concern, especially for 
Lillie Carroll Jackson, whose own political activism stemmed in part from 
the indignation she felt when her own daughters were denied admission to 
Maryland institutions of higher education. Beginning in the 1930s the 
NAACP's legal counsel, Baltimore-born Thurgood Marshall, initiated a 
series of suits against educational discrimination that eventually proved 
successful in challenging the segregation of professional and graduate 
schools at the University of Maryland (including the School of Law, to 
which he himself earlier had been denied admission) and laid the ground-
work for the landmark 1954 Supreme Court Brown decision. 
In the postwar period the campaign found new energy; the coalition 
expanded to include broader white participation and added newer orga-
nizations, such as CORE. Targets of protests and demonstrations in Bal-
timore included downtown theaters, department stores, and eating estab-
lishments, with breakthroughs eventuating on all three fronts by the 
mid-1950s. Further employment progress occurred in 1953 with the end-
ing of racial discrimination for jobs in the city's fire department. 
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Education again took center stage as the strategy of mounting a na-
tional legal attack on segregated schooling had its local counterpart in 
challenges to racial separation in the Baltimore City schools. In 1945 the 
Baltimore branch of the NAACP demanded a parallel African American 
administration if the school system remained segregated, but in subse-
quent years its efforts focused upon gaining entry for qualified African 
American students to specialized programs currently available only to 
whites and where no parallel Jim Crow program existed.~;4 This strategy 
challenged the "separate but equal" doctrine; the potential cost ofprovid-
ing such programs on a divided basis upped the financial ante and caused 
moderate whites to question whether the price of segregation was worth the 
trouble. The approach bore fruit in 1952 when the Baltimore Board of 
School Commissioners confronted the issue posed by sixteeen young Afri-
can American men who had applied to Baltimore Polytechnic Institute, the 
public school system's well-regarded selective male-only secondary school 
for math and engineering. As the board saw it, the questions posed were 
twofold: I) whether the youth qualified by Poly's admission standards, and 
2) whether a comparable program could be established at all-African 
American Frederick Douglass High School. When the board was advised 
that ten men qualified, the debate focused on the issue of comparability, 
and on these grounds the board on a 5 to 3 vote decided to admit the ten to 
Poly, a decision supported by the president of the board (an appointee of 
the mayor, Thomas D'Alesandro, Jr.) and Governor McKeldin. Integra-
tion of Poly proceeded with little fanfare, and subsequent challenges were 
mounted for African American admission to other selective programs at 
all-female Western High School and at Mergenthaler Vocational and Tech-
nical SchooI.55 
These developments meant that the May 17, 1954, Supreme Court 
ruling that segregation in schooling was unconstitutional did not come as 
a complete surprise in Baltimore, and local officials, pressed by the civil 
rights coalition, moved quickly to address the issue. At its regular June 3, 
1954, meeting, the board received the opinion of the city solicitor that the 
Supreme Court decision took precedence over state segregation statutes, 
and the School Board, with little debate, unanimously adopted a resolu-
tion endorsed by School Superintendent John H. Fischer and Board Pres-
ident Walter Sondheim that "our system should be conformed to a non-
segregated basis to be in effect by the opening of schools in September of 
this year." The provision for immediate implementation of the open en-
roHment plan gave Baltimore the distinction of being the first segregated 
school system to approve a plan to integrate, and the following fall 3 
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percent of the city's African American children elected to enter formerly 
all-white schools. Clearly the growth of a broad-based civil rights coali-
tion and the support of key city elected officials and administrators were 
essential elements in these developments.56 
While the 1954 Supreme Court decision and the subsequent Bal-
timore School Board action may not have been unexpected for careful 
followers of civil rights issues, the inevitability of successful challenges to 
the prevailing racial status quo, so apparent in retrospect, was by no 
means a given at the time for many white residents of Baltimore in com-
munities such as Edmondson Village-or elsewhere in the nation, for 
that matter. In what seemed to be a golden era of postwar prosperity and 
well-being, the prospect of fundamental changes may have appeared dis-
tant and remote, rumblings beneath the surface with little likelihood of 
altering familiar patterns. Yet, the suburban housing boom and chal-
lenges to the racial status quo represented twin forces of metropolitan 
change occurring in the postwar era with potentially profound conse-
quences for the rowhouse neighborhood. 
The Demographics of the Village's Golden Age 
The postwar Edmondson Village community experienced the paradox of 
simultaneous stability and growth. The sense of stability resulted from 
the strong tradition of residential permanence and the general persistence 
of the neighborhood's social character. Yet, population growth, a conse-
quence of housing expansion and the baby boom, provided a sense of 
youthfulness, vigor, and vitality. 
Population bulged in the years during and following World War II, 
increasing overall by nearly 40 percent between 1940 and 1950 (from 
11,779 to 16,388 in the two tracts); a more modest 10 percent growth (to 
18,074) occurred between 1950 and 1960.57 Moreover, development on the 
northwest (the triangle between Walnut Avenue and the old city line west 
of Woodington, not included in the two census tracts) further contributed 
to the population surge of the contiguous Edmondson rowhouse area. 
As communities elsewhere, Edmondson Village experienced a baby 
boom. Between 1940 and 1950 the number of children under five years old 
more than doubled, and the number of those age five through nineteen 
increased substantially, though less dramatically. The growing numbers 
of young residents helped to give the community a youthful cast and pro-
vided the basis for a suburban-style teenage culture in the 1950s. At the 
same time, a substantial proportion of the population was maturing. For 
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example, between 1940 and 1950 those over age fifty-five also increased 
significantly in number (from 1,684 to 2,655), while their fraction of the 
total remained at a relatively constant one in seven. 
The sample block survey provides some insight into this dynamic of 
stability and growth. Blocks settled prior to World War II remained re-
markably stable residentially into the late 1940s and early 1950s. In 1940, 
for instance, 62 percent of residen~es in the block study sample were in-
habited by their original householders and 38 percent by second house-
holders. In 1950, first householders still constituted 56 percent and sec-
ond householders 33 percent on the sample blocks, suggesting a high 
degree of residential stability. 58 The 1950 census, which did not discrimi-
nate between new and existing housing, found that in Edmondson Village 
86 percent had resided in the same house the previous year, close to the 
percentage (84) for the city as a whole. Given such residential tenure, new 
housing construction provided the major opportunity for younger resi-
dents attracted to the area. 
Edmondson Village's newcomers continued to follow the same migra-
tion paths as their predecessors. In 1940 and 1950 their places of previous 
residence were virtually identical; almost entirely from the Baltimore 
area, most either moved from neighborhoods on the west side closer to the 
city or from other parts of Edmondson Village. However, shortly after the 
war's end the direction of out-migration changed markedly. While most 
moves during the 1940s continued to be to other parts of Baltimore City, 
during the 1950s most were westward to suburban county areas.59 
As housing expanded and population grew, the occupational charac-
ter of the Edmondson Avenue area's wage earners remained remarkably 
consistent. In 1940, 57 percent were in white-collar occupations; ten years 
later the percentage was 56. Among men, slightly more than half had 
white-collar occupations in 1940; slightly less than half did so in 1950-
but the difference was insignificant. 
In 1940, at the end of the Depression decade, 29 percent of Ed-
mondson area women were in the paid labor force (women constituting 
28 percent of the total). No doubt the war years brought some increase 
(census data provides no basis for making this determination with cer-
tainty, though there is little indication that Edmondson Village women 
were likely candidates for roles as "Rosie the Riveter"), but in 1950 female 
labor force participation had risen only slightly to 32 percent (30 percent 
of the total). However, the continued pattern of work outside the home by 
a substantial minority of women suggested that the traditional norm was 
not so absolute as community ideology would have it. Most who did so 
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were employed in lower level pink-collar positions; in 1950, for example, 
approximately half of women workers were in clerical occupations.60 
Also remaining consistent was the strong rate of home ownership, 
which had been a high 63 percent even at the end of the Depression 
decade in 1940 and rose to 73 percent by 1950. Housing values declined 
during the Depression, but rebounded in the postwar period. The esti-
mated median value of homes in tract 1608 in 1940 had been $3,528; ten 
years later it stood at $9,142. In 1940 the estimated value for Edmondson 
Avenue owner-occupied houses was 18 percent above the city median; in 
1950 it was 22 percent higher.61 
Finally, to this portrait of relative stability amidst change must be 
added the ingredient of race. Edmondson Village's rowhouses were still 
white-only. In 1950 just forty-four African Americans resided in the com-
bined tracts-living on the margins of the area-the exact number as 
twenty years previously in 1930. (See map 2.) 
Rowhouse Culture in the Postwar Years 
Until World War II, suburbanization typically took two forms. One was 
represented by elite developments such as Baltimore's Roland Park and 
Guilford, which promised elegance, privacy, and exclusivity for a social 
elite. Rowhouse suburbanization constituted the other principal option. 
Built on a much more modest scale, with a high degree of density and 
without the parklike setting of the classical suburban ideal, rowhouse de-
velopments nevertheless offered an analog to the more affluent version in 
their promise of a family-oriented environment, social homogeneity, and 
respite from urban life. And they did so at a cost that a broad middle-
income cross section could afford. 
Post-World War II suburbanization, however, offered new alterna-
tives to this polar choice. As buses replaced trolleys and as private auto-
mobiles proliferated, the density of rowhouse suburbia was at once less 
necessary and less appealing. Bungalow developments in the immediate 
postwar years departed from the attached row to provide detached dwell-
ings set on surrounding yards, though often on an extremely modest 
scale, as if developers only timidly recognized the potential to be tapped 
by expanded house and yard size. By the early 1950s, however, ranch-style 
suburbanization realized this opportunity, providing greater floor space 
(frequently on a single-floor or split-level plan, which eliminated the 
stair-climbing of traditional two-story rowhouse and detached house de-
sign), larger yards, and accommodations for the automobile-driveways, 
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carports, garages. While postwar ranch-style suburbanization had its 
wide variety of cost and class, compared to the rowhouse suburbs it more 
closely resembled the earlier, upper-class version in its appeal to space, 
amenity, and differentiation. Privacy was another matter. Physical sep-
aration of housing, large yards, and frequently isolated settings afforded 
conditions conducive to social distance, but life cycle considerations (the 
prevalence of young families) and the common circumstances of suburban 
pioneering (cut off, for instance, from family networks) often promoted a 
passion for togetherness that became a 1950s stereotype.62 
Edmondson Village, with its own early postwar housing and youth 
booms, in some respects mirrored these postwar suburban trends, its reju-
venation and family oriented-lifestyles resembling newer outer suburban 
versions. Moreover, Edmondson Village continued to offer the suburban 
assurance of social homogeneity. In these respects, therefore, postwar Ed-
mondson Village shared in the burgeoning suburban culture of the late 
1940s and early 1950s, its lifestyles and social patterns congruent with the 
white middle-class mainstream whose economic prosperity and social sat-
isfaction seemed to set a golden tone for the era. The realities, of course, 
were that rowhouse suburbanization would have a hard time competing 
for upwardly mobile aspirations. Moreover, the social and economic bar-
riers that had insulated outer city rowhouse suburbs from the changing 
demography of the inner city would prove transitory and illusory. Still, 
the logic of suburban differentiation went virtually unquestioned-in Ed-
mondson Village, as in the rest of white suburban America. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that many white interviewees recall the 
postwar period as a golden era for Edmondson Village. Life in the Village 
sufficiently resembled trend-setting suburban styles to make Villagers part 
of the mainstream, and the prospect of change seemed remote enough to 
have played little role in the collective consciousness. In these respects, 
retrospective interviews with residents recalling this era no doubt closely 
resemble perceived social reality. At the same time, however, such recollec-
tions may exaggerate the degree of satisfaction and well-being interviewees 
associate with the period, not only because of the inevitable aura of nos-
talgia that must be sifted when considering any oral history narrative but 
particularly because many interviewees participated as young parents or 
as youth in the dominant family-oriented suburban culture that they view 
as the hallmark of the period. Further, there can be no doubt that the 
trauma of eventual massive racial change has contributed substantially to 
the memory of the period immediately prior as a golden, yet lost, epoch. 
Interview recollections portray a postwar reaffirmation of the subur-
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ban version of traditional family values and gender roles that had charac-
terized the community's aspirations since its establishment as a rowhouse 
preserve in the 1920s, as discussed in chapter 2. Elaine Tyler May has 
argued that in the aftermath of the Second World War, middle-class Amer-
ica embraced a resurgent domesticity through young marriages, parenting,. 
and traditional roles for women as housewives and men as breadwinners: 
she attributes these trends to the dominant preoccupation ,of the period 
with security and containment.63 Edmondson Village seemed in the main-
stream of these trends, displaying its own version of an ideal of domesticity 
that considered it normative to send men into the city each day to provide 
income for their families and to assign womerr, as wives, the care of home 
and children. 
For both men and women, the increasing expectation was the com-
pletion of education through high school. Few Edmondson Village youth 
of either gender went on to college. Joe Slovensky commented on the 
expectations for young men in the immediate postwar period: 
A lot of them quit school and went in the service. That was a thing to do then-
oh, to heck with school. But you know back then if you had a high school diploma 
it was like a college degree. So nobody said to me, well, what about college? That 
wasn't even mentioned. If somebody went to college, it was somebody who had 
money, or something, back then .... So, I would say maybe 50 percent of us quit 
. school and went in the service. That was the thing. And then come back, and wear 
your uniform up to the Village. Go up the bowling alley and show off your uni-
form. 
While Slovensky may have overestimated the high school drop-out rate 
for young men in an era when secondary school completion was becoming 
normative, clearly the expectation of college education was not widely 
shared. Among Edmondson Village's adults (25 years and older) in 1940, 
only 3.4 percent had attended four years of college, and in 1950 the per-
centage had risen to only 5 percent.64 The unlikelihood of college educa-
tion was even greater for young women, in the view of Edith Romaine: 
"Especially with the girls, there was no way in my mind I wanted to go to 
college. It wasn't talked about that much. Not many of us did, the wom-
en .... There were a few who went [to work]. I did work a year before I 
was married, and the only reason was because he [her fiance, who was in 
the service] wasn't here; most likely, if he was here, I'd have gotten mar-
ried even younger. See at that time we weren't exposed to as much as 
today-you know, the careers, especially for women."65 
After high school, men entered the labor force directly, while women 
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might work outside the home until marriage, or possibly until childbirth, 
but generally not thereafter. For many families, the pattern of separation 
of roles by place that had characterized the prewar era was reasserted in 
the postwar period. As one interviewee recalled her own family life: 
My mother was a housewife, and my father was an accountant downtown. He went 
to work everyday on a bus .... We did not own a car until I was seventeen, so 
everywhere we went we either walked, went by cab, or went by bus. [We] rarely left 
the neighborhood. I can't remember needing a car-it was not essential in those 
days. My father had a three-block walk to the bus stop-he thought it was good 
exercise. Ifwe went shopping, we walked to the Village. Ifwe went downtown, we 
took the bus. On those occasions when we had to go out ofthe neighborhood-like 
to a doctor or relative-we took a cab, but ... that didn't happen real often. Most 
oCthe time we stayed in the community.66 
The reassertion of the community's traditional separation of work 
roles according to gender was reflected in the fact that the percentage of 
women participating in the labor force increased only marginally between 
1940 and 1950. A significant percentage of the three in ten of Edmondson 
area women who were employed outside the home were in their early 
adult years prior to probable marriage, or young married women prior to 
likely childbirth. For example, Madge Cooper, who had been in the busi-
ness course in high school, observed: 
Oh, yes, we didn't really have an option [except to work], I don't believe, at the 
time-until we were married. Ultimately, we hoped that when we married we 
wouldn't have to work again, because we didn't at that time aspire to real careers. 
I worked until I was married about a year, and then my husband went into the 
military, shortly after we were married, because he was part of the Korea [contin-
gent], and I went off to live with him for a year, and when I came back I probably 
fully intended either to be pregnant or-When I came back I probably really 
wouldn't have considered going back to work-but I did, on a part-time basis, so 
we could buy our first house, and I believe that's where most of us were at that 
time; when we worked, we worked for a specific reason, and when we had attained 
that goal, then we stopped working.67 
Some who worked outside the home were married women with children, 
but usually the circumstances were considered special. Marilyn Simkins, 
for instance, reported that her mother always worked as a nurse, largely 
due to her father's poor health. Agnes Malone recalled several sisters who 
were "maiden ladies" and worked in department stores but contended 
that it was "just automatically accepted" that wives, particularly those 
with children, should stay home, except in what were considered atypical 
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situations: "There was one woman down the street with children, and she 
worked, but she was a single parent. That's the only one that I remember. 
Everybody else's mothers were at home." 68 While these various special 
circumstances apparently did not represent a fundamental deviation from 
past conventions, they indicate that after a decade and a half of Depres-
sion and war, the prevailing norm could nevertheless accommodate broad 
exceptions. Still, the dominant note in Edmondson Village's postwar ex-
perience was the reassertion of traditional patterns as part of the return 
to normalcy, and the era's relative prosperity made the norm attainable 
for many of the area's families. 
Housing and population growth produced expansion for institutions 
that provided for family-centered needs', such as churches and schools. 
For example, Edmondson Methodist Church in 1946 reported a severely 
overcrowded Sunday School facility and in 1951 dedicated a new educa-
tional building to serve these needs. Its congregational membership 
reached an all-time high in the early 1950s.69 
For families and their young members, the churches served as hubs 
both of religious and social life, their youth centers especially seeking to 
address a need not otherwise provided by institutional means in the com-
munity. Though the populace was relatively evenly divided between Protes-
tants and Roman Catholics-a division that separated some young people 
not only in church but in school-it was the Catholic Youth Organization 
at St. Bernardine's that most successfully attracted a broad spectrum of 
community youth, Catholic as well as non-Catholic. As Marilyn Simkins, 
whose family belonged to Christ Edmondson Methodist, recalled: 
Now, I was not Catholic-most of my friends were-I went to Christ Ed-
mondson, which offered little for young people .... St. Bernardine's had a very 
active CYO, one of the best, if not the best, in the area. They had a lot to offer 
kids-they had girls' and boys' basketball teams ... I think it was the priests, the 
rector-Msgr. Vaeth-he loved kids. They were scared of him, but he really liked 
kids, and I think he liked to have a very active parish .... As far as social life, for 
myself as a teenager, St. Bernardine's was it-for Edmondson Village .... So I 
danced. at St. Bernardine's on Saturday night, and worshipped at Christ Ed-
mondson on Sunday morning. 70 
Schools experienced overcrowding, and school construction lagged 
considerably behind need. In the early postwar years Lyndhurst Elemen-
tary School gained an annex, which housed a gym, cafeteria, and addi-
tional classrooms. By the early 1950s high school enrollment, until this 
point accommodated entirely by citywide schools outside the neighbor-
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Figure 18. Parishioners of St. 
Bernardine's Roman Catholic 
Church spill out onto Ed-
mondson Avenue and across 
the streetcar tracks for the 
dedication of a memorial to 
members who had served in 
the armed forces. The cere-
mony was photographed on 
August 23, 1948 by Albert D. 
Cochran of the Baltimore Sun. 
(Baltimore Sun) 
hood, reached such proportions that planning was initiated in 1954 for the 
area's first community-based comprehensive high school. Edmondson 
High School was completed in 1957 and, almost immediately, enlarged in 
1959. In the late 1950s its attraction may have been largely a function of the 
desire to avoid racially changing public schools in other parts ofthe city.71 
Edmondson Village teenagers participated in an emergent youth cul-
ture that became an important feature of the era, finding expression in 
the nation's popular culture even as national popular culture shaped it. 
Such social commentators as Robert and Helen Lynd had identified the 
rudiments of youth culture in their study of Muncie, Indiana, in the 1920s 
and 1930s, a product of the changing economic role of teenagers and the 
impact of the mass media. 72 A self-conscious youth culture, deferred by 
the Great Depression and World War II, even as those successive crises in 
some respects laid a basis for it by undermining adult authority and 
heightening age-based affiliations, found new expression in the prosper-
ing postwar period at the grassroots as well as the national level. 
The development of Edmondson Village's commercial facilities played 
an important role in the form a patterned youth culture took in the postwar 
community. The movies, the bowling alley, drug stores, and ice cream shops 
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all provided places not only for consumption but for gathering. The shop-
ping center management facilitated this role by furnishing facilities for a 
teen center and sponsoring dances hosted by popular media disk jockeys on 
the center's asphalt parking lot. Edith Romaine recalls: ''At Halloween up 
in the Village, they used to block off part of the parking area. They had 
Buddy Dean, you know, who was on television .... They used to have 
dancing contests. They would block off a whole section of the parking area. 
You'd be dancing right there, and cars would be passing by on Edmondson 
Avenue, and see all these kids dancing. That was nice." 
Commonality and togetherness are central themes in retrospective 
accounts of growing up as young people in Edmondson Village in the 
1950s. Within a context where everyone could be presumed to be pretty 
much alike, subtle forms of differentiation relating to age or personal 
tastes developed, as friends spent time together, walking places and 
"hanging out." In a peer-oriented youth culture, such groupings defined 
identity and status. They also mirrored national cultural phenomena, in-
dicative of the growing influence of mass media-especially films, televi-
sion, and records-as translated at the local level, complete with distinc-
tive language and clothing styles. 73 For example, Edmondson Village in 
the early to mid-1950s had its "drapes" and "squares," and recollections 
represent a veritable taxonomy of teenage behavior and dress. Joe Sloven-
sky said, ''A 'drape' was a bad guy-long hair-a D.A.-and he had 
pegged pants, usually black, with a pink stripe up the side." Edith Romaine 
described "drapes" as having "hair that curled down, just flopped down. 
They had the leather jackets. And the girls that were considered 'drapey' 
wore their hair long and pinned it right behind the ear with bobbie pins. 
They wore it real long. Now, see the squares would look like this: plaid, 
khaki pants, crew neck sweaters, shorter hair .... I guess I was more 
square, but every now and then I would dress a little bit, maybe, that way. 
And see, the guy I was going with at that time definitely was on the 
drapey side." 
Drug stores and ice cream shops drew particular crowds who "hung" 
there and provided a changing social map of peer relationships. The shift-
ing social definitions applied to such neighborhood commercial hangouts 
as the Edgewood Pharmacy, Whalen's, the Arundel, and the Greek's in the 
following interviews suggest variations in experience as well as changes in 
perceived social reputations over time: 
The place we went to in Edmondson Village was the Arundel. Down in my neigh-
borhood at the corner of Allendale and Edmondson there was a place called the 
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Greek's; they had a soda fountain and a jukebox .... When you were little you 
went in Voshell's but when you were old enough to be in the teenage group, you 
went to the Greek's. I think the people were Greek-and they called it the 
Greek's.-Agnes Malone 
The Village was a hangout. The library was there-that was always a good ex-
cuse. You'd go meet your friends. A lot of people hung out at the Arundel and at 
Whalen's Drug Store and the bowling alley .... It would be just whoever was 
there. Now, I didn't hang around the Village all that much; my hangout was the 
Edgewood Pharmacy. But you could go in and find no less than a dozen kids in 
the Arundel at one time, or there might be only two or three. I knew some of them 
by name or sight, but I usually stayed around the Edgewood Pharmacy-that's 
where my friends hung out. At the Greek's the people who hung out were 
greasers, drapes-we called them drapes in those days-and I was very scared of 
them .... They were three to five years older than I-I was terrified of them. 
Some of them were bad. But now that I look back on them I think it was funny. I 
would walk up Edmondson Avenue, then I would cross the street for about a 
block, and then cross back over again. I wouldn't walk by them; I was afraid. 
There were girls who hung out there too, but I don't remember them; I remember 
the guys. They had slicked black hair, black leather jackets, peg pants, a coupl~ of 
them had those crazy long key chains-the typical stuff you would see in the 
movie "Grease." But some of them were worse. Although now they're grown and 
have their own families, and they're not quite so foreboding as they were then .... 
The Edgewood Pharmacy was where the squares were-how they got that name, 
I don't know. They had a regular pharmacy department in the front, and a soda 
fountain in the back. We'd just go there and have some ice cream or a Coke and 
kill some time.-Marilyn Simkins 
We didn't go up there [to the Arundel]; those guys were too old for us; we used to 
hang down at Whalen's. I used to just go to the Arundel, get an orange sherbet, 
and leave. Yes, we were afraid of that place. That was where the big boys 
were .... The Greek's, well I never went there .... People like "the Fonz" would 
hang down there; you didn't go there.-Joe Slovensky 
We'd go to the Arundel and have a Coke or a milkshake. You'd usually go up to 
the Village and meet other people you knew .... The Greek's was a corner soda 
shop-back in the early to mid fifties, the local drapes and drapettes-that was a 
term that was given them-would go there. They would be the people you would 
consider greasers today, I guess; the people with the black leather coats and D.A. 
haircuts who rode motorcycles. They were considered the bad people of the neigh-
borhood. They were the unruly, incorrigible teenagers that no decent person was 
allowed to go near. People were very much more willing to divide people into good 
and bad in those days-I think we've come a ways since then. I was definitely not 
allowed to go to the Greek's. That was also one place my brother couldn't go. I 
had to walk by there almost every day. I did slip in there once just to find out why 
it was off limits. And I recall girls sitting around in very tight, low-cut sweaters, 
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with lots of hair and lots of lipstick-totally scornful of anyone who would walk 
into the place who wasn't in their crowd-but I was a good bit younger than those 
people. I recall them as being very pushy people and very aggressive and loud-
people who would cuss a lot .... I remember one day I had a fight with one of 
them-what had actually happened was that I had had a disagreement with one 
of these person's twin sisters, and they went home and got their older sister to 
come after me, and she did-she must have been six years older than me and 
quite a bit bigger. And this girl just beat me up and down.-Alice Hughes 
Such social differences seldom resulted in open conflict, as in the 
latter instance. Indeed, interviewees testify to the general safety and secu-
rity young people felt and the general freedom permitted them by their 
parents as long as they remained within the extended neighborhood's 
confines. However, sometimes parental prohibitions suggested concern 
about groups of people considered less than desirable. In the following 
account, told by Alice Hughes, apprehension may have resulted as much 
from age and gender differences as from genuine social distinction or 
threat: "I know that the people at the bowling alley were not people we 
were supposed to associate with-I don't know why, maybe because they 
were faster than the people my mother wanted me to hang around with. 
We would go there to bowl, but my mother was very much opposed to us 
going to the bowling alley to visit. I guess you could say that if there were 
different groups of people, there were the ones who went to the bowling 
alley and those who didn't. But by the time I was a teenager, Edmondson 
Village was changing." Gender differences also patterned norms in sub-
tle, but significant ways, as Alice Hughes recalls: 
There were a lot of people, including my brother, who would go up there and hang 
out-stand on the corner, and do whatever you did-talk and smoke cigarettes 
and whistle at the girls-but I never hung out there. I would just go there for a 
place to go, and browse. He would go up there for the evening; I would go up there 
for as along as it took to have a Coke and see if I knew anyone. I might go for an 
hour; he would go for three hours. I would be walking the whole time, and he 
would be standing in one spot. I guess that would be the difference. 
If drapes and squares represented local variations of cultural types 
within the national phenomenon of teen culture, they did not appear to 
correspond in ,any significant way to socioeconomic differences within the 
community. Indeed, interviewees suggest that "drapes," for instance, 
came from throughout the residential area, not from one particular sec-
tion deemed socially different or deviant. Rather than signaling a chal-
lenge to the community's social homogeneity or to its common cultural 
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values, these distinctions seemed relatively transitory, symptoms of incipi-
ent intergenerational cleavages but not fundamental rebellion or challenge. 
Indeed, teenage life in Edmondson Village was a sheltered existence. The 
community's young people, like their parents, had little exposure to genu-
. ine social diversity and, like their white suburban counterparts elsewhere, 
were little prepared to accept it. 
Certainly this was true when it came to race. Within the community 
there was virtually no contact with Mrican Americans, except the occasio-
nal '~-rabbers" or hawkers who sold their wares from horse-drawn wagons 
in the alleyways. Baltimore public schools continued to be segregated until 
1954, as were the community's churches and its shopping district. In one 
sense, then, African Americans didn't exist for Edmondson Village resi-
dents, at least in terms of immediate experience. However, in another and 
very real sense they did, for interviewees testify that prejudice was a signifi-
cant feature of their upbringing, a topic to be considered more fully in chap-
ter 4. Beneath the "gold" of the Edmondson area's postwar rowhouse sub-
urban boom and its flourishing family-oriented lifestyle was the reality that 
the suburban ideal allowed little room for change or for social diversity, and 
such assumptions were about to be challenged profoundly. 
4 
A White Community 
Responds to Change 
I think the only thing that might be similar to it would be the 
Three Mile Island thing-something that would create such a fear. 
- David Graff 
Pressure for racial change was building up on the community's borders, 
yet white residents of the Edmondson Village area continued to believe 
that their neighborhood was insulated and secure, a suburban haven. 
Nevertheless, in approximately 1955, the first African American settlers 
took up residence in rowhouses in the southeastern corner. (See map 2.) 
By 1960 the area south of Edmondson Avenue (census tract 2007) had 
changed from its 1950 count of6,662 whites and 13 non-whites, to a popu-
lation of 3,528 whites and 5,714 African Americans. In 1970 the same 
tract totaled 9,276 African Americans, 841 whites. North of Edmondson 
Avenue (in census tract 1608) the racial line remained virtually intact in 
1960; in 1950 population totals had been 5,089 white, 21 nonwhite, and in 
1960 they stood at 8,708 whites, 96 African Americans. But during the 
decade of the 1960s, nearly twenty thousand persons exchanged places in 
tract 1608, as the population changed dramatically to 11,007 African 
Americans and 390 whites by 1970.1 Census years make the process seem 
more prolonged than it was; in fact, the change proceeded block by block 
at an incredibly rapid rate, too fast for consideration of a "tipping point" 
to be either measurable or meaningfu1.2 
Triggering this episode of racial change was the systematic activity 
labeled blockbusting, the intentional action of a real estate speculator to 
place an African American resident in a house on a previously all-white 
block for the express purpose of panicking whites into selling for the profit 
to be gained by buying low and selling high. Blockbusters stepped into 
the artificial void maintained by the dual housing market, relying upon 
African American housing needs and white racial fears to manipulate the 
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process of racial change for their own ends. In doing so, they provided a 
commodity to African Americans that they previously had been ille-
gitimately denied. But the transaction typically was exploitative, victimiz-
ing both sellers and buyers. Edmondson Village illustrated just how per-
vasive the process could be once the seeds of a blockbusting activities had 
been sown. 
The Social Context for Blockbusting 
As noted in chapter 3, the postwar years brought unprecedented subur-
ban expansion, typically on a white-only basis. The century's second 
housing boom produced renewed development in outer city rowhouse 
neighborhoods such as Edmondson Village, where the Keelty Company 
and other developers completed their work offilling the remaining vacant 
land with residences but brought even more impressive growth to the 
newer suburbs beyond, where apartments, group homes, and ranchers 
acted as magnets for the postwar white middle class. In the 1950s, the 
Keelty Company itself recognized this trend by shifting its operations 
from filling in older areas to constructing new suburbs, playing the game 
of suburban leapfrog like many other developers. 
The World War II period and the immediate postwar years also pro-
duced immense pressure upon housing for Baltimore's African Americans. 
While population increased substantially, the areas of African American 
residential concentration expanded only marginally. Moreover, overcrowd-
ing and slum conditions only became worse. For those whose financial 
status had improved from expanded job opportunities and whose expecta-
tions regarding social progress had been raised by a formative civil rights 
movement, limited housing opportunities remained a major source offrus-
tration. Shut out of the suburban housing market, their only option was to 
seek "hand-me-downs" (as Sun reporter Carroll Williams called them) in 
adjacent white areas. 3 Yet, they continued to meet resistance from white 
residents and from the powerful but informal mechanisms of the dual hous-
ing market. Questionnaires surveying the policies and practices of Bal-
timore real estate brokers in the 1950s indicated that most were unwilling to 
sell to African Americans in predominantly white sectilons of the city. 
Mainstream firms belonged to the National Association of Real Estate 
Brokers, whose 1950 revised code of ethics contained a clause listing as 
unethical "the introduction of a character of property or occupancy whose 
presence will clearly be detrimental to property values in the neighbor-
hood." While on the surface this 1950 reformulation referred only to use or 
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class rather than specifying race or nationality, as had been the case since 
1924, it nevertheless could be understood to continue to imply these exclu-
sions, if one assumed-as many certainly did-that the entry of new Afri-
can American residents into previously all-white residential areas neces-
sarily would lower property values or have other negative consequences.4 
Similar patterns of discrimination and assumptions about the soundness of 
neighborhoods as the basis for policy decisions prevailed for local banking 
institutions, as well as for such federal governmental mortgage agencies as 
FHA and VA. The redlining policies of these two pillars of residential fi-
nancing excluded African Americans from access to broad sectors of the 
housing market.5 
While this silent conspiracy characteristically took the form of refusal 
to do business with African Americans seeking housing in white areas, in 
some instances it resulted in a carefully orchestrated charade that permit-
ted mainstream real estate firms to benefit from racial changeover with-
out being directly involved. Mal Sherman, a well-regarded member of the 
Baltimore Real Estate Board, testified to the U.S. Civil Rights Commis-
sion about his company's activities on the northwest side of the city in the 
early 1950s: 
For the period fifty-one to fifty-five we were making black sales in areas of the city 
that were all-white, but we didn't have the nerve to make them ourselves, so we 
were doing it on the basis of listing houses with black brokers and getting one-
third referral fee. In other words, if we have a owner that wanted to sell to black 
[sic], we would refer it to a black real estate broker, and we would get a referral 
fee, and we were not making the house sales ourselves because in those days, it 
was considered that this was a block and if a real estate broker put a black in 
place on that block, he was called a blockbuster, and we did not have the guts to 
participate in making black sales that we wanted to make ourselves. So rather 
than get that kind of label, we worked through black brokers.6 
In this case the etiquette of the dual housing market was maintained 
through referral to an African American broker. However, in the context 
of what one real estate insider active during this period described as "the 
hottest real estate market I had ever seen," the potential for lucrative 
profits attracted speculators ready to breach the conspiracy, and main-
stream realtors prepared to look the other way.7 The former typically had 
operated on the margins of the real estate market, acquiring properties 
others no longer coveted, picking them up at bargain rates. Their more 
aggressive role in the post-World War II period might have been resented 
and resisted by mainline realtors, except that the latter now stood to ben-
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efit by white relocations to existing housing in the outer ring and to new 
house sales in the exploding suburbs beyond. As pieces of the proverbial 
pie expanded for all segments of the industry, speculative activity inten-
sified and its scale increased exponentially. In the process, a handful of 
operators became major players in the racial turnover of neighborhoods. 
While the general climate created conditions ripe for such activity, 
the tactics associated with blockbusting provided the wedge. Early in-
stances occurred in the period immediately following the war. For exam-
ple, in 1945 white residents in the Fulton Avenue section on the near west 
side complained of "the practices of some real estate operators to 'break' 
a block" and insisted that further "encroachment" should stop. The 
charge that Jewish operatives were involved in some of the transactions in 
this area led to intervention by the Baltimore Jewish Council, which ad-
monished the offending parties but objected to the emphasis placed upon 
their Jewish identity, insisting that this was a larger civic problem.8 As 
broad sections of older neighborhoods adjacent to the wartime bound-
aries of the African American ghetto changed racially in the following 
years, similar episodes occurred. The issue suddenly received widespread 
public notice in 1955 and 1956 when a flurry of newspaper articles called 
attention to systematic instances that had occurred in various parts of the 
outer city, primarily on the northwestern and western sides, as well as in 
certain areas to the northeast. In these press accounts the term "block-
busting" often was put in quotation marks, suggesting its relative novelty 
to the general newspaper readership.9 By early 1957 the Maryland Com-
mission on Interracial Problems and Relations was expressing alarm that 
"the in-migration of Negro families into formerly all white neighborhoods 
was becoming the most troublesome area of friction between the races." 
Asserting that "block-busting" was at the root of the rapid changeover 
process, the commission went on to lament that there was "no legal 
means of deterring the real estate dealers from their offensive and highly 
lucrative practices." 10 
In the public discourse of the mid-1950s, the term blockbusting often 
was used to refer to any real estate practice that introduced an African 
American household into a formerly white residential area for the purpose 
of provoking panic-driven racial turnover. Institutional voices found it nec-
essary, however, to try to delineate more precisely the specific practices 
that should, be labeled unscrupulous, unethical, or illegal. Since blockbust-
ing challenged many of the implicit assumptIons of the dual housing mar-
ket, public agencies-like the race relations commissions-found them-
selves forced to consider whether atry introduction of an African American 
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household into a racially segregated neighborhood constituted abuse per 
se, or whether such an interpretation was too sweeping an appeal to de 
facto segregation. Therefore, statements from this period reveal the search 
for formulations that were more precise in their identification of the spe-
cific practices deemed inappropriate. Recognition of this need for delinea-
tion was evident, for instance, in the 1956 statement by the Baltimore Com-
mission on Human Relations that" 'block-busting' is not caused merely by 
Negroes moving into white neighborhoods, but by the practices of 'certain 
unscrupulous real estate operators of both races.''' II 
These more qualified interpretations of blockbusting focused princi-
pally on three areas of alleged abuse: the manner and mode of solicita-
tion, the alleged characteristics of the new residents, and excessive profits. 
Solicitation was neither illegal (in state or local law) nor unethical (under 
the Real Estate Board code of ethics), though when applied to a targeted 
neighborhood systematically and repeatedly, with veiled and not so veiled 
references to impending racial change and lowered property values, it 
clearly could be a powerful destabilizing force. 12 One real estate broker, 
Stanley Greenberg, asserted in an interview that the major speculators 
singled out neighborhoods and saturated them with solicitors, typically 
assuring the desired results of panicked sales. Not until 1966, after anoth-
er decade of intensive blockbusting activity in broad sections of the city, 
did the Baltimore City Council pass an ordinance forbidding real estate 
activity that involved "general door-to-door solicitation, in person, by 
telephone or mail, or by the mass distribution of circulars." The Real 
Estate Board of Baltimore opposed the law, contending that the organiza-
tion was capable of dealing with such abuses through its own procedures, 
although these clearly had not been effective, nor were all who engaged in 
such activities necessarily members of the board. 13 
A second aspect of the effort to delineate the illegal or unscrupulous 
elements of blockbusting focused on the type of resident to whom real 
estate operatives rented or sold in the initial stages of racial turnover. On 
this point the tendency was to specify as inappropriate the introduction of 
residents who were "undesirable"-typically the term was not precisely 
defined-for the purpose of provoking panic. The 1956 statement by the 
Baltimore Commission on Human Relations, for instance, charged that 
"these speculators buy houses in stable neighborhoods and rent them to 
undesirable tenants, relying on a 'fear campaign' to force other home 
owners to sell out in panic." 14 The Maryland Commission on Interracial 
Problems and Relations sought to distinguish the unethical elements in 
blockbusting along similar lines: "Numerous complaints were received at 
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our office from home owners and also from officers of improvement asso-
ciations about the unscrupulous real estate dealers who were buying up 
properties in certain neighborhoods and putting in undesirable tenants 
with a view to frightening the residents into selling their properties at 
panic prices." 15 In 1958 the Baltimore Commission went so far as to as-
sert that there often was little difficulty if African Americans moving into 
IR)rmerly all-white neighborhoods were "of the same economic and cultur-
al background as the former residents" but that "the true block-buster is 
a speculator who buys a house in a stable neighborhood and puts in ten-
ants at little or no rent-the type of tenants who would be undesirable 
neighbors no matter what their race, religion, or origin." 16 
In some instances blockbusters indeed rented to African Americans 
with little capacity to payor sold houses on newly broken blocks to African 
Americans without the financial resources to handle the steeply inflated 
pricesY For instance, in 1958 and 1959 in the nearby Ashburton neighbor-
hood, a real estate operative was accused of fraudulent sale to an African 
American to create the appearance of purchase and thereby to panic 
whites. Newspaper coverage of the incident noted: "[Residents] charged 
that Manning-Shaw had moved Mr. Carter, a Negro, into the house and 
erected a 'sold' sign in an attempt to frighten white neighbors into selling 
their homes. This is a key. technique used by blockbusters." 18 Sometimes, 
especially in sections with larger homes, blockbusters might divide a newly 
acquired property into smaller units rented by people with lesser economic 
means than area homeowners, thereby profiting from the revenue as well 
as creating a situation of overcrowding that area whites viewed with alarm. 
Baltimore Sun reporter Douglas Connah, Jr., for example, contended that 
in the 1950s "houses once occupied by single families [were] bought by 
speculators, stuffed with poor people, and 'milked.''' 19 
On the other hand, not all African Americans who were the first of their 
race on formerly all-white blocks fit this pattern, nor did they necessarily 
differ in terms of class from their new white neighbors. As unscrupulous 
and exploitative as the methods and goals involved in the blockbusting pro-
cess may have been, the interpretation that blockbusting necessarily in-
volved the introduction of "undesirable" tenants was problematic in its 
substitution of class as a marker for race. 
The fact of the matter is that in the racial climate of the mid-1950s it 
took only a relatively few instances of real estate transactions resulting in 
African American settlement to induce panicked white flight. Blockbust-
ing depended upon white bias, which-protestations to the contrary-· 
often rejected settlement by any African American, regardless of class. As 
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one writer of a letter to the editor of the Sun noted in 1955: "The real 
villains are prejudice, which makes a whole neighborhood flee because of 
one Negro family, and the monopoly in new homes which the white citi-
zens enjoy." 20 Therefore, assertions that the first African American set-
tlers in the blockbusting process were necessarily of a lower class status 
blurred the reality that race tended to be the primary determinant of 
white response. Moreover, such interpretations presented African Ameri-
cans as necessarily unwitting tools, victims in the process. They tended to 
obscure the active choices most initial African American settlers were 
making about their housing status-choices made in spite of risks, both 
known and unknown. They also failed to recognize that the victimization 
African Americans experienced stemmed primarily from their exclusion 
from access to normal real estate and financial mechanisms, exclusion 
that left them vulnerable to the exploitative and insecure terms they were 
forced to accept from blockbusters and speculators. Therefore, efforts to 
portray initial African American settlers as victims often tended to justify 
the dual housing market without questioning its underlying assump-
tions-rather than to demonstrate genuine sympathy and understanding 
for the circumstances pioneers faced. 
The third contention regarding blockbusters was that their activities 
were designed to produce exploitative profits. Complaints about block-
busting practices frequently contained references to "panic prices" and 
"lucrative practices." The principal pattern prevailing in blockbusting 
involved purchase prices below market value from whites who had been 
panicked into flight and the resale of properties to African Americans at 
prices above the market value. Typically the blockbuster might be willing 
to make an initial purchase on an all-white block at an unusually high 
price on the assumption, proved correct time and time again, that the 
first African American presence (even the rumor of such presence) could 
reap a harvest of severely depreciated prices from the remaining whites on 
the block. In acute instances of heightened blockbuster-induced panic 
situations, houses might be bought for as little as 50 percent of the pre-
vailing market value, then sold for as much as 50 percent above. Even 
discounting the attendant real estate costs and risks in such procedures, a 
markup on the order of 100 percent might indeed be deemed exploitative.21 
Ironically, the depression in prices whites received for housing in panic situ-
ations fueled their perception that the advent of African Americans lowered 
property values, even though speculators in fact typically commanded ex-
cessively high prices on resales, a point apparently not widely understood 
by fleeing whites but key to those engaged in such speculative activity.22 It 
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was not until the most intense episodes of the blockbusting era had ended in 
near total racial changeover in neighborhoods such as Edmondson Village 
that fair housing advocates were able to document the dynamic of price 
victimization on both sides of racial change.23 
The refusal of mainstream realty firms to be involved in racially mixed 
areas gave blockbusters and attendant real estate speculators a monopoly 
on the market, which meant that prospective African American home 
buyers typically had no recourse except to deal with speculators at arti-
ficially high prices. Similarly, the shunning of such transactions by main-
stream financial institutions afforded these operatives a monopoly in the 
mortgage arrangements. Speculators financed their operations through 
loans from large banks that typically did not lend to individual home-
owners, certainly not to African Americans, or from federal or state savings 
and loan institutions, willing to do business with them as white business-
men, thereby only indirectly dealing with African American home buyers. 
For speculators the risks sometimes were substantial, but they pro-
tected themselves through such arrangements as land installment con-
tracts, lease option contracts, and double mortgages. Land installment 
contracts, legal under Maryland statutes, provided a mechanism to pro-
spective home buyers that enabled them to acquire housing without ini-
tial downpayment or closing charges. However, such contracts did not 
involve the immediate transfer oftitle and provided little ofthe protection 
afforded buyers under conventional mortgages. In Baltimore during this 
period, African American families hoping for eventual home ownership fre-
quently had little option except to accept such terms. A 1955 survey by the 
Maryland Commission on Interracial Problems and Relations found that 
over half of the sample (53 percent) were purchasing their homes through 
these means rather than through regular financing. In 95 percent of the 
cases of contract sales, the arrangement was with a white firm or individu-
al. Expressing the concern that such evidence suggested that "the owner-
ship financial status of the majority of this group is highly tentative," the 
commission identified a number off actors as possibly responsible, citing 
"high level demand for housing by non-whites; shortage of rental housing of 
better quality; relocation requiring families to discover new residences; dif-
ficulty in getting regular financing through established institutions; and 
sudden accessibility of housing of somewhat better quality through release 
by white families moving to county and peripheral areas." 24 
As part of the blockbusting process, speculators widely applied the 
land installment contract to their benefit in ways that often left prospective 
buyers vulnerable. Payments usually were required on a weekly basis, and 
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any failure to meet installment deadlines placed tenants at the mercy of the 
seller, who was free to declare default on the contract. Sometimes aspiring 
African American owners had difficulty finding out how much their in-
stallment payments had accumulated, especially since subsequent house 
repairs often were added to the amount due. Only after the seller had 
covered the costs of his markup (any improvemenr costs and the desired 
profit) through such payments would the potential buyer be offered a 
chance for a conventional mortgage, arranged through the speculator. 
Lease option ("buy-like-rent") contracts resembled the land install-
ment version but with even less protection because the agreement was 
merely verbal and unrecorded. Tenants often believed that their "rent" 
payments were accumulating equity, whereas in faCt the speculator was un-
der no legal obligation to apply them to the eventual settlement, even if the 
tenant subsequently was offered an option to buy and exercised that option. 
Lease options provided so little protection to tenants and so little restraint 
upon sellers that a Maryland state delegate from Baltimore, Wally Or-
linsky, sought to have them outlawed in 1969, asserting sarcastically that 
they were so "obscene" that "they were a beauty to behold"; indeed, he 
said, '~ lease option is not recorded and it has no efficacy whatsoever." 25 
Whether initially employing land installment or lease option con-
tracts, speculators who eventually arranged permanent financing for pro-
spective homebuyers often sought to underwrite the transaction with first 
and second mortgages, usually secured through building and loan institu-
tions with which they conducted the bulk of their business activities. In 
these arrangements, the first mortgage covered the outlay for the original 
purchase (made at or below market value), thereby protecting the invest-
ment for the financial institution. The second mortgage covered the 
markup, an amount that usually represented clear profit for the operative 
and provided capital for new speculative acquisitions. In 1971, Sun writer 
James Dilts, who was investigating charges raised by fair housing advo-
cates, chronicled a typical financing procedure used by speculators: 
The flow of money is as follows: the speculator borrows money on a short-term 
basis from a large bank. He buys houses from white families cheaply in a chang-
ing neighborhood and resells them after substantial markups to black families. He 
takes the families to a friendly savings and loan association where the families 
obtain a mortgage loan. This money goes to the speculator. Mter taking a rela-
tively small profit, he uses it to repay his bank loan. However, at the same time, he 
secures second mortgages from the families. These second mortgages are gener-
ally for several thousand dollars and, when combined with the first mortgage, 
represent a debt substantially iII excess of the values of the houses. The second 
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mortgages represent almost clear profit to the speculator. He uses them in turn as 
collateral for more bank loans, to buy more houses, and the cycle continues.26 
These procedures were carefully crafted to assure quick turnovers 
and replacement capital for further speculative investment. Under such 
circumstances, there were indeed instances where new tenants lacked the 
standard economic means to meet the demands of their new housing, 
since there is little evidence that the interests of prospective tenants were 
carefully considered. However, the fact of the matter was that the process 
artificially drove prices far above the market value for comparable hous-
ing in other parts of the urban area. Therefore, even those African Ameri-
cans who would have been able to meet the financial requirements under 
ordinary conditions were instead forced to bear the added burden of the 
excessive costs and insecurity of these extraordinary arrangements. 
Between 1950 and 1970 the scale of residential racial change, unleashed 
by various social and economic forces but heightened by blockbusting and 
speculative real estate activity, rewrote the racial geography of the city in 
dramatic fashion. (See map 1.) Speculators whose primary investments 
previously had been in marginal properties-commercial and residen-
tial-now rapidly expanded their activities, establishing themselves as 
dominant actors in the real estate of racial change and accumulating im-
mense business volume in the process. For all of the abuses and exploitation 
associated with blockbusting, speculators-whether directly responsible 
for blockbusting or capitalizing on it-shrewdly identified a need in the 
housing market and calculatingly moved to fill it. As Stanley Greenberg 
observed of their role: "They pushed this thing and made money off it, but 
they filled a niche by providing housing for blacks who needed it." Most 
episodes of systematic and dramatic racial change across the city resulted 
from operations conducted on a large scale, not simply from lone agents 
working on their own. In the extensive northwest section where some of the 
most widespread residential turnover occurred in Baltimore, for example, 
five or six principal firms played primary roles. 
During this period the East Baltimore ghetto area expanded only 
modestly, since class (working to middle class) and ethnicity (neighbor-
hoods where Central and East European ethnic identities remained 
strong) seemed to combine to slow the process of change on that side of 
the city. On its northeastern fringe episodes of blockbusting occurred 
along lower Harford Road and The Alameda in the 1950s, and in the 
1960s they extended beyond these sections into neighborhoods in the vi-
cinity of Lake Montebello, where some rowhouse developments resem·· 
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bled Edmondson Village in age and social character. On the south side, 
pockets of African American population had expanded in the 194Os, prin-
cipally in geographically isolated districts like Cherry Hill and Fairfield. 
Due north, the more affluent wedge formed by Roland Park, Guilford, 
and Homeland remained exclusive white preserves. 
The preponderant direction of racial change was west and northwest 
along three principal corridors where considerable suburban develop-
ment had begun in the county areas beyond the city line. In these sections 
especially intense blockbusting and speculative activity occurred. Along 
Park Heights Avenue the change process followed the corridor pioneered 
only a few decades before by the city's Jewish community. Initially con-
centrated near the city center on the east, Baltimore's Jews first migrated 
to the Eutaw Place area on the near northwest, then proceeded to settle 
along a route extending like a spoke beyond Druid Hill Park into the 
Lower Park Heights rowhouse area. This section had been developed dur-
ing the 1920s and 1930s, and in many respects-other than religious 
identification-it resembled Edmondson Village. In 1960 Lower Park 
Heights had only 5 percent African American population; in 1970 the 
percentage was 95 percent. As the center of Jewish population shifted 
farther to the northwest into suburban areas of the county such as 
Pikesville and Randallstown, racial changeover in this wedge assumed a 
classic pattern of succession from Jewish to African American.27 
A related axis of change occurred in northwest neighborhoods along 
the Liberty Heights corridor, beginning in older rowhouse areas such as 
Walbrook near west North Avenue, and then proceeding to such middle-
to upper-middle-class neighborhoods as Ashburton, Windsor Hills, Forest 
Park, and Arlington (the latter three also areas of considerable Jewish 
residence). In relatively affluent Ashburton and Windsor Hills, notable 
attempts were made to stem white flight and counter blockbusting with 
"good neighbor" approaches that promoted acceptance of residential in-
tegration. However, aside from the modest success in cooling the rate of 
racial change in these exceptional areas, blockbusting and white flight 
proceeded at a rapid rate on the far northwest.28 By 1960 substantial Afri-
can American presence had reached the old 1888 city boundary; in the 
following decade it spread to the current city line.29 
Blockbusting and SPeculation Come to Edmondson Village 
While these two corridors were closely intertwined geographically, the 
Gwynns Falls stream valley separated them from the third route of rapid 
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racial change, which proceeded due west along Edmondson Avenue into 
the Edmondson Village rowhouse section. There, blockbusting and atten-
dant speculative real estate activity during the period from the mid-1950s 
through the mid-1960s was as systematic and extensive as in any part of 
the city. To contemporaries on both sides of the transactions many of the 
dynamics in Edmondson Village were not fully understood in this period 
of panic, confusion, and rapid resettlement. In retrospect, however, con-
siderable evidence points to widespread employment of a variety of solic-
itation methods to induce panic and trigger white flight. Once change 
was set in motion, these conditions attracted speculative real estate activ-
ity on a large scale. 
In a section formerly characterized by residential longevity and high 
home ownership levels, the sudden appearance of outside interests as 
intermediaries-real estate brokers and investors-provides one indica-
tion of the mechanisms involved in neighborhood turnover. To investigate 
this process, I examined the biannual tax assessments for the ten blocks 
included in the sample block survey, checking the years 1955 to 1973. 
Many nonresident parties appear on the lists during this period, includ-
ing the following sample: 
Firms: 
Arbor, Inc. 
Best Realty 
Bob Holding Corp. 
Butler Building Co. 
Chesco, Inc. 
Crown Enterprises 
Fairfax Investment Corp. 
Lee Realty 
Oak Investment Co. 
Rab Corp. 
Rainbow Realty 
Woodhaven Investment Corp. 
Individuals: 
Daniel W. Caplan 
Howard W. Cohen 
Anthony Piccinini 
Henry J. Shmidt 
Donald Terry 
Henry E. Caplan 
Harold Goldsmith 
Louis Singer 
Albert T. Smith 
(See Appendix B for tables showing the complete record of ownership on selected 
bl()cks.)3° 
A check of city directories for 1961 and 1964, key years in terms of the 
transactions considered here, failed to turn up listings for most of the 
company names cited above, a curious-and perhaps telling-circum-
stance, since it suggests that these firms may not have been operating on 
their own and that they chose not to make their identities readily avail-
able to the public. A number of the individuals listed addresses downtown 
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(presumably business locations) or in affluent sections of the metro area 
outside Edmondson Village, principally in the northern section of the city 
and the adjacent Baltimore County area of Pikesville. 
On block after block essentially the pattern was repeated: stable ten-
ure by long-term residents, the appearance of outside interests on the tax 
rolls in scattered fashion (with many of the same individual and corporate 
names showing up repeatedly throughout the area), rapid property turn-
over on the rest of the block, followed by a mix of new resident ownership 
and some property retention by nonresident investors. This profile, evi-
dent on eight of the ten sample blocks, suggested that, typically, resale 
rather than long-term investment was the primary goal. On some blocks, 
however, the prevalence and persistence of outside ownership indicated 
speculative activity that resulted in longer-term investment, possibly be-
cause of oversaturation of purchases and lack of resales.3l Of course, the 
survey of tax records can provide no evidence whether any of these indi-
viduals or firms might themselves have engaged in the activities defined 
as blockbusting or whether as investors they instead stepped into the void 
created by panicked white flight. However, the pattern of concentrated 
outside investment that emerges from the survey suggests that this indeed 
was a community under siege. 
In the aftermath of the massive scale of racial change that occurred in 
the Edmondson Village section, the episode became the major focus of 
public controversy over the role of real estate operators when a civil rights 
organization, the Activists, specifically challenged the Morris Goldseker 
Company regarding its involvement there. The Activists asserted that the 
company had operated under a variety of other names (including Lee Real-
ty; Fairfax Investment Corp.; Best Realty; Arbor, Inc.; Rainbow Realty; 
Woodhaven Investment Corp.; and others). These Goldseker-affiliated 
firms, the group claimed, had been party to over one-third of the real estate 
transfers in census tract 1608 (on the north side of Edmondson Avenue) 
between 1960 and 1968. Further, they charged that the markups on the 
transactions represented excessive profits, a process that took advantage of 
both sellers and buyers.32 Representatives of the Goldseker Company ad-
mitted large-scale business operations in racially changing sections of the 
city but claimed that the firm had been providing housing to people other-
wise denied opportunity, that the variety of names under which it operated 
was only a legal device for tax purposes, and that the markups had been 
neither excessive nor exploitative when consideration was given to legiti-
mate operating costs and risks. 33 
Morris Goldseker was one of several real estate entrepreneurs who had 
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built businesses upon the acquisition of properties in low income districts 
of older parts of the city and who-during the 1950s and 1960s-expanded 
their operations to a number of working-class or middle-class neighbor-
hoods that previously had been considered white-only. Purchasing houses 
in a systematic manner, these brokers then sold or rented them to African 
Americans. Whether anticipating or taking advantage of the unprece-
dented growth of the real estate market, they chose to operate on the back 
side of white flight rather than on its suburban frontier. As in the case of 
Edmondson Village, the charge frequently was made that they-or those 
closely associated with them-contributed mightily to the process. 
To Morris Goldseker's defenders, he represented an American suc-
cess story, one of a number of remarkable tales spun by the generation of 
East European Jewish immigrants who settled in the United States at the 
turn of the century and applied their energies and talents to finding 
niches within the system of American capitalism. The Polish-born Gold-
seker, who arrived in Baltimore alone at age fourteen and never married, 
began working in real estate in the 1920s, eventually starting his own 
business, which concentrated upon the purchase of old properties at de-
pressed prices in declining sections of the city. The Great Depression, a 
calamity for so many, proved a boon to Goldseker, who positioned himself 
. to make expanded acquisitions at rock bottom prices. Profits in a specula-
tive business with high risks came through rents or through improve-
ments and resale. By most accounts, rental or sale clients were among the 
city's low income residents, though whether Goldseker was a slumlord 
exploiting less advantaged tenants or a pioneer providing a service to 
those otherwise left out of the city's housing market has always been a 
subject of controversy.34 There is general agreement, however, that Gold-
seker's proven success opened access to financial sources that provided 
credit for further operations and positioned him to be a significant player 
in the fluid real estate market following World War II. By the 1960s the 
firm had become what his nephew and business associate, Sheldon Gold-
seker, claimed was "one of the largest and most respectable real estate 
firms in the city of Baltimore." 35 
The charges and countercharges in the Activists-Goldseker contro-
versy will be discussed more fully in chapter 5 in relation to the circum-
stances confronting new African American settlers.36 Suffice it to say here 
that the eventual public controversy over the Edmondson Village case 
illustrated the degree to which it came to epitomize in a particularly in-
tense fashion the complex dynamics of the era's rapid racial change pro-
cess: blockbusters to stir panic, white residents vulnerable because of 
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their own racial prejudices, African Americans in desperate need of im-
proved housing, and speculative real estate firms as beneficiaries. 
White Perceptions of Initial African American Settlement 
According to the testimony of interviewees, Edmondson Village residents 
felt insulated from th.e social and racial diversity of older urban areas even 
as symptoms of widespread change began to appear across the Gywnns 
Falls stream valley in nearby sections of west Baltimore. Residents shared 
a belief, both literal and metaphorical, that the bridge would not be 
crossed. Agnes Malone remembered prevailing white sentiment: "People 
had said they'll never cross the Edmondson Avenue bridge." 37 Madge 
Cooper recalled similar sentiment: "The bridge on Edmondson Avenue 
was supposed to save Edmondson Village; they were not going to come 
across that bridge." 38 And Ann Morgan agreed regarding feeling at the 
time: "They were to the bridge, and everybody said they'll never cross the 
bridge." 39 
When change did occur, the bridge crossed was not along Edmondson 
Avenue, often thought of as the main access from the city to the rowhouse 
neighborhood, but in the southeastern corner of the area at Baltimore 
Street. (See map 2.) It was as if the moat had been breached by a rear gate. 
Ann Morgan recalled: "We always said they came the back way, you know; 
they came Hilton Street and Gwynn Avenue-they came that way, instead 
of coming over the bridge and our way. But people had foolish ideas; they 
said they'd never move opposite Western Cemetery, because black people 
didn't like to live opposite the cemetery. You know, people had all those 
dumb ideas." Marilyn Simkins pictured the process similarly: "It started 
down around the junior high school; it seemed to come the back way, so to 
speak-up Caton Avenue, and then across Edmondson-to Denison 
Street, Edgewood Street, and on up."4{1 
Once African American presence was established in the southeastern 
corner, the change that ensued was perceived as rapid and inexorable. 
Alice Hughes recalled the feeling of white residents: "When the [Mrican 
American] people started moving into the neighborhood, they did come 
in, literally, block by block. I can recall when they came across the Hilton 
Street bridge everybody was very upset; they said, 'Oh my God, they're 
over the bridge now; our street will be next.'41 Agnes Malone remem-
bered the path of racial change similarly: "They came up Poplar Grove 
Street to Edmondson Avenue and Ellicott Driveway, which is just at the 
beginning of the bridge. And then gradually it began coming in Denison 
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Street and back around Hilton, Culver, and that area, and eventually 
along Gelston Drive." Other recollections reinforce the perception of the 
change as relentless and overwhelming, once the bridge crossing was 
breached. Vera Johnson said, "It was a creeping thing from Monroe 
Street .... It kept crawling and crawling. We all said, 'Come on, now, it 
will never get past Poplar Grove Street. It will never come across the 
bridge, never.' And that's how we lived; we convinced ourselves of all 
that. But then it started to creep across the bridge, and they all moved 
because everybody got so frightened. This was the initial beginning of the 
breaking up of neighborhoods." 42 Marilyn Simkins heard people refer to 
"the incoming change" as "the Black Wave"; the result, she said, was 
"The Exodus-that was the white people leaving." Whether a "black 
wave" or something that was "creeping" and "crawling," the result in-
deed was a white "exodus." 
The words chosen by the interviewees in their retrospection reflect 
the insulated culture of a white community that could not entertain the 
possibility that African American presence meant anything other than 
invasion. In the first place, as a relatively recent suburban rownouse de-
velopment, built and settled in the context of a rigid dual housing market, 
the Edmondson Village rowhouse district had never had any African 
American residents. "You just didn't see black people in the neighbor-
hood, except women who came in to do day work or delivery men, or 
something like that. They just didn't live in the area then," Marilyn Sim-
kins observed. Agnes Malone's family employed a part-time domestic: 
"Some of the women had cleaning ladies who used to come in every week 
or every other week; in fact, my mother did after my brother was born-
and after a while she became just like one of the family. Mom could go out 
shopping and just leave her there to do whatever she had to do-she used 
to come twice a week to iron and clean. She lived on Mount Street, down 
Edmondson Avenue, farther." Or, as Joe Slovensky noted about his own 
experience growing up in the area: "You know, there's a joke on 'Happy 
Days' or somewhere that back in the fifties we didn't have black people. I 
never had a black person in any of my classes until I was fourteen years 
old .... So I never really had any dealings; I just didn't know how to deal 
with it." 43 
Interviewees testify that most whites could not entertain the possi-
bility of residential integration. Marilyn Simkins reflected: '~ good por-
tion of the people just felt that they weren't going to live with blacks." 
Madge Cooper interpreted her parents' attitudes: "Remember that they 
had never in any way had dealings. with black people .... They may have 
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met them, like daddy, who knew men who worked at the dairy-but not 
in his capacity, probably on the janitorial side. My parents, yes, 1 guess 
they were prejudiced. They felt that they had a certain place, and they 
belonged there. And they didn't feel that they were equal to them in any 
way." Agnes Malone's assessment of her parents' views was similar: 
"They [her parents and their generation] were very prejudiced then, and 
1 found after 1 got out and started working for the company 
that kids get their prejudice from home." Joe Slovensky spoke of the rea-
son for his mother's decision to move: "I know a black person moved next 
to us, and that was it." Both in their sense of insulation and in their racial 
prejudice, Edmondson Village residents certainly were not very different 
from whites elsewhere during the period. 
The settlement of African Americans in the neighborhood seemed 
bound up with complex social, cultural, and economic mechanisms which 
white residents felt were beyond their control. Whether the issue was school 
desegregation, decreed by a distant Supreme Court and implemented by a 
city school board, or the activity of blockbusting real estate agents, who 
represented shadowy but powerful financial and property powerbrokers, 
their home neighborhood was being assaulted by elements of change that 
appeared at once new and relentless. Restrictive covenants had not been 
widely used in this neighborhood, so the Supreme Court decision in 1948, 
which ruled their enforcement by state power unconstitutional, had little 
direct consequence for Edmondson Village residents. However, changes in 
school policy impinged more directly, signaling unsettling challenges to the 
traditional pattern that had kept neighborhood institutions white-only, a 
topic to be addressed more fully later in this chapter. 
These legal assaults on the edifice of institutionalized segregation may 
have had less impact on white apprehension than the dawning awareness 
that the invisible boundaries, which had held areas of African American 
residency in check so systematically in the silent conspiracy of residential 
segregation, were rapidly crumbling. Wheras normal financial and real es-
tate forces always had seemed so effective in maintaining the dual housing 
market, now they appeared in different guise, either as impotent and inef-
fective or, worse, as conspirators in overturning the status quo. Around the 
year 1955 the sudden wave of newspaper references to instances of block-
busting in various parts of the city confirmed rumors that powerful forces of 
neighborhood change were underway. Whether Edmondson Village resi-
dents were aware of the specific tactics of blockbusters, these reports came 
from urban areas familiar to many of them, and they began to create un-
easiness. 
The experience and observation of Edmondson Village residents led 
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them to the conclusion that once racial change began, racial succession 
was inevitable. This article offaith squared with their real life experience, 
and they accepted it as social reality. Many had come to the Edmondson 
area from inner city neighborhoods where such change had been the rea-
son for their relocation-they had seen it once and knew its telltale signs. 
Christine Wallace recalled that the people who bought her mother's 
house in 1945 only to confront a racially changing neighborhood ten years 
later had moved from closer to the city's center: "We felt so sorry for the 
[couple] who bought my mother's house because they were both so elder-
ly. . . . And they had moved from the home where they had lived all their 
life [on Appleton Street], on the account of the colored people moving 
in." 44 Residents could observe the process of racial turnover and re-
segregation clearly etched in the changing racial demographics of the past 
decade along the Edmondson Avenue corridor many of them traveled 
each day. Neighborhoods where experience gave reason Ito expect any-
thing else were distinct exceptions. In more affluent Windsor Hills and 
Ashburton, located just across the Gwynns Falls Park ravine to the north, 
active neighborhood associations valiantly urged calm and the acceptance 
of gradual integration from the mid-1950s, but their example apparently 
made little impression in popular perceptions of the irreversibility of ra-
cial changeover once African American settlement began. 
Finally, Edmondson Village residents believed that racial change 
meant inevitable decline in the socioeconomic status of neighborhoods. 
Christine Wallace recounted: "My uncle lived on Dukeland, before you 
get to Poplar Grove Street, and he had colored people on both sides of 
him, and he said he liked the colored people better than he did his white 
neighbors. But they, too, eventually moved, because it seems like when 
they move in, the neighborhood starts to go down; they don't keep the 
houses up as well as the white people do." Not only did the prospect of 
neighborhood decline threaten them socially; its corollary was that prop-
erty values inevitably would fall. That likelihood frightened a predomi-
nantly home-owning populace whose financial resources were adequate 
but not extensive and whose most substantial investment---and resulting 
equity-was bound up in their houses. 
All of these considerations combined to challenge the comfortable 
and secure suburban ideal that had brought them to Edmondson Village 
in the first place in their quest for homogeneous neighbors and a satisfy-
ing, protected lifestyle. Ironically, blockbusting preyed upon both the so-
cial exclusivity and the economic security that served as the basis of this 
very ideology, simultaneously exploiting their prejudices and economic 
self-interest. It forced to the foreground recognition that their assump-
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tions about residency depended upon the mechanisms of the dual housing 
market even as it threatened to unravel the silent conspiracy that main-
tained residential racial segregation. Residents felt overwhelmed by forces 
of change beyond their control yet were unwilling or unable to adjust; 
therefore, they were complicit in the destruction of their own suburban 
dream, victims and victimizers alike. 
White Perceptions of Blockbusting 
Interviews with white former residents of Edmondson Village yield vivid 
descriptions of the blockbusting process. Although the experience there 
was particularly acute, newspaper accounts suggest similar patterns 
across the city during the same period.45 First, real estate operators would 
try to find a house for sale on an all-white block, often specifically allud-
ing to the prospect of potential racial change in the area and to the threat 
of lowered property values for those not wise enough to see the handwrit-
ing on the wall. As an inducement to sell, the agent typically offered a 
buying price at or above current market value. Second, having secured 
the first house by such means, he quickly installed a new African Ameri-
can tenant in the house-renter or buyer, different social class or same 
social class, these are areas where opinions differed. Third, as soon as the 
new tenant had taken up residence, if not sooner, the operator moved on 
down the block, alerting homeowners to the initial sale, warning them of 
the prospect of increased African American settlement, and offering to buy 
their houses as well. Those who were among the first to sell might be offered 
prices above the market value; the next several sales might approximate the 
actual worth of the house; those who sold later suffered a considerable loss. 
Typically, for instance, in a neighborhood where the average housing value 
was ten thousand dollars, the first sale might bring twelve to fifteen thou-
sand dollars, the next sales ten thousand dollars and many of the later 
transactions as little as five thousand dollars (these figures actually closely 
approximate the Edmondson experience, as noted below). Eventually 
prices rebounded, but few stayed long enough to learn the lesson. 
Several examples will illustrate the pattern. Alice Hughes, whose 
family moved in 1962, told me: 
I recall that about 1960 Goldseker came into the neighborhood, and he [presuma-
bly an agent of the Morris Goldseker Company] went door to door, literally, offer-
ing people a large sum of money for their houses-I would say the sum was fifteen 
thousand dollars-at least that's what I heard offered on my street. Those people 
who moved immediately got that; those people who waited till the neighborhood 
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was "broken," as they called it, got half that-they got six thousand dollars for 
their houses. My own parents got eight thousand or eighty-five hundred dollars 
when they moved, but they gave it as a trade-in on a house they bought [else-
where]. What Goldseker was doing was buying a house for fifteen thousand dol-
lars and almost giving it away to get a black family in, and then he would buy a 
house for six thousand dollars and sell it for fifteen thousand dollars-that's how 
he made his money on the deal. 
Madge Morgenstern described the pattern on Allendale Street in the 
1950s: "They [real estate agents] would call and come around. They 
would say, 'The neighborhood is going to be black. Don't you want to sell 
your property now while you can get a good price for it?' Those were the 
tactics they used. I thought it terrible, absolutely awful, and I would re-
sent it when they called or came to the door trying to buy." % 
Usually the blockbusting transaction was an all-white arrangement, 
white seller to white agent, but some interviewees described the involve-
ment of African American agents, as in Marilyn Simkins's experience in 
1962: 
Our house was sold in a very odd way, and it happened to a lot of people, I'm 
sure. It was a Sunday morning, in September or October, and my mother and I 
hadn't been to church yet, the beds weren't made and the breakfast dishes were 
still at the table, and a knock came at the door, and I answered it-my mother 
was upstairs getting dressed for church-and I went upstairs and said, "Mother, 
there's a black man at the door; he gave me his business card, and he says he has a 
family outside that wants to look at our house." And she said she didn't want to 
show the house because it was a mess ... but I said it didn't matter; they wanted 
to look at the house. So she said, '~ll right." And they decided on the spot that 
they wanted it. And this happened time and again. 
Eunice Clemens recited a similar instance of door-to-door solicitation: 
When we sold it was starting to get colored [in 1961]. The people next door to us 
on both sides moved. And we decided that we should too; it was just my husband 
and me .... Instead of having people come and look at it, a friend of mine from 
church had a real estate man come .... We gave it to the real estate agent, and he 
said, "Don't let anybody come in unless I call and tell you." So one day Bill and I 
were going downtown to the theater, and the doorbell rang, and I went to the 
door, and this colored man said he would like to come through the house, and I 
said, "I'm sorry, but you have to have permission." So I called the real estate 
agent, and he said, "You did the right thing."47 
Whatever the variation, interviewees' reports on the rapid depression 
of values once panic set in are in agreement. As a Sun article in 1955 
observed of the pricing games played by blockbusters: "With his first 
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bargain he recoups the premium laid out to bust the block in the first 
place. From then on it is gravy-sound structures at prices far below 
going prices elsewhere, far below the cost of reproduction, which he swift-
ly makes available at as high a rental as the demand will bear." -HI Most 
interviewees reported that their families lost out in the process. Vera 
Johnson, for example, said: "On account of staying in the old neighbor-
hood on the Hill too long-those houses were going for about fifteen 
thousand dollars-we only got eighty-five hundred dollars because we 
waited too long." Joe Slovensky, whose mother moved from the northwest 
section of the area as soon as an African American person moved next to 
her in 1964, reported that she had bought her house for nine thousand 
dollars in 1951 but, because of the depreciated values caused by block-
busting, sold it for only one thousand dollars more thirteen years later. 
Marilyn Simkins recounted the sense of economic vulnerability: "The 
market dropped, and a man who lived across the street from us stayed a 
year or two after we did, and he only got thirty-five hundred dollars for 
his house .... People sold because they were afraid they would lose their 
shirt." 
On the other hand, the very few who elected to remain through the 
most acute stages of panic (recall that in all of census tract 1608 only 390 
whites remained by 1970, 96 by 1980) frequently saw their housing values 
return to their previous levels. John Carpenter, for instance, said that the 
first panicked sale on Normandy, where racial change came late, brought 
only four thousand dollars: "That was the cheapest that went for any 
house, because from then on, every house went up in price, and my 
mother-who was one of the last [whites] to leave [in 1967]-got eleven 
thousand dollars." Most interviewees agreed with Carpenter's view that in 
the long run purchase prices eventually moved back to original levels and 
beyond-but few whites remained long enough to witness the rebound. 
White interviewees tend to view African Americans as having been 
used in the racial turnover process. However, they differ over the class 
status of the first African Americans to inhabit formerly all white blocks 
in the Edmondson area. Marilyn Simkins, for example, expressed the 
opinion that new African American residents were sold houses they could 
not afford: "Black realtors would bring in black families who wanted to 
move to the suburbs, so to speak-because Edmondson Village was 
somewhat of a suburban area; you had a lot of grass and trees-and 
entice these people into buying a house they couldn't afford. And I know 
in the case of the people who bought our house, that's exactly what hap-
pened. They had the dream of owning their own home, and this sweet-
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talking guy talked them into something they couldn't afford." Madge 
Cooper, on the other hand, viewed the first African American tenants 
quite differently: "They did not use poor families; they really used people 
who could well afford it and were normally professional people-doctors 
and teachers were the blockbusters." Similarly, there were conflicting re-
ports and impressions regarding whether the first African American set-
tlers were renters or owners. Madge Morgenstern made a distinction be-
tween her experience in the early stages of racial change on Allendale 
Street, when she felt homes were bought by speculators and rented to 
"undesirable" people, and her experience nearly ten years later in the 
latter stages of racial change on Augusta, when she felt the people buying 
were "a fine class of black people." However, Alice Hughes viewed the 
process as exactly the reverse, believing that the first settlers were stable, 
middle-income people, largely home purchasers, the latter of lower socio-
economic status and more difficult to accept. 
Clearly, there were instances where blockbusters rented or sold to Afri-
can Americans who lacked the economic means to afford the costs of the 
newly acquired housing. In this sense, the scare tactics may have con-
formed to the contention that blockbusting involved the intentional intro-
duction of new residents who differed not only racially but economically as 
well. Moreover, it took relatively few such arrangements to achieve the 
desired result. At the same time, however, the preponderance of African 
American settlers who found new housing opportunity in Edmondson Vil-
lage appear not to have differed in terms of socioeconomic status nearly so 
much as white residents tended to. believe. Many were neither "renters" 
nor "lower class," thereby calling into question the interpretation that the 
real issue was not race but class. The real issue, indeed, was race. 
The fact of the matter is that Edmondson Village's white residents 
were extremely vulnerable, both socially and economically, to the tactics 
of the blockbuster. Socially, their subscription to the suburban ideal as a 
haven, their lack of social contact with blacks, and their general prejudice, 
widely shared at the time, all would have made adaptation questionable 
under the best of circumstances-and the tactics of the blockbusting pro-
cess guaranteed, indeed depended in part upon the likelihood, that cir-
cumstances were anything but the best. 
Economically, the threat was no less real. In American society, if a 
man's home is not necessarily his castle, one's home nevertheless is one's 
accumulated equity and-for the broad middle class-one's economic 
security. Clearly, the development of the Edmondson area by Keelty and 
the other rowhouse builders had been made possible by mechanisms that 
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facilitated home ownership, and the area attracted settlers willing and 
able to make this investment. Sometimes, purchase represented a sacri-
fice, but one that seemed a risk worth taking for the status and security of 
residence in the new neighborhood. Home ownership equals stability, so 
the popular belief goes, and the evidence for the statement is widespread 
enough to give it credibility. But home ownership also represented count-
less individual decisions to move up and out, countless calculations of the 
cost of doing so, countless sacrifices, dreams, and aspirations. Blockbust-
ing, therefore, threatened the very foundation upon which Edmondson 
Village residents had built a satisfying and seemingly secure community 
lifestyle. David Graff moved to the area as a new clergyman during the 
latter stages of the racial change process in the mid-1960s. His observa-
tion on this point is instructive: "For people, their home is their biggest 
investment-that's their security blanket. And that's the fear that [racial 
change] brings ... because what happens in our [collective] understand-
ing is that if blacks move into the neighborhood, the value will go down." 
News of even a few instances-like the one cited earlier from the interview 
with Simkins where houses worth ten thousand dollars were reported to 
sell for thirty-five hundred dollars-spread like wildfire through the 
neighborhood and induced panic of major proportions because the threat 
seemed so clearly devastating to residents' financial well-being. 
The socioeconomic uniformity of the area's white residents was a key 
characteristic of this rowhouse neighborhood, a source of strength and a 
source of weakness: if one was threatened, all were threatened; if all acted 
in concert, security would be preserved, but if any acted out of self-
interest, as inevitably some would, then the stone foundations became 
foundations of sand. Bonuses for those who sold early, penalties for those 
who resisted the offers-these were the high risks and high stakes block-
busting introduced into the residential equation. As David Graff saw it: 
"If somebody offered someone a couple of thousand dollars more than 
they knew they could get ifthey put their house on the market, they'd sell 
it [right away]. There was a lot of fear involved. And it became personal 
survival over having any integrity for the community." 
Could people afford to relocate? As in any fluid neighborhood, some 
people had been doing so all along, as personal hopes and the prospects of 
upward mobility dictated, especially when new suburban housing oppor-
tunities boomed during the postwar period. Family type and economics 
played a mixed role in affecting these proclivities. For instance, under 
ordinary circumstances the group most likely to consider relocation in-
cluded younger families, even those whose economic resources may have 
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been strained in the process, because they saw such a move as "something 
for the kids." When the fuel of racial change was added to the equation, 
this group fled rapidly and en masse, as indicated by the rate of racial 
redistribution in the public schools. On the other hand, those whose fami-
lies were older, including some of the earliest settlers, had strong attach-
ments to the neighborhood and were less attracted to resettlement. In 
David Graff's view: 
I think that the people who were left were mainly the older. And they were probably 
the first ones on the hill when the houses were built. There was a lot of sentimen-
tality. It was home; they were too old to make any transitional moves. There were 
just too many things like that in their minds they just couldn't handle. And, also, as I 
talked with them, they weren't totally disturbed by the transition, because they had 
gotten to know many of their black neighbors. I can still remember when a couple of 
them did move, the black neighbors coming out and sitting on their porches and 
crying, because they had really established some close ties and friendships. 
In surprisingly short order, however, residents with these long-term attach-
ments were engulfed by the panic and joined the exodus as well. Among 
both younger and older family types were those with modest economic re-
sources who typically would not have felt they had the economic resources 
to contemplate a move, especially one likely involving higher housing costs. 
For this group, the prospect oflower sale prices was especially threatening. 
Nevertheless, many proceeded to relocate who could not necessarily afford 
to do so but who felt they had no other choice. The mechanisms of panic 
peddlers preyed upon white vulnerability and made a clean sweep. 
White Responses to Blockbusting 
The tactics blockbusters used in the Edmondson Village area were ex-
tremely effective. As Agnes Malone described the consequences: "It was 
gradual.-then there was a rush." While the result indeed was mass, col-
lective behavior, the response in fact took a variety of individual forms. 
The climate of blockbusting prompted many to act in isolation, keep-
ing their plans secret even from close friends, neighbors, and relatives. In 
part, the bribe of the blockbusting system encouraged sellers to get out 
when it was to their greatest advantage. And what people were told by the 
solicitors and learned quickly through neighborhood communication net-
works was that the moment of greatest advantage was to be among the 
first to sell. Yet to do so, especially in a context that people regarded as a 
dose, friendly neighborhood setting, meant betrayal of one's neighbors. 
No wonder that so many operated in great secrecy, often at the expense of 
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relationships and in spite of statements to the contrary. Agnes Malone 
recalled: '~lot of people said they would never sell their houses to blacks, 
and they were the first ones to do it." And Hughes recounted: 
There was a feeling of fear; there was a feeling of, get out fast while I still can. 
There was a feeling of pressure: I can't afford to move, but if! don't move now, I 
won't be able to move at all, because I won't be able to afford to buy another 
house. . . . The only thing that people kept secret was whether they were going to 
be one of the first sellers-everybody would say, well, if I move, I'm not going to 
sell to blacks, I'm only going to sell to whites-they would tell this to their neigh-
bors, because they didn't want to be thought of as contributing to the problem. 
But, of course, there wasn't anybody but the blacks who were going to buy the 
houses, so everybody did sell to blacks in the end. 
Vera Johnson, who talked about the particularly close relationships she 
and her family valued in the neighborhood, recalled the shocking experi-
ence regarding her uncle, who lived next door: "If you were depending on 
a certain number of neighbors to stick it out so you'd have white neigh-
bors, forget it! Even my dear uncle-guess when we found out he was 
moving? The day the moving van pulled up! This was right next door, and 
he never told us one word about it." David Graff described what people 
had told him of their experience: "They didn't tell their neighbors. Be-
cause the way it was presented to me was, I'm making this offer to you, 
but if you don't take this offer, two or three months from now, you'll 
receive an offer for maybe eight or nine thousand, not fourteen or fifteen. 
The whole design of the blockbusting system was built on secrecy, priva-
cy, because if words gets out, your neighbor is going to be the one who 
gets the prize, not you." 
Blockbusting produced a new community ethic, with individual fami-
lies feeling tremendous pressure not to be victimized themselves yet want-
ing to act with loyalty toward their neighbors. Many were reported to 
have taken the attitude described by Madge Morgenstern: "I'm not going 
to be the first one to sell to a black, but I'm sure not going to be the last." 
Nola Null expressed a similar consideration in her own case: "I said I 
couldn't sell because the neighbors aren't going to move. I hated to sell, 
but the neighbors moved two days before I sold mine. The blacks moved 
right in." 49 
Individuals kept a close eye on the behavior of their neighbors to try 
to judge what· was happening, since open and honest communication 
broke down-and trust along with it. Nola Null said, "The couple across 
the street sold their house to a colored family unbeknownst to us. I used 
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to go look out the corner of the curtain to see if any blacks were looking 
[at houses] because I didn't want to sell." 
In some instances, the threat of racial change was reported to have 
been used as a means of settling old scores, as silent betrayal became overt 
revenge. Indeed, Madge Cooper believes that the first instance of African 
American settlement in the southeastern corner where she lived occurred 
as the result of a neighborhood dispute: "In 1955 the first black family 
moved in on North Rosedale in the middle of the night. Ironically enough, 
by a neighborhood argument: ... there was an argument between two 
families, and what they would say was, 'O.K., I'll fix you, we'll sell to a 
black.' And that was actually how that neighborhood [started to change]. 
And they had a big meeting, and nobody else was going to do anything, and 
they were going to try to get rid of this person. But somebody else saw how 
they could make some quick money-and it just happened." John Carpen-
ter recalled a similar instance where neighborhood conflict led to a threat 
to sell to African Americans as a means of retaliation: "The man up the 
street, Mr. Jameson, who had been a fireman with the 53 engine company, 
lived on the alley next door to an old Army guy who was rough as nails .... 
Well, Mr. Jameson and this man, Mr. Penrose, didn't get along. Mr. Pen-
rose said, 'If you don't shut up, I'll sell this house to niggers!' So he did that. 
Well, then immediately the Archways sold their house .... " 
While the predominant tendency was for isolated decisions, collective 
action was sometimes attempted, particularly in the early stages. Often it 
took the form of urging united resistance to blockbusters' inducements. 
Neighbors might reassure one another informally that they would not sell 
to blacks. Sometimes, as Nola Null recounted, the commitments were 
more formal: "Before I thought about selling, everyone agreed to stay 
put .... One of the meri went around with a paper saying we wouldn't 
sell .... I felt that the neighborhood was going to go, but as long as we 
stayed, it would stop." In some instances, neighborhood associations 
sought to curb panic and persuade people not to sell. Marilyn Simkins 
recalled the efforts of William Donald Schaefer, then president of the 
Allendale-Lyndhurst Association and newly elected councilman from th:e 
district (later mayor of Baltimore and governor of Maryland): "I remem-
ber William Donald Schaefer ... coming to the house and talking to my 
mother and trying to persuade her to stay. At the time he came she had 
not put the house up for sale; he was there one afternoon and was trying 
to talk all the neighbors into staying and having faith in the area." Edith 
Romaine spoke of similar meetings in the northwest section: "When it 
first happened, they had meetings, and they told the people, 'Don't panic, 
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don't move-if you don't sell your house, they can't move in.' But evi-
dently people panicked-when one got in, that was enough for everybody 
else-they just started going. They had quite a few meetings." 50 
Aside from the community associations, few local institutions at-
tempted intervention in the process-perhaps one factor that accounted 
for the degree of panic. However, efforts to intervene to dissuade flight 
were seldom effective, sometimes perhaps counterproductive. The priest 
of the local Roman Catholic church in a neighborhood evenly divided 
between Catholics and Protestants was a person of considerable influence 
by virtue of his office and a character of considerable stubborn will by 
virtue of his personality. According to Father John Smith: "Monsignor 
Vaeth was a very feisty character .... He swore that blacks would never 
move into Edmondson Village .... As white people began to move, they 
said that he would get up in the pulpit and launch into tirades that 'All 
you dummies want to move; you ought to stay here; this is a good commu-
nity!' And they said that for about a year and a half, he just went into 
tirade after tirade-he began to see his whole parish just disintegrat-
ing." 51 Calm counsel, angry tirades-neither seemed capable of stem-
ming the tide of panic engendered by blockbusting. 
The monsignor's outbursts may have been his personal style, but the 
response conformed to the general stance of churches in the neighbor-
hood. Insofar as they addressed the issue at all, their tendency, as volun-
tary organizations, was to reinforce white control, not to encourage adap-
tation or acceptance of residential integration. In 1965 Christ Edmondson 
Methodist Church faced a decision about its future because of racial 
change, only seventeen years after the merger effected when Christ Meth-
odist closed its doors at its former North Avenue location because of racial 
succession and joined Edmondson Avenue Methodist. Since most of the 
parishioners of Christ Edmondson already had moved out of Edmondson 
Village, the congregation considered a vote to close and to sell out to an 
African American congregation. Only a minority of the membership 
urged that the church stay open and try to make the adjustment to racial 
integration. However, the Methodist hierarchy refused to approve the 
closing of the local congregation; instead, conference authorities assigned 
a minister to attempt to integrate the congregation. In response, accord-
ing to the church's historian, William Joynes, "some 92 withdrew their 
membership" in protest, leaving only a small white remnant committed 
to the church's continuation on the new basis.52 
The blockbusters and new African American residents were not the 
only outside forces impinging upon Edmondson area attitudes during the 
decade of massive racial change. Locally and nationally, challenges to 
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segregation had become more persistent, and education provided a ful-
crum for concern. Indications oflimited change, as in the 1952 vote by the 
Baltimore Board of School Commissioners to permit integration of the 
specialized program at Baltimore Polytechnic, paled in comparison to the 
sweeping decision by the Supreme Court in May 1954, that segregated 
schooling was inherently unequal and therefore unconstitutional. The 
Baltimore Board of School Commissioners responded to the ruling at its 
June 3 meeting by voting unanimously to "conform to a non-segregated 
basis" and announced that an open enrollment plan would be imple-
mented immediately, to take effect for the fall term.53 That action brought 
the first few Mrican American students from outside the area to Ed-
mondson Village'S Gwynns Falls Park Junior High School in September. 
Citywide, 3 percent of African American students enrolled in formerly 
white schools; at Gwynns Falls the number was eight of 2,109. 
Though the initial days of Baltimore school integration were calm, 
near the end of the month demonstrations occurred at several former 
white elementary and junior high schools. Parents picketed the schools 
and kept their children home. Most of the schools where the incidents 
occurred were on the south and west sides of the city in predominantly 
white, working-class areas adjacent to predominantly Mrican American 
sections. The westernmost of the school incidents occurred at Gwynns 
Falls, located on the eastern edge of the Edmondson Village area it gener-
ally served, just across the valley from neighborhoods that recently had 
changed to African American residency. 54 Interviewees who attended the 
junior high school as students at the time mention the tensions and the 
protests that occurred there. Madge Cooper recalled: 
I remember when the law was passed that the schools were-integrated .... Par-
ents marched, mostly the mothers. They were very fearful. I think that the biggest 
fear they had was their children would pick up some of the traits that they saw in 
the black community that they thought were less than desirable. [They marched] 
right in front of Gwynns Falls school. ... That was quite a time-it was very 
scary; you didn't know what was going to happen; and I guess you didn't know if 
someone was going to get hurt-that was what you were concerned about-fear 
for them. And they were pretty vocal-many carried signs. See, there were none 
[blacks] who were probably living right there then .... They had been precluded 
from coming there before, but now they could. 
Marilyn Simkins described consideration of a boycott of classes: 
I think I was in eighth grade .... I remember the day that it happened. We knew 
that it ... would be effective on such and such a day. I had heard rumors that 
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they wouldn't make us stay in school, and some were saying that when the law 
passes I have to walk out of school. My mother told me under no certain circum-
stances was I to come home. It was the law, and I was to stay in school, whether I 
liked it or didn't like it. And I did. And a lot of the kids' mothers came and 
demonstrated and wrote signs. It wasn't what you would call a large crowd, by 
today's standards of a demonstration. But a lot of mothers came and picked up 
their kids from schools. Some of the boys jumped out of the classroom windows. I 
think they just all got carried away. 
According to contemporary newspaper accounts, a lone counterpicket ap-
peared at Gwynns Falls: Clarence Mitchell, Jr., Washington bureau chief 
of the NAACP, whose son was one of the new African American enrollees, 
marched outside the school with a placard that read, "I Am an Ameri-
can, Too." The protests by white parents dissipated quickly throughout 
the city in the face of concerted calls for calm by elected officials and 
community leaders, buttressed eventually by a tough stand by the police 
commissioner, who announced that he would use a Maryland law that 
prohibited interference with schools or children attending school as the 
legal basis for action against the protesters.55 
Conditions at Gwynns Falls calmed down, but Kiefer Mitchell, 
whose father had carried the counterpicket sign, later told Sun reporter 
Eric Siegel that his experience at the junior high had been "a very trying 
time": "There was hostility on the part ofthe students and the surround-
ing neighborhoods. My father had to take me to school for at least six 
weeks until things settled down .... [Once, on the playground, I was] 
assaulted by a neighborhood gang of older youths, caught up in the an-
tagonism of integration. Each day I would get totally involved in art .... 
It was a safe haven as well as a way of exploring my interests .... After 
the first year, overt hostility was not as apparent .... But neither were 
steadfast friends forthcoming." 56 From the point of view of a neighbor-
hood white pupil, Marilyn Simkins, the African American students repre-
sented "a very small percentage. Three in my immediate homeroom-
maybe four in the classroom next to mine, so it was maybe one percent of 
my graduating class. [The students were] very nice, very quiet; in fact, 
they were nicer than some of the white kids that went there .... They 
were nice kids, well-spoken; they stuck to themselves. They were not bois~ 
terous or loud, never caused any trouble." Nevertheless, they were a sign 
of change and of the inability of the community to control it. The fact that 
the first instances of white flight occurred near the school in the same 
southeastern corner the same year may not have been unrelated.· Shortly 
after the integration of Gwynns Falls Park Junior High, the early stages of 
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new African American settlement brought resident minority students into 
the neighborhood's elementary schools for the first timeY 
Some interviewees feel that school integration served to trigger racial 
turnover. Marilyn Simkins said, "It was the new integration law. You just 
didn't go to school with black people; you just didn't live with them. It 
was foreign to people then. They found it distasteful. Fear. Prejudice. In 
some cases I know that the families had planned to move. The area had 
only been an interim move until they could get into a single family dwell-
ing. But a good portion of the people just felt that they weren't going to 
live with blacks." Whether school integration precipitated white flight or 
mirrored it, the ensuing rate of racial turnover in the area's public schools 
was rapid indeed. One white teacher, Eunice Clemens, reported that 
when she retired in 1959 she had only two African American children in 
her elementary school classroom (at Lyndhurst Elementary, in tract 
1608); a year later, when she went back as a substitute teacher, nearly the 
whole class was African American. A new school (Rock Glen) opened on 
the far western edge of the city in 1962, providing some west-side whites 
an alternative at the junior high level to rapidly resegregating Gywnns 
Falls. 58 The changing complexion of Gwynns Falls Park Junior High and 
the Edmondson area's other public schools was not unique in the city of 
Baltimore: a 1963 study reported that everyone of the nine all-white 
schools to integrate in 1954 was exclusively African American seven years 
later.59 This general citywide pattern of resegregation led civil rights ad-
vocates to charge in 1963 that the school board's open enrollment plan 
had not served to achieve meaningful integration and that the system 
instead perpetuated discrimination.60 
In response to blockbusting and residential racial change, instances 
of community collective action usually took the flOrm of resistance to inte-
gration. Few interviewees recall active consideration of racial inclusion as 
a conceivable or viable option. No doubt some of those who did not move 
immediately may have stayed because of a willingness to try to make ra-
cial accommodation work. However, the rate and speed of change led 
most to conclude that such prospects were dim. Similarly, few recall ex-
plicit instances where those who counseled restraint explicitly did so in 
the context of urging acceptance of racial integration. One African Ameri-
can pioneer remembered a white neighbor who did actively encourage 
other whites to accept African Americans as neighbors: "An attorney-
Goldberg-used to live on Linnard Street, and he used to always have 
meetings around in different people's houses-and we were one, so we got 
to go around. And he wanted to know why was it that when blacks move 
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in a neighborhood, the whites moved out. And he would say how nice the 
blacks had their homes fixed, because he had visited a lot of the people 
around here." 61 But such instances are scarce in the interview record, and 
there is little indication that integration was given much of a chance. 
Race relations among two groups under such stress did little to im-
prove its prospects. White and African American interviewees cite some 
instances of efforts at friendly neighborly relations on a one-to-one basis. 
However, unpleasant encounters stand out in people's memories on both 
sides of the racial change experience and certainly influenced attitudes. 
There is no way to put the nature, quantity, or validity of such instances 
in any objective context, but their impact must be taken seriously, be-
cause in a racially charged atmosphere, incidents perceived as intergroup 
conflict take on heightened significance.62 
African American interviewees report some instances of harassment, 
primarily by teenagers in the early stages of the pioneering period of 
residential settlement. Their experience will be discussed more fully in 
chapter 5. 
In the case of whites, incidents of African American behavior often 
confirmed negative stereotypes and convinced them that the social and 
cultural divide between themselves and their new African American 
neighbors was unacceptable. Frequently, such episodes were cited by in-
terviewees as the last straw in their family's eventual decision to move, as 
if in a context already fraught with stress, these events served as triggers. 
Vera Johnson explained: 
My uncle moved out [from next door]; so he sold to blacks. The people who lived 
in it were nice. The people on the other side you couldn't live with, and the people 
across the street who moved in were out dancing on the roof of their cars and on 
the street at two o'clock in the morning. Mortimers up the street told us they had 
little kids on the second floor roller skating. So it just got to the place we couldn't 
get to sleep. So after a while my father made the decision [to move] because oftwo 
things. The little boy next door (about four or five) opened the screen door; he 
came in with the hose-it was on-and he was squirting the hallway. Then Dad-
dy had a Pontiac .... These kids came down the street, walked over the hood, 
over the roof, down over the trunk like it was a pavement. So my father said, 
"That did it; we gotta move!" 
Madge Morgenstern explained that her family decided to move when the 
African American boy living next door broke into their home. Alice 
Hughes, who felt that the later African American settlers were more "ag-
gressive, quite pushy, and full of hate toward the whites," reported on her 
own experiences: 
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The last time I ever went to the sub shop, I went down there by myself one 
evening, I just wanted to bring home a sub, and it was eight blocks away and this 
was probably nine o'clock at night, and there were probably six to eight black 
boys in the store, and they started messing around in the store, saying all kinds of 
insulting things, and when I left the store, they followed me, and I literally ran for 
my life. I ran as fast as I could for eight blocks, and they chased me, right to my 
door. That was the last time-that was the turning point for me. That told me, 
hey, ... there really is something to be afraid of here. I can recall as the neighbor-
hood started to go, it went very fast. I remember hearing of many people who 
were beaten up, badly enough to be hospitalized, on the way home from school. 
One of my friends reported having someone shoot a gun through the window into 
hiskitchen--the bullet went into the wall just above his head. My uncle couldn't 
open his windows because people were throwing rotten vegetables at him. Little 
children weren't allowed to go out in their backyards any more, because black 
children would come in and beat them. Old people were being harassed, pushed 
down in the street. And so, between the people's own natural antipathy, through 
their own prejudice, to live with the blacks, and the over-aggressive behavior of 
the blacks, it is easy to see why the neighborhood changed as fast as it did. 
Such incidents played a role in the decision by Edith Romaine's family to 
move: 
I do recall one Christmas Eve I had some people over, and they left, I guess it was 
about 11:30, and I was sitting in the dining room, wrapping some last minute 
Christmas gifts, and my mother walked in from the kitchen, and! she got to about 
right here, and she started screaming. And evidently what had happened was that 
there was a black guy who was standing up on the outside rail, looking in the 
glass, and she was frightened. And we went in the kitchen and called the police. 
What had happened was that there was a peeping tom .... They caught him ... 
so, they got him on our front porch, and they wanted me to go down and identify 
him. Well, he was drunk, and he lived on Linnard Street. It just got to the point 
where everybody was afraid. Nothing really happened, [but] my mother was nev-
er right after that .... It just frightened her .... She tried to stick it out. 
While such occurrences may not have been widespread, nor neces-
sarily representative, clearly they added powerful fuel to an emotional fire 
already stoked by apprehension. And it was the folklore of racial change 
every bit as much as its reality that fanned those flames. When a popular 
young merchant, Tommy Creutzer, was shot in his Edmondson Avenue 
store by African American assailants, leaving him crippled, area white 
residents needed little further confirmation that their worst fears about 
integration had come true. 
As noted earlier, white recollection of new African American settlers 
make distinctions among them, especially between those they considered 
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to be more stable and more likely to be middle class in income and social 
values and those considered more transient, with lower income, and with 
values that clashed with those of a middle-class neighborhood. Fre-
quently, they express sympathy for the former, viewing them as victims, 
like themselves, and acknowledging that they may have been motivated 
by the same quest for improved housing and neighborhood amenities that 
brought the whites themselves to the neighborhood. Often, however, the 
sympathy is in the context of an opinion that they, like whites, were vic-
timized both by blockbusting and by the in-migration of an unstable so-
cial element within the African American community that was believed to 
accompany blockbusting. Thus, white sympathy for this group affirms 
one segment of Mrican American pioneers even as it serves to rationalize 
white flight. John Carpenter, for instance, observed: "I feel sorry for a lot 
of the black people who first moved in down there around our church. 
They had good jobs; lot of them were school teachers and so forth; and 
they're in a vicious circle, too, because, like the Greens, right behind the 
church, right next door to the Greens the kids are kicking the place apart-
the kids kick the spindles out [of the porch railings], and so forth." Vera 
Johnson expressed the view that some African American settlers had genu-
inely hoped for integrated residency so were disappointed when blockbust-
ing continued to produce white flight and racial resegregation: 
We got the impression that the black folk coming in wanted it the other way 
around. They didn't want to live with all black folk; they wanted to be in an 
integrated neighborhood. Just to show you what 1 tried to tell you is truth, we had 
a black police officer who moved into the Stephens's house where we used to play 
ball. He came up to us and said, "I was thrilled to move into this neighborhood, 
but 1 can't wait to get out. 1 can't get any sleep. The kids get in the alley and 
scream. 1 don't know what it is about black children, but they can't play without 
screaming." So he was going to move. 
Some former. white residents insist that the issue was class, not race, 
making the distinctions cited above and using them as an explanation for 
their-or the white community's-actions. Explaining that blockbusters 
had been unscrupulous in placing African Americans as renters in hous-
ing bought up in the early stages of blockbusting on Allendale, for exam-
ple, Madge Morgenstern insisted, "I mean, it wasn't that they were 
black-if they were undesirable and white and don't take care of their 
property-undesirable is undesirable." 
Sometimes, white interviewees said this distinction had been used at 
the time to try to curb racial fears and stem the tide of panic, by empha-
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sizing that the issue might be more class than race and that by welcoming 
the "right: kind" of African American neighbors, community socio-
economic decline might be averted. John Carpenter made this point about 
an incident on Rokeby Road, in the westernmost section, one of the last 
areas to experience racial change: "There was a hillbilly, white hillbilly, 
family moved in, and the man stood out front on the porch every Friday 
evening and collected money from the men who came to take his wife 
upstairs; and the kids were just running around on the front yard in their 
bare feet in cold weather-they were running a house of prostitution. And 
all the white neighbors would come down and stand opposite and laugh, 
and thought this was a bigjoke. But two black school teachers-a husband 
and wife--moved into one of the houses, and they all sold their houses!" 
Blockbusting and white flight produced such rapid change that 
whites felt engulfed by the large numbers of African American newcomers 
who had wrested their turf from them. Edith Romaine said, "It was just 
that there were too many of them. You felt like you were out of place." 
Madge Cooper expressed similar feelings: "The numbers increased-and 
that was another thing; they felt overrun. A one-on-one situation you can 
probably deal with better than a two-on-one. And they were the minority 
then, and I don't think they liked being the minority." 
Interpreting the process as a loss of residential turf, fleeing whites 
took with them feelings of bitterness and resentment. A very satisfying 
residential environment suddenly had been uprooted by forces they nei-
ther understood nor could control. In their collective action they provided 
dramatic proof of the power of blockbusting to prey upon their own fears 
regarding race. 
The Demographics of a White Community That Succumbed to 
Blockbusting 
The rowhouse community that received African American pioneer set-
tlers in 1955 was one that seemed at the peak of its golden period-its new 
housing now completed, the shopping center in place, other community 
amenities bursting at the seams in the wake of postwar population growth 
and general prosperity. But was it also a community that had become 
golden in terms of its age profile, as the original settlers from the 1920s 
and 1930s, so many of whom had found stable roots in this rowhouse 
version of the suburban ideal, brought up their families and now ap-
proached their late middle age and senior years? And were young families 
moving on to newer suburban housing and schools in the county beyond, 
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either leaving the community to establish new roots or bypassing it alto-
gether on their way outward? Similarly, did other signs of socioeconomic 
status-income, occupation, home ownership, etc.-suggest patterns of 
stability or change that might be a clue to the community's relative well-
being and help to account for the response to the challenge of race? 
The census years are not the most useful indicators, since the period 
of change roughly corresponds to two mid-decade points-1955 and 1965. 
Nevertheless, a close look at the 1950 census can provide a portrait of the 
community prior to change for both census tracts, while the 1960 census 
affords a profile of one census tract in the midst of change (2007), the 
second about to change (1608).63 
The community's age profile showed remarkable continuity from 
1930 through 1950. While the 1940 census at the close of the Depression 
decade recorded a smaller percentage of young children than in 1930, the 
1950 census reflected the Edmondson area's modest version of the baby 
boom. In the latter year, however, the percentage of those in the age 
group of young parents (age twenty-five to forty-four) had not grown 
proportionally, a possible harbinger of the loss of young families. At the 
same time, an increase in older age categories sugges~ed a maturing popu-
lation, though their numbers were in proportion to overall population 
growth. Therefore, in the half decade or more immediately prior to the 
first instances of racial change, there were few marked shifts in the area's 
age demographics. 
I t is clear, however, that the onset of racial change drastically altered 
this pattern. Less than five years after initial integration in tract 2007, the 
1960 white profile revealed a striking percentage (and real) loss of the 
area's twenty-five to forty-four-year-olds and the proportional increase of 
those over forty-five. Taken together with the fact that white population 
actually declined by 57 percent, reflecting shrinkages in nearly all age 
categories, these early changes were significant indicators of how white 
flight and white avoidance converged to alter the age profile of the white 
community.64 In 1960 north of Edmondson Avenue (in tract 1608)-
where the racial line was virtually intact but where massive change was 
imminent-substantial alteration in the white age profile had begun to 
occur as well. Again, the absence of young family-forming adults (age 
twenty-five to forty-four) was the significant feature of the altered profile. 
In terms of occupational status, tract 2007 displayed little change 
between 1940 and 1950, and even in 1960 the remaining whites repre-
sented an occupational profile that had changed only modestly. As one 
index, for instance, white-collar occupations stood at 50 percent in 1940, 
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52 percent in 1950, and 45 percent in 1960.65 Similarly, tract 1608 experi-
enced relative stability in occupational status between 1950 and 1960, just 
prior to the advent of racial change. White-collar percentages there had 
been 65 percent in 1940; in 1950 they were 61 percent and in 1960, 57 
percent.66 Therefore, while census reports suggest modest changes in oc-
cupationallevel among white residents, they provide little indication of a 
substantial shift on the eve ofracial change, which might be symptomatic 
of fundamental alteration in the area's socioeconomic status. 
The relationship of income and housing value may provide further 
insight on this question, however, especially when the two tracts are com-
pared. In tract 2007 (below Edmondson Avenue) white income in 1950 
stood at $3,717, 32 percent ahead of the citywide figure; by 1960 it had 
risen to slightly more than $4,940, but that figure was only 6 percent 
above the city median. This relative decline in the income of remaining 
white residents in this tract suggested either a general drop in financial 
resources, or, more likely, that those with higher incomes had been among 
the first to flee. In contrast, in tract 1608 (north of Edmondson Avenue) 
during the period 1950 to 1960, median family income ($4,054 in 1950 and 
$6,239 in 1960) continued to exceed the city level substantially, the per-
centage advantage dipping only slightly from 44 percent in 1950 to 33 
percent in 1960. These figures suggested that on the eve of racial change 
income medians in this tract roughly kept pace with the citywide rate of 
income growth and that no significant exodus of. those with higher in-
comes had yet occurred. 
Housing values, which had skyrocketed during the decade of the 
1940s (by more than 150 percent in both census tracts, 145 percent in the 
city as a whole), leveled off in the two tracts during the 1950s. Median 
values in 2007 rose a modest 4 percent to eighty-six hundred dollars; in 
1608 they even declined 5 percent to eighty-seven hundred dollars.67 At 
the same time, citywide values continued to rise (by 26 percent) to nine 
thousand dollars, and metro (SMSA) values exceeded those for the city 
by an additional eighteen hundred dollars. 
Taken together, income and housing values pose something of a puz-
zle, the former suggesting a neighborhood where income roughly kept 
pace with metro area trends, the latter indicating relative stability-or 
stagnancy--even as the metropolitan region experienced a substantial 
rise. Two observations seem justified: first, that some of Edmondson Vil-
lage's white population likely could afford to live in other parts of the 
region on the basis of their incomes; but, second, that they were de-
creasingly likely to receive equity from their housing that would provide 
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the means to improve their housing status with purchases elsewhere. 
Clearly Edmondson Village's white residents were being caught in an 
economic and social vise-between housing values in relative decline, 
making it an inopportune time to consider selling and moving, and the 
prospect of racial change, which led many to feel they had no choice but 
to relocate. 
The census figures on housing values also help to put the oral reports 
on the prices offered by blockbusting speculators in perspective. When 
interviewees mention later panic sale offers on the order of thirty-five 
hundred to six thousand dollars, these represent prices startlingly short of 
the two tracts' approximate eight to nine thousand dollars median values 
in 1960. On the other hand, early overtures reported to have been in the 
neighborhood of twelve to fifteen thousand dollars represented tempting 
bait to a community whose housing values had been flat and which had 
begun to experience depreciation in a relative sense. Since housing costs 
in newer suburban areas beyond the city line were considerably higher, 
the bonus paid by the blockbuster to early sellers might provide the 
means necessary to make the outward move. Moreover, such offers were 
even more persuasive when residents began to contemplate how low they 
might become in the latter stages of the blockbusting process. 
A strong force for stability throughout the Edmondson area's history 
had been its high home ownership rate, and there is little indication that 
this ceased to be the case even as the period of racial change approached. 
In 1950, 72 percent were homeowners in 2007 and 73 percent in 1608. In 
1960 home ownership among whites in 2007 held steady at 74 percent, 
while in 1608 it had declined only slightly to 65 percent. Ironically, at the 
same time that Edmondson residents were tied to their homes through 
ownership (and various other social and personal ties as well), it was 
home ownership that also left them feeling very vulnerable. 
Finally, had residential mobility increased in the area in advance of 
racial change? Here the ten-year census periods present particular diffi-
culties in determining an answer. In-migration had been very strong in 
the postwar period, as new housing was added to fill up the remaining 
parcels of land. Nevertheless, in 1950 less than two persons in ten had 
moved into the area as a whole during the preceding year, a rate almost 
identical to that for the city generally (17 percent in 1608; 12 percent in 
2007; 16 percent in the city as a whole). In 1960, when the census looked 
instead at the previous five years, more than six of every ten whites in 
both census tracts had lived in the same house longer than five years (62 
percent for 1608 and 66 percent for whites remaining in 2007), evidence of 
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much greater residential stability than either the rest of the city (54 per-
cent) or the metropolitan area (51 percent for the SMSA). Such relative 
residential permanence usually would be interpreted as a sign of commu-
nity well-being. In retrospect, was it an indication of socioeconomic stag-
nancy for the community? 
The census data tells only part of the story, however; the sample block 
survey provides the basis for a closer examination of mobility patterns, 
based on close analysis often sample blocks. A distinction must be drawn, 
of course, between the patterns of mobility on settled blocks (for which 
rates of population change might be considered typical of the neighbor-
hood) and on newly developed blocks (where virtually all residents would 
be newcomers). As noted previously, population growth due to new hous-
ing development continued into the 1950s, accounting for a sizable percent-
age of the continuing in-migration of white residents. Those moving into 
new housing on sample blocks along Flowerton Road and Wildwood Park-
way, for example, replicated the social character of other white residents 
both in terms of occupational profile and their prior residence in older 
sections of Baltimore's western and southwestern sectors. A greater sprin-
kling of East European and Italian names indicated the out-migration of 
later ethnic groups from the changing city. 
Once blocks were settled in the Edmondson area, rates of in-migra-
tion and out-migration remained low, a pattern evident during the De-
pression, World War II, and into the early postwar period. On sample 
blocks in the survey, 77 percent of the households in 1940 had the same 
resident as five years previous, and in 1950 the percentage held firm at 81 
percent. During the decade. of the 1950s, in advance of racial change, 
white in-migration and out-migration continued at essentially the same 
steady, low rate. In 1960 the proportion of whites who had lived in the 
same residence five years earlier was still 80 percent on blocks not yet 
experiencing racial change. However, out-migration, which in the past 
had usually been to other parts of the city, now was almost entirely di-
rected wesltward into Baltimore County. 
Some studies of racial succession have argued that white avoidance 
may be more significant than white flight as an explanation for racial 
turnover. However, for Edmondson Village the evidence strongly suggests 
that whites continued to seek settlement right up to the moment of racial 
change. Another model of racial succession has argued for a filtering pro-
cess, contending that the patterns of in-migration and out-migration may 
lead to a gradual socioeconomic alteration in the complexion of a neigh-
borhood's make-up.68 Common to both lines of analysis often is an as-
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sumption of incipient decline in the socioeconomic status of white resi-
dents. While the data on Edmondson Village may not be conclusive re-
garding whether there was some slight shift in the socioeconomic stand-
ing of new white settlers, clearly any process of gradual, long-term change 
was short-circuited by the rapidity of the racial change process that 
blockbusting precipitated. 
As late as 1956 all ten of the sample blocks were still entirely white in 
their racial composition. By 1961 racial change had occurred in the three 
blocks on the south side of Edmondson Avenue (Denison Street, Norman-
dy Avenue, Hilton Street), but none in blocks on the north side, except for 
Grantley Street, which had one African American household. In 1964 ra-
cial residential change on southside blocks was almost total; on the north 
side, eleven of fourteen Grantley Street households now were African 
American, but on other northern blocks African American residency was 
slight and scattered.69 However, by 1970, 102 of the 108 households in the 
sample were African American. 
White Perceptions in Retrospect70 
Clearly whites were bewildered by a process that was so rapid and seem-
ingly inexorable that it overwhelmed them. Blockbusting introduced into 
what had appeared to them to be a secure and stable social world an 
atmosphere of such panic proportions that confusion combined with tra-
ditional racial prejudice to overrule calm and reason. No wonder that 
retrospective memories of the process suggest a wide range of opinion 
about the social character of the pioneering African American residents 
as these two populations literally passed in the night. Many moved so 
abruptly as to have virtually no direct contact with their new neighbors. 
Some experienced unfortunate episodes-like incidents of harassment-
or heard enough rumors of such behavior to form very negative opinions. 
Others recall much more positive encounters but felt they had no choice 
but to bow to the inevitable. 
The interview accounts, generally, reflect perceptions that incoming 
African American settlers represented people of substantially differing so-
cioeconomic status whose presence signaled a significant break with the 
community's past social identity, an end to the dream of row house subur-
bia. No doubt at the root of many such feelings was the sense that in a 
racially divided society, differing cultural styles themselves represented 
radical discontinuity. But frequently the objection was couched in terms of 
social class rather than race. In the prevailing retrospective interpretation, 
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socioeconomic homogeneity and residential stability were supplanted by 
socioeconomic heterogeneity and residential instability, thereby threaten-
ing the sense of closeness and security that had been hallmarks of the 
rowhouse suburb. Many who fled must have harbored similar views at the 
time, no doubt heightened by the traumatic sense of crisis that blockbust-
ing induced. 
The tendency for former white residents to frame recollections in 
terms of this fault line of discontinuity undoubtedly is colored to some 
degree by nostalgia for the earlier period, compared to the sense of loss, 
frustration, or bitterness the era of change engendered. Moreover, for the 
earlier period their knowledge is direct, first-hand, the impression of the 
insider; for the latter it typically is more brief, distant, the impression of 
the outsider. While likely subject to distortions-magnified by the lapse 
of time-these interpretations bear analysis because such perceptions 
surely were at the heart of the individual and collective decisions that led 
to "the exodus." Since people act on the basis of what they believe to be 
true, whether it is objectively the case or not, their perceptions have a 
social reality that must be taken into account in any effort to understand 
a social scene as intense and complex as rapid racial change. Federal 
census tract data and the sample block survey provide retrospective evi-
dence to test some of the salient factors that may have undergirded such 
perceptions and to place them in a perspective not available to residents 
at the time. These factors will be commented on only briefly here for the 
purposes of comparison, since they are treated more thoroughly in the 
separate chapters on each period in the community's history. 
Did residential stabillity and longevity differ substantially for the pri-
or white community and the succeeding pioneer African American com .. 
munity?71 On one hand, both community profiles suggested striking de .. 
grees of stability, especially if one discounts the absolute discontinuity 
represented by the short period of near total population turnover. In both 
eras, in .. migrants tended to be young, married adults, already with young 
children or anticipating children, who shared in common the beginning 
stages of family formation. Both groups displayed exceptional residential 
permanence, suggesting either a high degree of satisfaction with housing, 
neighbors, and neighborhood, or, at least, a calculation that the housing 
package was the best of available options. The cycle of young couples 
moving in and beginning new families, which for white residents charac·· 
terized both the 1920s and the late 1940s and early 1950s, was repeated by 
young African American families in the early stages of racial change who 
gave the area its third era of rejuvenation-this time with a different hue. 
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As each successive group of in-migrants remained in place and matured, 
residential longevity eventually contributed subtly to change because it 
produced a gradually aging neighborhood. 
While the appearance of stability had a sound basis, the fact of the 
matter was that the community had always absorbed substantial rates of 
change, as well. Population growth had been the order of the day for the 
rowhouse community since its inception in the 1920s during successive 
waves of new building development up until the late 1940s and early 1950s. 
And while the sample block survey confirms perceptions of residential 
longevity, it also makes clear that steady rates of in-migration and out-
migration always characterized the area. Although the degree of change 
had been substantial throughout the first four decades of community expe-
rience, the perception prevailed that those moving in and those moving out 
closely resembled one another in social character, so that the neighbor-
hood's identity seemed Constant. Significantly, however, population and 
migration patterns following the period of massive racial change were not 
appreciably different. After the initial phase of population change and 
growth, the area reached its all-time population high in 1970 with 21,500, 
then actually declined for the first time in its history, in 1980 dipping below 
the 18,000 mark initially reached in the late 1950s. Moreover, both the 
census and the block figures indicate levels of residential stability closely 
matching the earlier levels once racial change occurred. The low rate of 
out-migration in later years may have been attributable, at least in part, to 
the lack of housing opportunity for African Americans in the suburban 
wedge beyond, where new housing was concentrated. 
High rates of home ownership undergirded the sense of stability in 
the rowhouse community from its initial development. This factor, evi-
dent in the census and sample block survey data, was frequently cited by 
interviewees, who noted its desirability as a token of the stake in the com-
munity that homeowners were expected to have. Home ownership also 
appears to have been interpreted as community protection, assuring that 
only a certain type of person would move in-a perception that proved 
essentially true in socioeconomic terms. Even after the period of racial 
change, however, high home ownership rates remained a significant char-
acteristic of the neighborhood, remarkably so, given the destabilizing cir-
cumstances under which African Americans gained access to Edmondson 
Village housingJ2 While this accomplishment might be claimed by spec-
ulators to refute the charge that their practices were exploitative, it more 
likely is testament to the resilience of the new African American settlers 
and to their resourcefulness in finding ways to sustain the costs of their 
much-needed housing gains. 
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Residents from the two periods also had a great deal in common in 
terms of shared place of origin and prior urban experience, since in both 
cases they were relocating to the greater socioeconomic homogeneity of 
the rowhouse suburb from more heterogeneous urban neighborhoods. 
Most white settlers had come from older sections of the city, principally 
on the west side, during periods when these areas were experiencing hous-
ing pressures in part related to the significant population increase of Afri-
can Americans and lower-income whites. In contrast to the changing ra-
cial and socioeconomic mix of their former neighborhoods, they found a 
rowhouse community consisting of people who seemed just like them. 
New African American settlers represented absolute discontinuity with 
this social definition as far as race was concerned, of course, but in some 
other respects their experience paralleled the patterns of their white pre-
decessors. They also were not newcomers to the city, nor had they or their 
families been part of the wartime migration from rural Southern areas to 
Northern and border state cities. Typically, most had moved from neigh-
borhoods on Baltimore's west side, which had become overcrowded as the 
result of these demographic dynamics. Like the whites before them, they 
were following a common path to residence in a neighborhood whose 
social characteristics were more narrowly differentiated along social lines. 
But they were doing so as part of a population surge that produced hous-
ing needs even more dramatic than those of the earlier migration. Many 
of them by their own accounts were seeking a greater degree of neighbor-
hood social homogeneity than had prevailed in the more socially and eco-
nomically heterogeneous ghetto neighborhoods from which they had 
come. For most, the desire for improved housing and community circum-
stances took precedence over explicit preferences for residential integra-
tion. However, those who intentionally sought an integrated setting, in 
part because they believed it would serve as a· hedge against the socio~ 
economic decline that often occurred when race rather than class deter-
mined neighborhood social character, found their hopes dashed when 
white flight left a community as rigidly segregated as it had been in the 
past. 
General economic status represented an important area of perceived 
discontinuity, especially in interpretations that argued that differences in 
class were more critical than differences in race per se in accounting for 
white concern about racial change. In terms of household income, from 
its early settlement this rowhouse community consistently and rather uni-
formly registered somewhat higher than the city or regional median. As 
racial change occurred, African American pioneer households had in-
comes closely approximating the figure for their white neighbors who 
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remained, though white incomes in sections not yet affected by change 
were somewhat higher. Significantly, household income stood considera-
bly higher than the African American median for the city as a whole, 
while approximating the metropolitan area figure. Over time, however, 
the income level of the community began to erode considerably, some-
thing that had not happened in the earlier era. 73 
The occupational base from which white households generated in-
comes above the median level had always been a white-collar/blue-collar 
mix, with few at either the top or the bottom of the occupational hierarchy. 
The sample block survey reveals this occupational profile to have been 
quite stable, even as older residents died or moved away and newer resi-
dents moved in, almost as if house type dictated work type, though the re-
verse more likely would have been the case. Interviewees also recall few 
adult women having been engaged in the paid labor force during the com-
munity's formative decades. Their steady entrance by 1940 and 1950 was 
notable as a source of additional household income, though they were con-
centrated in clerical jobs, technically white-collar but typically lower in pay. 
As racial change occurred, the occupational profile of the new pi-
oneer group shifted in some important ways, though not as greatly as 
white perceptions might have suggested. Indeed, block-by-block compari-
sons from the sample block survey show a striking degree of continuity in 
workforce makeup even as racial identification changed rapidly. But pi-
oneer households often had to adopt different economic strategies to gen-
erate comparable income levels and to afford the costs of life in the new 
community,74 In part, this circumstance stemmed from important differ-
ences in the character of the African American workforce, highly condi-
tioned by historic structures controlling access to types of jobs. For in-
stance, overall there was a notable tilt toward greater dependence upon 
blue-collar positions than had been the case in the past, especially pro-
nounced in a comparison of the jobs held by white and African American 
men. As a result, comparable income levels had to be generated from an 
occupational base somewhat more concentrated in less skilled job catego-
ries, which returned lower pay. Further, African American families placed 
greater reliance upon women in the paid labor force, a pattern long em-
ployed out of necessity within the African American communityJ5 In the 
case of Edmondson Village's young two-parent families, women in the 
workforce usually represented a second adult earner, a strategy whose 
importance for economic support in the new neighborhood was under-
scored by a higher participation rate than was the case for African Ameri-
can women citywide. Still, compared to Edmondson Village's white wom-
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en workers, African American women were less likely to gain access to 
coveted clerical jobs, and their job distribution was more broadly divided 
among clerical, service, manufacturing, and domestic service work cate-
gories. 
These contrasting economic strategies make judgments about com-
parative class status for the prior white and succeeding African American 
communities in Edmondson Village complicated, and they may have con-
tributed in part to conflicting perceptions at the time. There is little 
doubt that the profile of the new settlers represented some decline in 
typical indices of socioeconomic status regarding occupation. Even if 
those African Americans who relocated to new housing opportunity in 
rowhouse suburbs like Edmondson Village were, with some exceptions, 
somewhat more advantaged in socioeconomic terms than the urban Afri-
can American community as a whole, their ranks nevertheless were con-
siderably thinner than was the case for whites of similar status. Under 
ordinary circumstances the likelihood was that African American settlers 
might represent greater degrees of socioeconomic heterogeneity, and the 
extraordinary circumstances of blockbusting and white flight made this 
likelihood considerably greater. Nevertheless, differing styles in house-
hold strategies for economic support may have made these contrasts seem 
greater in perception than they were in fac~. 
For white Edmondson residents of the first forty years, consistency in 
occupational profile appeared to translate into a notable sense of econom-
ic security and well-being. Such continuity did not suggest dramatic up-
ward mobility, but, when change did occur, it typically meant modest 
improvement in status, creating expectations that contributed greatly to 
the general sense of community economic well-being and stability. Could 
members of the successor African American community harbor the same 
sense of stability and optimism about economic status that had charac-
terized the white community's earlier years? Here the data is too recent 
and limited to be conclusive, but interviews with African American re-
spondents suggest an attitude less hopeful about the prospect for security, 
less sanguine about the opportunity for advancement. African American 
workers in Edmondson Village, as elsewhere, have been more likely to be 
locked into increasingly outmoded, less rewarding, and less remunerative 
job categories. Similarly, they have been less likely to benefit from impor-
tant increases in such traditionally white-collar sectors as professional and 
technical work or upper- and middle-level management. Over time, the 
occupational profile in Edmondson Village has become less balanced 
than was the case for the pioneering generation, a decline calling into 
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question whether the neighborhood's economic foundation will continue 
in the future to exhibit the same kind of resilience that it had in the past, 
considerations to be developed in the next chapter. 
The point of these comparisons is not that the social character of the 
pioneering African American settlers was identical to that of previous 
white residents but rather that it did not differ as much as white residents 
may have assumed.16 A number of the factors that had produced a sense 
of homogeneity and stability in the former period were replicated, or at 
least approximated, by the pioneering group. Yet, when African Ameri-
cans began to move into the area, race-more than class-dictated the 
response of white residents, governing their decision to flee under circum-
stances that preyed upon their racial fears and prejudice. The ideal of the 
rowhouse suburb embodied in Edmondson Village had seemed to prom-
ise a degree of social homogeneity on exclusively white terms, and they 
refused to expand it to be inclusive racially. Ironically, the missed oppor-
tunity to redefine this conception cost them the very turf and territory 
they sought to protect. Over time, it also produced a more heterogeneous 
African American succession community, one that faced greater chal-
lenges than had ever been the case in the formative years. 
Indeed, the environment of the white rowhouse suburb bred an insu-
lated social world, one that apparently felt both stable and secure to its 
inhabitants yet was ill-adapted to the challenge of social change and 
therefore ultimately illusory. A setting that seemed permanent, close, and 
satisfying proved extremely fragile, succumbing to near total change in a 
matter of a few years. White residents had little prior experience with 
African Americans, and even under normal conditions they were unwill-
ing to entertain the option of accepting them as neighbors. But conditions 
were far from normal. Blockbusting not only preyed upon their racial 
prejudices but magnified them because of the implicit economic threat 
that fanned the flames of panic. Unwilling or unable to modify their 
views, not disposed toward overt resistance (despite some incidents of 
harassment on both sides of the color line), and overwhelmed by forces 
they felt were beyond their control, white residents pursued the only op-
tion they felt they knew: flight. 
As Marilyn Simkins sought to explain the thinking of white residents 
at the time, she offered this insight: "They saw a very secure world 
changing very drastically, and they couldn't accept it. This was distaste-
ful, and in some respects, it was forced down their throats, and they felt 
they had no other choice, I guess." Reflecting on this time of social trau-
ma, Madge Morgenstern offered a similar interpretation: "We were just 
A White Community Responds to Change 129 
not in the habit of living close to (or next door to) ... black people. It 
was somewhat of a shock-culture shock, I guess--to be doing it." 
Response to Blockbusting 
Edmondson Village whites may have been wrong in important respects 
about their new neighbors. And insofar as theJir own racial attitudes were 
a powerful motivation for their flight, they--like whites in numerous 
similar settings elsewhere-had only themselves to blame for the sense of 
loss and exploitation they felt in abruptly fleeing the setded and friendly 
environs of their neighborhood home. Clearly, there were other choices 
available to them as modes of response, both individual and collective; 
nevertheless, they were right in their perception that blockbusting un-
leashed forces beyond their control. Indeed, at the time few had any very 
systematic sense of just how complex those networks of responsibility 
were. While the blockbuster might be the visible agent of such forces, the 
web of economic, social, and political structures that undergirded the 
dual housing market and created the loophole that blockbusters exploit-
ed was tightly woven into the fabric of a segregated society. White resi-
dents may not have grasped such connections fully; what they did know 
was that they felt powerless to prevent what was happening to them. 
Since most were as unwilling to entertain the possibility of integration as 
the system was to permit it, their individual actions assumed collective 
proportions that contributed to the demise of their community as they 
had defined it. 
Moreover, it was hard to argue with their intuitive sense and in-
formed observation that racial change seldom meant integration but, 
rather, the inevitability of racial succession and resegregation. They had 
witnessed the process in urban neighborhoods many of them had inhab-
ited in the past, and they could see its results quite clearly on the west 
side along the Edmondson Avenue corridor. Despite some important ef-
forts at an alternative response, such as those in nearby Windsor Hills 
and Ashburton, the inevitability of racial succession and resegregation 
constituted a norm so ingrained in their observation and experience that 
it served as an article of faith. Many no doubt shared the sentiment of 
Nola Null that the advent of African American settlers meant that "the 
neighborhood was going to go." Right as such perceptions may have been 
from the point of view of historical realism, ironically, they assured that 
the prophecy would be self-fulfilling. 
Clearly, blockbusting manipulated whites' fears, triggering unprece-
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dented social panic. Just as clearly, it exploited the cracks in the dual 
housing system, seizing the economic advantage to be gained by violat-
ing the silent conspiracy. In its wake African Americans gained desper-
ately needed new housing opportunities-but at a considerable econom-
ic and social cost. 
5 
African American Pioneers 
Everything that is down now was up then. 
-Elizabeth Jones 
Mrican American pioneer Elizabeth Jones speaks about the current con-
dition of the nearby park playground in her Edmondson Village neigh-
borhood, but in a sense she speaks symbolically about a larger and ex-
tremely complex set of circumstances that have circumscribed the African 
American suburban quest for middle-class status and security in the 
American urban experience. 
Race and racial fears have had powerful explanatory force in American 
society, an assertion nowhere mOre dramatically demonstrated than in the 
scale and speed of racial change that rewrote the demographic maps of 
American cities during the three decades following the Second World War. 
Intensified African American housing needs had been thwarted by legal, 
real estate, and financial practices that combined with private patterns of 
prejudice and discrimination to weave a dense web of institutional and 
structural racism. Ironically, the impasse was broken by blockbusters and 
real estate speculators, who operated outside the pale of the real estate and 
financial establishment. Feeding upon white racial fears to induce panic, 
these agents took advantage oflegitimate African American aspirations to 
make a considerable profit in the process. Whites sold low to blockbusting 
real estate speculators rather than take the risk of waiting to see what 
happened to neighborhoods they always had known as "white-only." Afri-
can Americans bought high for the privilege of residency in mOre desirable 
outer city and suburban neighborhoods, in spite of the fact that they often 
had to do so on the basis of risky financial arrangements. The speed and 
scale of racial turnover in areas where speculative activity was especially 
concentrated proved to be a double-edged sword for the new settlers, creat-
ing new opportunity even as it left distinctive burdens for individual house-
holds and for the succession African American community as a whole. 
In the case of Edmondson Village, Mrican American pioneers in 
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many respects mirrored the social character and aspirations of their flee-
ing neighbors, contrary to the perceptions of many whites. Leaving con-
gested urban enclaves behind and seeking to benefit from the improved 
housing opportunities and neighborhood amenities of a more suburban-
style rowhouse neighborhood, new settlers perhaps resembled earlier resi-
dents in general socioeconomic terms more than they differed from them. 
Indeed, despite the traumatic circumstances under which racial change 
occurred, the community created by African American pioneers in Ed-
mondson Village achieved remarkable degrees of well-being, judged by 
such conventional measures as rates of home ownership and residential 
permanence. l 
Yet, the African American suburban quest in racial succession set-
tings like Edmondson Village inevitably took a different form than it had 
for the new settlers' white predecessors. Blockbusting sowed seeds of com-
munity instability that made the African American experience of second-
wave suburbanization a fundamentally different phenomenon. Many 
paid exploitative prices, frequently on the basis of financing arranged by 
speculators to protect their own interests while leaving buyers vulnerable 
to high interest rates and uncertain finance mechanisms. Moreover, as 
second-wave settlement, African American suburbanization in such set-
tings meant used rather than new housing. In the Edmondson Village 
area, most pioneers gained sound residences, but some-especially those 
built in the initial phase of development during the interwar decades-
would require increasing maintenance and repair costs. Faced with these 
substantial economic burdens, families were forced to develop new strate-
gies to afford their newly acquired lifestyles. Rapid resegregation pro-
duced a period of instability, uncertainty, and disorganization that con-
trasted with the sense of stability, security, and satisfaction that had 
characterized the white community's suburbanizing experience. More-
over, public and commercial services were strained and showed signs of 
deterioration just when new demands produced greater needs. 
African American pioneers could not assume the same degree of social 
class homogeneity in their new setting that the prior white residents had 
taken for granted. Ideologically, such exclusivity ran against the grain of 
equal rights for individuals eager to reap the initial gains in housing, em-
ployment, and education that the civil rights revolution had begun to usher 
in. Socially, African American pioneers represented a thin socioeconomic 
group, a factor that worked against traditional conceptions of suburban 
homogeneity in at least two respects. First, their own financial resources 
and status were relatively modest, yet they faced higher costs and greater 
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challenges than had been the case for their predecessors. Secondly, they 
constituted a small vanguard of a larger African American populace, few of 
whom had gained access to.improved socioeconomic status. As new living 
space expanded to absorb the housing needs of the first wave of pioneers, 
the ranks of potential successors with comparable resources were dimin-
ished proportionally. When to these factors were added the volatility, insta-
bility, and exploitation of the blockbusting process and its persistent legacy, 
the odds for ambivalence and frustration for African American pioneers' 
aspirations in the new community context were high, indeed. 
Herein lay the dilemma thwarting the hopes of a suburban African 
American middle class: thin both in terms of resources and numbers, the 
new settlers confronted a fragile balance between change and stability. 
That tenuous position illustrated the particular vulnerability of these Mri-
can American pioneers' middle-class quest in a secondhand suburb.2 
The Impact of Blockbusting and Speculation 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, well after nearly total racial resegregation 
had occurred in Edmondson Village, the community became the symbolic 
focus ofa public controversy regarding the role of third parties in the racial 
change process in Baltimore. An interracial fair housing coalition, the Ac-
tivists, charged that pioneer home buyers had been victimized by excessive 
profiteering, using the case as a platform for a broader campaign against 
real estate and finance practices that, the group contended, exploited and 
defrauded African Americans. 
The Activists, an outgrowth of a CORE committee established in the 
early 1960s, was a coalition of African American and white civil rights 
advocates, including Protestant and Roman Catholic clergy. Leadership 
for the group was provided by its chairman, Sampson Green, an African 
American attorney and member of the Maryland State Human Relations 
Commission, and its housing committee chairman, John J. Martinez, a 
white Jesuit teacher at St. Bernardine's Roman Catholic School. When the 
organization began to focus upon the issue of speculation in racially chang-
ing neighborhoods, it was instrumental in the founding of community asso-
ciations in Edmondson Village on the west side and Montebello on the 
northeast, the two neighborhoods that became the targets for much of its 
subsequent activity. A Washington Post reporter covering events in Bal-
timore noted that the group's strategy closely resembled the approach 
evolved by a similar coalition in Chicago, the Contract Buyers League: 
research, organization, picketing, economic pressure, and court suits. The 
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Figure 19. Six pickets were arrested by police during a demonstration 
against the Morris Goldseker Company in front of its downtown offices on 
Franklin Street, August 9, 1969. The photographer was Walter M. McCar-
dell of the Baltimore Sun. (Baltimore Sun) 
Activists and their community association partners first dramatized their 
protest against speculation in racially changing neighborhoods in the sum-
mer of 1969 when they began picketing the Mulberry Street office of the 
Morris Goldseker Company, shouting "Stop the exploiting!" The down-
town protests launched what became a three-year campaign, with Gold-
seker the symbolic center of the controversy.3 (See figure 19.) 
In September 1970, the Activists released a mimeographed study, 
"Communities Under Siege," which made use of Lusk reports on metro-
politan real estate transactions for the years from 1960 to 1968 to document 
the differential between purchase and sale prices in Edmondson Village 
compared to a similar but racially stable rowhouse area in northeast Bal-
timore. The report concluded that the average markup for all sales in the 
former (census tract 1608) had been double the increase in the latter (54 
percent compared to 26 percent). The difference between what might have 
been fair market prices and the inflated prices that Mrican American 
homebuyers had been forced to pay the Activists labeled "The Black Tax." 
Calling the pricing differential in Edmondson Village exploitative, the 
group concluded its comparison with the contention that "the dollar in the 
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hands of white man buys more than the dollar in the hands of the black 
man." 4 
The Activists went farther in "Communities Under Siege" to name 
names, identifying the Morris Goldseker Company as having been in·· 
volved in over one-third of the transactions in Edmondson Village's census 
tract 1608 during the period 1960 to 1968. Their documentation of the 
markups for houses bought and sold by Goldseker companies showed dif. 
ferentials of 69 percent (compared to real estate company markups of 3~f 
percent in the comparison neighborhood); when the creation or increase in 
ground rent costs was included, the markup reached 80 percent (compared 
to 38 percent). They also contended that the company operated through 
such a variety of other front names (Lee Realty, Eagle Corporation, Wood·· 
haven Investment Company, D & E Realty, etc.) that sellers and buyers 
often did not know they were doing business with Goldseker.5 
In 1971 the Activists continued to detail the relationship between real 
estate firms especially involved in racially changing neighborhoods and the 
finance institutions with whom they did business. Reports released that 
year focused specifically upon one bank Oefferson Federal Savings and 
Loan), the preponderance of whose loans had gone directly to Goldseker 
Company transactions (70 percent between 1964 and 1969j, and more gen-
erally upon the pattern of loans by savings and loans associations and by 
commercial banks, which indirectly contributed to speculative real estate 
activity by favoring investors over individual home buyers. The reports 
spelled out the case against land installment contracts, lease option ("buy-
like-rent") contracts, and double mortgages as devices for protecting both 
speculator and finance institution. They asserted that there often was col-
lusion between the latter two parties, further disadvantaging the interests 
of the customer.6 
The Activists justified targeting Goldseker throughout the fair housing 
campaign because they contended that the company was the largest in the 
city involved in speculative practices in racially changing neighborhoods. 
However, Sampson Green subsequently insisted that the protests had not 
been aimed only at Goldseker. Instead, he was quoted as saying, they were 
" 'directed at the whole exploitative operation' of banks that redlined black 
areas of the city and the 'political structure' that was insensitive to the 
problems of black families desiring to purchase homes, which made it pos-
sible for individual speculators to profit." 7 
In rebuttal to the Activists' campaign, representatives of the Morris 
Goldseker Company claimed that the firm had not been engaged in block-
busting (a specific charge the Activists themselves avoided making), insist-
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ing that its agents had not solicited properties for sale because they had not 
needed to do so, since the firm simply was filling a vacuum. Meeting the 
Activists' charges regarding pricing practices head-on, they asserted that 
the average markup represented reasonable profit when one took into ac-
count the risks involved and deducted the company's legitimate costs. In-
deed, a statement by the firm calculated its estimated profit as only 18.17 
percent. (The Activists had focused on overall price differential; their cal-
culation of profit was 31 percent, so considerable discrepancy remained 
between the two versions.) Moreover, Goldseker spokespersons defended 
the use of land installment contracts and buy-like-rent arrangements as a 
benefit to buyers who had no other access to securing mortgages. And they 
contended that the number of companies under which the firm operated 
was purely a device for tax purposes. In an indignant tone, Sheldon Gold-
seker defended his uncle's firm, claiming that the company had made it 
possible for people trapped in a ghetto environment to have "the oppor-
tunity to become proud homeowners in good houses in decent neighbor-
hoods." "We were," he insisted, "the first liberals. We were the first pi-
oneers .... We were supplying a need. We stepped into the market when 
people couldn't get financing but could make payments. We did it when 
people were somewhere in the inner city. And we did [it] without block-
busting." 8 
The Activists made their charges against the Morris Goldseker Com-
pany the subject of a civil suit, which brought even more public attention to 
the issue. However, the trial that was to test these charges and counter-
charges proved inconclusive when the plaintiffs withdrew their suit in 1972. 
The Activists contended that financial considerations forced them to can-
cel the proceedings when they were unable to afford the costs of an expert 
witness who could conduct an independent study of market value to verify 
their contentions that the housing prices had been excessive. Representa-
tives of the Goldseker Company claimed complete vindication and insisted 
that the withdrawal proved the suit had no merit.9 
The heat and light of the controversy between the Activists and the 
Goldseker Company posed the issues regarding speculative real estate ac-
tivity associated with racial change in sharp focus. Their specific charges 
regarded neither solicitation practices nor the possible victimization of 
white sellers, both subjects of much of the early public discourse on the 
subject. Instead, their analysis drew attention primarily to the impact upon 
the succession African American community under such circumstances 
and to the burdens, financial and otherwise, that had been placed upon 
individual homebuyers. In their view, the challenges facing racial pioneers 
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in Edmondson Village were formidable: "No statistics ... can ever docu-
ment the strains which the real estate and financial industries of the city 
created in the neighborhoqds mentioned in this report. Hidden behind 
these statistics are parents who have to work two and three jobs together to 
pay the housing bills, children who must suffer from the absence of their 
parents and in overcrowded schools, deteriorating properties which cannot 
be improved because the necessary money is already sunk into the over-
priced market." 10 In a 1975 statement Parren Mitchell, the Mrican Ameri-
can civil rights activist who by that date represented the district in Con-
gress, described his view of blockbusting's impact upon the Edmondson 
Village community: "Our schools could not handle the increase; our city 
services were strained to the breaking point; our people began to wonder if 
they themselves were creating another slum. . . . Money was literally 
carted out ofl6-08 for redistribution in the more affluent areas of the city 
and the suburbs." Nevertheless, Mitchell insisted, in the face of such ad-
versity a viable community had come into existence: "In spite of all these 
odds against them, far from creating or accepting the slum that was a 
distinct possibility, my constituents summoned forth their strength and 
integrity to such an extent that 16-08 is a viable neighborhood today." 11 
Edmondson Village and the Climate of Civil Rights 
The issues the Activists raised regarding Edmondson Village signified an 
important transition in the civil rights climate that had been evolving in 
tandem with the massive reconfiguration of the racial geography of Amer-
ican cities. The long, slow process of organizing and protest against racial 
segregation and discrimination had borne fruit at the local and national 
level in the postwar period, culminating in substantial legislative and pol-
icy gains in the 1950s and 1960s. In important ways Edmondson Village's 
new settlers were beneficiaries of many of those accomplishments. Yet, 
often the gains proved more symbolic than real, ineffectual in implemen-
tation or frustrated by countervailing forces. Ironically, it had not been 
civil rights, in any direct way at least, that had brought expanded housing 
opportunity for the community'S newcomers but real estate operators, 
whose methods and motives were now being contested as fraudulent and 
exploitative. In the aftermath of massive racial change and resegregation, 
the community faced substantial challenges, both from within and from 
without. As the agenda of the civil rights movement nationally shifted 
from integration and tolerance to equity and justice, the case of Ed-
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mondson Village pioneers illustrated both the dreams and frustrations of 
an era of change. 
When African Americans first settled in the Edmondson Village area 
in 1955, Baltimore's civil rights movement was gaining momentum. 12 Ini-
tially led by a large and vital NAACP branch, augmented by an increas-
ingly active chapter of CORE, local efforts targeted public accommoda-
tions and employment. Astute political alliances helped elect Republican 
Theodore McKeldin, who as mayor of the city and governor of the state 
proved to be a valuable ally, opening public jobs, supporting civil rights 
legislation, and pressuring business and civic leadership to be more re-
sponsive to African American concerns. In the late 1950s downtown Bal-
timore department stores, theaters, and hotels finally yielded to demands 
for equal treatment. A state public accommodations bill, supported by 
McKeldin's gubernatorial successor, failed in 1962 but passed a year later. 
Parallel momentum at the federal level led to passage of the Civil Rights 
Act in 1964 and the Voting Rights Act in 1965. At the height of the debate 
over these issues, national media attention focused briefly on Gwynn Oak 
Amusement Park a short distance from Edmondson Village in Baltimore 
County, where prominent out-of-town figures (especially religious lead-
ers) joined local protesters in a successful challenge to the discriminatory 
policies of this privately-owned entertainment facility.13 
Breakthroughs in employment in the public sector came in part as a 
result of African American political support for McKeldin, who as mayor 
opened municipal jobs such as police, librarians, and nurses in the 1940s. 
As governor, McKeldin ended the practice of separate racial listings for 
state employment in 1956. At the federal level, the Truman administration 
took tentative but significant executive action toward eliminating segrega-
tion in the armed services and establishing fair employment practices in 
federal agencies. Relocation of the national headquarters of the Social Se-
curity Administration to the Baltimore area on a permanent basis in the 
1950s expanded federal job opportunities for African Americans locally. 
The new main complex, which opened in 1960 in the Woodlawn section of 
Baltimore County several miles northwest of Edmondson Village, afforded 
convenient commuting distance for west side residents. In the private 
sphere, ending barriers came even more slowly. One of the area's largest 
employers, Bethlehem Steel, long had hired a substantial African Ameri-
can work contingent at its Sparrows Point complex, but advancement was 
tracked separately from whites. In 1941 African American support for the 
union (SWOC) was considered crucial in a decisive contract vote at the 
steel plant. Union commitment to equal opportunity seemed slow to trans-
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late into company policy, but by 1950 advancement to more skilled and 
supervisory positions was becoming a possibility for African American 
workers. Progress in the public and private sector required continual prod-
ding; in the 1960s the local organization of CORE mounted campaigns 
against the Social Security Administration and Bethlehem Steel to push for 
greater job access and fairer employment practices. 14 Edmondson Village's 
new settlers were among those African Americans who benefited from 
these employment gains, many of them working in the government sector 
and for some of the area's larger corporations where oPlPortunities had 
begun to open up in the 1950s and 1960s. Though they had experienced the 
greater employment access that made it possible for them to seek new 
residential space, they nevertheless faced the persistent limitations upon 
advancement and mobility that increasingly frustrated the civil rights 
movement as it confronted the gap between legislative mandates and eco-
nomic realities. 
Maryland politics illustrated just how controversial the issue of fair 
housing could be in this border state, with its distinctive mixture of urban 
and rural, ~iberal and conservative, native and ethnic, African American 
and white. It became a major subject of controversy in the gubernatorial 
race in 1966, in which the position of the Republican candidate and even-
tual winner, Spiro Agnew, seemed more moderate than that of Democrat 
George Mahoney, who campaigned on the slogan, ':.\ Man's Home Is His 
Castle." Fair housing legislation was enacted in 1967, only to be defeated 
subsequently by state voters in referendum. Passage of the federal Fail' 
Housing Act of 1968 made the state action moot. The new national legis-
lation addressed issues that had been at the heart of the Edmondson Vil-
'lage story; forbidden were discrimination in house sales and rentals, 
blockbusting and steering, and unfair lending practices. 
The hard-fought, hard-won gains of the civil rights movement seemed 
to culminate with passage of the Fair Housing Act. However, both nation-
ally and locally, frustration and conflict increasingly became the dominant 
note, as victories seemed more symbolic than real, and as deeper problems 
of discrimination, injustice, and economic disadvantage persisted. In re-
sponse, the rhetoric of the civil rights movement took a decided turn from 
integration and nonviolence to separation and confrontation. Locally, 
membership in the Baltimore branch of the NAACP began to decline 
precipitously, and CORE became distinctly more miilitant.15 Frustration 
erupted into violence, first in the simmering racial climate of Cambridge 
on Maryland's Eastern Shore in 1967 (site of H. Rap Brown's famous 
"Burn, baby, burn" speech), and then in Baltimore (and across the na-
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tion) in April 1968, following the assassination of Martin Luther King,jr. 
Baltimore's disorders began on Saturday evening, April 6, and escalated 
rapidly, prompting deployment of fifty-seven hundred Maryland Nation-
al Guardsmen, assisted eventually by five thousand federal troops. Before 
the disturbances ended there had been six deaths, six hundred injuries, 
eleven hundred businesses damaged by fire, and fifty-six hundred arrests. 
By the third day, Monday, April 8, a large section of west Baltimore east 
of Edmondson Village had become a "no-man's land," and that after-
noon episodes of violence spread to more distant neighborhoods previ-
ously unaffected. According to the Sun, a "thieving mob roamed out to 
the Edmondson Village Shopping Center," where looters shattered the 
windows of three stores; that evening "hundreds of Negroes" gathered on 
Edmondson Avenue, and eight to ten corner stores were ransacked, 
though none was set on fire. The following day, Tuesday, the traumatic 
episode had run its course. In a tense incident that vividly illustrated the 
impasse the civil rights movement had reached by the late 1960s, Gover-
nor Agnew lashed out at African American leaders for what he considered 
to be their betrayal in not controlling the violence, even though many of 
them had been on the streets trying desperately to do just that. 16 
When some Edmondson Village residents participated in the Activ-
ists' picketing against Goldseker in the summer ofl969 and three hundred 
joined the Edmondson Village Association as part of the coalition's fair 
housing campaign, they were giving voice to frustrated hopes in their own 
quest for the promises of an era of change. 17 
The Social Character of a New Community 
A community born through the agency of blockbusting, particularly on 
the scale experienced in the Edmondson Village area, faced great odds. 
So did its pioneer settlers. Saddled with high housing costs, subject to 
shaky finance mechanisms, their economic burdens would be heavier, 
their economic status more insecure than had been the case for whites 
who preceded them. The social costs might likely be high as well. A larg-
er, younger population would produce new strains upon public and pri-
vate services, historically not as responsive to the needs of African Ameri-
can neighborhoods as to white areas. And African American pioneers 
were the vanguard of a larger, poorer social group still confined to a 
racially restrictive residential ghetto. No wonder that the Activists, not to 
mention fleeing whites, would question whether the end- result of racial 
turnover through exploitative speculative activity would be slum creation. 
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Demographic evidence suggests a more complex picture, however. 
On the one hand, the socioeconomic status and stability of the pioneer 
group belied the frequently voiced anecdotal impression that many, even 
most, new settlers differed profoundly in these respects fmm whites they 
replaced. On the other hand, the economic resources of the new settlers 
were indeed stretched relatively thin, their prospects for improving their 
status, even holding their own, somewhat dimmer than had been the case 
for their predecessors. Moreover, as the cost of housing cooled from its 
artificially manipulated heat, the gates of neighborhood settlement were 
opened to a broader African American populace. SocioelCOnomic succes·-
sion may not have been inevitable when racial succession occurred, but in 
the wake of acute forms of blockbusting and white flight, its specter was 
unmistakably present. 
The destabilizing effects of blockbusting and white flight might be 
expected to show up chiefly in low home ownership rates and unstable 
residential patterns. 18 However, in both respects the experience of African 
American pioneers seemed to contradict the expectation. In 1960 home 
ownership rates for the first African American settlers actually exceeded 
the very high rate for whites, 84 percent to 73 percent, at a time when 
African American home ownership in the city was only 34 percent. This 
extremely high figure in part suggested that the primary avenue for Afri·· 
can American entry into the neighborhood was through purchase ar·· 
rangements rather than rentals. Ten years later, in 1970, when the two 
census tracts had become overwhelmingly African American, the overall 
home ownership rate in the Edmondson area (58 percent) exceeded the 
figures for whites citywide and for the metropolitan area (SMSA) as a 
whole (54 and 56 percent, respectively). Moreover, it compared with a 
city African American home ownership rate of 30 percent, which actually 
had declined during the ten years. 19 By 1980 it is no longer possible to 
isolate the pioneer group in the census data; however, home ownership 
rates of 64 percent in Edmondson Village not only surpassed the metro-
politan average of 60 percent but nearly doubled the rate for African 
Americans citywide (34 percent). Therefore, in spite of the highly tenuous 
conditions under which many African Americans owned their homes 
initially-land contracts and lease options, for example·-home owner··· 
ship rates in the neighborhood remained consistently at a surprisingly 
high level.2° 
Residential stability in the period after racial change represented a 
second area of contradiction to the expectation of potential transiency. Of 
course, the census figures show very high rates of in-migration as racial 
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change progressed from the mid-1950s onward.21 In 1970 the earliest pi-
oneers had been engulfed by a larger population stream, as four in every 
ten of the area's residents had moved in during the past five years.22 Yet in 
1980 those who had relocated to the area prior to 1970 represented a 
substantial 40 percent of the area's population, and 72 percent of all resi-
dents in 1980 had lived in the same house in 1975.23 
While the census figures only provide aggregate data on residential 
stability, the sample block survey permits some observations about specific 
individual households over time.24 Comparison of residential patterns on 
five study blocks that had become predominantly African American by 
1964 with their 1970 and 1980 profiles reveals a high degree of continuity 
once blocks were settled by new African American residents. On one sam-
ple block, listed by the Activists as having Goldseker-related sales in 1962 
(houses were purchased for seven to eight thousand dollars and sold for 
$12,800 to 13,000),25 all eleven African American householders in 1964 had 
moved there during the three years since 1961, and three whites remained. 
Of the eleven newcomers, ten were still there in 1970, and seven in 1980. 
Moreover, between 1964 and 1970 seven of those who remained in residence 
maintained their home ownership status, one gained it, and one lost it; ten 
years later only one original homeowner was missing, and an additional 
pioneer resident had gained home ownership status. 
Four additional sample blocks were among those that changed racially 
in the period after 1964. The Activists identified Goldseker-affiliated real 
estate activities on or near each of the four. Despite clear indication of profi-
teering on house sales to new African American residents in these latter 
stages of the racial change process (on one nearby block, for instance, 
houses were bought for $6,825, sold for $12,475),26 the pattern of residency 
on the four sample blocks between 1970 and 1980 was relatively stable: 
forty-one (offifty-four) were second or third householders in 1970; ten years 
later thirty-six were in those same categories. 
As these examples from the sample blocks testify, however, the price 
of home ownership and residential stability was high. In 1960 the first 
African American homeowning settlers in tract 2007 inhabited houses 
valued at a steep ninety-eight hundred dollars when compared to the 
tract median of eighty-six hundred dollars. That amount was one indica-
tion of the cost of blockbusting and speculation, what the Activists later 
termed the "black tax." It represented an inflated figure that placed 
more economic pressure upon new AfriCan American residents than upon 
their fellow white neighbors and stood in advance of the median for Afri-
can American homeowners in other parts of the city (the African Ameri-
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can city median for owners was eighty-two hundred dollars). Ten years 
later, in 1970, values in Edmondson Village were 12 percent higher than 
those for African American homeowners citywide. However, by 1980 me-
dian housing values in Edmondson Village (ranging from $21,500 to 
$28,100) more closely approximated the African American citywide fig-
ures ($24,600) and were lower than the total city median ($28,700). The 
relative decline in housing values seemed confirmation of the inflated 
prices associated with the blockbusting era, testifying to the consequences 
of overvaluation for those early settlers who had paid the high prices, 
because it reduced their equity investment. Simultaneously, of course, lev-
eling housing values opened the area to new settlement at less cost.27 
The trends in housing values may partly account for the degree of 
residential stability for homeowners, providing a clue to the ambiguous 
status of many Edmondson pioneer settlers, whose persistence in the com-
munity in part reflected their lack of options for subsequent physical mo-
bility. In 1970, Edmondson area African American residents would have 
faced economic difficulty, not to mention social resistance, in finding de-
sirable housing elsewhere, since the median value for owner-occupied 
housing in the metropolitan area exceeded the tract 1608 sum by nearly 
45 percent (the 1608 median was $10,500; the SMSA, $15,200). Ten years 
later the relative decline of Edmondson area housing values contrasted 
with a metropolitan area median now more than double the Edmondson 
valuation.28 By this point many Edmondson residents may have felt they 
had little choice but to remain where they were, even if resistance to Afri-
can American residency was beginning to break down to a small degree in 
the suburban counties nearby. In a highly mobile society, residential sta-
bility might indicate entrapment and limited choices for a group finding 
opportunities for social mobility restricted as well.29 
Income figures provide substantiation of the new group's median posi-
tion as well as its vulnerability. They also point unmistakably toa relative 
decline over time, no doubt a function both of pioneers' inability to improve 
their status and of the more modest means available to later settlers. 
Throughout the period Edmondson Village'S African American residents 
earned income in advance of African Americans citywide, and their rela-
tive position remained close to the metropolitan median. New African 
American settlers in 1960 registered an annual household income closely 
approximating the households of whites who remained ($4,881 compared 
to $4,940 for the tract as a whole) but an amount 45 percent in advance of 
African Americans from all parts of the city. Ten years later, in 1970, medi-
an income in the predominantly Mrican American Edmondson area ex-
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ceeded the citywide African American figure by 47 percent but fell short of 
the metropolitan median by 6 percent.30 By 1980 Edmondson Village in-
come still stood at roughly the same relative position; in that year it was 
approximately 59 percent ahead of the citywide Mrican American median, 
and 6 percent below the metropolitan median.31 
Employment for new African American residents was concentrated in 
governmental and corporate sectors where opportunity had increased in 
the period during and after World War II. Leading employers included 
the U.S. government (especially Social Security, the Post Office, and the 
Armed Forces), Bethlehem Steel, Westinghouse, Baltimore Gas and Elec-
tric, Baltimore Transit, the Baltimore City Public Schools, and area hos-
pitals. Many were located downtown, but some-like Bethlehem Steel, 
Martin Marietta, and Edgewood Arsenal-were on the east side of the 
metropolitan area, where housing opportunities for African Americans 
continued to be even more limited than on the west.32 
While the household income of initial African American settlers was 
only marginally lower than the level for neighborhood white residents, the 
occupational profile reflected a distinct decline in the proportion of white-
collar jobs relative to blue-collar positions. In 1960 among whites remain-
ing in census tract 2007 the white-collar/blue-collar ratio stood at two to 
three, while for new African American workers it was two to seven. Sim-
ilarly, a comparison between predominantly white tract 1608 in 1960 and 
the same tract ten years later in 1970, when it was almost entirely Mrican 
American, shows over half of the former to have been in white-collar posi-
tions, while only one-third of the latter were so engaged. 
New African American residents were less likely to be in professional, 
technical, and managerial capacities, in sales, or in positions as craftsmen 
(skilled trades) or foremen, more likely to be manufacturing or transporta-
tion operatives, service workers, or laborers. Along gender lines, several 
important distinctions stand out. While only slightly more than one-fourth 
of white males had been employed as operatives or laborers, almost half of 
all African American male employees worked in these categories.33 White 
women in the area's paid labor force had been almost exclusively in clerical 
occupations, while African American women were heavily concentrated in 
three categories: clerical, manufacturing, and service. Still, Mrican Ameri-
can women in clerical positions accounted for a sizable percentage of the 
white-collar positions held by new householders as a whole, a factor that 
underscored the relative exclusion of pioneer males from the white-collar 
sector.34 Indeed, the occupational distribution of Mrican American settlers 
throughout the period did not substantially vary from the general pattern 
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for African Americans citywide, even though median income was some-
what higher, suggesting the occupational base from which Edmondson resi-
dents generated a higher income was not substantially broader. 
New African American residents maintained their economic status in 
part as a product of a significantly high percentage offemalles in the labor 
force. In 1960, for instance, 48 percent of Edmondson's African American 
adult women (in tract 2007) worked in positions outside the home, com-
pared to onlly 33 percent of white women in the same neighborhood and 
to 44 percent for African American women in the city as a whole. This 
percentage increased to 62 in 1970 for Edmondson's African American 
female population (44 percent SMSA; 51 percent African American city) 
and stood at 61 in 1980 (52 percent SMSA; 53 percent African American 
city), as the community's women continued to playa greater role as 
breadwinners than did their African American peers across the city and 
other women in the metropolitan area as a whole.35 
Finally, age, family structure and size, and housing density all are 
significant considerations in the socioeconomic profile of the new neigh-
borhood, bearing on the issue of neighborhood well-being and stability. In 
1960 the median age for the first African American residents was approx-
imately twenty-three years; by 1980 it was close to thirty. Perhaps more 
revealing, only 9 percent of the 1960 pioneer cohort had been forty-five 
years of age or over, while in 1980, 29 percent of the total were in that age 
category.36 The earliest African American pioneers overwhelmingly con-
stituted young husband-wife families; in 1960 eleven of twelve African 
American households included a married couple; in 1970 seven of ten 
were so composed; and in 1980 six of tenY These changes over time were 
partly a function of aging and mortality, but they also were partly a func-
tion of changing social patterns. Households with female heads were few-
er than the African American citywide percentage throughout the period, 
though they continued to increase, reaching a substantial one-third of all 
Edmondson households in 1980.38 While Edmondson female household 
heads earned incomes approximating those for their peers metrowide and 
substantially more than other African American household! heads in Bal-
timore City, their incomes were still considerably less than the median for 
all households. 39 
In the early period of African American settlement, youthfu} families 
contributed to a housing density that not only surpassed that of whites 
who preceded them but African American household size across the city 
as a who1e.4o But population increase and greater housing density gener-
ally were not accommodated by the subdivision of existing housing units, 
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a typical strategy in areas characterized by larger, older housing and 
more impoverished new residents. In 1960, 76 percent of Edmondson Vil-
lage households resided in single structures; after ten years of racial 
change the percentage was 75 percent; and in 1980, 82 percent. 
Both the census and sample block survey suggest that the new Afri-
can American community weathered the period of blockbusting and ra-
cial change to emerge with considerable resilience and stability. The po-
tentially destabilizing consequences of white flight, speculative housing 
activity, and massive in-migration did not produce the rapid degree of 
socioeconomic decline many had predicted. Indeed, the home ownership 
rates achieved by African American pioneers and the degree of residential 
stability were surprising, given the nature of the blockbusting process. 
Yet, the toll of blockbusting had been enormously high, not only pro-
ducing short-term instability but weighting new residents with a heavy 
financial burden as the price of their effort to improve their residential 
circumstances. Coping strategies, such as high female participation in the 
paid labor force, provided some measure of the cost of the quest for 
middle-class status. However, even the high degree of residential persis-
tence, which helped to provide a new semblance of stability, suggested not 
only commitment to the community but limited opportunities for physical 
mobility, which mirrored limited opportunities for social mobility. As the 
pioneer generation aged, its members leaving the labor force to live on the 
restricted means of fixed retirement incomes and other sources of assis-
tance, familial and governmental, more recent settlers frequently lacked 
income and occupational status comparable to those of the pioneers at the 
time of their initial move. These twin phenomena-an aging pioneer pop-
ulace and the arrival of new settlers-contributed to the relative socio-
economic decline for the community as a whole over time. 
The neighborhood's demographics during the period of African Ameri-
can pioneer settlement present a picture of a new community resembling its 
predecessor in important respects yet with a greater degree of socioeco-
nomic diversity and unmistakable signs of relative decline. The product of 
complex racial politics and urban dynamics, second-wave suburbanization 
took on a very different and distinctive cast. 
The Experience of African American Pioneers 
The ambivalence evident in the demographic record is reflected in the 
experiences and attitudes expressed in interviews with selected residents 
from Edmondson Village's pioneering group, providing a key to the per-
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ceived social reality of life in the new community. The interviews reflect 
the hopes and aspirations of African American pioneers but also the di-
lemmas and frustrations of community-building in an area that under-
went such rapid racial change and resettlement. 
Seeking improved housing, neighborhood conditions, and urban ser-
vices, African American pioneers repeated the suburban quest of the 
middle-income white settlers who had preceded them in Edmondson Vil-
lage's rowhouses. Yet, while previous white in-migrants had been wel-
comed into a developing area that was experiencing continuing growth, 
expansion of public and private community services, and relative security, 
these new settlers were greeted with resistance and faced enormous new 
challenges. Some fifteen to twenty-five years after their move to Ed-
mondson Village, African American pioneer interviewees speak of the 
community experience with a mixture of pride and frustration. This am-
bivalence is evident, for instance, in their attitudes toward such issues as 
white flight, the nature and legacy of real estate practices that accom-
panied the racial change process, the role of public and commercial insti-
. tutions, and the problems posed by newcomers who may not share their 
socioeconomic status or values. Their testimony illustrates the particular 
vulnerability of their suburban dream. 
The pioneers interviewed were among the first Mrican American resi-
dents to move into particular blocks during the racial change period, the 
earliest who located in the first section of African American residency in 
1956, the latest in the last phases of racial change in 1968. To the inter-
viewees, Edmondson Village afforded a promise of the suburban dream: 
improved housing opportunity, greater space, and a more secure neighbor-
hood setting. Annie Green-hers was the second African American family 
on the block in 1961-recounts: "When I moved into the neighborhood, I 
said, 'Gee, it's so nice and clean' -it was just a perfect place, I thought, and 
convenient, everything. I walked around the neighborhood and sawall the 
beautiful houses, and Edmondson Village [the shopping center] was so 
nice, and I just couldn't believe it-it seemed that it was just like a little 
colonial town."41 Elizabeth Jones and her husband moved to Wildwood 
Parkway when the threat of the East-West expressway forced her family to 
relocate in 1968: "We used to ride through this neighborhood when it was 
about half and half; I was just impressed with this neighborhood. It was 
something we could afford, and it wasn't too far out .... After the express-
way pushed us out, we picked up and moved, and this looked like one of the 
better neighborhoods, and Wildwood at the time was very pretty."42 
Upward social mobility clearly was part of that dream for many of 
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the interviewees. Asked why a large number had settled on the west side 
of the city when some of their major employers were on Baltimore's east 
side, Horace Green replied: "It's hard for many blacks to feel that they 
are moving up in the world and live in east Baltimore-it's amazing; but 
if you live in northwest Baltimore, you figure you are moving up." 43 
The area's middle-class attributes clearly were attractive to aspiring 
African American settlers. Whether residential integration per se was 
part of that aspiration is less clear. Annie Green maintains that blockbust-
ers sometimes held out the prospect of an integrated neighborhood as an 
attraction to potential African American buyers: "They'd say, 'O.K., 
you're moving into a nice clean neighborhood; you're coming up to a 
white neighborhood, integrated neighborhood.''' Some express the view 
that white retention might have assured that community services and 
amenities would not have been neglected, confirming their common-sense 
evaluation that African American neighborhoods do not get the same 
consideration as neighborhoods with substantial white presence. Ensuing 
white flight quickly dispelled whatever hopes Mrican American pioneers 
may have harbored along these lines, however. 
African American interviewees in retrospect, at least, reflect consid-
erable realism about what happened. For example, Margaret Dawkins 
and her husband decided against buying a house offered them by a real 
estate agent when they realized, "we would have broke the block if we had 
gone in there," noting with both pride and irony, "we weren't that desper-
ate for a house." 44 Instead, they moved into a residence in a block where 
African American settlement already had occurred. 
Whether African American pioneers' suburban dream implied the 
degree of social homogeneity and class exclusiveness that often had ac-
companied the white suburban experience is also difficult to determine. 
Many of the settlers migrated from older sections of Baltimore's central 
city, areas almost totally African American but with considerable social 
class diversity. Indeed, all but one of the pioneer interviewees followed 
this route.45 In this sense, they were repeating the odyssey of social class 
differentiation that had characterized white suburbanization. Of course, 
socially homogeneous neighborhoods had not really been an option for 
them in the past, given the realities of the dual housing market. A few 
testified that they had experienced earlier phases of rapid racial succes-
sion, as in the case of Mary Slade, who had moved into an east Baltimore 
neighborhood in 1954 only to see an area that had been in good condition 
quickly "go kaput" as whites fled ("they ran like it was the plague") and 
large homes were subdivided for poorer African American settlers.46 
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Unmistakably, the prospects in the new neighborhood pointed to a 
greater degree of social class differentiation than had been the case in 
their previous experience. Narrow social distinction ran against the grain 
of an equal rights ideology that justified their own right to move, and 
none of the interviewees explicitly argued for social class exclusivity. How-
ever, some did regret that ordinary economic considerations had been 
waived by speculators willing to sign virtually anyone to a contract sale, 
regardless of ability to pay. In their view, these practices created a great 
degree of instability in the short run and contributed to eventual decline 
in the long term. As Mary Slade put it: '1\ lot of people want home own-
ership, but they don't realize the expense that's entailed; and unfor-
tunately speculators don't care whether people are able to take care of the 
house or not; if they can get their down payment from you, the house is 
yours .... When you're black, anybody else who is black can move in 
beside you, because they [the speculators] take you as being equal." Sim-
ilarly, Annie Green observed: "When the houses were booming, they 
made it so easy for people-just come on in, and you don't have to have 
any money down, and you pay as you go." 
Family opportunity, often a corollary of the suburban ideal, played a 
prominent role in pioneer settlers' explanation of their move to the new 
area. Virtually all of the interviewees brought young families with them, 
and many cited opportunities for their children as an important reason 
for their desire to move into the area. Slade, for example, recounted: "I 
had four kids, and I always followed them through school even though I 
worked for [the federal government] for twenty-some years. I worked an 
evening shift for seven or eight years because I could get the kids offin the 
morning and do whatever I had to do to get dinner ready, so that when 
father came home in the evening, he could see that they were fed, and 
eventually I had an aunt who came in to live with me, and so she took 
care of things then." Indeed, the cost of such opportunity frequently re-
quired two adult salaries; in all but one instance among the interviewee 
group both husband and wife were employed. 
Their general assessment of real estate practices in the racial change 
process betrayed considerable ambivalence. Frequently critical of the ex-
ploitative practices that often accompanied blockbusting, they also noted 
that institutional racism had closed off other avenues to housing oppor-
tunity. Annie and Horace Green, for instance, were among those who felt 
that real estate speculators had a destabilizing effect, especially when set-
tlers purchased through land contracts: "Most of them came, and bought, 
and either had problems keeping the house, or-I don't think that too 
150 Blockbusting in Baltimore 
many sold-I think they had problems keeping their houses-like fore-
closures. Then, too, I think a lot of those people lost their homes through 
these contract sales .... Goldseker was one that had a lot of those houses 
with contract sales, and you never got to own them." Blockbusters, they 
said, often held out a false hope to prospective African American pur-
chasers to justify the high housing prices being asked: "In a lot of cases, 
people could have gotten soaked .... What the realtors were saying then 
was, 'Yes, you get up in Edmondson Village because that's an integrated 
neighborhood'-they weren't telling the truth, knowing that it was going 
to turn over because of blockbusting-there was a lot of that going on at 
the time. So I think they gave people the wrong information. But that was 
a sales pitch, in order for the person to buy." 
On the other hand, a number of interviewees were less critical of the 
role played by real estate interests. ElizabethJones, for example, observed 
that she had heard of some blockbusting tactics-"little games," she 
called them-and she believed that there had been some profiteering-
"realtors had a little field day," as she put it. Nevertheless, she felt Afri-
can Americans had limited choiCes if they wanted the housing: "When 
you've been down and out, you know they're having a field day, but that's 
what you want, and you're going to pay that. It's a dream you want to 
come true, so you will pay that." And even though "buy-like-rent" con-
tracts had involved risks: "I didn't have any problem with that; it was 
better to have something to hold onto if you really like it instead of staying 
somewhere and paying a lot for rent; with an option to buy, eventually it 
would be theirs." 
Similarly, the Goldseker name draws mixed reactions from the pi-
oneers. While the Greens were critical of Goldseker's role, some, like 
Mary Slade, believe that Goldseker may have served a necessary function 
in breaking the dual market and expanding African American housing 
opportunities: "When we came in here, it was stated, nobody would show 
me a house beyond Hilton Street-because black folks weren't going to 
move up there: 'We're not going to have them in the Village'; 'They're not 
going beyond the bridge.' Maybe that was Goldseker's problem; he made 
sure that some black folks went beyond the bridge!" Her view is shared by 
others who note that without white prejudice Goldseker's peculiar role 
would have been unnecessary. 
African American pioneers similarly have mixed feelings about the 
actions of whites who fled the neighborhood. Few tell stories ofovert hostil-
ity or resistance. Some even have a tendency to view the whites as victims, 
too. For example, a number mentioned white neighbors who put their 
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houses up fQir sale, only to say at some later point that they regretted having 
done so once they got to know their new African American neighbors. Mary 
Slade remembered: "My next door neighbor said, 'Had I known you, Mrs. 
Slade, I'd never have put my house up for sale.''' Annie Green had a similar 
experience: "We had a neighbor here next door to us, one of the last ones to 
leave, and as a matter offact, almost sold her house for nothing in order to 
get out, but when she did sell it, she regretted the fact that she had. She said 
to me, 'You know, I'm sorry that I sold it. If I had known I had such good 
neighbors as you and the lady next door, ... that you all were as nice as 
you are, I wouldn't have moved.' " Slade also remembered how some whites 
in her section put up "This House Is Not For Sale" signs in an effort to 
resist the approaches of blockbusting agents but to little avail. Janice Wat-
kins recounted the efforts of a white resident to stem the tide of white flight, 
telling others "how nice blacks had their homes fixed." 47 
Such accounts may function to rationalize the harsh reality of rejec-
tion-if only whites had really gotten to know us, they would have realized 
we were really just like them. But many speak of the changeover as so 
rapid that there was hardly any occasion for contact, even if any had been 
desired, and most speak with some bitterness of the prejudiced rejection 
they felt. One interviewee told her story: "We were the only colored fami-
ly that lived there [on the block], but after we got in there, nothing but 
signs went up-'For Sale.' Almost every house put a sign up. And, of 
course, they didn't all sell, but quite a few moved away." Another told of 
her experience: "When I moved to the 500 block of Denison Street, there 
were just three [African American] families, and the next two years all the 
whites had scooted out." Or, as Margaret Johnson expressed her feelings 
(in the statement cited previously in chapter 1): "They [whites] were 
friendly, but: they were prejudiced; they didn't want to live where colored 
people did .... They don't have to say it. ... They didn't tell you [why 
they moved]; they just moved!"48 
Often the feelings expressed about white flight were somewhat more 
indirect, stressing its negative impact on community stability. Annie Green, 
for instance, recounted: 
When we first moved to the neighborhood, it was more white-we were just 
about the second black family on this block .... We could see the changes, be-
cause when we moved, there were so many sale signs all around, and it did make a 
difference in the neighborhood, because there was a change, and you had to get 
yourself adjusted to the people who were moving in, and you couldn't really know 
the ones who were moving out, because they were leaving so fast, so we were really 
going through that transitional stage. People were moving in and out overnight; 
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you really didn't know who your neighbors were. It was a very difficult period, 
because when we moved, we thought maybe the neighborhood would be stabi-
lized; it just wasn't. 
Asked why she felt the change was so rapid, Green continued: "Because 
the blacks were moving in, and the whites did not want to be integrated. 
It was as simple as that .... See, it was a threat to the whites-but they 
didn't stay here long enough to realize what kind of people we are, the 
people moving in. They were ready to give up and run away .... They 
saw black people come, and they took off." Any possible thoughts of inte-
grated residency quickly vanished, and in their wake many questions 
about the prospects for the new community remained. 
African American pioneers met resistance from existing institutions as 
whites acted from an assumed position of power to try to maintain hegemo-
ny in "their" neighborhood, making institutional adjustment diffiCult. 
Early experiences with many of the churches, for example, were negative, 
and these rebuffs cut deeply into the pride of African American pioneers. 
When the Greens asked the white minister of the Methodist church in the 
same block as their new home about the time of Sunday School for their 
children, he suggested an African American Baptist church outside the 
neighborhood. Similarly, Mrican American parishioners report initial re-
jection and discourtesy when they sought to attend Roman Catholic St. 
Bernardine's. As Father John Smith recounted: "One lady told me that she 
went to communion, and someone in the bench said, 'They even go to 
communion!' "49 
Some previously white churches simply folded their tents when the 
white membership aged and the number who returned on Sundays 
dwindled; some made a belated effort to adjust their policies and minister 
to the new Mrican American community, but few successfully made the 
transition from white to African American control. One exception tends 
to confirm the rule: St. Bernardine's virtually died as a white church 
before being reborn as a predominantly African American institution. 
The change came not because of the internal dynamics of the parish as 
much as because of a policy decision at the archdiocesan level. In 1975, 
well after the racial transition period, the Baltimore Archdiocese sent a 
young pastoral team-one white, one African American-to St. Bernar-
dine's with the express charge to develop a new Mrican American constit-
uency. A new style of worship and of community outreach developed. 
African American parishioner Roberta Warren described the change as 
"night and day; dead and alive." 50 Other than this case of belated, but 
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effective, institutional adjustment, new African American-controlled reli-
gious institutions were slow to develop to fill the void in the early years; 
more recently, several African American congregations have mounted siz-
able building efforts as signs of growing church memberships and re-
sources. 
The transition at the school door was more abrupt, illustrating a dif-
ference between voluntary and public institutions. In its 1954 decision on 
desegregation the Baltimore Board of School Commissioners relied upon 
an open enrollment plan. While the board's action represented a positive 
institutional response to the Supreme Court's mandate to end segrega-
tion, the plan nevertheless was a gradualist step rooted in voluntary 
choice. As noted in chapter 4, the entry of the firs!t African American 
students into Gwynns Falls Park Junior High School was met by a partial 
boycott of classes, part of a series of outbreaks at schools on the south and 
west sides of the city, though public calm was quickly restored. These 
initial junior high school students came from outside !the immediate 
neighborhood, but the first African American settlement in the nearby 
southeastern corner of the Edmondson area soon brought new resident 
African American children into the neighborhood's educational institu-
tions at the elementary level as well. Area schools experienced rapid ra-
cial turnover, so fast that Eunice Clemens, a white teacher, reported that 
the composition of her elementary school classroom changed from only 
two African American children in 1959 to an almost entirely African 
American class the following year. 51 
Not only was the racial complexion of the schools transformed dramati-
. cally, but younger African American residents with substantially more chil-
dren quickly meant severely overcrowded school facilities. Enlarged class 
size and a perceived decline in school services continued to concern African 
American pioneer parents as much as resegregated schools. Two new ele-
mentary schools built in the late 1950s and early 1960s temporarily eased 
the pressure, but dissatisfaction with schools stood out as a sore spot in 
many of the interviews.52 
Neighborhood frustration with the schools alldwith the effects of re-
segregation were echoed at the citywide level as well. In 1963 parents and 
community leaders brought considerable pressure to bear upon the school 
board for policies that continued to disadvantage African American stu-
dents, 80 percent of whom were in schools 90 percent or more African 
American and a substantial number of whom were taught by part-time 
instructors.53 By the 1970s officials were acknowledging that the series of 
policies employed to implement desegregation had not assured equal edu-
154 Blockbusting in Baltimore 
cational opportunity or improved racial balance, though prospects for the 
latter goal continued to be undermined by changing housing patterns and 
by resistance to regional solutions. 54 
Nowhere was the impact of the community's changed demographics 
and its new sense of powerlessness more evident than in commercial ser-
vices, most notably the decline of the Edmondson Village Shopping Cen-
ter. Though in its early years the shopping center was asmuch a white 
preserve as the prestigious downtown stores, by the time African Ameri-
can pioneers moved into the area most overt discrimination against Afri-
can American shoppers had been abandoned. When African American 
pioneers began to patronize the Village, it was in its heyday. Roberta 
Warren told me: "When I first moved here, I shopped at Edmondson 
Village for most everything. It was like heaven." A racially changing 
neighborhood, exploding white suburbanization beyond-the two factors 
combined to doom the center and its service to the community. In 1956 a 
second major department store, Hecht's, opened across the street, but in 
1958 the newer, larger Westview Shopping Center was built near the cir-
cumferential beltway two miles farther west. When Hochschild's, the first 
department store in Edmondson Village, closed in 1974 (Hecht's closed 
five years later-only twenty-three years after it was built), it simply con-
firmed a common perception of dramatic decline in the condition of the 
shopping center. 55 
In 1967 the Edmondson Village Shopping Center was acquired by 
Honolulu Limited, owned by Baltimore-born billionaire Harry Weinberg, 
formerly a Baltimorean and then a resident of Hawaii. Weinberg's firm also 
owned large sections of the old downtown retail district around Howard 
Street as well as several other marginal shopping centers on the city's pe-
riphery. According to newspaper accounts, Weinberg had a reputation for 
buying up "distressed properties" and permitting them to deteriorate, a 
reputation earned over a long history of purchasing commodities at mo-
ments of decline-whether Depression-era housing, failing rapid transit 
companies, or retail districts after their prime-then holding them for long-
term investment. This posture greatly frustrated Baltimore City officials 
and community leaders interested in property improvement and redevelop-
ment, whether on the large scale required for downtown revitalization in 
the city's declining central core or on the smaller scale for upkeep and re-
newal of neighborhood shopping centers. 56 
Why did the shopping center decline? Some pioneers blamed mer-
chants, who, they felt, drastically cut back on the quality of merchandise 
and the level of service when the clientele became increasingly African 
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Figure 20. Despite "Acres 
and Acres of Parking," the 
Edmondson Village shop-
ping Center parking lot 
stood nearly deserted, 
many shop windows 
boarded up in this Decem-
ber 1979 photo. In 1987 a 
local developer leased the 
center from its absentee 
owner, announcing plans to 
renovate the shops and 
attract new businesses. 
(Photo by David Lavin) 
American. Similarly, considerable community concern targeted neglect 
by an absentee landlord whose investment strategies appeared to pre-
clude improvement. Others noted such economic factors as the decreased 
buying power of the new residents combined with new competition in the 
suburbs. And some pointed fingers at elements of the African American 
community itself. Asked what made the Village change, for instance, se-
nior citizens at the Rodman Center replied: "The people that hang out up 
there. They have a lot of ruffians up there; they have a lot of dope addicts; 
they have a little bit of everything; when you come out of the bank, the 
younger people take your money-they do everything. People are scared 
to go up there." 
The vandalism and looting that erupted in the Village during the 
urban rioting in 1968 following the assassination of Martin Luther King, 
Jr., occurred as part of a broader social crisis, and it is difficult to deter-
mine the extent to which local residents joined outsiders as participants in 
these actions. Nevertheless, it may be significant that in this episode the 
role of the Edmondson Village Shopping Center had been transformed 
from community center to community target. In Elizabeth Jones's view, 
the riots sounded a death knell to the few merchants still remaining, lead-
ing to even more closures. 
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If the Edmondson Village Shopping Center served as a fitting symbol 
for the golden era of white settlement, its deterioration-and the frustra-
tion African American residents feel as a result-epitomized the later 
period. Whether the decline of the shopping center was th~ consequence 
of larger social and commercial consumer patterns, changing community 
demographics, individual and corporate investment policies, failure of lo-
cal governmental intervention, or such antisocial behavior as vandalism 
and muggings, its transformation to a community problem rather than 
community asset illustrated the strong sense of powerlessness that many 
African American pioneers expressed in the interviews. (See figure 20.) 
Recent years have witnessed a more hopeful prospect for the center. 
In 1987 a local Baltimore firm, JHP Realty (headed by developer Jack 
Pechter), succeeded in securing a lease for the shopping complex and 
announced plans to undertake major renovations, a welcome sign for the 
community and for those concerned about the impact of Weinberg prop-
erties throughout the city. (The nature and significance of this develop-
ment and the irony of the legacy of Weinberg, who died in 1990, are 
considered in chapter 6.) 
Finally, social class appears to be an unresolved issue for many of the 
pioneer settlers. A number explicitly link their own prospects for mobility 
to gains of the civil rights revolution, literally viewing themselves as "pi-
oneers" in that movement, and there is considerable discomfort in ad-
dressing issues of class diversity or succession because of these sensi-
tivities. Yet, early settlers attribute part of the difficulty encountered in 
the initial stages of their neighborhood experience to the minority of new 
residents attracted by the blockbusting process who lacked the economic 
means to make it in the new setting. Moreover, as the first generation has 
remained rooted, aging in the process of residential longevity, pioneers 
sometimes express bewilderment at the nature of newer, "younger" resi-
dents whose socioeconomic status and values they perceive to be different 
from their own. Roberta Warren, for instance, speaks of her feelings about 
contrasts between pioneers and subsequent settlers. For the early African 
American residents, she says, "It was more like a family affair. In this 
area in the morning the families would begin sweeping the back alley, and 
sweep down as far as they could go. They would take up the trash, wash 
down the middle of the alley .... It was just the people on that side ofthe 
block. And we kept it clean .... Some of the older blacks have moved out, 
and we have younger blacks here now. They could step over trash all day 
long." When asked what she thought made the difference, she replied, "I 
don't know! Some will cut the grass. But in the old days, younger people 
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would get out and cut the grass." Some tend to point the finger at "rent-
ers," often correlating them with younger settlers, contending that they 
seem to have less interest in keeping up their homes and yards. Margaret 
Dawkins noted that her block "was really very stable, so most of the 
people who are there now are the people who originally bought those 
houses"; however, she feels, "if they're renters, they're different. You see 
some things happening that you didn't see before." Annie and Horace 
Green live on a block that has had a great deal of stability among the 
pioneer generation. Yet, in recent years there has been deterioration in the 
condition of some houses and yards, changes that they attributed to 
"renters": "I think why it changed a lot was because there weren't as 
many homeowners. Because once you have something of your own, you 
take pride in it; but if somebody is just renting, it doesn't matter to them 
how well it looks as long as they pay their rent, and the landlord will just 
rent it, not screen people, put anybody in." Elizabeth Jones believes that 
the perception that newcomers are contributing to neighborhood deterio-
ration has been particularly troubling to African American pioneers who 
struggled financially to payoff mortgages only to feel that the community 
has changed in the meantime: "I have talked recently with some older 
community members who have felt 'down in the dumps.' They had just 
paid for their homes and here came a big change, and they kind of got 
disgusted." Nevertheless, when pressed for a further explanation of the 
change, Jones resists collective analysis, instead identifying problems as 
attributable to "a few rotten apples." 
"Renters," "young people," "a few rotten apples"-such terms crop 
up in the interviews with African American pioneers as they seek to put 
their fingers on subtle but significant challenges to community cohesion 
and well-being. All hint at but tend to skirt issues of class in the context of 
race, as recent years clearly have witnessed the broadening of the socio-
economic definition of the community evident in the demographic data 
discussed earlier. Mary Slade pointed to this uneasy balance in a predom-
inantly African American neighborhood at the socioeconomic mid-point 
when she talked about a community that had the appearance of middle-
class status yet in fact embodied a wider range of socioeconomic status 
and need: "It's a misnomer that all the people that live in zone 29 [the 
area's zip code, 21229] have a lot of money or are above the poverty line-
maybe they were initially, but as the neighborhood changed rapidly, we 
had people from all strata, and it presented a problem, because they had 
green grass in the front and green grass out back, and you usually thought 
of those folks as having a little bit of money, but we have people who 
158 Blockbusting in Baltimore 
Figure 21. Young residents 
in the Lyndhurst section of 
Edmondson Village pose 
outside the recreation 
building which neighbor-
hood residents repainted as 
part of a campaign to 
pressure the city govern-
ment to permit them to re-
open it to serve the needs 
of the community. (Photo 
by the author) 
receive food stamps ... and it's necessary for them to do so in order to 
survive." "Green grass" and "food stamps"-these are among the anom-
alies of the neighborhood that African American pioneers settled in their 
effort to find a more satisfactory residential environment and where 
many still reside. While pioneers are outspoken champions of equal rights 
and embrace a vision of community allowing for considerably more socio-
economic diversity than has been typical in first-wave suburbanization, 
they nevertheless express the ambivalent mixture of hope and frustration 
at the heart of the African American suburban experience. (See figure 
21.) 
Secondhand Suburbanization on Balance 
West Baltimore's Edmondson Village case epitomizes the dilemmas con-
fronting African American pioneers in the wake of systematic blockbust-
ing and rapid white flight. Initial resistance from individuals and institu-
tions; the decline of services, public and private; the difficult process of 
developing new community institutions; gradual socioeconomic change-
all cloud the picture of relative residential stability, a high level of home 
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ownership, and improved housing opportunities in the experience of the 
interviewees. Moving out to Edmondson Village under circumstances of 
blockbusting and white flight has brought measures of both satisfaction 
and frustration, as if the lines between stability and security, on the one 
hand, and stagnancy and deterioration, on the other, have been fine in-
deed in the experience of African American pioneers. The black tax has 
had its social as well as financial dimensions. 
No social processes have been more important in shaping the twenti-
eth-century history of American cities than suburbanization and racial 
change. Yet, the link between the two has been too little acknowledged or 
understood. In the case of the Edmondson area, the early period of develop-
ment served the needs of an expanding, upwardly mobile white populace, 
offering not only the explicit promise of new housing but the implicit prom-
ise of social class differentiation that has been an integral part of the Ameri-
can suburban experience. The blockbusting era opened up desperately 
needed housing opportunities for middle-income African Americans, but 
the exploitative cost of their new housing gains placed economic strains 
upon individual families, while an array of challenges confronted the new 
community collectively. Moreover, the sheer rapidity and scale with which 
new housing opportunities became available quickly thinned the ranks of 
those who shared the economic status of most early settlers yet concen-
trated new settlement within particular confines. Over time, some who re-
traced the pioneers' odyssey to Edmondson Village were more likely to have 
marginal social and economic resources-the "younger people," "rent-
ers," and "rotten apples." Therefore, the thinness of a African American 
middle-income group and the dynamics of a dual housing market have 
made the process of second-wave suburbanization a very different experi-
ence for African~American pioneers than for their white predecessors in 
instances of massive racial change. While the former might harbor the illu-
sion, if not always the reality, of social class differentiation, African Ameri-
can successors-not necessarily seeking white neighbors or social class 
exclusion--nevertheless have struggled for measures of residential stability 
and satisfaction in a changed neighborhood within a context of consider-
able stress and uncertainty. Only seventy years after the rowhouse com-
munity's initial development, Edmondson Village's African American pi-
oneers today have a somewhat tenuous hold on an African American 
middle-class quest in these secondhand suburbs. 
6 
The Legacy of Blockbusting 
Edmondson Village is one of Baltimore's larger townhouse communities, an 
area which has surmounted tremendous odds to offer some of the 
western section's most affordable housing. 
-Baltimore News-American, 1984 
People are afraid. A lot of people today still do not accept integration. But I 
don't know where they are going to go to get away from it. You can't; it's part 
of everyday living .... There will always be those who will knock themselves 
out to get away from all of it. But it's got to stop someplace-I hope it does. 
- Marilyn Simkins 
Today you don't see too many signs going up, crosses burned, craziness. When 
you move in, it's just another neighborhood. I'm not saying there are no prob-
lems; there will always will be problems. There are also problems black among 
blacks-don't put it all on racial prejudice. But people have accepted it. 
- Elizabeth Jones 
This study ends in 1980, twenty-five years after the first African Ameri-
can pioneers moved into Edmondson Village. Of course, the saga of the 
community and its inhabitants, past and present, is an ever-evolving one. 
Its meaning is tested daily in the unfolding demographics of the metro-
politan region and within the boundaries of the Edmondson Village area 
itsel£ Have there been more Edmondson Village-type experiences of ma-
nipulated massive racial change, and are there likely to be in the future? 
Has there been social learning as a result of such traumatic episodes? And 
what has been the legacy of the wave of urban racial change it epito-
mized? The record is not always easy to measure or interpret, but the 
general patterns deserve comment in conclusion. 
First, episodes of racial change on the massive scale of Edmondson 
Village have cooled considerably during the past two decades. While the 
reasons are many, they are somewhat difficult to document. The slow-
down of the economy in the 1980s may have had as much effect as any 
other single factor in reducing the readiness to move, both for African 
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Americans and for whites-though the point has been made that at the 
peak of blockbusting in Edmondson Village whites sold in panic almost 
without regard to the economic consequences. The dramatic expansion of 
the housing pool available to potential African American movers as the 
result of the opening of large sections such as Edmondson Village tempo-
rarily absorbed the demand for middle-income housing, though hardly 
provided the range of options available to whites with comparable socio-
economic status. Revised institutional practices governing real estate and 
financial practices mandated by such actions as the 1968 Fair Housing 
Act and comparable reforms at the state and municipal level corrected 
some of the most egregious of the discriminatory policies and practices, 
which at once undergirded the dual housing market and provided the 
crevice for blockbusters to manipulate the racial demographics of hous-
ing. The general patterns of institutional segregation, however, have re-
mained remarkably resistant to change. And at an individual and collec-
tive level, it may well be that the changing national social climate and the 
specific lessons of episodes such as Edmondson Village have had their 
effect in changing attitudes and behavior. In 1982 a local newspaper arti-
cle by political scientist Robert D.Loevy could note with emphasis, "for 
almost three out of every four Baltimore [City] citizens, neighborhood 
[racial] change simply was not a part of their lives during the decade of 
the 1970s"-a statement that spoke volumes in its implications regarding 
the urban norm in the previous decade.) 
Second, the exodus from cities such as Baltimore to the suburbs may 
have slowed down, but the general pattern persists. Indeed, in the 1970s 
those leaving residences in Baltimore City for the surrounding suburban 
counties--for whatever reason-actually outnumbered the out-migrants 
of the 1960s. In the case of the Baltimore metropolitan region this appar-
ent increase was in part a function of jurisdictional boundaries and the 
location of suburban development. In the 1960s moves to new housing 
often could be made to areas of recent development within the city limits, 
but in the 1970s new suburbanization became concentrated almost exclu-
sively in the surrounding county ring. Significantly, however, while white 
out-migration from the city remained strong during the 1970s, for the first 
time African American out-migrants outnumbered African American in-
migrants, and Mrican Americans therefore constituted a substantial mi-
nority of the total exodus from the city's limits. Noting that these trends 
represented a serious loss to the city of a generally middle-class popula-
tion, both white and African American, the Baltimore Sun in a 1983 article 
perceptively gauged the likely consequences: '~ middle-class residents 
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leave a city, taxes may go up, services may decline, and fewer middle-class 
children attend the public schools." 2 When the United States Civil Rights 
Commission conducted hearings in Baltimore in 1970, Commission Chair-
man Theodore Hesburgh concluded the lengthy sessions with an expres-
sion of concern that the city and the surrounding county areas were becom-
ing "two separate worlds in existence and the gulf that widens [between] 
them produces growing hostility and fear." 3 In 1986, Baltimore 2000, a sys-
tematic review of socioeconomic trends in the metropolitan area, reached 
much the same conclusion. 4 
Third, the segregation of existing housing and the resegregation of 
racially mixed neighborhoods have continued to constitute the prevalent 
residential pattern in the metropolitan region as a whole, despite some 
indications of greater degrees of integration than in the recent past. The 
1980 federal census offered some moderately hopeful news on this score. A 
Johns Hopkins University study that used the census to examine racial 
patterns at the neighborhood level found a modest increase in the number 
of Baltimore City neighborhoods that had remained integrated without 
experiencing sizable racial change as well as in the total number of neigh-
borhoods with a white percentage in the 30 to 70 percent range. However, 
the preponderance of the city's neighborhoods were clearly divided be-
tween those mostly African American and those mostly white.5 
Moreover, the substantial increase in adjacent Baltimore County's Af-
rican American population during the decades of the 1970s and 1980s was 
primarily concentrated-some might say channeled-along a single corri-
dor, Liberty Road. Racial change in northwest Baltimore City along Liber-
ty Heights Avenue had paralleled the experience of the western corridor 
and Edmondson Village, with many of the same dynamics, including 
blockbusting and massive white flight, and during roughly the same peri-
od, one difference being the concentration of predominantly Jewish popu-
lation in some northwest sections of the city and adjacent county. In the 
late 1960s and early 1970s African American residency leap-froggedthe city 
boundary, with substantial turnover occurring in Baltimore County along 
the Liberty Road corridor approximately five miles to the general Ran-
dallstown area.6 This section, which in 1980 accounted for half ofthe Afri-
can American population of a county only 8.2 percent African American, 
represented a clear example of a racial spillover pattern rather than even 
dispersion into a large metropolitanjurisdiction with widely ranging hous-
ing levels and costs. In 1990, when the African American percentage in the 
county as a whole had grown to 12.4 percent, the Liberty Road corridor 
continued to account for half of the enlarged percentageJ 
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By contrast, along the western corridor racial change proceeded at a 
much slower pace after the mid-1960s. Rowhouse and detached house 
neighborhoods between Edmondson Village and the city limits to the 
west had substantial African American percentages by 1980 but sufficient 
white presence to be considered integrated, perhaps stably so. Compara-
ble Baltimore County neighborhoods along the northern side of the Route 
40 corridor west to the beltway represented varying degrees of integra-
tion, though south of Route 40 county neighborhoods remained almost 
exclusively white. The 1980s witnessed persistence of these patterns, with 
steady increases in African American percentages in the city neighbor-
hoods west of Edmondson Village and in the Baltimore County neighbor-
hoods north of Route 40 to the beltway but very little African American 
presence on the south side of Route 40. During the same decades the 
general suburban Catonsville area of Baltimore County experienced only 
a slight increase in its African American populace, which stood at 9 per-
cent in 1980 and 10 percent in 1990.8 
In racially mixed sections on the west side, the demographic pattern 
often suggested two relatively distinct population profiles: among whites 
a preponderance of older adults with a smaller number of young adults, 
either in pre-family or starter-family stages, while among African Ameri-
cans a preponderance of households made up of relatively young to 
middle-aged adults and their children. The pace of racial change in these 
communities has been relatively slow; panic has been much less evident 
among whites, and-unlike in Edmondson Village-there has been some 
opportunity for extended neighborly interaction. It certainly is too early 
to judge whether integration is truly being given a chance.9 Nevertheless, 
if the destabilizing climate of the Edmondson Village experience can be 
avoided, the prospects for community well-being is likely to be enhanced 
for all. 
White Attitudes and the 7Tauma of Change 
Edmondson Village's white expatriates dispersed along the natural corri-
dors of suburban migration westward, some to nearby neighborhoods, 
others throughout Baltimore County's general Catonsville area and be-
yond to Howard County. Many friendship and family networks persist, 
and people often encounter old neighbors on visits to regional shopping 
centers, churches, or social organizations. The experience of uprooting 
lingers as an unhealed wound, the source of mixed feelings of nostalgia, 
bewilderment, bitterness, and social learning. Some believe they have 
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found new suburban havens that provide the social homogeneity and in-
sulation Edmondson Village afforded for a while. But others view life in 
their new neighborhoods differently as a consequence of the Edmondson 
Village experience. 
Interviews with white former residents of varying ages inevitably 
evoke considerable nostalgia for the old neighborhood and the lifestyle 
that accompanied it. Qualities of closeness, neighborliness, commonality, 
and security bubble forth unprompted in such discussions. For example, 
Marilyn Simkins, who was a teenager in the 1950s, offered this summa-
tion of her experience: "Personally, I would be satisfied if I still lived 
there, if things had stayed the way they were. It wasn't exactly what you 
would call paradise, but it was a nice neighborhood." Nola Null, whose 
brother worked for the Keelty Company and who herself settled on the 
Hill in the 1930s as an adult, expressed similar feelings: "I was proud to 
think that I lived in that neighborhood and had a nice village [the shop-
ping center] like that. . . . I felt that I had bought in a nice section-
security, a job, everything there you needed. I was proud to tell people in 
different parts of the city that I lived there and that Edmondson Village 
was my home." 10 
Retrospective nostalgia is common in oral history interviews, fre-
quently masking considerable degrees of ambivalence and contradiction, 
part of a normal inclination to put the best face on past experience and to 
romanticize the earlier life-cycle stages of childhood or family formation. 
While it often takes the tone of affirmation and lament for a lost time and 
place, in the case of Edmondson Village it assumes a distinctive note in 
the remorse for a place that still exists but where there no longer are any 
ties of kin or friendship because the break was so abrupt and so total. 
This sense of relatively recently lost turf is nowhere more evident than 
in the phenomenon of a series of reunions, conducted by large networks of 
people who grew up in Edmondson Village from the late 1940s through the 
early 1960s-broadly speaking the period of 1950s teen culture-and con-
sider themselves the "Village crowd." The first reunion, held in 1973 at a 
fire hall in a distant suburban location, attracted nearly two hundred peo-
ple who revelled in fifties music and photos screened by an opaque projec-
tor. Building on this success, the organizers planned the "25th Anniversary 
ofthe Village Crowd" for 1979, an event that drew some 350 to 400 people. 
Defined as primarily for those then between their early thirties and mid-
forties, the event prompted interchanges in which participants placed 
themselves by age and social peer group. Illustrative was the following 
conversation, related by Joe Slovensky, one of the organizers: "This one 
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guy I was talking to said, 'Joe Slovensky, I don't remember you,' and I said, 
'Well how old are you?' He said, 'Forty-four,' and I said, 'Oh, you're one of 
the boys from the Arundel,' and he said, 'Yeah, yeah,' and I said, 'We didn't 
go up there, man; you guys were too old for us; we used to hang down at 
Whalen's.' I used to just go to the Arundel, get an orange sherbet and leave. 
Yes, we were afraid of that place. That was where the bigger boys were." II 
Edith Romaine, another event planner, described the evening's activities: 
"We cut out paper letters, and we had the names of all the places we used to 
hang out: like the Varsity, Champs; we had drapes, squares, ponytails, blue 
suede shoes, hula hoops-things like that .... About an hour later, I 
turned around, and everyone was just standing in the middle of the floor 
[talking]. ... They were going around taking a poll; they wanted one every 
year." 12 The most recent reunion-held in 1990--again attracted a capaci-
ty crowd. 
Such events have not been unusual as the aging of the postwar teen 
generation has produced national waves of fifties revival. But in the con-
text of Edmondson Village, the reunions seem to take on special signifi-
cance, because at the heart of nostalgic memories is the omnipresent 
sense that something more was lost from the neighborhood experience 
than the innocence associated with growing up and that that something 
had to do with race. 
Some white former residents return periodically to see their former 
houses and the neighborhood, but frequently they speak of feeling de-
pressed by the changes they see, especially by signs of deterioration. Sim-
kins, for example, said wistfully: "It's just not taken care of anymore. I've 
driven through the area since I've moved out, and it depressed me so, I 
don't go back anymore." Voiced concerns about upkeep or signs of struc-
tural aging certainly may mask deeper unexpressed concerns about social 
and cultural changes as well. Indeed, change of any kind seems upsetting to 
memories of this past, interrupted by collective trauma. Joe Slovensky sud-
denly exclaimed: "I took David [his son] up where I played baseball-up 
on the Wildwood diamond-and they had changed the whole diamond 
around! It ain't the same way it was when I was there. They used to have it 
facing toward the woods; it's around the other way now!" The "they" 
seems to represent a whole array of individuals and forces, somehow re-
sponsible for forced change. But former residents do find themselves drawn 
back, as if a part of themselves was left behind in the uprooting. Slovensky 
described the return trip a friend had recounted to him: "This friend of 
mine came from Georgia. He brought his children-his son is sixteen-
and I guess where they live, people are always coming and going. He drove 
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his son through [Edmondson Village] that weekend and took pictures. His 
father owned a liquor store on Edmondson Avenue, down from the Edge-
wood movie, and they lived upstairs. He said his son can't imagine-he's 
not used to the way that we lived-and he feels he's missing so much-the 
closeness-whereas where they are now I'm sure they have friends, but it's 
so transient-people always moving." When asked how his friend's son 
reacted, Slovensky replied "I don't think it really did anything for the 
boy." 
Racial change of the type and magnitude that occurred in Edmond-
son Village between 1955 and 1965 indeed represented a pivotal social 
and cultural moment, a major challenge to the suburban dream of homo-
geneity and exclusivity for a group of new rowhouse suburbanites. Bound 
up with that version of the dream was an interwoven lifestyle, status, and 
sense of security that had seemed insulated from the factors of diversity 
and change at work in a dynamic metropolis. Yet, inherent in white row-
house suburbia were the seeds of its own demise: its unwillingness to 
adapt to new definitions of community and its consequent vulnerability 
to the manipulation and exploitation that ultimately befell it. Baltimore 
Sun columnist Michael Olesker, reflecting on his own very similar neigh-
borhood in the northwest section of the city, where the experience of racial 
change was virtually the same ("It happened in myoid neighborhood in 
1962"), has written perceptively: "The white families of the early '60s 
were in transition not only between neighborhoods, but between life-
styles. This neighborhood was our first framework of middle-class securi-
ty. Too bad we didn't hang around long enough to look in the mirror. We 
might have seen the faces of our new neighbors reflected in the frame-
work." 13 
Many former Edmondson Village residents now reside in westside 
suburban neighborhoods. Some, particularly in sections along the Route 
40 corridor, have already experienced recent African American settlement. 
Others live in neighborhoods characterized by racial homogeneity but 
where they recognize that minority residency is not out of the question. 
What is their response to the prospect of African American settlement, and 
how do they feel their communities will respond? Has the social learning of 
the Edmondson Village experience taught greater resistance, the necessity 
of flight, or accommodation and acceptance? As they express their own 
attitudes and seek to interpret the feelings of other former residents of 
Edmondson Village, interviewees acknowledge that resistance and flight 
continue to characterize much suburban white behavior. In their reflec-
tion, however, there sometimes is another note, one that suggests that the 
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social learning associated with the Edmondson Village experience may 
have led to greater willingness to accept new forms of community. Ann 
Morgan, who resettled in a rowhouse neighborhood across the county line 
in the 1950s, recalls how the ripple effects of the Edmondson Village panic 
initially produced some reverberations there but believes that recent Afri-
can American settlement has been accepted without the earlier fears: 
Well, we've been here about thirty years, and about twenty-five years ago a girl up 
on Channing Road said, "I'm not staying in this neighborhood because it will 
change. And I'm going to get out while I can get my money, because all of that 
property is going down." And she moved twenty-five years ago-for that reason. 
And it's only been in the last few years that we've had any blacks in the neighbor-
hood. And it doesn't bother anybody. They keep their places nice. In fact, this old 
friend of mine that lived on Denison [in Edmondson Village] now lives back on 
Channing. She has a young black couple next door to her, and she says that 
they're better than the white people who were there before. She says the whites 
were terrible and didn't take care of their house, and this couple do, and they're 
very nice. She doesn't see them that often-they both work-but she says they're 
very nice to her.14 
David Graf~ who believes that the slowing of racial turnover in westside 
rowhouse neighborhoods may be as much due to economic realities as 
changed attitudes, nevertheless thinks that people in these communities 
do not feel as threatened as did whites in Edmondson Village: "These are 
people who have lived in Edmondson Heights-in those areas, grew up as 
kids, and it's almost like in Little Italy; they're buying into their own 
community that they grew up in. They're well aware of those changes. 
But they're saying, 'If I'm going to move anywhere, [it's here]. I know 
this community, and I feel more comfortable buying into this commu-
nity.'" 15 Marilyn Simkins, whose family relocated to the Catonsville area 
of the county, says that her neighborhood is now receiving its first African 
American and Asian American settlers. Asked whether she felt that white 
flight would occur again in the way it did in Edmondson Village, she 
offered the view that she, at least, had come to the realization that people 
are mistaken in thinking they can find a place where they can escape: 
"You can't; it's part of your everyday living." And then she added, "It's 
got to stop someplace-I hope it does." 
Institutional Impact and Community WeU-Being 
Whether white attitudes and behavior have changed substantially during 
the past several decades-as a result of specific episodes such as Ed-
168 Blockbusting in Baltimore 
mondson Village and broad developments in American culture as a 
whole-questions of community stability in general and the character of 
neighborhoods relative to race and racial integration have always de-
pended to a great extent oil institutional factors as well. White prejudices 
and fears may have made the residents of Keelty's hill fertile ground for 
manipulation. However, the systematic application of blockbusting tactics 
and speculative real estate practices, the formal and informal mechanisms 
of a dual housing market, and the absence of either a commitment or will 
to prohibit and regulate such practices from both the public governmental 
and private business sectors combined with residents' proclivities to light 
the fuse and produce the explosion. In recent years much greater atten-
tion has been paid to institutional factors in the attempt to understand 
the persistence and impact of segregated housing patterns. 16 
Title VIII of the federal Fair Housing Act of 1968, passed just a few 
years after racial turnover was virtually complete in Edmondson Village, 
explicitly banned discrimination in the sale or rental of housing. Included 
in Title VIII was a prohibition against blockbusting, declaring it unlaw-
ful "for profit, to induce or attempt to induce any person to sell or rent 
any dwelling by representations regarding the entry or prospective entry 
into the neighborhood of a person or persons of a particular race, color, 
religion, or national origin." The act also sought to guarantee open access 
to the real estate market, forbidding steering-the process of directing 
members of racial, ethnic, or religious groups only into neighborhoods in 
which members of the same group already live. Discrimination in multi-
ple listings or other services related to the rental or sale of property was 
forbidden. Further, Title VIII made discrimination in housing loans ille-
gal.· Enforcement authority rests with the Department of Justice, while 
implementation procedures and regulations have been the responsibility 
of the Department of Housing and Urban Development. Critics have 
faulted both federal departments for failing to use the authority and pow-
er of the act to develop affirmative federal housing policies and programs 
effectively to challenge the institutional roots of the dual housing mar-
ketY 
Current Maryland law, the most recent version of the Maryland Real 
Estate Brokers Act having been approved in 1982, has a specific subsec-
tion (16.608) prohibiting blockbusting, defined in language that echoes 
the federal Title VIII. The subsection stipulates that brokers must not 
state that the entry of members of different social groups might result in 
"(i) the lowering of property values; (ii) change in the racial, religious, or 
ethnic character of the block, neighborhood, or area; (iii) an increase in 
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criminal or antisocial behavior in the area; or (iv) a decline in the quality 
of schools serving the area." A separate subsection (16.609) prohibits the 
solicitation of residential properties to sell or lease, if the purpose is to 
change the racial composition of the neighborhood. Specifically banned 
for such intent are door-to-door or telephone solicitation and the mass 
distribution of circulars. Subsections directed to particular jurisdictions 
prohibit steering practices in Baltimore City (16.525) and mass solicita-· 
tion in Baltimore County (16.527). Further, the Real Estate Commission 
may declare an urban neighborhood a real estate conservation area if 
there is evidence that the racial stability of the area is threatened by the 
volume of transactions (16.522).18 
The systematic real estate and finance tactics applied in Edmondson 
Village to manipulate racial change appear not to have been repeated in 
their exaCt form on the west side. In the late 1960s and early 1970s the 
specific charge of blockbusting was heard on the northwest along the 
Liberty Road corridor where the speed and scale of racial change resem-
bled the slightly earlier Edmondson Village pattern. More recently, how-
ever, the -primary concern has been about real estate activity that may be 
more subtile. For instance, in the view of community activists committed 
to fair housing practices, steering continues to be a serious problem, con-
tributing to the perpetuation of the dual housing system. Since steering 
employs the guise of the free market system, it is often difficult to detect 
and prove. However, real estate spokespersons often contend that the ab-
sence of documented and prosecuted complaints confirms the industry's 
contention that people steer themselves. 19 
When the Activists challenged blockbusting in Edmondson Village, 
their focus was primarily upon its destabilizing consequences and upon 
the exploitation of African American buyers. Not only did they document 
exceptionally high markups in sale prices, but they faulted shaky finance 
and loan mechanisms such as the land contract and lease option, which 
provided little protection for buyers and seemed designed to induce de-
fault. African Americans had no alternatives other than these arrange-
ments, because they had been systematically closed out of the normal 
house mortgage loan process. As Samuel Brown, a key member of the 
Activists, explained what the group's objectives had been in 1968: 
Prior to our dealing with that problem there were two markets in the Baltimore 
metropolitan area: there was a black market and a white market. The white real 
estate market belonged to the legitimate real estate firms; they were financed by VA 
and FHA issuance of mortgages to the buyers. Then there was the black market. 
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That market was 85 to 90 percent land contracts, lease options-absolutely no regu-
lation, and totally taking as much as the market would bear. At the same time you 
had the blockbusting syndrome, making housing available for exploitative pur-
poses, and the white flight, white fright syndrome-so they were getting the houses 
from the whites for below market value and selling them to the black people for 
anywhere from 50 percent to double on the lease option or land contract.20 
After a prolonged process of organization, protest, and litigation, the ac-
tions and publicity generated by the Edmondson Village example did 
benefit African Americans by opening conventional avenues for housing 
mortgages and educating potential homebuyers. In the view of the same 
interviewee: 
There were a lot of silent understandings within the housing industry. But we 
opened up the financial institutions so black people could go in and purchase 
houses with regular FHA and VA financing. We also educated the black commu-
nity regarding how houses should be bought. Most black people thought that this 
was a perfectly honest, legitimate way to obtain a home-the lease option or land 
contract. But most of the working-class people never received title to their home 
that they were attempting to purchase. For one reason or another the land con-
tract was canceled or the lease option was canceled. They were that loaded 
[against the buyer] that almost at the will of the seller, the buyer almost had to 
violate the contract-they were that loaded. We broke that method of transfer up. 
Lease options and land contracts did become outmoded mechanisms 
for housing purchases and conventional loans became much more widely 
available; however, the patterns that undergird the dual housing market 
remain deeply entrenched. As recently as 1987 a study of Baltimore area 
mortgage lending patterns found that the flow of credit from area finan-
cial institutions reflected disparity along racial lines. It concluded that 
the greatest number of mortgages continued to go to suburban and gen-
trifying areas and that banks avoided loans to low- and moderate-income 
African American families. These findings led Baltimore Sun columnist 
Garland Thompson to muse despairingly on their implications for perpet-
uating neighborhood racial segregation: "The neighborhood, that great 
meeting place expected to break down society's divisions, continues to be 
a fortress, proof against incursions of darker 'others.''' 21 
Other kinds of institutional decisions have had indirect impact on the 
stability of Edmondson Village and other urban neighborhoods, whether 
intended or unintended. The East-West Expressway, planning for which 
had begun in the 1940s with twin justifications of improved transporta-
tion and slum removal, created uncertainty and instability for the section 
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east of Edmondson Village. When site clearance finally got underway in 
the late 1960s along a one-mile corridor formed by Franklin and Mulber-
ry Streets (eventually designated 1-170), housing shortages occurred as a 
sizable low-income African American populace numbering some nineteen 
thousand was displaced and forced to seek new shelter.22 The rippling 
effect was felt by neighborhoods to the west and northwest, including 
Edmondson Village, even though the neighborhood was over a mile from 
the highway's abrupt terminus. In the view of Edmondson Village pi-
oneer Mary Slade, the displacement contributed to a new period ofinsta-
bility in the recently racially changed Edmondson Village community. 
She said that the expressway "impacted because people had to go some-
place, and they had to go whether they could afford it or not. So I under-
stand that a lot of them came into zone 29 [a large portion of which 
included the Edmondson Village area], and a lot of them went up to Park 
Heights [to the northwest] .... People just had to go someplace, and had 
to do the best they could under the circumstances. And it made it 
rough-for them, and also for the people they had to live near." 23 Further 
completion of the interstate route through nearby Gwynns Falls and 
Leakin Parks was vehemently opposed by a citywide coalition of environ-
mentalists and community activists, but supported by a number of Ed-
mondson Village pioneer political leaders, Their position was partly mo-
tivated by promises that the project would include substantial funds for 
recreational facilities adjacent to their neighborhood, an indication of the 
tough political choices forced upon a community where city resources 
were increasingly in short supply. 
The institutional aftermath of the Edmondson Village experience 
takes on special irony in the unfolding of the Goldseker story. Morris 
Goldseker died in 1973. According to the terms of his will, the Goldseker 
Foundation was established three years later. Following the organization 
of the foundation, the Morris Goldseker Company served primarily a real 
estate management function; in 1985 the company disposed of its remain-
ing properties and closed its doors as a business. In that year assets ofthe 
foundation were listed as approximately $26 to $27 million. According to 
the foundation's director, Morris Goldseker's will specified that grants be 
used for projects in the Baltimore area, especially for the disadvantaged. 
The will further stipulated that grants could be awarded only to nonsec-
tarian organizations that did not discriminate on the basis of race or reli-
gion. Between 1976 and 1985 the foundation conferred grants in the 
amount of$7 million. InJuly, 1989 it combined with the Baltimore Com-
munity Foundation; during the 1989 fiscal year the enlarged philanthropy 
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conferred $1,556,768 in grants to thirty-four nonprofit organizations for 
programs in categories of community affairs, education, health, human 
services, and neighborhood development.24 
Not surprisingly, the Goldseker legacy still draws the mixed response 
the living Goldseker received. Sheldon Goldseker, named as one of the 
trustees of the foundation, always has argued that his uncle was very 
much misunderstood. In his view his uncle's firm early established a via-
ble business selling houses to low- and moderate-income people, many of 
whom could not afford conventional mortgages. At the time of the suit 
brought by the Activists he vehemently denied that the company had 
been directly involved in blockbusting and that the profits in Edmondson 
Village (and elsewhere) were inappropriate. He continued to stress that 
the charges brought by the Activists and community organizations had 
not been proven in court. In his view, the establishment of the foundation 
was consistent with his uncle's life-long concern for the disadvantaged 
and his record of civic generosity, hitherto little known because many gifts 
had been made in anonymity. While even Sheldon Goldseker admitted 
that his uncle "was always an enigma," a 1978 Sun article could find 
many among Baltimore's leading corporate officials ready to praise Gold-
seker and to stress the consistency between his career and his bequest.25 
Those involved in the protest against the Morris Goldseker Company, 
on the other hand, found the establishment of the foundation a shocking 
surprise, an action they had difficulty reconciling with their view of the 
role the company had played. For example, one prominent Baltimore Af-
rican American politician involved in the actions against the company in 
the late 1960s was quoted by the Sun in 1978 as saying: "In every confron-
tation I had with Morris Goldseker, he certainly was not sensitive to the 
problems people had. He was a very hard-nosed businessman. He didn't 
demonstrate any sensitivity at all." Although Goldseker's bequest equally 
surprised another protest participant, he told the reporter that the Activ-
ists had targeted the Goldseker Company not as an attack upon its head 
personally or upon his firm more than others but to dramatize the sys-
tematic problems African Americans faced regarding fair treatment in 
housing: "His being the target was incidental. The protests were directed 
at the whole exploitative operation of banks that red lined black areas of 
the city and the political structure that was insensitive to the problems of 
black families desiring to purchase homes, which made it possible for 
individual speculators to profit." 26 Interviews with Edmondson Village 
residents found views on Goldseker's establishment of the philanthropic 
organization ranging from skepticism about possible motivations to ex-
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pressions of considerable appreciation for the foundation's grants to proj-
ects serving the needs of Baltimore's urban population. 
Recently, another player in the Edmondson Village story has also 
entered the ranks of Baltimore's major philanthropies. Harry Weinberg, 
for a number of years the absentee owner of the Edmondson Village 
Shopping Center along with a great number of other Baltimore area 
properties including substantial holdings in the old, decaying downtown 
shopping district along Howard Street, died in 1990. Long the target of 
neighborhood and municipal complaints for the deteriorated condition of 
his properties, Weinberg left a bequest to establish the Harry and Jeanette 
Weinberg Foundation with $900 million in assets, a figure that made it 
the twelfth largest foundation in the country, dwarfing most other Bal-
timore area charities, including Goldseker's. Half of the approximately 
$45 million specified for annual grants is required to be distributed to 
projects in the Baltimore area, especially for institutions and programs 
aiding the poor. 27 
Of the entire institutional legacy relating to the Edmondson Village 
experience, the philanthropic bequests of two of the story's main players 
may be the most startling reminder of the complexity of the circumstances 
involved in racial change and its aftermath. 
African American Experience and the Challenge of Community 
Just as major earthquakes produce enormous upheavals, then successive 
after-shocks, so the Edmondson Village experience of systematic block-
busting and massive racial change prompted both immediate and long-
lasting consequences for the community and its new generations of Afri-
can American residents. As recently as 1984 the Baltimore News-American 
began a routine review of area housing for its real estate section with the 
statement that Edmondson Village had "surmounted tremendous odds to 
offer some of the western section's most affordable housing," without any-
where in the article specifically mentioning what those odds were or sug-
gesting that they were related to racial change-as if everyone knew or as 
if it was something one did not talk about in an article playing up the 
reasonable cost of available housing.28 
As chapter 5 has suggested, the process of racial change and its after-
math was extremely destabilizing to the community. African American 
pioneers and later arrivals found new housing opportunities and the 
amenities of the new community satisfying in many respects, typically 
viewing both housing and neighborhood as improvements from condi-
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tions in their places of prior residency. Nevertheless, the flight of new 
neighbors, the instability that accompanied the change process, and the 
uneven record of public and private sector performance all combined to 
frustrate their aspirations in the new setting. 
Even for those with adequate economic resources, the financial bur-
dens and risky loan arrangements associated with this episode of block-
busting placed a heavy burden. And for those whose status was more 
marginal, the process was considerably more problematic, a condition 
that contributed to housing turnover and to early signs of physical blight 
or deterioration as what had been sound housing now began to show its 
age when it could not be kept up. While the neighborhood absorbed a 
number of new residents with comparatively more marginal status, it si-
multaneously held on to a sizable proportion of an economically secure 
middle-income group of residents for whom Edmondson Village contin-
ued to represent a desirable residential opportunity, especially when other 
options were limited by patterns of segregation and discrimination. 
After the unnatural succession of the early racial change decade, re-
cent years have given evidence of more normal urban patterns of what 
social scientists have called natural succession or filtering, the product of 
the gradual aging of a neighborhood and the expansion of housing oppor-
tunities in the outer city and in selected areas of nearby Baltimore and 
Howard Counties.29 No longer the new frontier of African American hous-
ing expansion, Edmondson Village today may be more of a half-way 
house, still a desirable alternative for African Americans able to make the 
move out from the problems of inner city neighborhoods but less attrac-
tive for an expanding African American middle class. Indeed, gains in 
housing opportunity over the past two decades have produced patterns of 
Mrican American suburbanization not unlike earlier white out-migration 
trends, raising concerns about a fundamental shift in the demographics of 
urban African American communities, formerly characterized by a great-
er degree of socioeconomic heterogeneity than their white counterparts, 
but now following a similar pattern, which separates along class lines. At 
the same time, deep-seated structural inequalities have been compounded 
by social and economic trends in the 1980s to place further limits on op-
portunities for a sizable proportion of the African American urban poor. 
In a division that some observers have called the separation of an African 
American middle class from an African American underclass, Edmond-
son Village is a borderland. 30 
The thinness of an African American middle class is demonstrated in 
both the earlier and more recent periods of African American experience 
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in Edmondson Village. In the early stages, many African American pi-
oneers were of modestly middle-class status, resembling the socioeconom-
ic profile of whites who fled more than differing from them. However, the 
rapid flight of whites combined with the lack of new white settlers to 
create a vacuum-a vacuum that in turn absorbed the pool of middle-
income African Americans seeking new residences. Unconventional real 
estate and finance mechanisms doubtless attracted some newcomers who 
were unable to pay for the cost of life in the neighborhood. The result of 
these factors was a community more broadly defined along socioeconom-
ic lines than its predecessor and certainly more so than in instances of 
typical suburbanization. Over time, this process of social class broaden-
ing has continued, especially as residential opportunities for African 
Americans with middle incomes or above have opened up in outer city 
and county neighborhoods. Therefore, in more recent years the thinness 
of an African American middle class, even one that ]has been gradually 
expanding, has further reduced the attraction of the Edmondson Village 
neighborhood for middle-income settlers with upwardly mobile aspira-
tions. 
The 1990 census provides recent confirmation of the ambivalent so-
cioeconomic status of this borderland African American community, ex-
hibiting trends indicative of continuity but also of relative decline. During 
the 1980s Edmondson Village residents maintained high rates of home 
ownership (68 percent) and residential stability (75 lPercent residing in 
the same house as five years before), exceeding both city and metro-
politan area levels. The percentage ofthe area's labor force in white-collar 
jobs increased slightly (from 38 to 45 percent), though at a smaller rate 
than the metropolitan region (which rose to 58 percent). However, these 
white-collar gains were entirely in sales, clerical, and technical categories, 
not in typically higher paying managerial or professional jobs. Indeed, 
sales, clerical, and technical workers combined with those in the service 
sector to account for 56 percent of the Edmondson Village labor force. As 
in recent decades, the Edmondson area depended upon a high degree of 
female participation in the labor force (60 percent of women over age 
sixteen, compared to 61 percent in 1980), a factor that by 1990 had be-
come prevalent for the metropolitan area as a whole (61 percent in 1990; 
52 percent in 1980). The rate of unemployment and the percentage of 
families below the poverty line remained relatively constant at levels that 
appeared disturbingly high in comparison to the metropolitan figures but 
were slightly lower than citywide averages. Families below the poverty 
line represented approximately 15 percent of the total (compared to 22 
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percent for the city and 10 percent for the metro area), and unemploy-
ment stood at roughly 10 percent (compared to 13 and 5 percent, respec-
tively). Perhaps most troubling, household income continued to decline in 
relative terms; in 1970 and again in 1980 it had lagged approximately 6 
percent behind the metropolitan area figure, but in 1990 the gap in-
creased substantially to a figure 28 percent lower (approximately $28,600 
compared to $36,550). As housing aged, housing values failed to keep 
pace with the metropolitan real estate market, a belated echo of the era 
of inflated prices now reversed in a trend that affected homeowners by 
reducing equity, threatening security, and limiting options for mobility 
even as it made purchase for prospective home buyers more affordable. 
Housing values in 1990 stood at approximately $42,000 compared to 
$53,900 for the rest of the city and $100,000 for the entire metropolitan 
region.31 
During the 1970s and 1980s the decline and deterioration of the Ed-
mondson Village Shopping Center became a symbol in popular percep-
tions for an increasingly negative image of the area as a whole, one evi-
dent not only in the views of many whites, including former residents, but 
also in the opinion of many African Americans, residents as well as out-
siders. Similarly, the physical deterioration of housing along such main 
transportation arteries as Edmondson Avenue and Hilton Street increas-
ingly suggested urban blight, though many side streets still displayed 
standards of upkeep and attractiveness long associated with the suburban 
rowhouse style of living. Residents expressed major concerns about such 
public' institutions as schools, police protection, and general urban ser-
vices. Recently, some public and private sector resources have been di-
rected at a community not perceived to be in dire straits yet sometimes 
recognized as having clear needs. A decade ago local and federal funds 
were allocated for major renovation of the area's two large apartment 
complexes, Edmondale and Uplands. In 1985, theAllendale senior hous-
ing facility opened, providing the first publicly supported housing for the 
elderly in an area experiencing substantial aging of its population. The 
new building punctuated the two-story rowhouse hillside with the area's 
first high rise. Several imposing, modern churches have been erected by 
local African American congregations along Edmondson Avenue. And in 
1987 a local development firm worked out a lease with the Edmondson 
Village Shopping Center's absentee ownership to renovate the retail and 
commercial facility, signaling a degree of commercial revitalization that 
may help to counter the negative community image it symbolized in re-
cent years. By 1992 the center had been refurbished and many of the 
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commercial spaces reoccupied by enterprises offering modestly priced 
lines of merchandise. 
As in many contemporary urban neighborhoods, issues of personal 
safety and concerns about crime frequently come up in interviews with 
residents, in the words of aging pioneers-whose generation now repre-
sents a sizable percentage ofthe community-as well as in those of yo un-
ger residents. Both groups recount incidents ofmuggings or of house rob-
beries that create uneasiness and apprehension and have led them to take 
precautions regarding everyday patterns of shopping or going to school. 
Underscoring their concern about the threat of crime in the area, a study 
of incidences of violent crimes committed in Baltimore City between Jan-
uary and September 1992 listed substantial sections of the Edmondson 
Village community in the highest category (more than 150 homicides, 
rapes, robberies, and assaults), a troubling distinction shared primarily 
by sections of the city with considerably lower socioeconomic status.32 
Further confirmation of their concerns about physical decay and the dete-
rioration of the quality of life, for example, was the 1988 decision by Bal-
timore City's Department of Housing and Community Development to 
designate Edgewood, a section in the older northeastern corner, as one of 
three outer-city Community Conservation Areas. The districts were de-
scribed as having a core of stability but experiencing problems related to 
the maintenance of home ownership and to blighting conditions. In an-
nouncing the program, Baltimore's Mayor Kurt Schmoke said, "We in-
tend to make sure our stable and solid neighborhoods continue to make 
the progress we expect." In a related development, a year later the same 
section was designated as one of eighteen "drug-free" zones in the city, 
one of a handful in the city's outer ring.33 
The pioneer generation exhibited exceptional rates of residential sta-
bility, especially given the destabilizing. conditions its members had to cope 
with, and many have remained, strongly committed to the neighborhood. 
However, the eventual availability of new housing opportunities elsewhere 
has attracted some residents with sufficient economic resources to consider 
relocating, especially as African Americans have settled in other commu-
nities along the western and northwestern suburban corridors. For exam-
ple, in 1983 a Sun reporter investigating patterns of African American out-
migration evident upon the release of the 1980 census, interviewed a family 
in the Liberty Road corridor of Baltimore County who recently had relo-
cated from Edmondson Village. Raymond and Vivian Sykes had decided 
that their rowhouse was too small for them and their three children and 
found more suitable housing in a three-bedroom rancher in a section of the 
178 Blockbusting in Baltimore 
county where African American settlement began in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s. The husband, a forty-three-year-old fire inspector in nearby 
Howard County, told the reporter he liked living in the city and had no 
particular desire to leave, except the need for improved housing. 34 
Interviews with young people, especially those of high school and 
college age, indicate that many of their patterns of sociability are outside 
the neighborhood. Like many adults, they commute considerable dis-
tances to the outer suburban ring for entertainment and shopping or 
sometimes to the popular revitalized downtown Inner Harbor area for 
special occasions. Frequently they express negative feelings about life in 
the neighborhood that stand in stark contrast to the strongly positive 
memories of those who were white teenagers in the 1950s and 1960s, even 
when one filters out the aura of nostalgia in interviews with the latter. 
And often their aspirations-whether necessarily realistic or not-are 
eventually to settle as adults in newer suburban areas. A recent interview 
study with a small sample of Edmondson Village highschool-age young 
people, all themselves involved in one of the neighborhood's Protestant 
churches, found their response to be significant both in terms of their 
upwardly mobile aspirations regarding career and residence and their 
reservations about their home community. Most said they would prefer to 
live in outer suburban areas and that they would not want to bring up 
children in Edmondson Village, citing such reasons as drugs, overcrowd-
ing, and poverty.35 Claudette Newsome, a college student whose family 
relocated to Edmondson Village from a deteriorating neighborhood on 
the near northwest side of the city, says her family's experience has not 
lived up to expectations. While she believes that her parents will stay, she 
hopes "to get away as fast as I can." Her goals are a career as a medical 
professional and residence in the redevelopment area near the Inner Har-
bor. Amanda Franklin, another student, says that she feels vulnerable as a 
female on the area's streets and expresses the view that there is a great 
deal off ear in the neighborhood. She is attracted by what she considers to 
be the more desirable rowhouse areas west of Edmondson Village along 
the city line. Speaking of parkland near her house, she exclaims, "I hear 
that people used to picnic there, but I wouldn't." 36 
For some of these interviewees upward and outward mobility may be 
strong possibilities. They may constitute a new generation of African 
American pioneers, as their parents before them. They may themselves 
settle in predominantly African American suburban communities or, in-
deed, forge new models of residential integration, possibly without the 
white flight that was so typical in the past. However, for many of Ed-
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mondson Village's youth, such a scenario is less likely. The real challenge of 
community in this aging secondhand suburb will be to maintain a livable 
and viable setting for an increasingly heterogeneous African American 
populace. 
Beyond Edmondson ViUage 
Embedded in the recent historical experiences of a typical rowhouse 
neighborhood is the story of twin suburban dreams and the unsettling 
discontinuity that left its lasting mark on both. Perhaps it is the dream 
itself that needs serious re-examination in this preponderantly suburban 
nation. If the suburban dream is valid in its promise of a middle ground 
between countryside and city, offering security, serenity, and comfort, 
then it must be available to all who can afford it-without regard to race 
or ethnicity. This is the principle offair housing. Its advocates point out 
that when all communities are open without discrimination, there is no 
opportunity for pressure to build up to the point of explosion as it did in 
Edmondson Village and as so often has happened when African Ameri-
can settlement has been channeled into narrow corridors of opportunity. 
Long-time Baltimore fair housing advocate Alan Hillman put it this way 
in his explanation of the efforts he and his neighbors have made to pro-
mote acceptance of integration in nearby urban neighborhoods and to 
stem the tide of white flight: "We were city-wide integrationists. If every 
neighborhood were open, then we wouldn't be feeling this pressure-
everybody could take it in stride." 37 
In recent years, some fair housing advocates have become wary of 
programs to reduce the impact of racial change and assure stable integra-
tion in formerly all-white suburban neighborhoods, fearing that such 
measures may place undue limits on the housing choices of minorities just 
when opportunities should be increasing. They have argued that efforts to 
stabilize integration often have good intentions but place the goal of racial 
balance above the principle of fair housing. Such efforts run hard up 
against the dilemma that levels of African American presence low enough 
to assuage white fears and thereby assure "stable integration" are consid-
erably lower than African American preference and needs. They argue 
that only systematic promotion and enforcement of equal opportunity in 
all communities can provide the basis for resolving the dilemma.38 
While fair housing rules out discrimination, it does not necessarily 
address issues of class or other forms of diversity. The power of the subur-
ban dream cannot be denied, but its principal flaw may be the assumed 
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necessity of exclusivity and homogeneity as the price of residential mem-
bership. Indeed, class difference, not race, frequently is cited by whites-
even those who subscribe to the principle of residential racial integration-
as their fundamental concern. Often this assertion is accompanied by the 
assumption that new African American settlers in predominantly white 
residential areas must themselves be of a lower class-or serve as har-
bingers of class change. And African American suburbanites themselves 
frequently share with their white counterparts this desire for class exclu-
sivity. Though typically more careful to subscribe to an equal rights ideolo-
gy and generally much more accepting of a wider degree of socioeconomic 
diversity, African Americans who have found a new and desirable residence 
in suburban settings may feel threatened by the arrival of newcomers of 
lower socioeconomic status-"renters," "young people," "a few rotten ap-
ples." Edmondson Village pioneer Elizabeth Jones recognizes these cross-
cutting issues of race and class when she asserts that today African Ameri-
can newcomers to suburban areas may be less likely to meet overt white 
resistance and white flight than in the past-"you don't see too many signs 
going up, crosses burned, craziness"-but that socioeconomic status con-
tinues to be a barrier, both among whites and among African Americans: 
"There are also problems black among blacks-don't put it all on racial 
prejudice." 
The American pattern of suburbanization has taken homogeneity as 
a given, with little questioning of its fundamental assumption. Therefore, 
as a society we have few models of community designed to be more broad-
ly inclusive-accepting and affirming diversity as a desirable rather than 
negative condition. However, as we confront the realities and prospects of 
a post-suburban age in which the luxury of physically separate social 
space is no longer as feasible as it was in a nation where there always 
seemed to be a new frontier to be developed, new forms of community 
may be a necessity-whether they can be worked out in the satisfactions 
and frustrations of life in neighborhood settings like Edmondson Village 
or must result from new affirmative institutional initiatives by the public 
and private sectors. 
It is imperative that we understand the link between suburbanization 
and racial change so dramatically illustrated in the experience of Bal-
timore's Edmondson Village. The kind of white flight that occurred there, 
fueled by blockbusting in a context where conditions were ripe for mas-
sive panic and rapid racial turnover, epitomized a particularly acute in-
stance of the relationship. However, the experience of Edmondson Village 
was unique only in degree, not in kind. In various forms the phenomenon 
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of rapid racial succession has affected virtually every metropolitan area in 
this country, and its legacy is still with us. While many of the earlier 
restrictions on African American settlement have changed in law and 
practice, and the traumatic scale of racial change that occurred there has 
been less common in recent years, persistent racial residential segregation 
and the resegregation of racially changing areas are testimonies to the 
continuing significance of the connection between race and suburbaniza-
tion in American society. 
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The dual housing market has been studied as it functioned in several spe-
cific cities. On Boston, two important studies focus on the interaction of real 
estate and governmental interests in shaping the city's racial geography: Harriet 
Lee Taggart and Kevin W. Smith, "Redlining: An Assessment of the Evidence of 
Disinvestment in Metropolitan Boston," Urban Affairs Q)larterly 17 (September 
1981): 91-107; and Hillel Levine and Lawrence Harmon, The Death of an American 
Jewish Community: A Tragedy of Good Intentions (New York: Free Press, 1992). For 
Chicago, Arnold R. Hirsch argues that politics played a major role in creating 
what he calls the "second ghetto" in the post-World War II metropolis in Making 
the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago, 1940-1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
Univ. Press, 1983). On the legal history of the dual housing market in Baltimore, 
see Garrett Power, "'Apartheid Baltimore Style': The Residential Segregation 
Ordinances of 1910-1913," Maryland Law Review 42, 2 (1983): 289-328 (see espe-
cially p. 321). 
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The Persistence of &sidential Racial Segregation 
Attempts to calculate indices of racial residential segregation using census data 
from 1940 through 1980 have found the patterns to be strongly persistent in metro-
politan areas. When Karl and Alma Taeuber first developed the index as a tool of 
analysis, based upon 1940,1950, and 1960 census data, they discovered rates of85.2 
percent, 87.3 percent, and 86.1 percent for the three periods, respectively. Negroes in 
Cities: &sidential Segregation and Neighborhood Change (Chicago: Aldine, 1965), p. 44. 
Replicating the earlier study for the period 1960 to 1970, Annette Sorensen, Karl 
Taeuber, and Leslie J. Hollingsworth, Jr., argued for "a distinctive pattern of 
change," a decline in the index to 81.6 percent. "Indexes of Racial Residential Seg-
regation for 109 Cities in the United States, 1940 to 1970," Sociological Focus 8 (April 
1975): 125-42 (see especially pp.125, 131). However, subsequent analysis by Thomas 
L. Van Valey, Wade Clark Roof, and Jerome E. Wilcox, "Trends in Residential Seg-
regation: 1960-1970," AmericanJournal of Sociology 82 Oanuary 1977): 826-44, and by 
Ann B. Schnare, "Trends in Residential Segregation by Race, 1960-1970," Journal of 
Urban Economics 7 (May 1980): 293-301, attributed the finding of decline primarily to 
methodological considerations and to the addition of new SMSAs in 1970, conclud-
ing that any change during the decade probably was very small. 
For the decade of the 1970s, Barrett Lee, comparing 1970 and 1980 census 
data, found some comfort that racial change in mixed tracts (in twenty-five se-
lected cities) had not proven "inevitable." "Racially Mixed Neighborhoods Dur-
ing the 1970s: Change or Stability?" Social Science Quarterly 66 Oune 1985): 346-64. 
In related research, Peter B. Wood and Barrett A. Lee have argued that the model 
of inevitable resegregation may be time and place specific, primarily descriptive of 
north central and northeastern cities during the period before 1970. "Is Neighbor-
hood Racial Succession Inevitable? Forty Years of Evidence," Urban Affairs Quar-
terly 26, 4 Oune 1991): 610-20 (see p. 618). Karl E. Taeuber's analysis of census 
data for twenty-five cities for the decade of the 1970s found a slight overall de-
crease (6 percent) in the index of racial segregation. Cited in Reynolds Farley and 
Walter R. Allen, The Color Line and the Qualiry of Life in America (New York: Russell 
Sage Foundation, 1987), pp. 140-43. 
However, John Farley's examination of data for St. Louis led him to conclude 
that there had been little change in the degree of segregation in that metropolitan 
area for the past forty years. "Metropolitan Housing Segregation in 1980: The St. 
Louis Case," Urban Affairs Quarterly 18 (March 1983): 347-59. Similarly, John R. 
Logan and Mark Schneider found that the increased rate of African American su-
burbanization during the 1970s, the greatest growth in northern and urban areas 
occurring in the inner suburbs adjacent to central cities, was accompanied by well 
established patterns of racial succession. "Racial Segregation and Racial Change 
in American Suburbs, 1970-1980," American Journal of Sociology 89 Oanuary 1984): 
874-88. 
Racial &sidential Change 
The literature of racial residential change is surveyed by Howard Aldrich in "Eco-
logical Succession in Racially Changing Neighborhoods," Urban Affairs Quarterly 
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10 (March 1976): 327-48. James T. Little, Hugh O. Nourse, R. B. Read, and 
Charles L. Leven, The Contemporary Neighborhood Succession Process: Lessons in the Dy-
namic of Decay from the St. Louis Experience. (St. Louis: Institute for Urban and Re-
gional Studies, 1975), provide an instructive analysis of the racial transition pro-
cess on a metropolitan scale in St. Louis, where the rapidity of residential change 
approximated the situation on Baltimore's west side. Primarily examining hous-
ing values, they analyze the relationship of race to other factors contributing to 
the socioeconomic decline of neighborhoods. 
Morton Grodzins advanced the tipping point concept in The Metropolitan Area 
as a Racial Problem (Pittsburgh: Univ. of Pittsburgh Press, 1958). John Goering 
summarized the many studies that sought to test the hypothesis in "Neighbor-
hood Tipping and Racial Transition: A Review of the Social Science Evidence," 
American Institute of Planners Journal 44 Oanuary 1978): 68-78; he concluded that 
there was no social evidence for a "universally applicable" tipping point that 
triggered white flight (p. 69). 
For the argument down playing the causal role of white flight and emphasiz-
ing nonracial factors for the racial changeover of neighborhoods, see Harvey Mar-
shall, "White Movement to the Suburbs: A Comparison of Explanations," Ameri-
can Sociological Review 44 (December 1979): 975-94, and W H. Frey, "Central City 
White Flight: Racial and Nonracial Causes," American Sociological Review 44 Oune 
1979): 425-48. However, ClarenceJ. Wurdock, "Neighborhood Racial Transition: 
A Study of the Role of White Flight," Urban Affoirs Quarterly 17 (September 1981): 
75-89, found evidence in a 1976 Detroit study for a continuing white propensity to 
flee integrating areas. 
For examples of studies placing emphasis upon white avoidance, see Harvey L. 
Molotch, Managed Integration: Dilemmas of Doing Good in the Ciry (Berkeley: Univ. of 
California Press, 1972), especially chapters 7 and 8; Harold Rose, "The Develop-
ment of an Urban Subsystem: The Case of the Negro Ghetto," Annals of the Associa-
tion of American Geographers 60 (March 1970): 1-17; Avery M. Guest and James J. 
Zuiches, ''Another Look at Residential Turnover in Urban Neighborhoods," Ameri-
can Journal of Sociology 77 (November 1971): 457-67; and Reynolds Farley, Howard 
Schuman, Suzanne Bianchi, Diane Colsanto, and Shirley Hatchett, "'Chocolate 
City, Vanilla Suburbs': Will the Trend Toward Racially Separate Communities 
Continue?" Social Science &search 7 (1978): 310-44. 
African Americans and Suburbanization 
Studies of the experience of African Americans in suburban areas in general have 
shown patterns of persistent discrimination, racial turnover, and resegregation. 
See, for ~xample, Harold Rose, Black Suburbani<.ation: Access to Improved Qualiry of 
Life or Maintenance of the Status Quo? (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1976); Farley et 
al., "'Chocolate City, Vanilla Suburbs'''; Thomas A. Clark, Blacks in Suburbs: A 
National Perspective (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1979); Kathryn P. 
Nelson, "Recent Suburbanization of Blacks: How Much, Who, and Where," 
American Planning Association Journal 46 Ouly 1980): 287-300; Robert W. Lake, The 
New Suburbanites: Race and Housing in the Suburbs (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers 
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Univ. Press, 1981); Logan and Schneider, "Racial Segregation and Racial Change 
in American Suburbs, 1979-1980"; and Dennis Gale, George Grier, and Eunice 
Grier, Black and White Urban-to-Suburban Outmigrants: A Comparative Analysis (Wash-
ington, D.C.: Center for Washington Area Studies [Occasional Paper No.4], May 
1986); George C. Galster, "Black Suburbanization: Has It Changed the Relative 
Location of Races?" Urban Affairs Quarterly 26, 4 Oune 1991): 621-28. 
Andrew Wiese has chronicled the development of small African American 
communities on the urban periphery during the period from 1940 to 1960; he 
argues these settlements sometimes served as precursors oflater African American 
suburbanization. "Driving a Thin Wedge of Suburban Opportunity: Black Sub-
urbanization in the Northern Metropolis, 1940-1960" (Richmond, Va.: paper pre-
sented to the Society for American City and Regional Planning History, Novem-
ber 9, 1991), p. 4. 
A general bibliographical review is provided in Halford H. Fairchild and 
Belinda Tucker, "Black Residential Mobility: Trends and Characteristics," Journal 
of Social Issues 38, 3 (1982): 51-74. 
Appendix B 
Home Ownership Patterns 
on Selected Blocks, 1955-1973 
Table 1. 400 Block of Denison Street 
1955 Finch Schaum 
1957 
1959 Preston Wheatley 
1961 
1963 
1965 
Vaughn 
1955 Hoffman Leach 
1957 
1959 Putnam Martin 
1961 
1963 Best Realty 
1965 
1955 Harmon Franklin 
1957 
1959 
1961 Mitchell 
1963 Woodhaven 
Invest. Corp. 
Cromartie 
Albright Johnson Germack laPaglia 
Butler Bldg. Oak Invest. Johnson Lynn Corp. 
Corp Corp. 
Gale 
Chapman 
Elam Pryor Wood Morris 
Realty 
Finance 
Alexander Realty 
Finance 
Viney 
Key: 
Resident homeowners, white 
Resident homeowners, African American 
Non-resident owners, corporation or individual 
'Unable to determine race of homeowner 
Note: 1971 data is missing; after 1955, new 
names appear only when property ownership 
changes. 
Source: Tax Assessments for Baltimore City, 
1955-73 
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Table 2. 600 Block of Grantley Street 
1955 Rollman Keffer Durkin 
1957 
1959 
1961 Bob Holding 
1963 Gould Pettie 
1965 Crown 
Payton 
NA 
1955 Herrera Harden McGinnis VanSant Kendrick 
1957 
1959 
1961 Fairfax 
Investment 
1963 Caplan 
1965 
1967 Rainbow 
Realty 
Banks 
1955 Crockett Helweick Service Sansone 
1957 
1959 Svotelis 
1961 
1963 Booker Blue Jones 
1965 
NA 
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Table 3. 3800 Block of Cranston Road 
1955 Durkee Kimmitt West Bait. O'Connor Vaeth 
Bap. Church 
1957 
1959 Hannon 
1961 
1963 Albert 
Realty 
1965 Eddy Rice Fonder Embassy 
1967 Real Estate 
Develop. 
NA 
Arons Lewis Davis Undner 
Nance 
Carmichael 
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Table 4. 601 Block of Augusta Avenuet 
1955 Rinaudo Egner 
1957 
1959 
1961 
R. Lee P. Lee 
Ward 
Cramer 
1963 
1965 Shields 
1967 Real Estate Carter 
Develop. 
1969 Jones 
NA 
t Sampling of block numbers due to length of block 
1955 R. Lee 
1957 
1959 
1961 
1963 
1i~65 
1967 Opher 
1969 
NA 
1955 Ritter 
1957 
1959 
1961 
1963 
1965 
1967 Glazer 
1969 
1971 NA 
1973 ~ 
Poe 
McHugh· 
Real Estate 
Develop. 
Simering 
Rainbow 
Realty 
Gorman Baker 
R. Lee 
Comegys Hamm 
Amos Berchet! 
Morris Mussachio 
Lee Realty 
Rainbow Brown 
Realty 
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Mussachio 
Jefferson 
Fox 
Rainbow 
Boatwright 
Emmerich 
Lee Realty 
Notes 
1. The 1rauma of Racial Change 
I. Interview with Marilyn Simkins, September 17, 1980. 
2. Interview with Margaret Johnson, December 14, 1982. 
3. The themes of white flight and racial change along the Edmondson Ave-
nue corridor are explored more briefly in Orser, "Flight to the Suburbs." 
4. Garrett Power, '''Apartheid Baltimore Style,'" especially p. 321. See Ap-
pendix A, for bibliographical notes on the concept of "The Dual Housing Market." 
5. Osofsky, Harlem, pp. 7-17, 92-95. 
6. S. Olson, Baltimore, p. 275. 
7. On Chicago, Goodwin, Oak Park Strategy, p. 67; McPherson, "'In My 
Father's House," and Rose Helper, Racial Policies, p. 35. For historical accounts of 
the nature and impact of this period of racial change at the metropolitan level in 
Chicago, see Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto; and Lemann, Promised Land. On 
Washington, D.C., Green, Secret City, pp. 322-23; and Grier and Grier, Equality and 
Beyond, pp. 26-30. On dynamics in sections of New York, see Connolly, Ghetto 
Grows in Brooklyn, p. 136; and Rieder, Canarsie. 
8. Levine and Harmon, Death qf an American Jewish Community, pp. 5-8; see 
chapter 4, part D, below, for a discussion of Jewish to African American succes-
sion in northwest Baltimore communities. 
9. Snow and Leahy, "Making of a Slum-Ghetto." 
10. Rieder, Canarsie, pp. 1-2, 20-21. 
II. Goodwin, Oak Park Strategy. In Baltimore good neighbors programs were 
initiated in several sections, including Ashburton and Windsor Hills and Bal-
timore Neighborhoods, Inc., was established to promote housing equity and ac-
ceptance of integration (see chapter 4). 
12. See Appendix A for the scholarly literature on "The Persistence of Resi-
dential Racial Segregation." 
13. See Appendix A for the scholarly literature on "African Americans and 
Suburbanization." 
14. See Appendix A for a discussion of the scholarly literature on "Racial 
Residential Change." 
15. Erikson, Everything in Its Path, p. 131. 
16. Useful discussions of the dimensions of community as applied to histori-
cal study are provided by Bender, Community and Social Change in America, and 
Conzen, "Community Studies, Urban History, and American Local History"; the 
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sociological perspective afforded by Hunter in Symbolic Communities also has in·· 
formed my conceptualization (see especially pp. 4, 67). In the mid-1950s Hillery 
reviewed sociological definitions of community and provided a bibliography in 
"Definitions of Community." 
17. Thernstrom argues strongly for objective criteria for social status in his-
torical study in Poverty and Progress, p. 84. As an example of sociological conven-
tions regarding the classification of class in American society, w.L. Warner in his 
influential formulation identified six categories, estimating that approximately 
three-fifths of the population were included in two of them, the lower middle and 
upper lower class designations, which he referred to together as "the common 
man level." American Lifo, pp. 74-80. For discussion of the concept of class, see 
Williams, Key Words, pp. 51-59. 
18. For oral history interview citations, exact dates of the interview sessions 
have been provided along with the pseudonyms assigned to the interviewees. 
Scholars interested in verification of the interview material may contact me to 
examine the transcribed record. Differences between historians and ethnogra-
phers regarding oral history conventions are discussed in Di Leonardo, "Oral 
History as Ethnographic Encounter." 
19. Portelli, "Peculiarities of History," p. 99. 
20. Orser, "Racial Change in Retrospect," p. 51. 
21. Census boundaries for tracts 1608 and 2007 correspond closely with the 
developing neighborhood's borders and therefore make the census tract data ex-
tremely useful. (The tracts bore the designations 16-8 and 20-7 in 1940 and 1950; 
in 1960 the same tracts were labelled 0016-8 and 0020-7; in 1970 the new designa-
tion was 1608 for the former, while the latter was subdivided as 2007.01 and 
2007.02; in 1980 1608 was also subdivided, becoming 1608.01 and 1608.02. 
Throughout, the outer boundaries of the tracts remained the same.) Though 
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) tract data for the Baltimore re-
gion was only first made available in 1930 (for a limited number of categories), the 
listings are increasingly detailed from 1940 onward. Boundaries for the tracts are 
Hilton Street on the east, Gwynns Falls Park on the north, Woodington Road on 
the west, and Old Frederick Road on the south. Tract 1608 encompasses the area 
north of Edmondson Avenue, 2007 the area on the south side. (See map 2.) Some 
of the rowhouse development in the 1940s and 1950s occurred in adjoining tracts 
just west of this area. The study tracts are located approximately three and a half 
miles west of the city center. 
22. Ten sample blocks with a total of 127 residences were selected to provide 
a cross section of the households of the neighborhood, taking into account such 
factors as period of development, cost levels, and geographical distribution. A 
profile for each household was then developed at ten-year intervals, providing 
information regarding the name of the household head, that person's occupation, 
and whether the home was owned or rented; additionally, comparable information 
was gathered on place of prior residence (five years earlier) and future residence 
(ten years later). This method made it possible to compile a profile of particular 
household histories, tracing the tenure of household heads, as well as patterns of 
in- and out··migration. A major source for the data in the early period was the set 
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of Baltimore City directories, published by the R.L. Polk Co. annually into the 
1930s, then less regularly until 1964. Directory information was supplemented by 
Baltimore City tax records for home ownership and voting records for place of 
residence. For later years, telephone directories and door-to-door surveys were 
also used to provide necessary data on residence and occupation. 
There has been an ongoing debate about the merits of city directories as a 
resource for social history research. See Goldstein, Patterns of Mobility; Knights, 
Plain People tif Boston, pp. 127-39; and Thernstrom, Other Bostonians, pp. 279-88. 
While tests of their reliability have verified their value for historical demograph-
ics, reservations have been raised in terms oftheir inclusiveness regarding women, 
racial minorities, and those more transient. Aside from the notable limitation of 
gender bias, some of the other drawbacks to reliance upon such data are mini-
mized in the present study because most new residents had prior and subsequent 
settlement in the Baltimore area, the community had high rates of residential 
stability, and additional means of verification were available for more recent 
years, when residential turnover and racial exclusion might otherwise have cre-
ated gaps in the record. 
23. On the evolution of the suburban ideal, see Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier; 
Schuyler, &difinition tifCity Form; Ebner, Creating Chicago's North Shore; and Stilgoe, 
Borderland. 
24. Waesche, Crowning the Gravelly Hill, p. 86. 
25. Hayward examines the historical evolution of Baltimore's nineteenth-
century rowhouse forms in "Urban Vernacular Architecture in Nineteenth-Cen-
tury Baltimore." On the history of the Baltimore-style rowhouse, also see Shivers, 
Those Placid Rows. 
26. Perin, Belonging in America, argues that the quest for socioeconomic homo-
geneity is at the root of the suburban dream; see especially pp. 62, 66. 
27. Fairbanks, Making Better Citizens, pp. 36-39, 52-53. 
28. Douglass, Suburban Trend, pp. 36, 218-24, 236, 312-13. 
29. Groves and Muller, "The Evolution of Black Residential Areas in Late 
Nineteenth-Century Cities"; and Neverdon-Morton, "Black Housing Patterns in 
Baltimore City." 
30. Power, "'Apartheid Baltimore Style.''' In his history of social patterns in 
Detroit in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Olivier Zunz has 
observed that African American migrants to the city, compared to European im-
migrants, "lived history in reverse," experiencing increasing degrees of residential 
segregation. Changing Face tif Inequality, p. 6. 
31. Cost tif Living in American Towns, p. 80. 
32. For a general sketch of African American activism in the city, see K. 
Olson, "Old West Baltimore"; also, Calcott, Maryland & America, pp. 145-71. 
2. The Making of a Rowhouse Neighborhood 
Note: This chapter is a revised version of an article that appeared under the title, 
"The Making of a Baltimore Rowhouse Community: The Edmondson Avenue 
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Area, 1915-1945," in the Maryland Historical Magazine 80, 3 (Fall 1985): 203-27. 
The epigraph is from House, "Street Car System and Rapid Transit," 1:557. 
l. Warner, Streetcar Suburbs, pp. 46, 158. See also, Thernstrom, Other Bosto-
nians. From different perspectives, Sennett, Families Against the Ciry, and Ryan, Cradle 
rifthe Middle Class, have argued that nineteenth-century middle-class out-migration 
to socially differentiated communities represented a retreat from the city to a private 
world of domesticity. 
2. G.w. and W.S. Bromley's Atlas rif the Ciry oj Baltimore (1896 and 1906 
editions) show the rural character of the Edmondson section at the turn of the 
century. A contemporary source with information on some of the gentry families 
and their estates is Hall, Baltimore: Its History and People, I: 106-7, 2:888-89. 
3. The preceding profile of the area's ninety-seven residents is based on the 
manuscript version of the 1910 federal census. United States Department of Com-
merce, Bureau of the Census, Thirteenth Census rif the United States Taken in 1910 
(Baltimore City Wards 16 and 20). 
4. Insurance maps issued by the Sanborn Map and Publishing Company in 
1914 provide detailed information on the two Edmondson Avenue settlements and 
the development along Walnut Avenue in Rognel Heights; on the new span, "The 
New Edmondson Avenue Concrete Bridge," Baltimore Sun (November 22, 1908), p. 
15; ads in the classified section of the Sun announced the sale of new houses along 
Edmondson Avenue between 1911 and 1914. 
5. Ad in the Baltimore Sun, October 6, 1912. 
6. Title map prepared by E.V. Coonan and Co., surveyors and civil engi-
neers, April 4, 1930, for the James Keelty Co., provided by courtesy of the latter. 
7. ''James Keelty" [obituary], Baltimore Evening Sun, June 15, 1944; inter-
view with Joseph Keelty (younger son of James), October 26, 1982; notes pre-
pared by Mary Ellen Hayward for the Peale Museum exhibit, "Rowhouse: A 
Baltimore Style of Living"; ads in the Sun, April 2, 1911; October 6, 1912; April 2, 
1916. 
8. Sun, October 7, 1917. Another builder advertised an early "daylight 
house" in a nearby residential area as early as 1914 (Sun, October 4, 1914). 
9. Two alternatives had been introduced along Edmondson in some of the 
houses prior to the daylights, both having similar dimensions as the standard 
rows. One, the duplex, provided light to internal rooms via a long, narrow area-
way separating every two houses but with the added expense of exterior side walls. 
The other, the "areaway" (pronounced "air-y way") house was part of an unbro-
ken row illl front, but had a short passageway extending from the rear to provide 
windows on the side of the kitchens, which they separated, as well as to an inner 
dining room (below) and bedroom (above). 
10. S. Olson, Baltimore, p. 302. On the social implications of Baltimore's zon-
ing reform in the 1920s, see Power, "Unwisdom of Allowing City Growth to Work 
Out Its Own Destiny." 
II. In April 1920, for instance, the municipal building permits department 
noted an historic record number of permits issued, nearly three-fourths of them 
for brick two-story dwellings. Sun, May 2, 1920. 
12. Interview with John Carpenter, October 7, 1982. 
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13. Sun, October 7, 1928. The Wildwood homes were viewed as an example 
of the developer upgrading his product. Interviews with Joseph Keelty and John 
Carpenter. 
14. As one barometer of the nose dive in housing starts, the Sun's real estate 
section plummeted from eight or more pages in the late 1920s to two or three by 
1932 and a mere half page by 1933. 
15. Sanborn Co. insurance map (1914) for water lines; sewer connections 
along Edmondson were first listed in housing ads in the mid-191Os (Sun, October 
4, 1914; October I, 1917). 
16. Kenneth Morse, "Baltimore Street Car Routes" [typed ms., revised 
1960], Maryland Historical Society. For examples of Keelty ads giving directions 
by streetcar, see the Sun, October 7, 1928; October 4, 1931; October 1, 1939. In 
the early 1920s the double tracks were moved from the south side of Edmondson 
to the center: subsequently, the avenue was widened and paved, sure signs of the 
increasing importance of automobile travel. (See Figure 2.) On the history of 
Baltimore's street railways, see Farrell, Who Made the Streetcars Go? 
17. Sun, January 16, 1932. 
18. A unique feature of Maryland's property system permitted title to land 
and house to be established separately, with the former subject to a ground rent of 
6 percent. The net effect was that the initial purchase price could be lowered 
substantially, a considerable benefit to buyers who might have difficulty raising 
sufficient funds for the total purchase of house and land. The system also was an 
advantage to builders, many of whom apparently counted on the ground title (or 
the rent from it) as their margin of profit. As an example, a typical house pur-
chased from Keelty in 1923 sold for $3,650; the additional land title (purchased by 
a third party as an investment at a cost of $1,226.30) created an annual ground 
rent for the new buyer of seventy-two dollars per year. In 1930, seven years later, 
the buyer had managed to payoff the mortgage on the house; in seven more years 
he bought the land title as well. Documents relating to the mortgage of their house 
on West Franklin Street provided by the Robert Lansinger family. 
19. Rossi, Wiry Families Move, argues that the primary housing package con-
sideration was housing size, related as it was to family size and needs on the one 
hand and economic status on the other, though he seems to have neglected social 
status as a consideration; pp. 17, 144, 225. 
20. Kemp's report, Housing Conditions in Baltimore, described two alley and 
two tenement districts, providing documentary photographs to illustrate the find-
ings on urban poverty. 
21. Power, "'Apartheid Baltimore Style,'" especially pp. 294-96; 316-17. 
22. The 1920-30 growth figure is an estimate; the 1930-40 percentage is 
based upon federal census data. Population increase or decrease typically masks 
much higher rates of in- and out-migration. Census figures cited here and subse-
quently for the two census tracts (1608 and 2007) comprising the Edmondson 
Avenue section are from the United States Census census report of tract data for 
the Baltimore Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA), 1930, 1940, and 
1950. This source hereafter is cited as US. Census. Figures regarding out-migra-
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tion here are from the sample block survey. See chapter I for the methodological 
note regarding the use of census data and the procedures involved in the sample 
block survey. 
23. Sample block survey. 
24. US. Census, 1920, 1930, and 1940. In 1930 adults age twenty-five to 
forty-four represented 37.5 percent of the population and children through age 
twenty, 32.4 percent; in 1940, when population figures had grown by nearly two 
thousand, adults in that age range constituted 38.4 percent, children through age 
nineteen, 26.1 percent-a comparison suggesting that the Depression decade may 
have brought both a lower birth rate and a gradual aging trend. In 1940 median 
household size in the Edmondson area was listed as 3.08 (for tract 1608) and 3.19 
(for tract 2007); for the city as a whole it stood at 3.36, and in owner-occupied 
housing at 3.53. US. Census, 1930, 1940. 
25. US. Census, 1940, 1950. The discrepancy between rates of home owner-
ship in the sample block survey and the total tract figures suggests that the former 
was above average on this scale, a factor that must be taken into consideration in 
judging other findings from the survey. 
26. Interview with John Carpenter. 
27. Argersinger, Toward aNew Deal in Baltimore, pp. 7-8, 19,207; she notes that 
unemployment hit various social groups disproportionately; for African Americans, 
for instance, it went as high as 50 percent. For the Edmondson area there is no 1930 
tract data to compare on these indices, but in 1940 unemployment in this neighbor-
hood was only 3.75 percent compared to a city rate of9.95 percent, and home owner-
ship was 63 percent, compared to 39 percent (US. Census, 194O). 
28. Sample block survey. The assertion that the great majority were not new-
comers to the city is based on the large number of settlers whose prior residence 
can be traced through the city directories to city addresses (five years previous) 
and the comparatively smaller number for whom no data was available, some of 
whom (but not all) might have migrated from outside the metropolitan area. 
29. US. Census, 1930, 1940. 
30. Interview with Madge Cooper, November 4, 1982. 
31. Interview with Marilyn Simkins, September 17, 1980. 
32. Power, "~partheid Baltimore Style,'" pp. 318-19; Helper, Racial Policies 
and Practices tif Real Estate Brokers, p. 201. On racially discriminatory policies of 
federal mortgage agencies, see Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier, especially pp. 190-218. 
33. On the religious history ofthe area's congregations as well as the names of 
early members, see St. Bernardine's Church Silver Anniversary, 1928-1953 and Joynes, 
Thirty-Two Years at Christ Edmondson Methodist Church. Ward figures for 1920 (when no 
tract data was available) show the foreign-born population to have been relatively 
slight on the outer west side of the city as a whole (7.4 percent in wards 16 and 20, 
when the citywide ratio was 11.5 percent). In the Edmondson Avenue neighbor-
hood, only 5 percent of residents were foreign-born in 1930 and 4 percent in 1940. In 
1930 another 17 percent were the offspring offoreign or mixed parentage, a figure 
that no doubt declined over time (though the 1940 tract data does not include the 
category). US. Census, 1920, 1930, 1940. 
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34. Henretta, "The Study of Social Mobility," and Chudacoff, in "Success 
and Security," for example, raise important questions about the use of occupa-
tional classification in many social mobility studies: I) .the adequacy of occupa-
tional classification and ranking systems; 2) the extent to which occupation may 
correlate with other factors in people's lives (though they concede the often close 
correlation with income); and 3) the assumptions that are made about occupa-
tional status and social mobility, especially the inference that all Americans want 
to be socially mobile and use occupation as a means to achieve that goal. 
The present study uses the descriptive categories for occupation and the occu-
pational coding for those categories developed by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. For 
purposes of standardization, the code book used is the 1970 version. 1970 Census tif 
Population Alplwhetical Index tif Industries and Occupation (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 
1971). While the Census Bureau's general categories have changed some over the 
years (as, of course, has the coding system), use of such a standardized system not 
only provides a generally accepted basis for occupational coding but makes it possi-
ble to compare the earlier block data (when no census tract information was avail-
able) with comparable later data, as well as to compare the latter data (from 1940 
onward) with the tract figures. 
35. In their classic early community studies of Middletown, Robert and 
Helen Lynd observe that "One's job is the watershed down which the rest of one's 
life tends to flow in Middletown. Who one is, whom one knows, how one lives, 
what one aspires to be,-these and many other urgent realities of living are pat-
terned for one by what one does to get a living and the amount ofliving this allows 
one to buy." Middletown in Transition, p. 7; see also, Middletown, pp. 22-24. 
36. Sample block survey. 
37. Sample block survey and U.S. Census, 1940. Again, some caution must be 
used in comparing the sample block data and that from the census, not only 
because of slight deviation in the former in comparison to the latter but also 
because the sample block data is based on information regarding household heads 
only, while the census figures provide data for all workers. 
38. The sample block survey is limited to household heads, which city direc-
tories usually list as male. Though directories sometimes include a wife's occupa-
tion, few in the sample were so indicated. In some cases an unmarried daughter 
living in her parents' home received a separate notation. Otherwise, women 
whose occupations were provided were single or widows, though in this neighbor-
hood few widows were employed. 
39. Tract data on employment is not available for 1930; in that year census 
figures for Baltimore as a whole reveal that 27 percent of native white women (age 
ten and over) were in the paid labor force, compared to 17 percent offoreign-born 
white women and 51 percent of African American women. In 1940,30 percent of 
white women (age fourteen and over) and 47 percent of African American women 
were engaged in paid labor; for Edmondson area women, 29 percent. U.S. Census, 
1930, 1940. 
40. While the small share of professional and managerial positions paralleled 
the low ratios for these groups in the city total, laborers and domestics were nearly 
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absent from the occupational equation. Slightly more oriented toward the crafts 
than manufacturing (particularly for men), Edmondson's middle-level job profile 
was striking for its greater prominence in sales and clerical positions, where it 
surpassed city averages by 18 percent (by 9 percent for males). u.s. Census, 1940. 
41. Between 1900 and 1920, for example, Baltimore's adult employees ex-
panded by more than half (60 percent, from 217,350 to 347,754), while between 
1920 and 1930 the number advanced a modest 4.6 percent (to 362,172) only to fall 
back 3.8 percent by 1940 (to 348,358), after a decade of economic depression. u.s. 
Census, 1900, 1920, 1930, 1940. In the latter year, however, the figure is for those 
over age fourteen; previous figures are for those over age ten. 
42. In Zunz's terms, a substantial number of them were the corporation's 
white-collar workers, salaried employees rather than upper or middle-level man-
agers. Making America Corporate, pp. 9, 126-27. 
43. The percentage of in-migrants (those who had lived elsewhere five years 
previous) making an occupational change was relatively consistent: in 1920 only 
21 percent had done so; in 1930, 19 percent; and in 1940, 17 percent. Sample 
block survey. 
44. Comparison of cohorts of new residents in 1920, 1930, and 1940 over 
their first ten years in the neighborhood indicate a 28 percent occupational 
change rate for the 1920 group, and 16 percent for the 1930 group. While missing 
data on the 1940 group makes any observation quite tentative and the period of 
consideration must be extended for 16 years (because of the absence of a city 
directory in 1950), the available data show only one in fourteen making a change. 
Sample block survey. Compare Goldstein, Patterns qf Mobility 1910-1950, pp. 190-93. 
45. Those who moved out of the neighborhood during this period were much 
more likely to move to another part of the city (though usually not to the older 
sections from which many had come) than to proceed into the suburban county. 
Occupational data is much thinner, but it suggests that movers were no more 
likely to change occupational category than nonmovers. Sample block survey. 
46. Warner viewed the process of streetcar suburbanization nn the late nine-
teenth century as producing a more specialized metropolis, one that physically sepa-
rated primarily middle-class suburbs from the older, more heterogeneous parts of 
the city, citing as among the consequent problems of modern life "the discipline of 
the lives of city dwellers into specialized transportation paths, specialized occupa-
tions, specialized home environments, and specialized community relationships" 
(Streetcar Suburbs, p. 3). Wise and Dupree found that by 1925 "the extension of street-
car service had paralleled residential growth patterns to such an extent that 93.8 
percent of the total population of Baltimore lived within one-quarter mile, or a five-
minute walk, ofa streetcar line," though already the auto was becoming a signifi-
cant factor in the commuter and leisure transportation equation. "The Choice of the 
Automobile," p. 154. 
47. These dimensions of community culture are identified in chapter I. The 
present section is based primarily upon oral interviews with approximately fifteen 
residents of the neighborhood during the period being examined. Only in cases of 
direct quotation, however, are specific citations provided. 
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48. Interview with Ann Morgan, March 23, 1981. 
49. Hunter, Symbolic Communities, contends that names and boundaries (so-
cial as well as natural) function as symbols of shared community understanding 
(p. 67). 
50. Interview with Ann Morgan and Christine Wallace, March 23, 1981. 
51. Interview with Alice Hughes, October 2, 1980. 
52. Not only were men providers; they were, for the most part, husbands 
and/or fathers; very few adult males were single or unattached. City directories 
seldom listed a second employed male living in a household on the blocks sur-
veyed; analysis of the 1950 census tract data, slightly after the period considered 
here, suggests that only 16 percent of males age twenty or older were single. 
53. Ryan found precursors of this ideal among the emerging "new" middle 
class of mid-nineteenth-century Utica, a "cult of true womanhood," which she 
argues actually narrowed women's sphere (Cradle of the Middle Class, p. 189); 
though the occupational mix of Edmondson's settlers was not so clearly white-
collar as Ryan's middle class, they were doubtless seeking to emulate a widely 
shared aspiration. In the 1920s the Lynds concluded that the absence of business 
class married women among Muncie's paid workforce was one of the important 
differences separating that group from its working-class counterparts (Middletown, 
p. 27). Yet, it would seem that in Edmondson Village the line was not quite so 
clearly drawn in actual practice as in ideology. 
54. Again, marriage was the norm: 1950 census tract figures list only 18 
percent of all females over twenty years of age as single. 
55. Interviews with John Carpenter, Madge Cooper, Ann Morgan, Christine 
Wallace, and Marilyn Simkins; interviews with Agnes Malone, September 12, 
1980, and with Henrietta Latour, September 12, 1980. In response to a question 
about how important were the churches to the neighborhood, for instance, Mar-
ilyn Simkins responded: "Very important; as far as social life, for myself as a 
teenager, St. Bernardine's was it. ... That was our social life. St. Bernardine's 
had a very active CYO, one of the best, ifnot the best in the area. They had a lot to 
offer kids." 
56. In mid-nineteenth-century Utica children of middle-class families de-
ferred marriage and family until they were considered economically established 
(Ryan, Cradle rifthe Middle Class, p. 179); the Lynds found a growing trend toward 
early marriage and family responsibilities in Muncie in the 1920s (Middletown, p. 
Ill), but a renewed tendency for the middle class to defer during the Depression 
years (Middletown in Transition, p. 150). In the Edmondson area college education 
was still a relatively exceptional experience; in 1940 only 3.4 percent of the commu-
nity's adult population (twenty-five years of age and over) had completed four years 
of college. U.S. Census, 1940. 
J. Continuity and Undercurrents of Change 
Note: the epigraphs are from interviews with David Graff, June 12, 1981, and 
Edgar Raines, September 22, 1980. 
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1. The quote is from the Baltimore Evening Sun, April 30, 1947; the center's 
opening also was cited in Baltimore, May 1947. 
2. Advertisement, Baltimore Sun, February 24, 1946. The ad stressed the 
center's auto orientation: '~n important feature of Edmondson Village is its park-
ing facilities for about 800 automobiles-the principal portion of which will be in 
a specially designed Parking Plaza, surrounded by decorative walls, trees, and 
shrubbery, in keeping with the district in which the Village is located." 
3. Sunday Sun Magazine, September 23, 1945. The article explained the rea-
sons for the sale: "The present owner, Miss Mary Adelaide jenkins, lives ... in 
an atmosphere foreign to modern houses. . . . Meanwhile the city has moved 
steadily closer. More streets were cut through. Under present conditions Miss 
jenkins finds it no longer possible to get help to keep things in condition, keeping 
grass cut, leaves raked. When the city condemned 10 feet along Edmondson Ave-
nue and paved it, leaving her with 1,620 feet of Edmondson Avenue sidewalk to 
keep free of ice and snow, as well as 500 feet along Swann Avenue, she knew 
something had to be done. Vandals broke into outhouses, starting fires. She de-
cided to sell." 
4. Evening Sun, April 30, 1947; Baltimore News American, November 13, 1977; 
john F. Kelly, "'You Can't Take It With You'-joe Myerhoff," Sunday Sun Maga-
zine, September 12, 1982. 
5. For an examination of the social and cultural politics of Rockefeller's 
involvement in Colonial Williamsburg, see Wallace, "Visiting the Past." Wallace 
cites a critic's view that during the 1950s suburban America was "Williams-
burgered" (p. 64). Locally, the Depression decade passion for historic restoration 
found a smaller-scale echo in renovation of the nearby nineteenth-century mill 
village of Dickeyville. 
6. Urban Land Institute, Technical Bulletin No. 11 (1949), pp. 20-21; the review 
also noted that the style might make store rearrangement difficult. 
7. Evening Sun,june I, 1950 (full-page advertisement for the third anniver-
sary). In its 1953 survey of shopping centers the Urban Land Institute under-
scored the value of architectural character in attracting people, citing one "astute 
developer" as insisting: "Give them something that makes the people want to 
proudly show off your center to the out-of-towners." Urban Land Institute, Technical 
Bulletin No. 20 (1953), p. 12. 
8. Advertisement, Evening Sun, September 6, 1951. References to provision 
for the auto appeared in Urban Land Institute, Technical Bulletin No. 11, p. 20; Sun, 
February 24, 1946; Evening Sun, April 30, 1947; Baltimore, May 1947. 
9. Advertisement, Evening Sun, September 6, 1951. 
10. Advertisements, Evening Sun,june I, 1950; September 6, 1951. The latter 
described automobile as well as trolley and bus access: "It's easy to get to Ed-
mondson Village from any place in Baltimore and the surrounding countryside. 
Edmondson Village is right on the doorstep of residents of Rognel Heights, Ten 
Hills, Nottingham, Lyndhurst, Hunting Ridge, Westgate, Edmondale, Catonsville, 
and the adjacent county areas. People in the southwestern section--Arbutus, Lans-
downe, Halethorpe, etc., can reach Edmondson Village in a few minutes via Caton 
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Ave. and Hilton St. Northwest Baltimoreans, driving down Hilton Street, can be at 
Edmondson Village in a surprisingly short time. Folks in the Central and Eastern 
parts of the city can drive at express speeds straight out Franklin Street. Edmondson 
Village is served directly by the No.9 and 14 streetcar lines, and by the No. 20 and 
49 bus lines." 
II. An interview with Marilyn Simkins, September 17, 1980, was typical of 
the response on the center's significance. 
12. Brief discussion of the shopping center as part of the early Roland Park 
Company development is included in Waesche, Crowning the Gravelly Hill, p. 60. 
13. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier, pp. 258-59; Urban Land Institute, Technical Bulle-
tin No. 11, (1949), pp. 26-27; Urban Land Institute, Technical Bulletin No. 20, (1953), 
pp. 7, 37. See also Gillette, "Evolution of the Planned Shopping Center." Gillette 
traces the role of the pl~nned shopping center within the tradition of "environ-
mental reform in which physical designs are used to advance social goals" (p. 
449). The claim regarding precedence is a very difficult one to determine and 
hinges partly on definition. Rae, The Road and the Car in American Life (citing 
Homer Hoyt, "The Status of Shopping Centers in the United States," Urban Land 
19, no. 9 [October 6, 1950]), includes three East Coast sites in his list of the eight 
shopping centers in the United States as of 1946 ("located outside central busi-
ness districts, with ample parking space and easy access by automobile"): Upper 
Darby in West Philadelphia (1927); Suburban Square in Ardmore, Penn. (1928); 
and Shirlington in Arlington, Va. (1944), p. 230. However, several on Rae's list 
more closely resembled secondary business districts than suburban shopping cen-
ters of harmonious design. 
14. Interview with Joe Slovensky, October 27, 1980. 
15. Interview with Bertha Roberts, June II, 1981. 
16. Interview with Eunice Clemens, June 9, 1981. 
17. U.S. Census, 1940, 1950, 1960. 
18. ''James Keelty" [obituary], Evening Sun,June 15, 1944. Keelty was at his 
office at 4200 Edmondson Avenue when he suffered the stroke that led to his 
death. In the late 1930s the Keelty family moved from west Baltimore just beyond 
Edmondson Village to Homeland, the prestigious Roland Park Company develop-
ment in north Baltimore. Interview with Joseph Keelty, October 26, 1982. 
19. Keelty Company ads from the late 1930s indicated a shift from English-
to colonial-style housing, both in Wildwood and in Rodgers Forge (Sun, October 
I, 1935; October 3, 1938). Dimensions and floor plans of the colonials also repre-
sented a retrenchment in size and scale from the earlier Wildwood models, evi-
dent, for example, in the contrast between the 600 and 700 blocks of Augusta 
Avenue or the 800 and 900 blocks of Woodington Road. (In the late 1930s Keelty 
also built scaled-down English-architecture houses in the 3800-4000 blocks of 
Cranston Avenue and Woodridge Road). 
20. Examples of these early colonials can be found in such blocks as 700 
through 900 Wildwood Parkway and 900 Woodington Road. 
21. The earlier colonial-style houses had been approximately 22 by 37 feet; 
the later were 16 to 19 by 30 to 32. The mansard colonials with porches are 
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evident in the northeastern Wildwood section (800 block Mt. Holly St., 900 block 
Allendale Street) and in the 700 block of Augusta; mansard colonials without 
porches stretch along the northwestern Wildwood section (Kevin, Wicklow, Semi-
nole, Flowerton, Rokeby, and Colborne). 
22. U.S. Census, 1950; the comparable citywide rate was 50 percent. In Crab-
grass Frontier Jackson examines the nature and impact of federal housing policy 
upon suburbanization (pp. 190-218). 
23. The use of steel casement windows, a relatively new innovation no doubt 
employed because of its cost saving, rather glaringly compromised the Colonial 
motif; examples are along Stokes Road. 
24. Sun, April 3, 1949. 
25. Sun, April 6, 1952. 
26. Sun, April 3, 1954. 
27. Colonial Gardens houses were advertised for $16,500. Sun, April 6, 1958. 
28. Baltimore News-Post, March 8, 1946. . 
29. U.S. Census, 1940, 1950, 1960. 
30. Frank Henry, "New Neighborhoods Are Keys to City's Pattern of 
Growth," Sun, September 10, 1950. In the same year the Sun noted that housing 
and population growth were changing the urban configuration: "This new city is 
not confined within the official limits of Baltimore, but the great majority of the 
new city's inhabitants will depend on Baltimore for their livelihood." Sun, April 
16, 1950. 
31. Sun, September 11, 1949. 
32. Sun, October 2, 1950. 
33. Interview with Stanley Greenberg, February 17, 1993. 
34. Sun, September 11, 1949. 
35. Sun, September II, 1949; October 2, 1950. Unlike many of the apartment 
projects of the period, which offered a choice of either one or two bedrooms, 
Uplands consisted entirely of one-bedroom apartments, which filled rapidly de-
spite skepticism about locating so many small units in one market area. The Up-
lands mansion house, on land not part of the development project, was renovated 
as a home for elderly church women according to the provisions of the Jacobs will. 
Today it serves as the site for the New Psalmist Christian School. Evening Sun, 
January 25, 1937; March 9, 1951; Baltimore American, March 30, 1952. 
36. The quote is from the Sun, April 16, 1950; see also Sun, September 11, 
1949. 
37. Sun, September 11, 1949. 
38. Sun, September 6, 1958. 
39. Evening Sun,January 26, 1953; January 25, 1954; Sun, April 3, 1953; Bal-
timore News-Post, July 27, 1954. 
40. Sun, July 1, 1962. 
41. John Goodspeed, "Boom Around the Beltway," Baltimore, November, 
1965. 
42. U.S. Census, 1930, 1940, 1950. Between 1940 and 1950 three census tracts 
along the western edge of the westside ghetto had become more than 75 percent 
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African American; also, one on the northwest corner and one adjacent to the CBD 
had similar percentages. 
43. Mimeographed copy of letter, J.D. Steele to Baltimore Mayor Theodore 
R. McKeldin, February 15, 1945, Enoch Pratt Free Library. 
44. Sun, October 19, 1944. 
45. Citizens Planning and Housing Association of Baltimore, "Memoran-
dum on Negro Housing in Metropolitan Baltimore" (mimeographed report), Au-
gust 1944, Enoch Pratt Free Library. 
46. Sun, March 20, 1955; January 18, 1957. 
47. Wartime and postwar changes injob opportunities for Baltimore's Afri-
can Americans are discussed more fully in chapter 5. 
48. Carroll Williams, "The Drive Behind Block-Busting," Sun, September 
23, 1955; "Cure for Block-Busting," Sun, September 28, 1955; the quote is from 
the latter. 
49. Sun, February 2, 1948. 
50. Joynes, TkirfJ"-Two Years, p. 27. 
51. Interview with Samuel Brown, June 13, 1981. 
52. The following discussion of the changing real estate racial boundary is 
based upon the author's survey of the Sun classified section in April of each year 
for real estate information relevant to the Edmondson area and its environs for the 
period 1910 to 1980. Specific references are from the Sun, April 3, 1950; April I, 
1951; April 6, 1952; April 5, 1953. 
53. The following discussion is based upon K. Olson, "Old West Balti-
more"; Calcott, Maryland & America, pp. 146-150; Hughes, Figktfor Freedom, pp. 
177-178; John C. Robinson, "Ma Jackson-Fighter from Way Back," News-
American, January 24,1971; Charles L. Wagandt, "Lillie May Uackson] and Teddy 
[McKeldin]-They Led Baltimore Over and Around Prejudice," Evening Sun, No-
vember 15, 1979; and Goldberg, "Party Competition." 
54. "Negroes Request School Control: Seek Full Charge of Colored Educa-
tion in City," Sun, February 16, 1945; "Request Made for Negroes: NAACP Wants 
White School Open to Them," Sun, February 13, 1946. The Baltimore Sun noted 
in 1954 that since World War II African American public school enrollment in the 
city had increased by approximately twice the rate for white enrollment, with 
consequent overcrowding in segregated African American schools a major prob-
lem. "The Shifting Ratio," Sun, February 23, 1954. 
55. Minutes oftke Board ofSckool Commissioners (Baltimore City), September 2, 
1952; Furman L. Templeton, "Admission of Negro Boys." The closing statement 
prior to the vote was by Thurgood Marshall, who reviewed the nature of cases cur-
rently before Supreme Court, arguing that separate programs were by nature un-
equal.The coalition supporting the candidates' entry to Poly included the Baltimore 
Urban League, Americans for Democratic Action, the Council for Human Rights, 
the Citizens Committee on Education, and the Baltimore branch, NAACP. Gover-
nor Theodore McKeldin sent a letter to the board urging that its action be guided by 
the law, fairness, and good community relations, rather than an alternative that 
might lead to court litigation. Maryland Commission on Interracial Problems and 
Notes to Pages 72-76 203 
Relations [report by Elinor Pancoast], Study on Desegregation in Baltimore Schools, pp. 
18-19. As one indication of the burden of continuing to maintain a segregated school 
system, the Pancoast report noted that in 1952-53 all-African American Frederick 
Douglass High School, built to accommodate 1,250, had an enrollment of 2,600. 
The report also observed that the school board president had indicated in February 
1953 that if the Supreme Court ruled for desegregation, Baltimore might abandon 
segregation right away (pp. 22-23). 
56. Minutes rifthe Board of School Commissioners [Baltimore City] Gune 3, 1954). 
Baltimore had no mandatory school districts, so officials pointed out that the 
desegregation plan required no alteration in existing policies other than elimina-
tion of the racial distinction, though it was later clear that such open enrollment 
approaches produced very little racial integration. Edgar Jones, "How Desegrega-
tion Has Worked," Sun, June 26, 1955, and "City Limits," pp. 82-83; John H. 
Fischer, "Former School Chief Recalls 'Exemplary' City Reaction," Evening Sun, 
May 17, 1979. The Pancoast report noted that the matter had been handled by 
the board as normal business and that there had been little immediate public 
reaction. Pancoast report, pp. 30-31. 
57. The following analysis is based upon tract data for 1608 and 2007 in the 
U.S. Census tract data report for the Baltimore Standard Metropolitan Statistical 
Area (SMSA) in 1940 and 1950 (for these two census years the tracts had the 
designations 16-8 and 20-7, but the numbers listed above are used throughout the 
study for consistency). 
58. Sample block survey (see chapter 1 for the methodology of the sample 
block survey). 
59. Sample block survey. 
60. In Baltimore City as a whole, 35 percent of women were in the paid labor 
force; the figure for white women was 32 percent, for African American women 43 
percent. (All figures are for women fourteen years of age and over.) U.S. Census, 
1950. 
61. Both calculations are for 1608; 2007 was slightly less. 
62. The characterization was advanced by such contemporary social an-
alyst:; as Riesman, Lonely Crowd, and Whyte, Organization Man. W'hyte noted that 
the suburbanites he studied in Park Forest, Ill., had ambivalent feelings about 
privacy, since the 1950s suburban ethic placed so much emphasis on togetherness 
(pp. 389-90). Rowhouse suburbs of the Edmondson Village type afforded less 
space for privacy, with their small front yards close to the street, porches within 
easy view of neighbors, small backyards set apart by fencing but open to sight and 
sounds, and shared rear alleyways, physical features that gave rowhouse living a 
degree of contact with neighbors often associated with urban rather than subur-
ban lifestyles. Wright discusses general trends in postwar suburban house con-
struction and the evolution of a suburban lifestyle in Building the Dream, especially 
pp. 240-61. 
63. May, Homeward Bound; for statement of her general argument, see pp. 
5-10, 13-15. 
64. U.S. Census, 1940, 1950. 
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65. Interview with Edith Romaine, October 27, 1980. 
66. Interview with Alice Hughes, October 2, 1980. Agnes Malone noted, 
"until high school, everything we needed was right in our own neighborhood." 
Interview September 12, 1980. 
67. Interview with Madge Cooper, November 4, 1982. 
68. Alice Hughes said she knew only one woman who worked: "I had a 
friend whose father died when she was twelve, and when her mother went to work; 
my mother watched my friend, and the thought of taking money would have been 
an insult." 
69. Joynes, Christ Edmondson Methodist Church, pp. 26-30. 
70. Alice Hughes commented similarly: "St. Bernardine's was a very com-
munity-oriented church. It was the center for the Catholic people of the neighbor-
hood, and I think for many of the non-Catholics also." 
71. Sun, October 25, 1959. 
72. Lynd and Lynd, Middletown and Middletown in Transition. In the latter the 
Lynds found considerable disillusionment among Muncic youth in the 1930s be-
cause they felt the adult world had failed dismally (p. 168); similarly, May discusses 
the economic pressure of Depression-era economics upon families as possibly con-
tributing to the quest for economic security and the resurgence of traditional notions 
of gender among young adults in the 1950s (Homeward Bound, pp. 51-53). 
73. The John Waters film, "Hairspray" (1988), set in Baltimore in 1962, is a 
satirical comment on these social trends. 
4. A White Community Responds to Change 
Note: Epigraph is from interview with David Graff, June 12, 1981. 
1. U.S. Census, 1950, 1960, 1970. 
2. See Appendix A for a discussion of the literature regarding neighborhood 
tipping, summarized in Goering, "Neighborhood Tipping," pp. 68-78. 
3. Carroll Williams, "The Drive Behind Block-Busting," Baltimore Sun, 
September 23, 1955; "Cure for Block-Busting," Sun, September 28, 1955; the 
quote is from the latter. 
4. Helper, Racial Policies, p. 201. On Baltimore area practices, Helper cites a 
1950 Baltimore Urban League survey, Civil Rights in Baltimore (p. 233); a 1955 
survey by the Maryland Commission on Interracial Problems and Relations (to 
which only 12 percent of the firms even responded) found only 17.8 percent will-
ing to sell to African Americans in any [all?] section[s] of the city (An American 
City in Transition [1955], pp. 55-59). 
5. Lief and Goering report that the FHA's own studies showed that through 
the later 1960s the agency made virtually no loans to racial minorities in most 
housing markets. "Implementation of the Federal Mandate for Fair Housing," p. 
243. 
6. U.S. Civil Rights Commission, Hearing Before the U.S. Commission on Civil 
Rights, Baltimore, August 17-19, 1970, p. 94. Sherman went on to testify that in 1963 
when his firm announced a policy of selling to all individuals regardless of race, 
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creed, color, or national origin, brokers in the northwest Baltimore area "pro-
ceeded to tell the marketplace that they ought not to do business with us because 
we would sell to 'niggers' and they ought not to do business with our company 
because we would break blocks" (p. 95). 
7. Interview with Stanley Greenberg, February 17, 1993. 
8. '1'-cts to Bar Negro Homes," Sun, July 21, 1945. On the involvement of 
the Baltimore Jewish Council, see Vill, "Park Heights"; Vill cites the Minutes of 
the Baltimore Jewish Council, May 15, 1945. 
9. "Block-Busters," Sun, August 18, 1955; "Not For Sale," Sun, August 26, 
1955; "The Drive Behind Block-Busting," Sun, September 23,1955; "Cure for 
Block-Busting," Sun, September 28, 1955; "'Block-Busting' Called Big Cause of 
Racial Tension," Sun, April 13, 1956; "'Block-Bust' Blame Is Put on Builders," 
Sun, April 25, 1956. 
10. Maryland Commission on Interracial Problems and Relations, Annual 
&port (1957), p. 21 [report on the preceding year, 1956]. The commission con-
cluded that the "only avenue of approach was to educate the white citizens as to 
the best means of protecting their property values and preserving their neighbor-
hoods." 
11. Martin Millspaugh, "'Block-Busting' Called Big Cause of Racial Ten-
sion," Sun, April 13, 1956. The commission called upon the Real Estate Board, the 
city government, and the neighborhood improvement associations to fight the 
speculators in order to "save tlwse parts f!! the ciry which may still he salvaged" [emphasis 
added]. A 1955 Sun article discussing a "Not for Sale" campaign in the 700 block 
of Cold Spring Lane (in the northern section of the city) similarly tried to define 
the unacceptable elements in blockbusting: "the name that is given to the deliber-
ate changeover of a neighborhood from white to Negro occupancy, by unscrupu-
lous real estate operators and against the wishes of most affected property own-
ers." "Not for Sale," Sun, August 26, 1955. 
12. Josephine Novak quoted an early African American resident in a for-
merly all-white neighborhood who reported being the recipient of solicitation in-
tended for her white neighbors: "So we would get circulars through the mail from 
real estate investors, and phone calls. How many Negro families have moved into 
your block? they would ask. They were trying to get us to sell our house; they 
didn't know we were Negro and had just moved in." "Negro Buyer Exploited as 
Neighborhoods [Change]" (unidentified newspaper article, c. 1969, in the files of 
the St. Ambrose Housing Aid Society, Baltimore). 
13. '1'-nti-Blockbusting Bill Gets Mayor's Signature," Evening Sun, March 18, 
1966. The following year the municipal law was ruled invalid because its provision 
regarding the mail usurped a federal prerogative (" 'Blockbust' Law Voided," Sun, 
November 23, 1967). A new law, minus the mailing ban, was enacted in 1968 and 
upheld by the local criminal court in a test case ("Council to Vote onBill to Ban 
Blockbusting," Baltimore Evening Sun, April I, 1968; "DorfUpholds Blockbusting 
Law of 1968," Sun, December 11, 1969). In that same year the federal Fair Hous-
ing Act outlawed discrimination in the sale of housing and specifically prohibited 
blockbusting. 
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14. "'Block-Busting' Called Big Cause of Racial Tension.'~ 
15. Annual Report {1957}. 
16. "Block-Busting," Sun, September 7, 1958. 
17. The contention that some blockbusters introduced "lower class Negroes" 
into the first home "busted," often on a rental basis, sometimes even without 
rent, was contained in "'Block-Busting' Called Big Cause of Racial Tension" and 
"'Block-Bust' Blame is Put on Builders." In the latter, Samuel T. Daniels, execu-
tive director of the Maryland Commission on Interracial Problems and Relations, 
addressing the Baltimore City Council's Housing Committee in April 1956 assert-
ed that "speculators buy homes in a stable neighborhood and then 'at little or no 
rent' put in tenants of the type who are truly undesirable." 
18. "Revocation of Realty Permit Asked," Sun, September 6, 1958; "Block-
busting Complaint Filed," Evening Sun, September 30, 1958; "New Real Estate 
Complaint Filed," Sun, October I, 1958; "Real Estate Case Ends," Sun, March 25, 
1959; "Board Acts Against 2 in Realty Firm," Sun, April 23, 1959; "3-Month 
Realty Suspension Is Linked to 'Blockbusting,''' Sun, July 21,1960. The quote is 
from the last article; it noted that "the partners were not charged with blockbust-
ing, which is not illegal, but it was implicit in much of the testimony." 
19. Douglas Connah, Jr., "Blockbusting in Baltimore: Less Blatant and Ra-
pacious, But Still the Subtle Cause of a Continued White Exodus," Sun, January 
26, 1969. 
20. William B. Dorsey, letter to the editor, Sun, August 30, 1955. 
21. Simple excess markup was not the only way that speculators profited 
from blockbusting-induced sales. Ground rents, a standard mechanism under 
Maryland law, might be increased in the process of the transaction; speculators 
then would reap the benefit of the increase either by retaining the ground rent as 
an investment or by selling it off {whether to the new homeowner or to others as 
an investment}. 
22. In a 1960 study of Baltimore housing patterns, Favor found evidence to 
rebut the popular notion that property values declined when African American 
occupancy occurred. "The Effects of Racial Changes on Occupancy Patterns." In 
their review of studies of housing prices in instances of racial change, Kain and 
Quigley contend that most have shown that in the initial phases values rise rather 
than decline. Housing Markets and Racial Discrimination, pp. 75-82. 
23. During the late 1960s and early 1970s fair housing advocates began to 
substantiate the extent of excessive markups by speculators in racially changing 
areas. Examples were reported in the local press, such as instances of markups 
amounting to 105 percent in Montebello and 81 percent in the Alameda section, 
both on the northeast side {"Montebello Negroes Held Overcharged," Sun,June 2, 
1969; Connah, "Blockbusting in Baltimore"}. James Dilts reported as a typical 
illustration from the Edmondson Village area a house bought by a speculator for 
$6,500 and sold for $13,000, a 100 percent markup ("Inflating Home Costs with the 
'Black Tax'" [undated Sun newspaper clipping in the files of the St. Ambrose Hous-
ing Aid Society, Baltimore]); similar instances from the Edmondson Village area 
are in James Dilts, "2 Neighborhoods: Speculators Take a Cut," Sun, September 19, 
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1971. A number of these press accounts were based upon evidence compiled and 
published in reports by the Activists for Fair Housing, Inc., an organization origi-
nally founded by CORE; see, for instance, the Activists, "Communities Under 
Siege" (typescript report, September 1970). The Activists' charges are discussed 
more fully below and in chapter 5. 
24. An American City in Transition, pp. 51, 54-55. The report cited the case ofa 
Mr. X, who made arrangements to purchase a house on a land contract basis, 
making a downpayment of$260 toward a purchase price 0[$5,000 and agreeing to 
pay $12 weekly; of the $12, $6 was for interest, $3.50 for expense charges, and 
$2.50 applied toward the principal. However, when his complaints about needed 
repairs finally were addressed by the seller, he discovered that the charge for the 
work had been added to the total cost: '~fter two years, Mr. X does not know how 
much he has accumulated in real ownership of the property, for his present bal-
ance is almost the same as the amount after the original down payment" (p. 55). 
Similar problems regarding land contracts were noted in Odell M. Smith, "Slick 
Speculators: Few Home Buyers Know Rights Under 1951 Law," Sun, December 
15, 1954. By Maryland law, sellers on installment contracts who declared a tenant 
in default on payments had to list the property for auction; in practice, they often 
were able to turn around and buy the property back themselves. Calvin Bradford 
provides an excellent discussion of land or installment contracts in "Financing 
Home Ownership," p. 319. 
25. Janelile Keidel, "Orlinsky Files Three Bills On Real Estate Practices," 
Sun, August 10, 1969; Activists, '~ Conspiracy to Defraud and Exploit Home-
buyers: The Story of Jefferson Federal Savings and Loan" (typescript report; Feb-
ruary, 1971); Novak, "Negro Buyer Exploited as Neighborhoods [Change]." 
26. Dilts, "Housing Speculators Fill Void," Sun, September 25, 1971. 
27. Vill, "Park Heights"; Vill mentions both "steering" and "pressure on 
local owners Ito sell" in Park Heights (pp. 23-26). 
28. Ellsworth E. Rosen, "When a Negro Moves Next Door" ('~ Baltimore 
resident tells how his neighborhood [Ashburton] welcomes Negro homeowners-
and keeps white families from moving away"), Saturday Evening Post (April 14, 
1959); at the time the article was published, the African American percentage in 
Ashburton was reported to be 5 percent. Alan Hillman in an interview discussed 
similar efforts in nearby Windsor Hills Uune 16, 1981). These grassroots efforts 
eventually won support from the Greater Baltimore Committee, which was instru-
mental in the establishment of Baltimore Neighborhoods, Inc., in 1960. BNI sup-
ported initiatives to challenge blockbusting and stabilize city nelighborhoods by 
promoting racial understanding. Cherrill Anson described some of these pro-
grams throughout the city in "Good Neighbor Pioneers," Sun, February 28, 1965. 
29. West, "Urban Life and Spatial Distribution of Blacks in Baltimore"; 
Center for Urban Affairs, Johns Hopkins University and the Department of P1an-
ning, City of Baltimore, Census Notes (Baltimore, 1971) provides the census figures 
by race for sections of the city, 1960 to 1970. 
30. For the methodology involved in the author's sample block survey, see 
chapter 1. The present analysis is based upon Baltimore City Real Estate Tax Assess-
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ments volumes for the years 1955 to 1973 (published in odd years to report on 
current state-mandated property value assessments; the volume for 1971 was in-
advertently missing). The names cited here are intended as a sample, not an 
exhaustive list. Addresses were checked in Baltimore city directories for 1961 and 
1964. In only rare instances was ownership acquired by people already resident 
on the block (examples included Robert E. Lee and Vincent Mussachio on the 
600-odd block of Augusta) or investors living elsewhere in Edmondson Village 
(for example, Thomas Creutzer on the 3300 block of Edmondson and elsewhere). 
31. For example, on two blocks (the 3300 block of Edmondson Avenue and 
the 300 block of N. Hilton, both situated at the foot of the hill in the section with 
some of the oldest housing), a remarkable number of original settlers whose ten-
ure dated to the 1920s persisted as resident owners as late as 1961. However, in 
that year some of the houses had been purchased by nonresident investors, and 
over the next several years many others showed outside ownership; this pattern 
continued to prevail in 1973, the last year examined. 
32. The Activists' case regarding the Morris Goldseker Company was stated 
in "Communities Under Siege" (1970), which used the Lusk reports on real es-
tate activity from 1960 to 1968 to identify 144 of 391 transactions in census tract 
1608 as Goldseker Company-related. The Activists did not raise the specific 
charge of blockbusting, concentrating instead upon the issue of excessive profits. 
Their report calculated markups to have been 69 percent (additional data on 
Goldseker sales in Park Heights claimed approximately 80 perce~t). A follow-up 
study (''A Conspiracy to Defraud Homebuyers"), based on all real estate transac-
tions in the city for the same period, contended that markups on 742 properties 
bought and sold by Goldseker (of 1,768 purchased) averaged 85 percent. The 
same study detailed charges on the relationship offinancial institutions. On issues 
raised by the Activists' reports,james D. Dilts, "Housing Exploitation Charged," 
Sun, March 5, 1971, and a seven-part series by Dilts in the Sun, September 19-25, 
1971. Bradford notes a 1963 report by the Chicago Human Relations Commis-
sion, which found markups averaging 73 percent in a racially changing area of 
that city where homes were bought through contract sales ("Financing Home 
Ownership," p. 325). On the matter of affiliate companies, it might be noted that 
none of those listed above showed up in Baltimore city directories for 1961 or 
1964, although the Morris Goldseker Company advertised on its own, as in the 
1964 directory, where its ad stated, "Modern Homes-Sold on Small Downpay-
ment; Homes Purchased for Cash." The Goldseker Company ad included the seal 
of the National Association of Real Estate Brokers (Realtors). 
33. In response to the Activists' charges and the suit the group filed against 
the Morris Goldseker Company, Sheldon Goldseker defended the policies and 
practices of his uncle's firm in "Comment from Sheldon Goldseker" (Sun, October 
2,1971); in his letter to the editor of the Sun, june 22,1973; and in an article by 
james Dilts, "Landlord's Lament: 'Don't Blame Goldseker'" (Sun, March 9, 
1971). 
34. For example, the range of conflicting retrospective views is evident in 
such newspaper accounts as "Goldseker Foundation," Sun, july 14, 1973 (which 
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quoted his nephew, Sheldon Goldseker); Eric Siegel, "The Riddle of Morris Gold-
seker's Legacy," Sun, February 5, 1978; and Jesse Glasgow, "Goldseker Firm, 
Manager for Fund, to Close Its Doors," Sun, February 1, 1985. 
35. The quote is from Sheldon Goldseker's letter to the editor, Sun, June 22, 
1973. The Activists asserted that during the 1960s the Morris Goldseker Compa-
ny and its affiliates bought 1,768 houses in the city (''A Conspiracy to Defraud," 
p. 1); Siegel ("The Riddle of Morris Goldseker's Legacy") claimed that in 1969 
the Goldseker firm employed one hundred employees, with a payroll of a half 
million dollars. 
36. In the legal suit brought by the Activists against the Morris Goldseker 
Company the group charged the firms' profit on these transactions had been 31 
percent, while company representatives claimed a profit of 18 percent. The suit 
was withdrawn and, therefore, dismissed by federal judge Rozel C. Thomsen in 
March, 1972. The Activists insisted that the reason for not pressing the charges 
was their inability to afford the costs of an expert witness to conduct a full market 
study to verify their contentions regarding fair housing values; Goldseker repre-
sentatives insisted that withdrawal of the suit constituted full vindication of the 
firm's position. James D. Dilts, "Plaintiffs Drop Goldseker Suit: Cite Lack of 
Funds," Sun, March 10, 1972; "Finally-The Truth About the M. Goldseker 
Suit" [Goldseker Company ad], Catholic Review, March 24, 1972; Reginald Ben-
nett, "Version of Why Housing Suit Ceased," Catholic Review, May 19, 1972; 
Siegel, "The Riddle of Morris Goldseker's Legacy." 
37. Interview with Agnes Malone, September 12, 1980. 
38. Interview with Madge Cooper, November 4, 1982. 
39. Interview with Ann Morgan, March 23, 1981. 
40. Interview with Marilyn Simkins, September 17, 1980. 
41. Interview with Alice Hughes, October 2, 1980. 
42. Interview by Nancy Swartz with Vera Johnson, September, 1985. 
43. Interview with Joe Slovensky, October 27, 1980. 
44. Interview with Christine Wallace, March 23, 1981. 
45. The following discussion is based upon 1955-56 newspaper accounts in 
"Not For Sale"; "The Drive Behind Block-Busting"; "'Block-Bust' Blame Is Put 
on Builders"; "Block-Busters"; "Cure for Block-Busting"; and" 'Block-Busting' 
Called Big Cause of Racial Tension." 
46. Interview by Nancy Swartz with Madge Morgenstern, September, 1985. 
Madge Cooper said that real estate agents would come after dark, especially ap-
proaching people they believed to be disaffected for one reason or another. 
47. Interview with Eunice Clemens, June 9, 1981. 
48. "Block-Busters." 
49. Interview by Nancy Swartz with Nola Null, September, 1985. 
50. Interview with Edith Romaine, October 27, 1980. 
51. Interview with Father John Smith, February 15, 1983. 
52. Joynes, Thirty Yilars, p. 27. 
53. Minutes of the Board of School Commissioners (Baltimore) June 3, 1954. On 
the Baltimore Board's decision and the early desegregation process, Gertrude 
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Samuels, "School Desegregation: A Case History," New York Times (May 8, 
1955); Edgar jones, "How Desegregation Has Worked," Sun Oune 26, 1955); 
Banks, "Descriptive Study of the Baltimore Board of School Commissioners." 
54. Maryland Commission on Interracial Problems and Relations [report by 
Elinor Pancoast], The Report of a Study on Desegregation in the Baltimore Ciry Sclwols 
(1956), pp. 33-67. Incidents occurred at eight elementary schools and several 
secondary schools, according to the report. 
55. Pancoast report, pp. 68-78; the Clarence Mitchell incident is cited on p. 
78 and discussed more fully in Mark Miller, "Gentlemanly Persuasion," Baltimore 
Magazine (September 1981), pp. 124-25. 
56. Eric Siegel, '~ Nonpolitical Mitchell, Who Is a Doctor and an Artist," 
Sun, February 5, 1984. 
57. As part of its open enrollment plan, the school board insisted that there 
were no designated school districts, except in the case of overcrowded schools where 
districts were necessary to control total enrollment; in theory this meant that stu-
dents might attend any school in the city, but the board clearly assumed that ele-
mentary school students would enroll in schools in their own neighborhoods. 
58. Rock Glen opened in 1962 as a community school, with some elementary 
and junior high grades; in 1964 it became exclusively a junior high school under 
the new superintendent's open enrollment plan for the city, and the school's popu-
lation soared (interview with Rock Glen teacher Dorothy Clark, October 24, 
1988). 
59. An article on the study surmised that resegregation had resulted from 
the removal of white children, changing housing patterns, and the higher density 
of Mrican American children in neighborhoods. "De Facto Segregation," Johns 
Hopkins Magazine (October 6, 1963), p. 9. 
60. A parents' group challenged the small amount of integration and raised a 
number of other concerns about the lack of educational opportunity for African 
American school children; see chapter 5 for further discussion of the issues raised .. 
League of Women Voters. [Baltimore], Desegregation: Baltimore Public Sclwols: Histo-
ry, Problems, Solutions (September 20, 1963), pp. 10-11. On the occasion of the 
twentieth-fifth anniversary of the adoption of the Baltimore school desegregation 
policy, former superintendent john Fischer, who provided leadership for the 
change, generally praised the smooth and orderly process but reflected that "free-
dom of choice has not entirely worked to assure equal educational opportunity." 
"Former School Chief Recalls 'Exemplary' City Reaction," Evening Sun, May 17, 
1979. 
61. Interview with janice Watkins, May 24, 1983. 
62. Case histories of racial conflict related to residential turf in Brooklyn 
(Canarsie) and Boston (Mattapan) demonstrate the impact of such incidents in 
escalating tensions and magnifying fears. Rieder, Canarsie (p. 71-78), and Levine 
and Harmon in their account of Mattapan, Death of American Jewish Communiry 
(pp. 215-18, 306-8), both cite actual (as well as rumored) incidents of increased 
crime and conflict in the schools as contributing to the hardening of white atti-
tudes. 
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63. The following discussion is based upon the U.S. Census tract figures for 
tracts 1608 and 20.0.7 (and subdivisions of those tracts), 1940. to 1960. 
64. In dramatic contrast, the pioneer African American community in 2007 
bore substantially higher percentages in the under fourteen and the twenty-five to 
forty-four age categories-young children and their parents-than had ever been 
the case in the white community's history. 
65. Between 1950. and 1960. male percentages for white-collar participation 
changed only from 41 to 40. percent. Note that the white-collar figure was en-
larged by the heavy concentration of female workers in sales and clerical catego-
ries. 
66. In 1950., 52 percent of men in 160.8 were in white-collar occupations; in 
1960,50. percent. Between 1950. and 1960. for men the greatest difference had been 
the decline in the craftsmen (skilled trades, foremen) category (from 17 to 12 
percent); on the white-collar side, an increase in the professional category (from 8 
to 13 percent) was offset by a similar decrease in managerial jobs (from 9 to 7 
percent). For women, the greatest increases had come in sales and clerical posi-
tions. In 1960 nearly halfofwomen workers were in these two categories, and they 
represented 21 percent of the total labor force. 
67. In 1960. median housing values in tract 160.8 were 19 percent above the 
Baltimore SMSA (metro area) median of $5,239, but values in tract 2o.()'7 closely 
approximated the metro figure. 
68. See Appendix A for discussion of the literature on white avoidance and 
on filtering. 
69. On northside sample blocks (Edmondson, Augusta, Wildwood, Walnut, 
and Flowerton) there were African American residents in seven of fifty-nine 
households in 1964. Sample block survey. 
70.. An earlier, expanded version of the following discussion originally ap-
peared in Orser, "Racial Change in Retrospect." In this reconsideration of white 
perceptions, it is important to understand that interviewees not only sought to 
convey their own views but also tried to interpret the views of other members of 
the community, like those of their parents and neighbors. 
71. Pioneer is defined broadly as a member of the first generation of African 
American settlers, generally those in the wave of settlement from 1955 to 1965. It 
is not always possible to isolate this group precisely for analytical purposes in the 
1970. and 1980. census tract reports. 
72. While home ownership rates dipped slightly from previous levels, they 
continued to exceed the metropolitan area median. 
73. In 1960., African American pioneer households In 2007 had median in-
comes ($4,881) only minimally lower than white families who remained ($4,940 was 
the median for the tract as a whole), though whites in 160.8, where racial change had 
not yet occurred, had higher levels ($6,239). In that same year, the citywide African 
American household median was $3,354, the metropolitan (SMSA) figure $5,329. 
In 1970. median incomes in the census tracts ranging from $8,162 to $8,312 com-
pared with the city African American median of $5,590. and the SMSA median of 
$8,676. U.S. Census, 1960., 1970.. 
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74. Lamphere demonstrates the usefulness of the concept offamily strategies 
in her analysis of gender and ethnicity in a Rhode Island textile community, From 
Working Daughters to Working Mothers, pp. 27-31. 
75. Note that the presence of women workers in the paid labor force helped to 
compensate for the lower percentage of African American males in job categories 
traditionally more closed to them; for instance, among white-collar occupations, 
African American women outnumbered men in professional and clerical jobs. 
76. The discussion of discrepancy between the oral history recollections and 
the social profile from census and sample block data is not intended to imply the 
lack of credibility of the former. Rather, the oral testimony is extremely useful 
because it illuminates the perceptions individuals likely held at the time and 
therefore helps us understand the basis for the collective action that occurred. It 
might be argued that these perceptions represented the central social reality at the 
heart of the neighborhood experience, overriding other considerations of the type 
a retrospective examination of the demographic data permits. For further discus-
sion of this point regarding oral history testimony, see Orser, "Racial Change in 
Retrospect," p. 51. 
5. African American Pioneers 
Note: This chapter is an expanded version of Orser, "Secondhand Suburbs." It 
examines the experience of the first generation of African American pioneers from 
1955 to 1980. Epigraph is from interview with Elizabeth Jones, July 3, 1985. 
I. In general, sociological studies of such indicators of socioeconomic status 
as education and income for African Americans who have initiated moves into 
predominantly white neighborhoods have found them to be comparable to those 
of whites residing in the area and in advance of blacks in the metropolitan region 
as a whole. See, for example, Long and Spain, "Racial Succession in Individual 
Housing Units"; Denowitz, "Racial Succession in New York City, 1960-1970"; 
Scott, "Blacks in Segregated and Desegregated Neighborhoods"; Edwards, "Fami-
ly Composition as a Variable in Racial Succession"; Nelson, "Recent Suburbani-
zation of Blacks"; Lake, New Suburbanites. For a general bibliographical review of the 
Mrican American experience in succession communities, see Fairchild and Tucker, 
"Black Residential Mobility." 
2. Rose raised a similar concern about the experience of African American 
settlers in new suburban settings when he observed, "given the fact of race and all 
its many implications, the question becomes whether such communities can sur-
vive without deteriorating into environments similar to those the initial mover 
wished to escape." Black Suburbanization, p. II. 
3. Leonard Downie, Jr., "Black Home Buyers' Protest Hits Baltimore," 
Washington Post (c. 1969, undated article in the files of the St. Ambrose Housing 
Aid Society, Baltimore); "6 Arrested in Goldseker Protest," Baltimore Sun, Au-
gust 10, 1969; interview by the author with Samuel Brown, June 13, 1981. Ac-
cording to Sheldon Goldseker, nephew of Morris Goldseker and an associate in 
the business, the firm stopped selling houses and released its eight-man sales staff 
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in 1969, at least partly in response to the protests; as he told a reporter in 1971: 
"We haven't sold houses for two years, since the trouble. With the pickets, we 
can't close deals, we can't bring people into the office." James Dilts, "Landlord's 
Lament: 'Don't Blame Goldseker,'" Sun, March 9, 1971. Originally called the 
Activists for Fair Housing, the group took the name Activists, Inc., in 1967 be-
cause of the intention to extend its civil rights activities beyond housing; at that 
time the organization had two hundred dues-paying members, both Mrican 
American and white. Sun, December 31,1967. The campaign in Chicago to organ-
ize African American residents who had bought from speculators on a land con-
tract basis had parallels to the Baltimore effort, and there is some indication that 
the two movements drew upon one another for concepts and strategy. The Chi-
cago movement was chronicled in James Alan McPherson, "'In My Father's 
House There Are Many Mansions.''' 
4. Activists, Inc., "Communities Under Siege" pp. 4-5. The comparison 
tract was 26-03, along Belair Road in northeast Baltimore. "Communities Under 
Siege" was based on a study undertaken by Charles Keeley of Western Michigan 
University on behalf of the Activists and completed in draft form in the summer of 
1970; the term "Black Tax" was used in the early picketing campaign and was 
repeated in another draft document by the Activists, "From Ghetto to Ghetto: 
The Odyssey of the Working Class Black Family" (typescript, n.d., c. 1970), p. 
11. One of the leaders of the Chicago Contract Buyers League used the term "a 
vile race tax" in describing the same concept. McPherson, p. 58. 
5. "Communities Under Siege," pp. 5, 9 a-d. The contention that the vari-
ety of front names meant that clients did not know they were doing business with 
Goldseker was the basis for an Activists' complaint that the company had en-
gaged in deceptive advertising practices. The report also documented patterns of 
excessive markups for Goldseker transactions in the Lower Park Heights area 
(alleged to be c. 82 percent for the cases examined), the third city district where 
the Activists focused their attention (p. 11). 
6. Activists, Inc., ''A Conspiracy to Defraud and Exploit Homebuyers," pp. 
5-6. The report argued that the savings and loan firm had underwritten excessive 
sale prices and that it benefited from inflated interest rates on refinanced mort-
gages. It also noted that a Goldseker Company employee, Martin Weinberg, had 
been a member of Jefferson's board, implying a conflict of interest. The Jefferson 
Federal allegations were reported by James Dilts, "Housing Exploitation Charged," 
Sun, March 5,1971. Later the same year the Activists published "Baltimore Under 
Siege," asserting that in 1968 twenty-four of Baltimore's state and federally char-
tered savings and loans institutions had made 78 percent of their housing loans to 
investors or those buying from investors (p. 11). It also contended that two major 
commercial banks, Equitable Trust Company and Maryland National Bank, pro-
vided major mortgage support for Goldseker companies and for Jefferson Federal 
during the 1960s (p. 25). James Dilts ran a seven-part series on the housing issues 
raised by the Activists in the Sun, September 19-25, 1971. The same article that 
contained the charges by the Activists against Jefferson Federal reported that the 
Home Loan Bank Board in 1969 had expressed concern toJefferson about the vol-
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ume ofits loans to investors or speculators and that in March of that year Jefferson 
had ceased financing Goldseker Company customers. Dilts, "Housing Exploitation 
Charged." 
7. Eric Siegel, "The Riddle of Morris Goldseker's Legacy," Sun, February 
5, 1978. 
8. The latter quote from Sheldon Goldseker is contained in Dilts, "Land-
lord's Lament." He defended the Morris Goldseker Company similarly in his 
response to the Sun's series by James Dilts in September, 1971, and in "Comment 
from Sheldon Goldseker," Sun, October 2, 1971 (reprinted as an ad in Catlwlic 
&view, October 8, 1971). The Goldseker and Activists calculations regarding 
profit margin were cited in James D. Dilts, "Plaintiffs Drop Goldseker Suit: Cite 
Lack of Funds," Sun, March 10, 1972. In a 1973 letter to the editor Sheldon 
Goldseker took exception to repetition of the charges contained in the Sun's obitu-
ary for his uncle (for the obituary, Sun, June 18, 1973; his letter, June 22, 1973). 
9. The suit on behalf offorty-one individual homebuyers and the two com-
munity associations (Edmondson Village and Montebello), initially filed in 1969 
and dismissed in March 1972, charged that Goldseker companies had conspired 
to IIX housing prices and to monopolize the housing markets of the two neighbor-
hoods; Goldseker lawyers denied both charges (Dilts, "Plaintiffs Drop Goldseker 
Suit"). The Catlwlic &view (published by the Archdiocese of Baltimore) contained 
a company ad claiming complete exoneration ("Finally-The Truth About the 
M. Goldseker Law Suit," March 24, 1972) and a letter to the editor that repeated 
the Activists' explanation for withdrawing the suit (Reginald Bennett, president of 
the Montebello Community Association, "Version of Why Housing Suit Ceased," 
May 19, 1971). The conflicting interpretation of the Goldseker record and legacy 
is discussed further in chapter 6. 
10. "Communities Under Siege," p. 13. 
II. "Testimony Presented by Congressman ParrenJ. Mitchell (D. 7th MD) 
[on a Senate bank reform bill]," May 6, 1975, pp. 1-2. 
12. The following discussion of the politics of the civil rights movement in 
Maryland draws heavily upon Ca1cott, Maryland & America, especially pages 
145-71; Goldberg, "Party Competition and Black Politics"; K. Olson, "Old West 
Baltimore"; and James D. Dilts, "The Warning Trumpet: CORE Is 'The Only 
Voice Black People Ever Had,'" Sun, December I, 1968. Annual reports of the 
Maryland Commission on Interracial Problems and Relations (1952-1968) high-
lighted particular actions and accomplishments in the struggle against discrimi-
nation. 
13. "393 Integrationists, Many Clerics, Arrested at Gwynn Oak Park," Sun, 
July 5, 1963. The demonstrations represented the IIrst active participation of the 
National Council of Churches leadership in a civil rights demonstration as a 
group; together with demonstrators from Washington, Philadelphia, and New 
York, they joined local organizers-including CORE, clergy from the Inter-
denominational Ministerial Alliance, and other area civil rights activists-in the 
protests. After continued pressure and negotiation, the park's ownership agreed to 
desegregate; the victory proved short-lived, however, since the park was largely 
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destroyed by Hurricane Agnes in 1972 and subsequently closed. In John Waters's 
satirical film "Hairspray" (1988), set in Baltimore in the early 1960s, a similar 
amusement park protest occurs as a climactic scene. 
14. The Truman administration's fair employment policies regarding federal 
agencies and the armed services are evaluated in McCoy and Reutten, Quest and 
Response, pp. 251-57, 281; and McCoy, Presidency of Harry S. Truman, pp. 108-9, 
\69-70. Reutter discusses employment practices regarding African Americans at 
Bethlehem Steel in Sparrows Point, pp. 252, 292-8, 347-352; see also Zeidman, 
"Sparrows Point, Dundalk, Highlandtown, Old West Baltimore," p. 190-91. On 
the CORE protests, Dilts, "The Warning Trumpet." 
15. These developments are discussed in Calcott, Maryland and America, pp. 
158-66. On the changing orientation of the Baltimore Chapter of CORE, Dilts, 
"The Warning Trumpet"; by 1969 membership in the Baltimore branch of the 
NAACP, once the nation's largest, had fallen to five thousand (William Stump, 
"NAACP Turns Face Inward," Baltimore News American, January 25, 1976). 
16. "1,900 U.S. Troops Patrolling City; Officials Plan Curfew Again Today; 
4 Dead, 300 Hurt, 1,350 Arrested," Sun, April 8, 1968; "West Baltimore Is an 
Ugly No-Man's Land," Sun, April 9, 1968; "1,900 More GI'sJoin Riot Forces as 
Snipers Peril Police, Firemen; Arrests in 3 Days Run to 3,450," Sun, April 9, 1968 
(the report on Edmondson Village and Edmondson Avenue was contained in this 
article); "Backbone of Riot Reported Broken; Return to Normal Could Be Near," 
Sun, April 10, 1968. On the incident between the Governor and African American 
leaders, "Text of Governor Agnew's Statement to Civil Rights Leaders," Sun, 
April 12, 1968; Gene Oishi, "Negroes Quit Conference with Agnew," Sun, April 
12, 1968. The casualty figures are from Jane Motz, "Report OIlI Baltimore Civil 
Disorders, April, 1968" ([typescript] Baltimore: Middle Atlantic Region, Ameri-
can Friends Service Committee, September, 1968), pp. 5, 18. 
17. Horace Davis, president of the Edmondson Village Community Associa-
tion, was among those arrested in the protests at the Morris Goldseker Company 
in August 1969 ("6 Arrested in Goldseker Protest"); the membership figure is 
mentioned in Downie, "Black Home Buyers' Protest Hits Baltimore." 
18. The following discussion is based upon analysis of the U.S. Census tract 
data for 1960, 1970, and 1980. The 1960 census provides the first opportunity to 
reconstruct a social portrait of African American pioneer residents south of Ed-
mondson in tract 2007, where they outnumbered whites 5,714 to 3,528 by that 
date; in tract 1608, north of the avenue, only ninety-six African Americans had 
settled by that year. A decade later, after white flight and African American set-
tlement had produced near total racial change in both census tracts, the 1970 
census furnished a full-scale profile of the new African American community at a 
point when the effects of rapid in-migration were still very fresh. By 1980 it is no 
longer possible to isolate the pioneer group in the census tract data, though in that 
year they constituted a substantial 40 percent of the area's population. However, 
the 1980 census does provide an important benchmark for evaluating the commu-
nity that resiident pioneers continued to inhabit some fifteen to twenty-five years 
after the period of their first settlement. 
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19. White home ownership also declined during the decade in Baltimore, by 
8 percent. Between 1960 and 1970 only 6,594 additional owner-occupied homes 
were secured by African Americans in all of Baltimore City; 2,744 (42 percent) of 
them were added in the Edmondson Village section alone. Center for Urban Af-
fairs, Johns Hopkins University and the Department of Planning, City of Bal-
timore, "Changes in Housing by Race and Renter/Owner Status, Baltimore, 
Maryland, 1960-1970," Census Notes (February 15, 1972), p. 8. 
20. Bianchi, Farley, and Spain used data from the 1960 census and the 1977 
Annual Housing Survey to calculate the national home ownership rate for African 
Americans in the former year as 51 percent and in the latter as 60 percent ("Ra-
cial Inequalities in Housing," pp. 37-51). Comparable white figures nationally 
were 64 and 69 percent (p. 46). Scott's analysis of 1970 data found African Ameri-
cans in "low-percentage" (i.e., "integrator") neighborhoods more likely to be 
home buyers than other African Americans. "Blacks in Segregated and Desegre-
gated Neighborhoods." 
21. In 1960, 80 percent of the African American population in census tract 
2007 had moved in during the past five years, 88 percent of whom had come from 
Baltimore's central city. 
22. The 1970 in-migration rate of 42 percent actually was less than the 50 
percent rate of residence change for Baltimore City African Americans as a whole. 
For the SMSA population the figure was 45 percent. Eighty-six percent of Ed-
mondson's new African American residents were from Baltimore's central city. 
23. Comparable figures for the metropolitan (SMSA) region as a whole were 
58 percent, for African Americans in Baltimore City, 59 percent. Goodman, and 
Streitwieser noted on the basis of 1974-76 national Annual Housing Survey data 
that African American city-to-suburb mobility continued to lag significantly be-
hind white mobility, a factor they referred to as "black retention" and attributed 
to actual or expected racial discrimination. "Explaining Racial Differences." 
24. The sample block survey was conducted for ten blocks at ten-year inter-
vals (it also was compiled for 1964 to provide an additional reference point in the 
midst of the racial change period). See chapter I for a discussion of the sources 
and methodology employed in the study. 
25. The housing cost figures are from "Communities Under Siege," p. 9b. 
26. "Communities Under Siege," pp. 9, 9b. 
27. Kain and Quigley's 1975 review of studies of housing prices in circum-
stances of rapid racial change found that most confirmed that housing prices rose 
rather than declined in the initial phases. Housing Markets and Racial Discrimination, 
pp. 75-82. Similarly, Lake noted that studies based on data from the 1950s and 
early 1960s found African Americans paid more than whites for comparable hous-
ing. However, his data from the mid-1970s on selected New Jersey suburbs found 
that as African American population in an area increased, African Americans 
paid less for comparable housing and that housing values declined over time, 
factors leading to an equity loss for early African American purchasers. New Subur-
banites, pp. 180, 201-202. Schnare used 1970 housing data from Boston to argue 
that rapid expansion of available housing stock during the previous decade led to 
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an eventual decline in the relative housing price in the city's Mrican American 
neighborhoods. "Racial and Ethnic Price Differentials," especially p. 114. On the 
"net penalty associated with being· black" relative to housing opportunity and 
quality, see Bianchi, Farley, and· Spain, "Racial Inequalities in Housing." 
28. The metropolitan median for owner-occupied housing in 1980 was 
$51,400; Edmondson Village medians ranged from $21,500 to $28,100 in the four 
tracts. 
29. Mrican American population percentages in nearby suburban Baltimore 
County stood at 4 percent in 1960, 3.2 percent in 1970 and 8.2 percent in 1980, 
actual numbers rising from 17,054 in 1960 to 53,955 in 1980. Factors responsible 
for African American retention in areas like Edmondson Village no doubt include 
financial considerations, perceptions of a lack of receptivity in suburban areas 
beyond the city limits, and satisfaction with present housing and neighborhood. 
On these factors, see Goodman and Streitwieser, "Explaining Racial Differ-
ences"; Cottingham, "Black Income and Metropolitan Residential Dispersion," 
especially pp. 274, 280, and 287; and Farley and Colsanto, "Racial Residential 
Segregation." 
30. The 1970 percentage is based upon median household income in the two 
tracts of c. $8,240, compared to $5,590 for African Americans citywide. 
31. In 1980 Edmondson household income in the tracts averaged approx-
imately $17,786, while the metropolitan median was $18,958, and the African 
American citywide median $11,158. 
32. The list of employers is from the sample block survey, based on the 1964 
city directory; unfortunately, the directories often did not provide a job designa-
tion for working wives. See the comment by Horace Green below on the signifi-
cance of westside residence, even for those whose employment was on the east 
side. 
33. In tract 2007 in 1960, 38 percent of white males were in operative or 
laborer positions, 53 percent of African American males; in tract 1608 in the same 
year, males (preponderantly white) in the two categories constituted only 14 per-
cent, while in 1970, 58 percent of males (preponderantly Mrican American) were 
in these two types of jobs (39 percent as operatives, 19 percent as laborers); 
34. Note that in 1970 in tract 1608 the white-collar percentage for men was 
20 percent, for women 46 percent (the greatest concentration of the latter being in 
clerical positions). In 1980 the occupational distribution for Edmondson workers 
continued to resemble closely the profile for Baltimore's African American popu-
lation as a whole. Occupations classified as white-collar did increase by 8 percent 
during the decade to nearly 4 in 10 (38 percent), but blue-collar jobs still predom-
inated. 
35. The percentage of the Edmondson female labor force who were married 
(with husband present) stood at 52 percent in 1970 but dropped to 41 percent in 
1980. Significantly, during the decade 1970-80 the percentage of Edmondson 
households headed by a female increased substantially. As an indication of house-
hold employment patterns, husband/wife combinations of occupations for pioneer 
residents interviewed by the author were as folloWs: skilled cabinetmaker/city 
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librarian; maintenance mechanic at Bendix/purchasing agent, Johns Hopkins 
Hospital; supervisor, U.S. Post Office/nurse, University Hospital; sod company 
worker/nurse, University Hospital; baker/Social Security staff. 
36. In 1960 the median age for white residents had been approximatel forty. 
While half the African American populace was under twenty in 1970, by 1980 that 
percentage had shrunk to thirty-six. 
37. In 1960 the African American citywide ratio of households with married 
couples to total households was close to five of eight; in 1970 and 1980, approx-
imately five of ten. 
38. The 1970 Edmondson figure of 18 percent compared to 25 percent for all 
African American city households. By 1980 the Edmondson figure was 32 percent 
and the African American city figure 46 percent, compared to an SMSA rate of 19 
percent. 
39. In 1980 median incomes in Edmondson households headed by a female 
ranged from $12,329 to $14,798 in the four tracts, approximately $4,000 to $6,000 
below the median family income for the Edmondson area. 
40. In tract 2007 in 1960 African American households were comprised of 
4.24 residents; in the total tract, white and African American, the median was 
3.67. By 1970 housing densities in the predominantly African American Ed-
mondson tracts were 4.12-4.23 persons per household (compared to 3.6 for Afri-
can American citywide). By 1980 density had declined to 3.17-3.73, a rate still 
higher than the SMSA (2.45) and African American citywide (2.74) medians. 
41. Interview with Annie Green, December 13, 1982. 
42. Similar opinions were expressed in a group interview at the Mary Rod-
man Center (senior citizens group), December 14, 1982. 
43. Interview with Horace Green, December 13, 1982. 
44. Interview with Margaret Dawkins, February 24, 1983. 
45. In 1960,88 percent of African American newcomers in census tract 2007 
had come from Baltimore's central city, and in 197086 percent of newcomers in 
both tracks (during the preceding five years) had similar origins. 
46. Interview with Mary Slade, March 14, 1983. 
47. Interview with Janice Watkins, May 24, 1983. 
48. The preceding quotes all are from the interviews at the Rodman Center, 
including the interview with Margaret Johnson on the same date. 
49. Interview with Father John Smith, February 15, 1983. 
50. Interview with Roberta Warren, January 5, 1983. 
51. Interview with Eunice Clemens, June 9, 1981. 
52. These concerns were expressed in interviews with Jones, Warren, and the 
Greens. 
53. In 1963 controversy over desegregation policies surfaced when an inter-
racial group of twenty-eight concerned parents charged that Baltimore's schools 
and classrooms remained largely segregated and challenged enrollment policies 
(including districting, transfer, and transportation), use of part-time instruction 
(alleging that 79 percent of students with part-time instructors were African 
American), and school construction. League of Women Voters [Baltimore], Deseg-
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regation. The school board response in 1963 essentially reaffirmed open enroll-
ment, though certain policies were revised, such as those governing districting. 
54. On persistent concerns about the failure to achieve desegregation and the 
problems confronting the schools, see George Rodgers, "School Integration Woes 
Seen Worsening Here," Baltimore Evening Sun, February 2, 1967 [on the U.S. Com-
mission on Civil Rights study, Racial Isolation in the Public Schools]; Mike Bowler, 
"City Magnet Schools, Open Enrollment Fail to Halt Segregation," Sun, November 
25, 1972; John Crew, "Desegregating Baltimore City's Public Schools," Baltimore 
Magazine, 68 (September, 1975), pp. 18-19, 28. Noted earlier was former schooll 
superintendent John Fischer's observation that freedom of choice had not entirely 
worked to assure equal educational opportunity. "Former School Chief Recalls 'Ex-
emplary' City Reaction," Evening Sun, May 1 7, 1979 [on the occasion of the 25th 
anniversary of the initial school board decision]. A 1968 study argued that the re-
segregation of Baltimore metro area schools was a problem related in part to the 
division of the metropolitan area into political jurisdictions that kept the city and 
suburban counties separate. Stinchcombe, McDill, and Walker, "Demography of 
Organizations." 
55. Baltimore City Department of Planning, "Analysis of the Edmondson 
Village Shopping Center in 1979" (1979). 
56. On concern about the shopping center and criticism of Weinberg's role, 
"Mayor Exhorts Merchants to Act at Edmondson," Sun, August 10, 1973; "Vii·· 
lage Defects Found," Sun, November 7, 1973; "City Did Its Best in Edmondson, 
Mayor Says," Sun, November 8, 1973; "Boarded Up," Sun, January 8, 1974; 
"Boarded-Up Hochschild Building Called Edmondson Village Eyesore," Sun, No-
vember 3, 1975; "Failure to Renew Edmondson Mall Blamed on Powerful Ab-
sentee Landlord," Sun, June 14, 1979; "Coalition Works to Revitalize Edmondson 
Village," Evening Sun, December 30, 1977. On Weinberg's posture in resisting 
development proposals and the frustration of Baltimore municipal officials, ROo-
bert Douglas, "Honolulu Harry," News American, July 10, 1980; Alison Langley, 
"'HonoluluHarry' Holds Up the Works," News American, April 7,1985; Michael 
Olesker, "Weinberg's Life Gave Few Clues to Final Kind Act," Sun, November II, 
1990. 
6. The Legacy of Blockbusting 
Note: Epigraphs from Walter Herman, "Edmondson Village: A Community of 
Townhouses in Various Styles," Baltimore News-American, March 31, 1984. inter-
view with Marilyn Simkins, October 2, 1981; interview with ElizabethJones,July 
3, 1985. 
I. Robert D. Loevy, "Baltimore's Population Is Nearing Racial Stability," 
Baltimore Evening Sun, April 12, 1982. Loevy wrote that 73 percent of Baltimore 
residents lived in tracts that had experienced less than 10 percent racial change 
during the decade. 
2. Eileen Canzian, '''70s Exodus from Baltimore Left It a Larger Share of 
Poor," Baltimore Sun, March 27, 1983. The article noted that during the decade 
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from 1960 to 1970 Baltimore City experienced a net migration loss of 120,791. 
The following decade the loss was an even larger 142,438; during that decade 
white net out-migration actually declined substantially (from 152,132 to 119,877), 
but the total figure was magnified by the net loss of 22,461 African Americans, a 
significant new development (in the I 960s, for instance, African American net 
gain in the city had been 31,341). Farley, et al., found strong evidence of the 
polarization of the Detroit metropolitan area between predominantly white sub-
urbs and the predominantly Mrican American city, in "'Chocolate City, Vanilla 
Suburbs.' " 
3. Hearing bifore the United States Commission on Civil Rights: Hearing Held in 
Baltimore, Maryland, August 17-19,1970 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. G.P.O., [1970]), p. 
486. 
4. Szanton, in Baltimore 2000, warned of the trend toward a metropolitan 
configuration characterized as a "double-doughnut," with a revitalized central 
core, a poor and minority hub, and an outer ring of middle- and upper-income 
suburbs, largely white (p. 21). Note that the report was commissioned to com-
memorate the tenth anniversary of the Morris Goldseker Foundation, discussed in 
the next section. 
5. M. William Salganik, "City Neighborhoods' Integration Increased in 
'70s, Study Says," Sun, July 18, 1981 (the article reported on a Johns Hopkins 
University study by Ralph B. Taylor and Rachel T. Taladay). The study found 
that during the decade the number of tracts that were mostly African American 
(i.e., 70 to 100 percent) increased from 84 to 95; those mostly white (70 to 100 
percent) decreased from 136 to 107; and those mixed (30 to 70 percent white) 
increased from 17 to 35. 
6. For example, along Liberty Road from the city/county line to the belt-
way, 4 of 6 census tracts lost more than 50 percent of their white population 
during the 1970s (percentage losses ranged from 52 to 69); by 1980 African Amer-
ican percentages in the four varied from 50 to 77. U.S. Census, 1970, 1980. In 1978 
the Baltimore Sun ran a seven-part series oil this "Corridor in Transition" (the 
series began on February 5, 1978). 
7. The section between the city line and the beltway alone contained 25 
percent of the county's African American population in 1980 and 30 percent in 
1990. U.S. Census, 1980, 1990. In a study of the Washington, D.C., metropolitan 
area between 1970 and 1980 Gale, Grier, and Grier have observed similar concen-
tration of African American suburbanization in a pattern they refer to as "black 
'spillover.'" Black and White Urban-to-Suburban-Outmigrants, pp. 14-15. For other 
studies on recent patterns of African American suburbanization, see Appendix A. 
8. Within the city limits, the two large census tracts west of Edmondson 
Village to the city line had Mrican American percentages of 45 percent (in 
.2804.01, north of Route 40) and 30 percent (in 2804.03, south of Route 4O) in 
1980; these percentages had increased to 63 and 46 percent, respectively, in 1990. 
In 1980 Baltimore County the three census tracts along the north side of the 
Route 40 corridor west to the Beltway had Mrican American percentages of 14, 3, 
and 12 percent; in 1990 these had become 21, 5, and 30. Along the same corridor 
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on the south side, no census tract in 1980 had more than 3 percent African Ameri-
can presence; in 1990 one registered 8 percent, but others remained at 3 percent 
or below. Except for these changes along the north side of Route 40, the prepon-
derance of the African American population in the general Catonsville area of 
Baltimore County remained concentrated in the historicailly separate section of 
the community along Winters Lane. U.S. Census, 1980, 1990. 
9. The 1990 U.S. Census figures reveal that African American presence in 
Baltimore City has reached 59.2 percent, in Baltimore County 12.4· percent (com-
pared to 55 percent and 8.2 percent, respectively, in 1980). The evidence relative 
to residential segregation remains mixed. Areas of African American residency 
have increased throughout the metropolitan area, including the suburban coun-
ties, and exclusively white areas have decreased. U.S. Census, 1990. Nevertheless, 
in the words of Sun reporter James Bock, "the vast majority of blacks in Baltimore 
live in highly segregated areas while most whites in the metropolitan area's five 
suburban counties reside in neighborhoods where blacks are only a modest pres-
ence." "Race and Housing: Barriers Fall, But Patterns Endure," Sun, July 7, 
1991. 
10. Interview by Nancy Swartz with Nola Null, September, 1985. 
II. Interview with Joe Siovensky, October 27, 1980. Note that twenty-five 
years earlier would have been 1954, apparently a symbolic year in a great many 
ways. 
12. Interview with Edith Romaine, October 27, 1980. 
13. Michael Olesker, '''For Sale' Can Be a Bad Sign, History Shows," Sun, 
February 10, 1983. Olesker was reflecting upon the decision by the Maryland 
State Real Estate Commission to lift a ban on "for sale" signs it had imposed ten 
years earlier in nineteen city neighborhoods designated as conse!!'Vation areas un-
der provisions ofa 1973 state law. In 1974 the city council had banned signs in all 
city neighborhoods, an action ruled a violation offree speech by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in 1981. See below for current Maryland laws on discriminatory real estate 
practices, including blockbusting and steering. 
14. Interview with Ann Morgan, March 23, 1981. 
15. Interview with David Graff, June 12, 1981. 
16. Rabin, for instance, concludes on the basis of his numerous studies 
across the United States: "While widespread hostilRty to blacks may be a major 
influence on the kinds of locational decisions made in private housing transac-
tions, the actual spatial distributions that result are strongly influenced by public 
actions." "The Roots of Segregation in the Eighties," pp. 210-11. A similar judg-
ment is found in Schlay, "Financing Community." On attitudinal and institution .. 
al factors, also see Goering, Housing Desegregation and Federal Policies. 
17. Tide VIII, Civil Rights Act of 1968 (Public Law 90-284-). Lief and Goer-
ing summarize national fair housing legislation and review the role of federal 
agencies in their chapter, "The Implementation of the Federal Mandate for Fair 
Housing," pp. 227-6'7. They fault HUD during the early years of its responsibility 
for failing to "exercise what statutory and regulatory power it had with the ag-
gression and determination necessary to change housing market patterns," while 
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during the 1980s the evidence of an affirmative federal role has been even less, in 
their view (p. 258). 
18. Maryland Real Estate Brokers Act (Annotated Code of Maryland, Busi-
ness Occupations and Professions, Article 16, Real Estate Brokers, 1982). Bal-
timore City passed an anti-blockbusting ordinance in 1966, which was subse-
quently found deficient by the courts; a revised law took effect in 1968 (Evening 
Sun, March 18, 1966; Sun, November 23, 1967; Sun, April I, 1968; Sun, December 
II, 1969). State and city restrictions on "for sale" signs in designated areas, origi-
nally enacted to curb blockbusting activities, were removed in the early 1980s. 
Ironically, the sign bans were successfully challenged by an African American real 
estate broker,James Crockett, who charged that they unfairly limited the freedom 
of African Americans seeking to buy homes and placed unnecessary restrictions 
on the business of African American real estate brokers (Laura Hammel, "Broker 
to Challenge Blockbusting Limits," News-American, April 18, 1979; "Crockett-
Why He Fights the Law vs. For Sale Signs," News-American April 29, 1979). 
19. A study based on interviews in the Woodmoor section of the Liberty Road 
corridor found respondents who contended that blockbusting occurred there as 
recently as the late 1960s and early 1970s and who feel strongly that steering contin-
ues to occur (April Lunn, "Black Suburbanization in Woodmoor," unpublished 
American Studies senior seminar paper, UMBC, 1988). In 1969 Douglas Connah, 
Jr., writing in the Sun, reported instances of intensive real estate activity that had 
the effect of blockbusting, ifnot all theusual components (less evidence of specula-
tion and property devaluation, for instance) along Liberty Road ("Blockbusting in 
Baltimore: Less Blatant and Rapacious, But Still the Subtle Cause of A Continued 
White Exodus," Sun,January 26, 1969). In 1978 Sun reporters Mark Reutter and 
Antero Pietila quoted charges by the president of the Liberty Road Community 
Council that steering continued to be a problem there and noted that in 1972 the 
U.S. Justice Department reached an agreement with two of the largest Baltimore 
area real estate firms in which they did not admit past wrongdoing but agreed to 
refrain from steering in the future and to submit data regarding their sales activity 
to verify their practices. The authors observed that between 1972 and 1978 no spe-
cific charges of steering in the metro area were brought by the department. How-
ever, they cited allegations of practices that might have the effect ofsteering, such as 
selective advertising, preclusion of FHA and VA loans, and vest pocketing-
holding multiple listings until a suitable buyer already had been found as a way of 
controlling clientele. ("Corridor in Transition: Charges of Illegal Steering Persist," 
Sun, February 6, 1978) When the U.S. Civil Rights Commission held hearings on 
suburban development in the Baltimore area in 1970, an African American real 
estate broker voiced similar charges regarding subtle forms of discrimination that 
excluded African American brokers and their clients. Hearings BifOre the United States 
Commission on Civil Rights (1970), pp. 132-33. 
20. Interview with Samuel Brown, June 13, 1981. 
21. Garland Thompson, "King's Housing Goals Still Unachieved," Sun, 
January 21, 1988. Thompson was reacting to several recently released studies by 
Anne B. Schlay, including "Maintaining the Divided City: Residential Lending 
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Patterns in the Baltimore SMSA" and "The Underwriting of COinmunity: Eval-
. uating Federally Regulated Depository Financial Institutions' Residential Lend-
ing Performance within the Baltimore Area from 1981-1984" (Baltimore: Institute 
for Policy Studies,Johns Hopkins University, March 1987). Also, see Schlay, "Fi-
nancing Community." 
22. James Dilts, "Franklin-Mulberry Highway's Cost Is Double 1972 Esti-
mate," Sun, October 1, 1975. 
23. Interview with Mary Slade, March 14, 1983. 
24. "Morris Goldseker" [ obituary], Sun, June 18, 1973; "Goldseker Founda-
tion," Sun, July 13, 1973; Jesse Glasgow, "Goldseker Firm, Manager for Fund, to 
Close Its Doors," Sun, February 1, 1985; Morris Goldseker Foundation of Maryland, 
Incorporated, 1989 Annual Report (Baltimore, 1990). 
25. At the time of his uncle's death, Sheldon Goldseker took issue with the 
obituary in the Sun Oune 18, 1973), most of which was devoted to the controversy 
over the company's role in the housing controversy of the late 196Os; in a letter to 
the editor he defended his uncle's record, contending that the charges brought 
against his company were unjust, unfounded, and unproven in court (letter to the 
editor, Sun,June 22, 1973). A month later, when the Foundatiolll was announced, 
Sheldon Goldseker insisted, "Mr. Goldseker was a pioneer in the selling of houses 
to low-income people" (Sun, July 13, 1973). For a very favorable weighing of the 
Goldseker legacy, see Eric Siegel, "The Riddle of Morris Goldseker's Legacy," 
Sun, February 5, 1978. 
26. These statements, by Clarence Mitchell and Sampson Green respec-
tively, were quoted in Siegel, "The Riddle of Morris Goldseker's Legacy." 
27. David Simon, "Property Czar to Leave It All to 'Poor,' Not Kin," Sun, May 
30, 1983; "Financier Weinberg Dies, Leaves $1 Billion to Poor," Sun, November 5, 
1990; Michael Olesker, "Weinberg's Life Gave Few Clues to Final Kind Act," Sun, 
November 6, 1990; "Weinberg's Properties Put Under Group's Control," Sun, No-
vember 6, 1990; Edward Gunts, "Weinberg's Legacy," Sun, November 26, 1990; 
Frank Kuznik, "We Need More Angels," Baltimore Magazine, (December, 1990), pp. 
40-45, 110-111, 116. The Weinberg Foundation legacy continues to be something of 
a riddle. In a report on a major grant to the Levindale Hebrew Geriatric Center and 
Hospital, the Sun noted that "the Weinberg foundation has been a low-profile orga-
nization that does not accept grant applications, has no published telephone 
number and only one full-time stafTmember." Sun, Jan. 13, 1992. Gradually, how-
ever, the profile of Weinberg Foundation-sponsored projects has risen, as has the 
volume of grants. Recipients in 1991 included Levindale, Meals-on-Wheels of Cen-
tral Maryland, the American Red Cross of Maryland, Sheppard and Enoch Pratt 
Hospital, Israel Guide Dog Center for the Blind, and the Association for Retarded 
Citizens of Hawaii. Michael Ollove, "Don't Ask Them-and You Just May Re-
ceive," Sun, March 29, 1992. 
28. News-American, March 31, 1984. 
29. One of the best studies applying the classic concept offiltering in a met-
ropolitan area where racial change has been a substantial factor is Little, Nourse, 
Read, and Leven, Contemporary Neighborhood Succession Process. 
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30. Gale, Grier, and Grier found in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area 
that African American out-movers were more likely than whites to conform to the 
family type traditionally associated with the suburbs, though they had slightly 
lower socioeconomic status than white out-movers (Black and White Urban-to-
Suburban Outmigrants, pp. 16, 20-31). There has been considerable discussion in 
recent years about the separation of a suburbanizing African American middle 
class from other segments of the African American community. This concern was 
articulated by Lemann, for instance, in "Origins of the Underclass," and ampli-
fied in his provocative interpretation of the impact of twentieth-century African 
American population changes, Promised Land. Wilson has argued that economic 
factors have become more important than racial discrimination in determining 
the class status of African Americans and has pointed to evidence of a growing 
split between the gains of those who might be considered members of the African 
American middle class and African Americans considered of lower socioeconomic 
status (Declining Significance <if Race). Landry, in The New Black Middle Class, ques-
tions as overly optimistic Wilson's view of African American middle-class gains 
but agrees that entrenched economic and social structures continue to be serious 
stumbling blocks for the upward social mobility of an African American "under-
class" (pp. 194-96; 224-33). A recent study of African Americans in Maryland 
confirms this view (James Bock, "Gulf Widens Between Black Middle Class, 
Those 1'-t Bottom,' College Park Study Says," Sun, April 28, 1990). 
31. U.S. Census, 1980, 1990. During the 1980s the community's population 
continued to drop, declining by 11 percent to register at 15,821 in 1990. 
32. Michael Ollove, "Crime vs. Community: Ever-Increasing Violence 
Threatens Neighborhood Bonds," Sun, january 3, 1993. 
33. Ann LoLordo, "Communities Come Around," Sun, july 12, 1988; Brian 
Sullam, "Schmoke, Hailing Impact, Adds 18 'Drug Free' Zones," Sun, November 
7, 1989. 
34. Eileen Canzion, "'70s Exodus from Baltimore Left It a Larger Share of 
Poor." 
35. These were the findings of Kelly O'Shea (with the assistance of Monica 
Murray) in interviews with a small sample of Edmondson Village young people, 
"Expectations of High School Students" (unpublished American Studies senior 
seminar paper, UMBC, 1990). She found the Edmondson Village teenagers to 
have more upwardly mobile career and residential aspirations than a working-
class white sample from a nearby city neighborhood; moreover, they closely re-
sembled a white middle-class suburban sample in career aspirations and in their 
reasons for rejection of the city. 
36. Interviews with Claudette Newsome, February 18, 1983, and Amanda 
Franklin, May 8, 1983. 
37. Interview with Alan Hillman,june 16, 1981. A 1989 survey conducted in 
twenty-five metropolitan areas nationwide using pairs to test for discrimination in 
the sale and rental of housing found instances of discrimination against African 
Americans in more than half of the cases and only slight variation by region. 
"Survey Finds Housing Bias Continues in U.S.," Sun, August 8, 1991 (the study 
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was published in 1991 and conducted by the Urban Institute of Syracuse Univer-
sity for HUD). 
38. This critique is stated forcefully by Lake and Winslow, "Integration 
Management," and by two essays in Goering, Housing Desegregation and Federal 
Policy: Wilhemina A. Leigh and James D. McGhee, ''A Minority Perspective on 
Residential Racial Integration," and Robert W. Lake, "Postscript: Unresolved 
Themes in the Evolution of Fair Housing." The Goering volume illustrates the 
divergence of views on this issue among fair housing advocates; see, for example, 
the essays by Gary Orfield, "The Movement for Housing Integration: Rationale 
and the Nature of the Challenge," and Alexander Polikoff; "Sustainable Integra-
tion or Inevitable Resegregation: The Troubling Question." Exploring this dilem-
ma in Baltimore in 1991, Sun reporter James Bock quoted George N. Buntin, Jr., 
executive director of the Baltimore Branch of the NAACP: "I'm not sure integra-
tion is what we're looking for. What we're looking for is equal opportunity and 
open housing." "Blacks Less Eager for Housing Integration: Equal Opportunity 
is More Important," Sun, July 7, 1991. 
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